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1. Introduction 
 
1.1 Introduction: the case of Maronier v. Larmer  
 
Mr. Larmer was a dentist practicing in Rotterdam, the Netherlands. In 1984, one of his clients, 
Mr. Maronier, claimed damages of EUR 26,800 from Mr. Larmer, in respect of the treatment 
he had received from him. After an exchange of pleadings and statements, in 1986 the 
proceedings were stayed for a period of twelve years. After this period Mr. Maronier instructed 
his lawyers to pursue the case. In the meantime, however, Mr. Larmer had moved to England, 
leaving his address with the Rotterdam City Hall and the Dutch Association of Dentists. His 
lawyer, who had not been informed of the new address, stated that he had not been in contact 
with Mr. Larmer for a number of years and that according to his information Mr. Larmer was 
living in England. Whether the lawyer explicitly withdrew from the case is unclear. 
Despite recognizing that Mr. Larmer was not represented in law, and recording Mr. Larmer as 
living in Rotterdam, the Rotterdam District Court nevertheless delivered judgment on 31 
December 1999 and awarded Mr. Maronier damages to the sum of EUR 33,000.1 Not having 
been served with any of the documents, Mr. Larmer only found out about the reactivation of 
the procedure when enforcement measures were taken against him in England. At that point, 
there was no way for him to appeal the judgment. Given that he had submitted a statement 
before the proceedings were stayed, the judgment was not a default judgment, and he was 
therefore not able to invoke the remedy of opposition (or verzet under Dutch law). The only 
option open to him was therefore to oppose enforcement of the judgment in England.2 
The case of Maronier v. Larmer shows the conflict inherent in cross-border enforcement of 
civil judgments. In an integrated European Union (EU), as people and businesses move across 
borders, many legal relationships involve cross-border elements. Economic activity within the 
internal market is only possible when businesses and consumers are able to rely on the effective 
functioning of the civil justice system to resolve any disputes resulting from that activity.3 
Cooperation between Member States in the field of civil justice, and in particular rules 
facilitating the cross-border recognition and enforcement of judgments, are essential in this 
regard. 
At the same time, the case of Maronier v. Larmer illustrates the difficulty of effectively 
safeguarding the defendant’s right to be heard in a cross-border case. Such difficulty can be 
caused by differences in the procedural law of Member States, a lack of information such as to 
the defendant’s whereabouts, or simple mistakes in the application of the law. The question is 
whether, and how, EU legislation on cross-border recognition and enforcement of civil 
judgments should effectively safeguard the parties’ rights to a fair trial. This question involves 
a balancing between, on one hand, a judgment creditor’s right to enforcement of a civil 
                                                 
 
1 Not published; Kramer (2003) p. 16.  
2 Court of Appeal, Maronier v. Larmer, [2002] EWCA Civ 774. See Beaumont and Johnston (2010b) p. 255. 
3 Jenard (1979) p. 3. 
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judgment, and on the other hand, protection of the judgment debtor’s right to a fair trial, 
including his right to be heard. 
1.2 Background: free movement of judgments in the European 
Union  
Since the inception of the EU, the European legislature has strived to achieve effective 
mechanisms for recognition and enforcement of civil judgments between Member States. The 
1957 Treaty establishing a European Economic Community (EEC) already required Member 
States to enter into negotiations in order to simplify the formalities attached to the recognition 
and enforcement of civil judgments.4 Prior to, and apart from, the European integration process, 
states already made provisions in national law for the recognition and enforcement of 
judgments from other states, and concluded treaties. The European integration process gave 
great impetus to the development of rules on this matter. For a long time, EU legislation 
balanced judgment creditors’ with judgment debtors’ rights by combining a harmonized 
procedure for requesting a declaration of enforceability in the Member State of enforcement 
(exequatur) with limited grounds for refusal of recognition and enforcement.5 These grounds 
for refusal included the public policy exception,6 which enabled a court in the Member State 
of enforcement to refuse recognition or enforcement if that would be contrary to, inter alia, 
that Member State’s public policy, and a ground for protecting the defaulting defendant.7 
With the inclusion in the 1997 Treaty of Amsterdam of a legal basis for EU legislative action 
in the field of judicial cooperation in civil cases,8 EU law on recognition and enforcement, and 
civil justice cooperation as a whole, underwent what may be termed a paradigm shift. Whereas 
historically states saw the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments as an exercise of 
state sovereignty and an act of comity towards the other state,9 in the EU it has become 
increasingly automatic and governed by harmonized European rules. 
What spurred on this development is the goal, expressed at the 1999 the European Council of 
Tampere, of creating a ‘European Area of Freedom, Security and Justice’.10 The conclusions 
from this meeting, the ‘Tampere Conclusions’, proposed a number of far-reaching measures to 
                                                 
 
4 Article 220, Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, Rome 1957, OJ 25 March 1957. 
5 Convention on jurisdiction and the enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters, done at Lugano 
on 16 September 1988; Convention of 27 September 1968 on Jurisdiction and the Recognition and Enforcement 
of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, Brussels.  
6 Article 34(1) Brussels I Regulation. 
7 Article 34(2) Brussels I Regulation. 
8 Article 65, Treaty Establishing the European Community (Amsterdam consolidated version) OJ C340/173, 1997. 
Under the current Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) judicial cooperation in civil matters 
is based on Title V (articles 67-89) of Part III. With the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty in 2009 the European 
Union has replaced and succeeded the European Community. 
9 Not all authors agree that this paradigm is no longer valid in the EU framework: Lopez de Tejada argues that 
abolition of exequatur is unwise mainly because it would remove Member States’ control powers to check whether 
judgments conform to domestic standards. Lopez de Tejada (2013) p. 115-117. 
10 Tampere European Council, 15-16 October 1999, Presidency Conclusions.  
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achieve this goal, many of which affected civil justice, but also criminal justice and asylum and 
migration law. 
The most influential idea arising from the Tampere Conclusions was the introduction of the 
principle of mutual recognition as a cornerstone for cooperation in these areas of law. Mutual 
recognition is a legislative concept, originally developed in the context of free movement of 
goods,11 which requires Member States to recognize or otherwise give effect to judicial 
decisions, official documents, and other ‘products’ from fellow Member States. The underlying 
notion is that of mutual trust of Member States in each other’s legal systems. Though there is 
no uniformly accepted definition of mutual trust, it seems to require Member States to presume 
that, because those decisions and other documents emanate from a fellow EU Member State, 
they comply with norms and principles (such as fundamental rights) that are common to all 
Member States. Those common standards, which are laid down in primary or secondary EU 
legislation, thus obviate the need for grounds for refusal of recognition such as public policy. 
Mutual recognition thus presupposes mutual trust, though whether this trust indeed exists or 
whether the European legislature merely assumes it exists is a matter of debate. In any case, 
where mutual recognition has been implemented, the absence of mutual trust in a concrete case 
is no legitimate reason for Member States to refuse recognition. Mutual trust should therefore 
be seen as an objectified form of trust. It has proved controversial: the fact that all EU Member 
States are signatories to the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) does not justify 
the conclusion that fundamental rights are therefore at all times respected.12 It has consequently 
been argued that mutual trust should only give rise to a rebuttable presumption that this is 
always the case.13 
The European Council of Tampere’s adoption of mutual recognition as the cornerstone of 
justice cooperation proved fruitful. The 2004 The Hague Programme,14 the 2010 Stockholm 
Programme,15 and the Civil Justice Agenda for 2020,16 all proposed measures for the 
implementation of this concept. 
For the field of civil justice, the introduction of mutual recognition launched a legislative effort 
with the aim of simplifying or altogether abolishing the existing procedures for cross-border 
                                                 
 
11 CJEU Case 120/78 Rewe-Zentral AG v Bundesmonopolverwaltung für Branntwein, ECLI:EU:C:1979:42, para. 
14; also known as Cassis de Dijon. 
12 Statistical data show that, in the period 1959-2011, the ECtHR delivered a total of 3672 judgments in which a 
violation of Article 6 was found (still excluding complaints about the length of proceedings) making it the most 
violated provision of the ECHR. See Table of Violations 1959-2011 at 
http://www.echr.coe.int/ECHR/EN/Header/Reports+and+Statistics/Statistics/Statistical+data/. 
13 Kramer (2011b) p. 217. 
14 European Council, The Hague Programme: Strengthening Freedom, Security and Justice in the European 
Union, 2005, OJ C 53/01. 
15 European Council, The Stockholm Programme - an open and secure Europe serving and protecting citizens, OJ 
C/115/10, 2010. 
16 European Commission, The EU Justice Agenda for 2020. Strengthening Trust, Mobility and Growth within the 
Union, COM(2014) 144 final, 2014.  
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recognition and enforcement.17 This move towards simplification has resulted in the removal 
of formal requirements for enforcement in another Member State (exequatur) of judgments 
falling within the scope of the Brussels I bis Regulation, which is to say most civil and 
commercial judgments.18 For some categories of judgments, it has also, more controversially,19 
resulted in the abolition of the grounds of refusal of enforcement and recognition that were 
previously available. In this category, the European Enforcement Order Regulation allows the 
court that handed down the judgment to provide a certificate, which renders the judgment 
automatically enforceable throughout the Union, without any possibility of opposing its 
enforcement.20 The European Small Claims Regulation21 and the European Order for Payment 
Procedure22 are uniform European procedures that yield decisions that are likewise 
automatically enforceable throughout the Union. The Maintenance Regulation has abolished 
prerequisites for enforcement altogether.23 Finally, the Brussels II bis Regulation on family 
matters has abolished any possibility for Member States to refuse enforcement of judgments 
from other Member States ordering the return of a child that was wrongly removed across 
borders from his or her state of habitual residence.24 This same regime applies to judgments 
concerning access rights.25 
The simplification or abolition of procedural steps necessary to enforce or recognize a 
judgment across borders has a profound impact on the protection of fundamental rights. On 
one hand, simplification of the procedure for cross-border enforcement improves parties’ 
confidence in the rule of law and allows the judgment creditor to exercise his right to 
enforcement, which both Article 6 of the ECHR and Article 47 of the EU Charter of 
Fundamental Rights (EU CFR) guarantee. On the other hand, safeguards, such as grounds for 
refusal of enforcement, are necessary to protect the debtor’s right to a fair trial under those 
same provisions. The European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) supervises, within the limits 
of its jurisdiction,26 the conformity of the application of EU legislation with the ECHR. 
                                                 
 
17 Kramer (2011b) p. 209.  
18 Regulation (EU) of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2012 No 1215/2012 on 
jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters, OJ L 351/1. This 
Regulation is a recast of Regulation 44/2001 (the Brussels I Regulation). 
19 See among others Cuniberti and Rueda (2011); Van der Grinten (2006); Beaumont and Johnston (2010b); 
Oberhammer (2010); Frąckowiak-Adamska (2015); Lopez de Tejada (2013); Schack (2011); Timmer (2013).  
20 European Enforcement Order Regulation, Article 5. 
21 Regulation (EC) No 861/2007 of the European Parliament and the Council of 11 July 2007 establishing a 
European Small Claims Procedure, OJ L 199/1. 
22 Regulation (EC) No 1896/2006 of the European Parliament and the Council of 12 December 2006 creating a 
European Order for Payment Procedure, OJ L 399/1. 
23 Council Regulation (EC) 4/2009 of 18 December 2009 on jurisdiction, applicable law, recognition and 
enforcement of decisions and cooperation in matters relating to maintenance obligations, OJ L7/1. 
24 Council Regulation (EC) 2201/2003 of 27 November 2003 concerning jurisdiction and recognition and 
enforcement of judgments in matrimonial matters and matters of parental responsibility, OJ L 338/1, Article 42.  
25 Ibid., Article 41. 
26 Since the European Union is as of yet not a member of the Council of Europe and not a signatory to the ECHR, 
the ECtHR considers it has no jurisdiction to review actions of the EU as an organisation. The ECtHR however 
does entertain applications against the EU’s Member States, such as in ECtHR Andreasen v. the United Kingdom 
and 26 other Member States of the European Union (dec)., appl. no. 28827/11, 31 March 2015; see 5.4.6. It also 
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This research considers what consequences abolition of such safeguards has for the protection 
of both parties’ rights to a fair trial, and how an EU regime for cross-border enforcement and 
recognition of civil judgments should be organized in order to effectively protect those rights.  
1.3 Relevance and theoretical framework 
 
The questions submitted above merit examination for three reasons: timeliness, the 
controversial nature of the topic, and its relevance for EU law as a whole. 
Firstly, as the previous section described, a great variety of mechanisms for recognition and 
enforcement currently exists in European Regulations, some of which, such as the European 
Enforcement Order (EEO), are entirely unprecedented. Given that it has now been around ten 
years since the entry into force of these instruments, it is possible and necessary to evaluate 
whether they have achieved their stated aims of simplifying cross-border enforcement while 
respecting the rights of defendants. 
Secondly, the reforms in this field have proved controversial. The idea of abolishing exequatur 
and the accompanying refusal grounds, while being presented as progress, was severely 
criticized by some.27 With the knowledge that is currently available on the functioning of the 
various mechanisms, it is possible to evaluate whether that criticism has proven to be justified.  
Thirdly, the topic of free movement of judgments represents certain larger developments in EU 
law. The EU increasingly presents itself as a fundamental rights organization,28 the most 
important exponent being the adoption of the EU CFR. In light of this development, careful 
analysis of EU legislation on its conformity with fundamental rights such as the right to a fair 
trial becomes all the more relevant.29 The EU’s responsibilities under the ECHR and the (lack 
of) jurisdiction of the ECtHR to review the application of EU legislation is also highly relevant 
in this regard.30 The operation of civil justice regulations provides a unique perspective on this 
highly topical matter: the ECtHR’s approach to cases involving mutual recognition of civil 
judgments highlights the difficulties with this concept and with the relationship between the 
ECHR and EU law more generally. 
The topic of mutual recognition of judgments also raises profound questions about the nature 
of European integration and the role of fundamental rights in that respect. Though mutual 
                                                 
 
reviews actions of EU Member States where they act in the implementation of their obligations under EU law, 
though this review is limited where States have no discretion; see ECtHR Bosphorus Hava Yollari Turizm ve 
Ticaret Anonim Sirketi v. Ireland, Application no. 45036/98, 30 June 2005, ECHR 2005-VI, discussed in detail 
in Chapter 5.  
27 Supra note 19. 
28 Article 2 of the Treaty on European Union proclaims that ‘the Union is founded on the values of respect to 
human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights’. Article 6(1) provides 
that the Charter shall have the same legal value of the Treaties, whereas Article 6(3) provides that ‘fundamental 
rights […] shall constitute general principles of the Union’s law’.  
29 See Sanna (2011).  
30 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, 2000, OJ C 364/01. 
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recognition can work in various ways, it often involves the reduction or abolition of 
discretionary powers of the Member State where enforcement of a judicial decision is 
requested. This has raised the question what Member States should do when they believe the 
enforcement of a decision is contrary to (national or European) standards of fundamental rights. 
This question proved especially difficult in the field of European asylum law, where it led to 
the much discussed M.S.S. judgment of the ECtHR,31 and the subsequent N.S. and M.E. and 
Others judgment from the CJEU,32 in which the latter ruled that mutual recognition should, 
under very strict circumstances, give way to fundamental rights concerns. How legally and 
politically sensitive the relationship between mutual recognition and fundamental rights has 
become is also demonstrated by the fact that the CJEU saw accession of the EU to the ECHR 
as a potential threat to the functioning of mutual recognition, and partly for this reason advised 
against the 2014 Draft Accession Agreement.33 The question of whether fundamental rights 
may override mutual recognition has also arisen in relation to the European Arrest Warrant.34 
Whereas the problems associated with mutual recognition are different in criminal law and in 
asylum law than in civil law, due to the difference in subject matter, they stem from the same 
development. Since this thesis aims to develop a principled view on the relationship between 
fundamental rights and mutual recognition, it needs to take into account the problems 
associated with that relationship in fields other than civil law, and consider whether similar 
solutions may be useful for these fields. The proposed solutions are therefore of interest not 
just for actors in the field of civil justice, but for those in other areas of law as well. 
1.4 Research questions and aims 
 
As stated above, this research takes as a starting point that there is a tension between the EU 
concept of mutual trust on one hand, and ECHR-guaranteed fundamental rights on the other. 
The parameters identified above together give rise to the following research questions: 
Which are the requirements imposed by the right to a fair trial (as laid down in Article 
6(1) ECHR and Article 47 EU CFR) on the free movement of civil judgments in cross-
border cases within the EU, and how can the right to a fair trial be effectively safeguarded 
in this context? 
These research questions can be divided into the following sub questions: 
1. How does the (previously) existing mechanism for recognition and enforcement 
protect, and what consequences does its abolition or simplification have for the 
protection of, the right to a fair trial in cross-border cases? 
2. Which requirements can be derived from Article 6(1) ECHR and Article 47 EU CFR 
that are relevant to the civil trial, including the enforcement stage? 
                                                 
 
31 European Court of Human Rights, Case of M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece, Application No. 30696/09, 21 January 
2011. 
32 CJEU Joined Cases C‑411/10 and C‑493/10, N.S. and M.E. and others. 
33 Opinion 2/13 of the Court (Full Court) of 18 December 2014, ECLI:EU:C:2014:2454. 
34 CJEU Case C‑399/11 Stefano Melloni v. Ministerio Fiscal, ECLI:EU:C:2013:107; CJEU Case C‑396/11 
Ciprian Vasile Radu, ECLI:EU:C:2013:39. 
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3. To what extent does the ECHR require a mechanism that allows the Member State 
where enforcement is sought to refuse such recognition or enforcement in case of a 
violation of the right to a fair trial, and what preconditions does it impose on its 
abolition? 
4. To what extent does the EU legal order require a mechanism that allows the Member 
State where enforcement is sought to refuse such recognition or enforcement in case of 
a violation of the right to a fair trial, and what preconditions does it impose on its 
abolition? 
5. If a mechanism for the refusal of recognition and enforcement is found to be necessary, 
what criterion should national judges apply? 
6. Which procedural safeguards should EU legislation concerning the recognition and 
enforcement contain in order to guarantee the effective protection of right to a fair trial 
in cross-border cases? 
 
The aim of this thesis can be described as defining the parameters arising out of the case law 
and doctrine on the cross-border effect of the right to a fair trial that need to be considered if a 
political decision is taken on how to further facilitate free movement of civil judgments within 
the EU. 
This thesis focuses on the right to a fair trial as laid down in Article 6 ECHR and Article 47 
EU CFR. It does not focus on other fundamental rights. The reason for this is that procedural 
fairness is the most important aspect of public policy, as it is most often invoked. Procedural 
fairness has also been the subject of CJEU and ECtHR case law, unlike substantive public 
policy. This focus does not preclude acknowledging that other fundamental rights could also 
be of importance in this context; it is simply not possible to include all potentially relevant 
fundamental rights in this research project, though they are considered in the context of child 
abduction cases. This thesis may therefore serve as a starting point for further discussion on 
whether standards could also be derived from other fundamental rights, which are also relevant 
to the abolition of exequatur. 
This research has as its explicit aim to discuss the cross-border recognition and enforcement of 
civil judgments from the perspective of fundamental rights. It does not explore whether free 
movement of civil judgments is feasible or desirable politically or economically. Another 
limitation is that this research does not consider whether it is legitimately possible to weigh the 
protection of fundamental rights against considerations of efficiency, such as the potential costs 
and benefits of the abolition of certain safeguards, or against other considerations of societal 
interest. This research has as its starting point that the right to a fair trial should be protected 
effectively in all proceedings falling within its scope. Since both the EU and its Member States 
have committed themselves to protecting fundamental rights, limitations on that protection are 
only allowed in so far as the fundamental rights framework allows for those limitations. 
Whereas, for example, the right to privacy in Article 8(1) ECHR can be legitimately limited 
provided certain conditions are fulfilled, the right to a fair trial does not contain an explicit 
limitation clause.35 It is therefore not possible to legitimately discuss in what cases interference 
with the right to a fair trial should be allowed. Whether such an outcome is acceptable as 
                                                 
 
35 See for a general overview of the topic Koch (2008).  
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‘collateral damage’ of the abolition of safeguards that may be seen as obstacles to enforcement 
is a political question; but this research would maintain that even politically, such a trade-off 
could not legitimately be considered, given that within the EU’s political framework, 
fundamental rights are considered to be among its founding principles. 
 
1.5 Sources, method, and structure 
 
It follows from the aims cited above that this research project is analytic and evaluative in 
character. It seeks to identify, on the basis of existing case law and other sources, the parameters 
that define to what extent the right to a fair trial needs to be guaranteed in a context of interstate 
cooperation. It evaluates these parameters in order to draw the conclusions needed to answer 
this question.  
1.5.1 Sources 
 
This thesis can be classified as a classic doctrinal legal research project. Its primary sources are 
the legislation that the introduction referred to: the instruments of EU private international law 
and civil procedure, primarily the Brussels I Regulation (recast); the Treaty on European Union 
(TEU) and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU); the EU CFR; and 
the ECHR. 
For the interpretation of EU legislation, this thesis looks at legislative history. This history is 
found in preparatory documents such as policy documents, reports and early drafts, as well as 
case law from the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU). For the EU CFR, an 
important means of interpretation, though not binding, are the Explanations relating to the 
Charter.36  
As for case law, the database of the European Fundamental Rights Agency (FRA) was of great 
help for CJEU cases.37 Otherwise, case law was found in the EU’s Eur-lex database by using 
Regulation numbers (e.g., ‘805/2004’) or certain keywords (‘fundamental rights’, ‘rights of the 
defence’, et cetera).38 Dutch case law was found through the Dutch case law repository,39 by 
searching for the relevant Regulations (e.g., ‘805/2004’). The Dutch journal Nederlands 
Internationaal Privaatrecht, published by the Asser Institute, was also a good source of case 
law and accompanying notes.40 For other EU Member States, case law was found either 
                                                 
 
36 Explanations relating to the Charter of Fundamental Rights, OJ C 303/17, 2007. 
37 http://fra.europa.eu/en/case-law-database.  
38 http://eur-lex.europa.eu; also accessed through http://curia.europa.eu.  
39 http://www.rechtspraak.nl. 
40 Nederlands Internationaal Privaatrecht (NIPR) http://www.nipr-online.eu/.  
25 
 
through the literature and reports cited above, or through journals such as IPRax (for German 
case law).41 
For the ECHR, legislative history plays a less significant role, since it was recognized at the 
outset that the Convention should be a ‘living instrument’. Therefore, the primary source of 
interpretation is the case law from the ECtHR itself. Since the body of case law on Article 6 is 
enormous, the selection of case law was mainly (but of course not exclusively) guided by the 
following sources: the PhD thesis Artikel 6 EVRM en het civiele proces (Article 6 ECHR and 
the civil trial) by P. Smits;42 handbooks by Janis et al.;43 Harris et al.;44 Van Dijk and Van 
Hoof;45 Rainey et al.;46 and Leanza and Pridal.47 The implementation handbooks48 and case 
law guide49 published by the Council of Europe were also valuable sources. Finally, to collect 
a representative sample of the ECtHR’s most important recent judgments on Article 6, a 
collection was made of all judgments on Article 6 in civil cases published in the 2005 to 2015 
editions of the case law journal European Human Rights Cases. The literature used as an aide 
to interpretation is cited in the footnotes and in the bibliography. 
As for citation, this thesis refers to European Case Law Identifier (ECLI) numbers for Dutch 
case law and CJEU case law.50 For the ECtHR, the citation refers to the application number, 
names of the parties, and the year of publication in the ECtHR’s Reports of Judgments and 
Decisions, including a volume number where available.51 Where a judgment was published in 
a journal, this is also included. For case law from other EU Member States, the mode of citation 
that is usual in the Member State of origin of that judgment is applied.52 
Save for exceptional cases, case law and literature research was concluded on 1 February 2016. 
This means that the ECtHR Grand Chamber’s important judgment in Avotins v. Latvia53, which 
is very relevant to EU Member States’ obligations under the ECHR, could not be taken into 
                                                 
 
41 Praxis des Internationalen Privat- und Verfahrensrechts (IPRax) http://www.iprax.de/.  
42 Smits (2008). 
43 Janis et al. (2008). 
44 Harris et al. (2014). 
45 Van Dijk et al. (2006).  
46 Rainey et al. (2014) 
47 Leanza and Pridal (2014). 
48 Mole and Harby (2006); Vitkausas and Dikov (2012). 
49 Council of Europe/European Court of Human Rights, Guide to Article 6. Right to a fair trial (civil limb) Council 
of Europe 2013, available at http://www.echr.coe.int.  
50 E.g. Rechtbank Den Haag 23-12-2008, ECLI:NL:RBSGR:2008:BG9144; CJEU Case C‑399/11 Stefano 
Melloni v. Ministerio Fiscal, ECLI:EU:C:2013:107. See the notice on ‘Method of citing the case-law of the Court 
of Justice of the European Union on the basis of the ECLI (European Case-Law Identifier)’ on the CJEU’s website 
(http://curia.europa.eu).  
51 E.g. (European Court of Human Rights, Case of M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece, Application No. 30696/09, 21 
January 2011.). See the Court’s Note explaining the mode of citation and how to refer to the judgments and 
decisions of the Court (old and new) (October 2013). 
52 For the UK, citations refer to the law report the case was published in, e.g. Maronier v. Larmer, [2002] EWCA 
Civ 774. For France and other Member States, citations include the court that delivered the judgment, the date, 
and the case number, e.g. CA Colmar 25 March 2004, No 02/04955; OLG Celle, 30 September 2010, 18 UF 67/10 
(Germany). 
53 ECtHR Avotins v. Latvia [GC], appl. no. 17502/07, 23 May 2016. 
26 
 
consideration. The Chamber judgment in this case is discussed in Chapter 5. The reader should 
be aware that some of that Chapter’s observations are affected by the Grand Chamber ruling.  
 
1.5.2 Method 
 
It was stated that this thesis constitutes a classic doctrinal legal research project. This means 
that it studies law as a normative system.54 Its aim is to examine whether EU legislation that 
facilitates recognition and enforcement of civil judgments is consistent with the hierarchically 
superior norms of European fundamental rights law. The starting point is that fundamental 
rights, being one of the stated general principles of EU law and, through their membership in 
the Council of Europe (CoE), binding on all EU Member States, are the supreme guiding 
principles for EU legislative action. This does not only mean that EU legislation should prevent 
fundamental rights violations from occurring in its implementation. The EU’s stated adherence 
to fundamental rights, and its unique position as a legislature capable of making rules on cross-
border situations, has created a responsibility for the EU to make rules that protect fundamental 
rights effectively. The aim of this research is therefore not simply to identify whether the 
existing EU legislation (potentially) leads to fundamental rights violations, but also to propose 
amendments or adaptations that may help to protect fundamental rights more effectively. This 
research is therefore not just about identifying the ‘bare minimum’ standards that EU 
legislation should comply with.  
1.5.3 Structure  
 
In order to achieve this aim, this research is structured as follows. Part I (Chapters 2 and 3) 
outlines the history, legislative function and practical use of EU legislation on recognition and 
enforcement, up to and including the move towards reform. Next, it analyses the way in which 
the exequatur has functioned as a means of protection against fundamental rights violations in 
cross-border cases, and explains what consequences its abolition will likely have (or in some 
instances has already had) on fundamental rights protection. This analysis uses case law, which 
was collected in the manner described above under ‘Sources’. Empirical evidence on the 
functioning of the EU Regulations is also a valuable source here, particularly the 2007 
Heidelberg Report on the functioning of the Brussels I Regulation,55 the 2011 Report on the 
functioning of the public policy exception,56 and recent reports on the functioning of other 
regulations. This research uses the empirical data gathered in these reports throughout, in order 
to show what problems are encountered but also to show the scale of those problems. Though 
it is not an explicit aim of this project, it does take data on the functioning of the regulations 
into account, where possible, to see how any proposed adaptations will affect the efficiency of 
the regulations’ functioning as a whole. Primarily, however, this research focuses on the 
                                                 
 
54 Van Hoecke (2011). 
55 Hess, Pfeiffer and Schlosser (2007). 
56 Hess and Pfeiffer (2011). 
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positions of the individual litigants as protected by the right to a fair trial. The conclusions from 
this analysis are presented as a conclusion to Part I and used as guidelines for Part 2. 
Part 2 (Chapters 4, 5, and 6) constructs a normative framework on the basis of the ECHR and 
EU fundamental rights law. Chapter 4 discusses the requirements that can be derived from the 
right to a fair trial (Art. 6(1) ECHR, Art. 47 EU CFR). It discusses both ECtHR and CJEU case 
law to identify the existing standard; it is after all possible that the CJEU has developed, in its 
application of Article 47 EU CFR, more precise standards than those that can be derived from 
the ECtHR’s case law. The Chapter also contains a discussion of the aims and values that 
underlie the right to a fair trial; this analysis serves, partly, to determine the relative weight of 
elements of the right to a fair trial in case of a conflict. This discussion looks at the history of 
the right to a fair trial and its purpose and function within the larger corpus of fundamental 
rights in Europe. Its conclusions are supported by insights from legal philosophy. 
Apart from this identification of norms, it is also necessary to establish how the responsibility 
for protecting these norms is organized in the multi-level legal system of the EU. Chapters 5 
and 6 analyse legislation, but particularly focus on case law, to establish exactly how these 
responsibilities are divided between the EU as an organization and its Member States, 
according to (respectively) the CJEU and the ECtHR. The aim is to answer sub-questions 4, 5 
and 6. 
Part 3, Chapters 7 and 8, contains a synthesis of the findings of Part 2. Its purpose is to interpret 
the findings and to offer a perspective on how the findings apply to the larger area of EU law 
of civil procedure. As stated above, the aim is to propose amendments or adaptations that may 
help to protect fundamental rights effectively.  
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2. The evolution of free movement of civil judgments in the 
European Union 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
In an integrated legal order such as the European Union (EU), free movement of civil 
judgments is essential to enabling cross-border trade and to ensuring legal certainty. In order 
to achieve free movement, EU legislation long since facilitated the recognition and 
enforcement of civil judgments delivered in one Member State in another Member State. This 
legislation has evolved radically over the past decades. Since the Tampere European Council 
of 1999 made mutual recognition a principle of civil justice cooperation, the EU legislature 
made it a priority to simplify cross-border recognition and enforcement as much as possible 
and to remove potential obstacles. This Chapter outlines the evolution within the EU of the 
rules facilitating recognition and enforcement of civil judgments and shows the changes that 
have an impact on the protection of both parties’ right to a fair trial. 
This Chapter starts by placing the development of mechanisms for recognition and enforcement 
in the broader context of legislation in the field of judicial cooperation in civil matters (Section 
2.2). It shows that whereas legislation on civil justice cooperation was originally motivated by 
the internal market rationale, aimed at facilitating trade, the objective of creating a true 
European area of freedom, security, and justice, and the introduction of mutual recognition, 
meant that civil justice cooperation became more ideologically motivated. Justice has become 
increasingly accessible to all types of litigants, and the recognition and enforcement of civil 
judgments is now seen not simply as the fulfilment of a legal obligation but as an expression 
of trust among Member States. This ideology led to the gradual abolition of obstacles to 
complete free movement of civil judgments, as Chapter 1.1.3 explains. 
Section 2.3 goes on to discuss how recognition and enforcement are currently organized under 
EU legislation in the field of civil justice. It shows that the mechanism obtaining permission 
for enforcement is characterized by a strict separation into what is called judgment import, the 
simplified and nearly automatic procedure for obtaining a declaration of enforceability 
(exequatur), and what is called judgment inspection, the opportunity to challenge the 
recognition or enforcement on appeal on the basis of a limited number of grounds for refusal. 
After these general observations, the Chapter considers how this mechanism is laid down in a 
number of instruments: the Brussels I bis Regulation (the recast Brussels I Regulation), the 
Brussels II bis Regulation, the Insolvency Regulation and the Succession Regulation. It also 
discusses the two uniform European Procedures, the European Small Claims Procedure (ESCP) 
and the European Order for Payment Procedure (EOP), as well as the European Enforcement 
Order for uncontested claims (EEO). It discusses to what extent these instruments achieved 
complete free movement of judgments in their respective fields. The discussion of the existing 
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legislation provides a basis for Chapter 3, which examines the consequences of the abolition 
of obstacles to free movement of civil judgments for the protection of the right to a fair trial. 
 
2.2 Free movement of civil judgments in the EU: historical and 
political background 
 
2.2.1 Free movement of judgments and the internal market 
 
Free movement of civil judgments means that parties are able to invoke a judgment in a civil 
case in a state other than the state where it was delivered. This requires that recognition of the 
judgment is possible, and that enforcement of the judgment is facilitated. Recognition of a 
foreign judgment means that its legal effects may be relied on. An example of this may be 
where a judgment from one state establishes that the seizure of goods was unlawful, and is 
invoked to claim damages for the unlawful seizure in another state.1 Enforcement means that 
the judgment creditor may take measures, assisted by an enforcement authority such as a bailiff 
if necessary, to ensure that he indeed receives what the judgment awarded him: for example by 
attaching a bank account. In this research, free movement of judgments refers to the facilitation, 
to the greatest extent possible, of cross-border recognition and enforcement, by EU legislation. 
Complete free movement means that judgments are recognized and can be enforced across 
borders without the interested parties needing to surmount any procedural obstacles.  
Free movement of civil judgments across national borders is essential to fostering international 
trade and to facilitating the free movement of persons across borders. It is especially important 
in the EU, an internal market in which goods, people and capital move freely across its Member 
States. Early on, it was realized that international trade within the Union would be greatly aided 
if the rights arising out of legal relationships concluded across borders could be adequately 
recognized and enforced throughout the Union. If a judgment resulting from a trade conflict 
could not be recognized or enforced over a debtor’s assets in another Member State, this would 
greatly discourage parties from entering into cross-border trade relationships. Effective 
mechanisms for cross-border recognition and enforcement are therefore a prerequisite for 
international trade. The benefits of securing cross-border recognition and enforcement are not 
limited to the interests of the parties involved. As summed up by Michaels: 
Parties are interested in transnational legal certainty and in avoiding repeated litigation 
and conflicting decisions; the general public has an interest in avoiding resources spent 
on re-litigation and in international decisional harmonies; and States have a common 
interest in promoting inter-State transactions.2 
 
                                                 
 
1 CJEU Case C-681/13 Diageo Brands v Simiramida-04 EOOD ECLI:EU:C:2015:471. 
2 Michaels (2009) para. 1.  
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Facilitating cross-border recognition and enforcement of judgments resulting from civil and 
commercial cases has therefore long been on the European legislative agenda. The founding 
Treaty on the European Economic Community (EEC Treaty) already contained a provision 
requiring the Member States to enter into negotiations in order to “simplify formalities 
governing the reciprocal recognition and enforcement of judgments of courts or tribunals and 
of arbitration awards.”3 
In 1959 the Commission of the European Economic Community invited the then six Member 
States to enter into such negotiations. In its letter, it stated that:  
[A] true internal market between the six States will be achieved only if adequate legal 
protection can be secured. The economic life of the Community may be subject to 
disturbances and difficulties unless it is possible, where necessary by judicial means, to 
ensure the recognition and enforcement of the various rights arising from the existence 
of a multiplicity of legal relationships. As jurisdiction in both civil and commercial 
matters is derived from the sovereignty of Member States, and since the effect of 
judicial acts is confined to each national territory, legal protection and, hence, legal 
certainty in the common market are essentially dependent on the adoption by the 
Member States of a satisfactory solution to the problem of recognition and enforcement 
of judgments.4 
 
The Member States entered into such negotiations, which resulted in the first EU instrument 
regulating jurisdiction, recognition and enforcement: the Convention on Jurisdiction and the 
Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters,5 or the ‘Brussels Convention’, 
signed by the then six Member States of the European Economic Community (EEC) on 27 
September 1968.6 The Brussels Convention applied to most types of civil and commercial 
matters, excepting family matters, insolvency proceedings, social security, and arbitration. The 
introduction of rules on jurisdiction is understandable considering that jurisdiction of the court 
of origin is a common prerequisite for recognition and enforcement in many national legal 
systems.7 
One of the most important elements of the Convention was the introduction of a common 
procedure for obtaining a declaration of enforceability (exequatur), in the Member State where 
                                                 
 
3 Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, Rome 1957, OJ 25 March 1957, Article 220. 
4 Jenard (1979) p. 3. 
5 Convention of 27 September 1968 on Jurisdiction and the Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil 
and Commercial Matters, done at Brussels on 27 September 1968 (‘Brussels Convention’). 
6 The Lugano Convention extends the Brussels regime to three EFTA Member States: Switzerland, Norway and 
Iceland. Convention on jurisdiction and the enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters, done at 
Lugano on 16 September 1988.  
7 For example France (Rosner (2004) p. 233); Germany (section 328(1) Zivilprozessordnung) Switzerland (Article 
26 Federal Statute on Private International Law). 
34 
 
enforcement was sought, of the judgments falling within its scope. The introduction of this 
procedure was important because it greatly reduced the procedural steps interested parties 
would need to take in order to have their judgments enforced in other EU Member States. Prior 
to the introduction of this common procedure, recognition and enforcement of foreign 
judgments was either governed by national procedural law – and therefore different in each 
state – or governed by bi-or multilateral treaties.8 In some states enforcement of foreign 
judgments was very difficult, if not almost impossible, necessitating complicated procedural 
steps. What was revolutionary about the newly introduced regime for recognition and 
enforcement was that it guaranteed, to the furthest extent possible, the recognition and 
enforcement of judgments, and created a simple and uniform procedure for obtaining 
recognition. All judgments were recognized automatically,9 which meant that the effects of the 
judgment could be relied on in all EU Member States without any procedural steps being 
necessary. As for enforcement, the Convention provided for both ‘judgment import’ and 
‘judgment inspection’. In order to enforce a judgment from one Member State in another 
Member State a declaration of enforceability had to be obtained: the exequatur.10 The exequatur 
effectively imported the foreign judgment into the legal order of the Member State where 
enforcement was sought. 
The Brussels Convention balanced this simple procedure for cross-border enforcement, which 
greatly benefited judgment creditors, with protection for judgment debtors: it allowed Member 
States to refuse recognition or enforcement if one of a number of specific refusal grounds 
applied (judgment inspection). The introduction of common refusal grounds became a standard 
feature of EU legislation in the field, as they provided protection of the debtor’s (and other 
interested parties’) rights, while also being narrowly defined and thus providing clarity on the 
grounds on which recognition or enforcement could be refused. The Brussels Convention 
authorized Member States to refuse recognition or enforcement if such recognition or 
enforcement would be ‘contrary to public policy in the State in which recognition is sought’ 
(Art. 27(1)). The concept of public policy or ordre public, which is discussed in detail further 
on,11 encompasses principles that are deemed to be of fundamental importance in the legal 
order of the Member State where enforcement is sought. As the next Chapter shows, the public 
policy exception has proved instrumental in protecting the debtor’s right to a fair trial. 
The debtor’s procedural rights were also protected by the another ground for refusal, improper 
service in default proceedings. Recognition or enforcement could be refused where the 
judgment was given in default of appearance, if the defendant was not duly served with the 
document that instituted the proceedings, or with an equivalent document, in sufficient time to 
                                                 
 
8 Of course this is still the case for judgments falling outside the scope of European Union legislation. See for an 
historical overview Berglund (2009). 
9 Article 26, Brussels Convention.  
10 Article 31, Brussels Convention.  
11 Chapter 3.2. 
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enable him to arrange for his defence (Art. 27(2)). Recognition or enforcement could also be 
refused for judgments that were irreconcilable with a judgment given in a dispute between the 
same parties in the State in which recognition was sought, or a judgment given in a third state, 
provided it involved the same cause of action and the same parties and fulfilled the conditions 
necessary for its recognition in the state addressed (Arts. 27(3) and (5)).12 
The early Treaties on the European (Economic) Community did not give the European 
Community (EC) the capacity to pass legislation on free movement of judgments, which is why 
the first instrument within the context of the EU was a convention concluded by its Member 
States. This changed with the 1993 Treaty of Maastricht, which created the first legal basis for 
the European institutions to legislate in this field under Title VI of the Treaty on European 
Union. The 1997 Treaty of Amsterdam then moved this legal basis to Title IV of the EC 
Treaty.13 This enabled the EC to pass legislation on these matters if necessary to guarantee free 
movement, and firmly entrenched judicial cooperation in the framework of the internal market. 
It also meant that legislation on cooperation in the field of civil justice could now take the form 
of EC regulations. 
For the cross-border recognition and enforcement of judgments, this meant that the Brussels 
Convention was replaced by a regulation. On 1 March 2002, Regulation 44/2001 on 
Jurisdiction and the Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial 
Matters, or the ‘Brussels I Regulation’, entered into force.14 This regulation simplified the 
procedure for obtaining an exequatur: whereas under the Brussels Convention the court in the 
Member State where enforcement was requested could review the grounds for refusal at the 
judgment import stage, before it issued a declaration of enforceability, under the Brussels I 
Regulation this review was no longer possible.15 This meant that a declaration of enforceability 
would be issued after a check of only formal requirements. The party against whom 
enforcement was sought would then have to take the initiative to invoke the refusal grounds, 
in either an application for refusal of the declaration of enforceability, or incidentally in another 
                                                 
 
12 Article 27(4) is not discussed here because it was removed when the Convention became a Regulation and 
therefore was not a factor in the discussion on the abolition of refusal grounds. Article 27(4) allowed recognition 
or enforcement to be refused if the court of the State of origin, in order to arrive at its judgment, has decided a 
preliminary question concerning the status or legal capacity of natural persons, rights in property arising out of a 
matrimonial relationship, wills or succession in a way that conflicts with a rule of the private international law of 
the State in which the recognition is sought, unless the same result would have been reached by the application of 
the rules of private international law of that State.  
13 Under the current Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) judicial cooperation in civil matters 
is based on Title V (articles 67-89) of Part III (Consolidated version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union OJ C 83/47). With the adoption of the Lisbon Treaty in 2009 the European Union has replaced 
and succeeded the European Community.  
14 Council Regulation (EC) No 44/2001 of 22 December 2000 on Jurisdiction and the Recognition and 
Enforcement of Judgments, OJ L 12/1 (the ‘Brussels I Regulation’). 
15 Article 41, first sentence, Brussels I Regulation.  
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procedure.16 The Brussels I Regulation thus clearly distinguished between a judgment import 
and a judgment inspection stage. 
Furthermore, two of the grounds for refusal were limited: the Brussels I Regulation codified 
the limitation on public policy17 introduced by the Court of Justice of the European Union 
(CJEU) in its case law.18 Recognition or enforcement could now only be refused in case of a 
‘manifest’ incompatibility with public policy. The Brussels I Regulation also limited the 
application of the ground for refusal of undue service upon the defendant in case of a default 
judgment19 so that it no longer applied in cases where the defendant did not lodge an appeal 
even though he was able to do so. This increased legal certainty for the creditor.20 
The creation of a Europe without internal borders did not just facilitate cross-border trade, but 
also the movement of individuals (such as workers and students), families and property. This 
meant that the recognition of other legal claims across borders became increasingly important. 
The harmonized procedure for recognition and enforcement devised in the Brussels system was 
therefore transposed (with some specifics) to a number of instruments in specific areas of civil 
justice. Most of these are found in the area of family law. The mechanism for recognition and 
enforcement of the Brussels system thus became a standard feature of EU instruments on civil 
justice cooperation. However, the introduction of mutual recognition in 1999 brought about 
radical reforms of this mechanism. 
 
2.2.2 The introduction of mutual recognition  
 
The development of EU policies on judicial cooperation gathered momentum with the 
introduction of the ‘Area of Freedom, Security and Justice’. Created by the 1992 Maastricht 
Treaty, this policy area encompasses police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters as well 
as judicial cooperation in civil matters. It became more prominent after the Treaty of 
Amsterdam intensified cooperation in criminal matters within the Third Pillar (Justice and 
Home Affairs), increasing openness and accountability,21 while cooperation in civil matters 
was moved to the Community pillar entirely. The area of freedom, security and justice was the 
topic of the 1999 European Council in Tampere. In its Conclusions,22 the Presidency of the 
European Council introduced the principle of mutual recognition as the cornerstone for 
                                                 
 
16 Article 43 Brussels I Regulation. 
17 Article 34(1) Brussels I Regulation. 
18 See in more detail Chapter 3.2.5. 
19 Article 34 (2) of the Brussels I Regulation, Article 27(1) of the Brussels Convention. 
20 See Chapter 3.3.1.  
21 Craig and De Bùrca (2015) p. 966.  
22 Tampere European Council, 15-16 October 1999, Presidency Conclusions (the ‘Tampere Conclusions’). 
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cooperation in this area.23 The implementation of mutual recognition meant that intermediate 
steps necessary for the enforcement of judgments across borders would need to be reduced.24 
The introduction of this principle therefore led to a new policy goal: the abolition of the 
requirement for an exequatur and reform of the grounds for refusal, for all types of civil cases. 
The implementation of this plan started in 2004 with the adoption of the EEO.25 The EEO 
regulation authorizes the court of origin of a judgment resulting from an uncontested claim to 
certify the judgment as an EEO. This Order is then enforceable throughout the EU without an 
exequatur being required and without any possibility for refusing its recognition or 
enforcement. The regulation applies only to uncontested claims and is intended to reduce the 
delay and expenses associated with the need for an exequatur.26 
The EEO paved the way for two unprecedented uniform European procedures: the European 
Order for Payment Procedure (EOP),27 and the European Small Claims Procedure (ESCP).28 
These instruments do not require an exequatur, but result in decisions that are immediately 
enforceable throughout the EU. Instead of refusal grounds, they contain minimum standards 
that are intended to safeguard the procedural rights of the debtors. All three instruments are 
available only in civil or commercial matters that have cross-border implications. Their 
purpose, according to their recitals, is to increase speed and reduce costs in cross-border 
litigation. While the EEO and EOP seek to facilitate commercial litigation, the ESCP is 
primarily aimed at consumer cases. 
Having achieved complete free movement of judgments in these three instruments, the 
European legislature pursued this goal for the Brussels I Regulation. As opposed to the three 
instruments discussed above, which are optional and have a limited scope, the Brussels I 
Regulation applies to most civil judgments and is mandatory. The proposed abolition of 
exequatur and refusal grounds under this instrument therefore met with more resistance than 
the introduction of the three optional instruments. 
The proposal for reform of Brussels I was buttressed by the finding of the 2007 Heidelberg 
Report29 that the exequatur procedure of the Brussels I Regulation had functioned quite 
efficiently, given that in 90% of cases a declaration of enforceability was granted and that it 
                                                 
 
23 Tampere Conclusions, para. 33. See Storskrubb (2016). See in general on the topic of mutual recognition 
Janssens (2013); Thunberg Schunke (2013); Ouwerkerk (2011); Thomas (2013). 
24 See section 2.2.3 of this Chapter. 
25 Regulation (EC) No 805/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 April 2004 creating a 
European Enforcement Order for uncontested claims, OJ L 134/15 (the ‘EEO Regulation’). 
26 Recital 9, EEO Regulation. 
27 Regulation (EC) No 1896/2006 of the European Parliament and the Council of 12 December 2006 creating a 
European Order for Payment Procedure, OJ L 399/1 (the ‘EOP Regulation’). See section 2.3.7. 
28 Regulation (EC) No 861/2007 of the European Parliament and the Council of 11 July 2007 establishing a 
European Small Claims Procedure, OJ L 199/1 (the ‘ESCP Regulation’). See section 2.3.7. 
29 Hess, Pfeiffer and Schlosser (2007) p. 221. The findings of this report are discussed in more detail in section 
2.2.4.1. 
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was seldom challenged successfully. The European Commission, in its 2009 Green Paper on 
the Review of Brussels I,30 concluded on the basis of these numbers that abolition of exequatur 
for all civil and commercial matters would be feasible. In 2010 the Commission therefore 
submitted a proposal for a recast31 of the Brussels I Regulation in which the exequatur was 
abolished. The grounds for refusal would be narrowed, and their application redistributed 
among the Member State of origin and the Member State of enforcement. The public policy 
exception was to be replaced with a more narrow reference to ‘fundamental principles 
underlying the right to a fair trial’. The 2010 Proposal also entailed a redistribution of the 
authority to apply refusal grounds between the Member State of origin and the Member State 
of enforcement: the ground for refusal of undue service upon the defendant in case of a default 
judgment (Art. 34 (2) of Brussels I) would be applicable only in the Member State of origin.32 
The 2010 Commission Proposal provoked much discussion on the value of the exequatur and 
the grounds for refusal. From the reactions to the 2009 Green Paper, it was clear that abolition 
of the exequatur was generally supported, but that reform or abolition of the refusal grounds 
was not.33 The recast Regulation 1215/2012,34 which entered into force on 10 January 2015,35 
indeed abolished the exequatur as it existed under Brussels I. All that is needed for enforcement 
today is a certificate issued by the court of origin, but this only serves to provide information 
to the enforcement authorities and does not as such constitute an enforceable title. The grounds 
for refusal however remain intact.36  
The introduction of mutual recognition also had a profound impact in the field of family law. 
Regulation 2201/2003 (the Brussels II bis Regulation),37 which facilitates the recognition and 
                                                 
 
30 Green Paper on the Review of Council Regulation (EC) No 44/2001 on jurisdiction and the recognition and 
enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters, COM(2009) 175 final. 
31 Recasting is a legislative technique that involves bringing together in a single new act a legislative act and all 
the amendments made to it. The new act passes through the full legislative process and repeals all the acts being 
recast. Apart from codification, recasting involves new substantive changes, as amendments are made to the 
original act during preparation of the recast text. See http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/legal_service/recasting_en.htm, last 
visited 06 March 2016. 
32 See Zilinsky (2011) para. 2.3. 
33 Oberhammer (2010); see the contributions to the consultation on the 2009 Green Paper on the review of 
Regulation 44/2001, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/news/consulting_public/news_consulting_0002_en.htm, from Austria; Belgium; 
Bulgaria; Denmark; Finland; Germany; less clearly, Greece; Latvia; Lithuania; Malta; Slovenia; and the UK. 
34 Regulation (EU) No 1215/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2012 on 
Jurisdiction and the Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters (recast) OJ L 
351/1 (the ‘Brussels Ibis Regulation’). 
35 In accordance with its decision to implement it Regulation 1215/2012 will also be applicable in Denmark.: 
Agreement between the European Community and the Kingdom of Denmark on jurisdiction and the recognition 
and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters, OJ L 79/4, 31 March 2013.  
36 See under 2.3.3.2. 
37 Council Regulation (EC) 2201/2003 of 27 November 2003 concerning jurisdiction and recognition and 
enforcement of judgments in matrimonial matters and matters of parental responsibility, OJ L 338/1 (the ‘Brussels 
IIbis Regulation’. This instrument replaced Regulation 1347/2000, or the Brussels II Regulation, which was the 
first piece of EC legislation in the field of private international law in family matters (other than maintenance) and 
39 
 
enforcement of judgments in matrimonial matters and matters of parental responsibility, 
allowed for complete free movement of judgments ordering the return of a child in order to 
simplify and speed up the return of a child in cases of abduction.38 An exequatur is still required 
for custody orders.39 A 2014 report by the European Commission expressed a clear intention 
to pursue the further abolition of exequatur for judgments in the field of family law.40 
The 2009 Maintenance Regulation also abolished exequatur and refusal grounds for 
maintenance orders.41 According to the proposal for the regulation, the reasons for proposing 
abolition of exequatur were 1) simplifying the citizen’s life, 2) strengthening legal certainty, 
and 3) ensuring effectiveness and continuity of recovery.42 
The recast Insolvency Regulation43 allows for enforcement of judgments opening insolvency 
proceedings by incorporating the mechanism of the Brussels I bis Regulation.44 Exequatur has 
therefore been abolished for these types of judgments. The recast Insolvency Regulation 
includes one refusal ground (the public policy exception).45 
The 2012 Regulation on Wills and Succession46 still contains an exequatur procedure for 
decisions in matters relating to succession (Chapter IV); as do two proposals47 for regulations 
                                                 
 
was therefore considered a landmark (see (Stone, 2006) p. 384; Council Regulation (EC) No 1347/2000 of 29 
May 2000 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in matrimonial matters and in matters 
of parental responsibility for children of both spouses, OJ L 160/19. 
38 Regulation 2201/2003, Recital 17. See also Jänterä-Jareborg, (2003) p. 205; see on the free movement of 
judgments in these matters section 2.3.5. 
39 Regulation 2201/2003, Articles 21-52. 
40 Report from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council and the European Economic and Social 
Committee on the application of Council Regulation (EC) No 2201/2003 concerning jurisdiction and the 
recognition and enforcement of judgements in matrimonial matters and the matters of parental responsibility, 
repealing Regulation (EC) No 1347/2000, COM(2014) 225 final, p. 10-11. 
41 Council Regulation (EC) 4/2009 of 18 December 2009 on jurisdiction, applicable law, recognition and 
enforcement of decisions and cooperation in matters relating to maintenance obligations, OJ L7/1 (the 
‘Maintenance Regulation’). 
42 See Proposal for a Council Regulation on jurisdiction, applicable law, recognition and enforcement of decisions 
and cooperation in matters relating to maintenance obligations, COM(2005) 649 final, p. 4-6. 
43 Regulation (EC) No 1346/2000 on Insolvency Proceedings, OJ L 160/1. 
44 Article 32 of Regulation (EU) 2015/… of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 May 2015 on 
insolvency proceedings (recast) 2012/0360 (COD) LEX 1607, PE-CONS 31/15 (not yet published in the Official 
Journal) (‘recast Insolvency Regulation’).  
45 Article 33 of the recast Insolvency Regulation. 
46 Regulation (EU) No 650/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 4 July 2012 on jurisdiction, 
applicable law, recognition and enforcement of decisions and acceptance and enforcement of authentic 
instruments in matters of succession and on the creation of a European Certificate of Succession.  
47 These two Proposals were not adopted after a failure to reach political agreement. Instead, in March 2016 the 
European Commission adopted a proposal for a Council decision authorising enhanced cooperation on these 
topics. European Commission, Proposal for a Council Decision authorising enhanced cooperation in the area of 
jurisdiction, applicable law and the recognition and enforcement of decisions on the property regimes of 
international couples, covering both matters of matrimonial property regimes and the property  
consequences of registered partnerships, COM(2016) 108 final. 
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on matrimonial property48 and property consequences of registered partnerships.49 In the text 
of these proposals, the Commission points out that an exequatur procedure is deemed necessary 
because the proposals are a first step in the harmonization of property regimes resulting from 
marriage or registered partnerships,50 but that abolition will become an option once these 
instruments have been evaluated.51 
The latest instrument based on mutual recognition is the European Account Preservation Order 
(EAPO).52 It is an instrument that allows creditors to preserve the amount owed in a debtor’s 
bank account. The EAPO exists as an alternative to national procedures for cross-border cases. 
It is an ex parte procedure, which means the debtor is not notified of the application for the 
EAPO. The EAPO can be requested from a court in the Member State that has jurisdiction over 
the substance of the matter (Art. 6(1)) or, where a judgment has already been obtained, from 
the court in the Member State that issued the judgment (Art. 6(3)). This court shall issue the 
EAPO when the creditor has submitted sufficient evidence to satisfy the court that there is an 
urgent need for a protective measure in the form of a preservation order because there is a real 
risk that, without such a measure, the subsequent enforcement of the creditor’s claim against 
the debtor will be impeded or made substantially more difficult (Art. 7(1)). When the EAPO 
has been issued, it is recognized and enforceable in all other Member States without the need 
for a declaration of enforceability (Art. 22). There are no grounds for refusal of recognition or 
enforcement in the Member State addressed, though the debtor may apply to the court of origin 
of the EAPO, which may revoke or modify it when the conditions set out in the regulation are 
not met; for instance, where the Order was not served on him within 14 days of the preservation 
of his account or accounts (Art. 33(1)). 
The EAPO facilitates cross-border debt recovery by offering a uniform instrument for account 
preservation. However, the EAPO is not a (final) judgment, but rather a protective measure 
that is issued ex parte, without the defendant being summoned to appear. Under Brussels I bis, 
such measures are already excluded from the scope of the regime for recognition and 
enforcement, and therefore also from the scope of the refusal grounds.53 The innovation of the 
                                                 
 
48 Proposal for a Council Regulation on jurisdiction, applicable law, recognition and enforcement of decisions in 
matters of matrimonial property regimes, COM (2011) 126 final. 
49 Proposal for a Council Regulation on jurisdiction, applicable law, recognition and enforcement of decisions 
regarding the property consequences of registered partnerships, COM (2011) 127 final. 
50 Proposal for a Council Regulation on jurisdiction, applicable law, recognition and enforcement of decisions in 
matters of matrimonial property regimes, COM (2011) 126 final, para. 5.4; Proposal for a Council Regulation on 
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51 The European Parliament was of the opinion that the exequatur procedure should indeed be retained for these 
procedures given their complexity. (European Parliament, Report on the proposal for a Council regulation on 
jurisdiction, applicable law and the recognition and enforcement of decisions in matters of matrimonial property 
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52 Regulation (EU) No 655/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 May 2014 establishing a 
European Account Preservation Order procedure to facilitate cross-border debt recovery in civil and commercial 
matters, OJ L 189/59. 
53 Article 2(a) Brussels Ibis Regulation. See CJEU Case 125/79 Denilauler v SNC Couchet Frères, 
ECLI:EU:C:1980:130; see further under 2.3.1.1. 
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EAPO is therefore primarily that it provides a uniform and automatically enforceable 
provisional measure, not that it contains no refusal grounds. Since it does not facilitate the 
recognition and enforcement of judgments, it is outside the scope of this research. The EAPO 
is however another example of the simplification of cross-border litigation in civil cases 
pursued by the European legislature and therefore worth mentioning. 
To conclude, considering the amount of legislation that has recently been adopted in this field, 
it seems safe to say that the simplification of the regime for cross-border recognition and 
enforcement of civil judgments in the EU will remain a legislative priority for the future. 
2.2.3 The role of mutual recognition and mutual trust  
 
Under current legislation on civil justice cooperation within the EU, free movement of 
judgments is based on the principle of mutual recognition, which in turn presupposes mutual 
trust. In order to understand how these principles function, it is necessary to define them and 
explain how they have shaped the development of legislation in the field of civil justice.  
There is no widely accepted definition of mutual trust as of yet,54 but it generally refers to the 
confidence Member States have, or should have, in the functioning of each other’s legal 
systems. It is a matter for discussion whether mutual trust in fact exists between the Member 
States, or whether it is assumed to exist in order for EU legislation to function effectively. It is 
also a matter for discussion whether mutual trust implies a blanket presumption that a fellow 
Member State’s legal system functions adequately or whether Member States are entitled to 
review, in specific cases, whether that trust is justified. These questions were the subject of a 
number of highly important CJEU and ECtHR judgments, that are discussed in Part II of this 
thesis.55 
Mutual recognition can be seen as the practical application of mutual trust: if one Member State 
trusts another, then it should recognize judicial decisions and other acts of the other Member 
State without second-guessing whether it conforms to its own national standards. Mutual 
recognition presupposes and is based on mutual trust. Mutual recognition is a well-established 
mode of cooperation within the European Union,56 and was first introduced by the CJEU in its 
seminal judgment Cassis de Dijon.57 In this judgment, which concerned the free movement of 
goods between Member States, the CJEU ruled that goods lawfully marketed in one Member 
State should, in principle, be admitted to the market of any other Member State.58 This principle 
makes sense from the internal market perspective: it would be incompatible with the idea of an 
                                                 
 
54 Andersson (2005). 
55 Chapters 5.4.5 and 6.3.3.  
56 See for a discussion on how mutual recognition was ‘transferred’ to the justice context Storskrubb (2016).  
57 CJEU Case C-120/78 Rewe-Zentral AG v Bundesmonopolverwaltung für Branntwein ECLI:EU:C:1979:42 
(Cassis de Dijon) para. 14. 
58 Craig and De Bùrca (2015) p. 674 onwards.  
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internal market if States were free to prevent goods from being brought to market within their 
territory by imposing their own requirements on top of those the product had already fulfilled 
in the Member State of origin. Put rather superficially, mutual recognition reduces the need for 
extensive harmonization of, for instance, product standards, though in practice a certain level 
of harmonization has always been achieved to mediate the consequences of mutual 
recognition.59 
In the context of free movement of civil judgments, the concept of trust in another state’s legal 
system was as such not new.60 The 1968 Brussels Convention’s regime, with common and 
narrowly defined grounds for refusal, was also based on the premise that differences between 
Member States’ civil procedure law should not, in principle, be an obstacle to recognition and 
enforcement of judgments (though the concept of ‘mutual trust’ was as such not used). The 
Member State where recognition or enforcement was sought did however retain the authority 
to refuse recognition or enforcement, and a declaration of enforceability still needed to be 
obtained from that Member State. The purpose of the introduction of mutual recognition was, 
as is explained below, intended to increasingly simplify this regime, to the extent where the 
Member State where recognition or enforcement is sought retains no discretionary power at 
all. 
The 1999 Tampere European Council introduced mutual trust and mutual recognition as 
leading principles within the context of the creation of an area of freedom, security and justice. 
The Maastricht Treaty of 1992 first introduced the objective of creating such an area. It 
intended to provide Member States with a framework through which they could cooperate in 
certain politically sensitive areas: immigration, asylum, border controls, police and judicial 
cooperation in criminal matters, and judicial cooperation in civil matters. As these policy areas 
were considered politically sensitive and closely connected to national sovereignty, the 
Maastricht Treaty created a ‘pillar’ structure in which these issues were separated from the 
supranational Community decision-making process; it devised a structure that was more 
intergovernmental, with almost no – or a much reduced – role for the Community institutions.61 
The Treaty of Amsterdam of 1997, however, moved judicial cooperation in civil matters to the 
Community Pillar. This change was significant, because it not only greatly reduced the 
obstacles for decision-making on these matters, but it also shows that these issues were no 
longer considered particularly sensitive. Yet, the legislative developments in this area were still 
very much governed by economic objectives. In 1998, the European Commission still 
proclaimed that: 
full abolition of the registration (exequatur) procedure is inconceivable, if only because 
of the wide procedural divergences between Member States as regards enforcement.62 
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The 1999 Tampere European Council shifted focus from mere economic rationales to the 
creation of an area of freedom, security and justice. Its Conclusions first articulated the role of 
the principle of mutual recognition in the creation of such an area. Though this document does 
not use the term “mutual trust”, it starts by referring to values common to all Member States: 
From its very beginning European integration has been firmly rooted in a shared 
commitment to freedom based on human rights, democratic institutions and the rule of 
law. These common values have proved necessary for securing peace and developing 
prosperity in the European Union. They will also serve as a cornerstone for the 
enlarging Union. 
It then goes on to state that while the primary goal of the Union, the creation of an internal 
market, has already been achieved, the freedom this internal market grants the EU citizens can 
only be exercised effectively if there is also a genuine area of justice, in which people can 
approach courts and judicial authorities in other Member States as easily as in their own. For 
civil justice, this meant that citizens should not be prevented from exercising their rights due 
to incompatibility or complexity of legal or administrative systems in the Member States. In 
order to facilitate the protection of such rights and the cooperation between judicial authorities, 
the Tampere Council: 
endorse[d] the principle of mutual recognition which, in its view, should become the 
cornerstone of judicial co-operation in both civil and criminal matters within the 
Union.63 
The Council then went on to state what this would mean specifically: 
34. In civil matters the European Council calls upon the Commission to make a proposal 
for further reduction of the intermediate measures which are still required to enable the 
recognition and enforcement of a decision or judgement in the requested State. As a first 
step these intermediate procedures should be abolished for titles in respect of small 
consumer or commercial claims and for certain judgements in the field of family litigation 
(e.g. on maintenance claims and visiting rights). Such decisions would be automatically 
recognised throughout the Union without any intermediate proceedings or grounds for 
refusal of enforcement. This could be accompanied by the setting of minimum standards 
on specific aspects of civil procedural law. 
The principle of mutual recognition is thus used as a basis to call for the ‘further reduction’ of 
intermediate measures for the recognition and enforcement of judgments – though it is not 
further explained why this principle is deemed appropriate in this context. More importantly, 
however, the Tampere Conclusions refer to the “reduction” of “intermediate measures”, but it 
is not clear what exactly this means. 
On the matter of mutual trust, the European Commission made quite clear that it assumed this 
to be at an appropriate level to proceed with the introduction of mutual recognition in the field 
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of civil justice. It made this most explicit in its first proposal for the Recast Brussels I 
Regulation. In its Explanatory Memorandum, it stated that: 
 
Today, judicial cooperation and the level of trust among Member States has reached a 
degree of maturity which permits the move towards a simpler, less costly, and more 
automatic system of circulation of judgments.64 
 
In the 2000 Draft Programme of Measures for implementation of the principle of mutual 
recognition of decisions in civil and commercial matters,65 the European Council presented a 
number of explicit legislative objectives. First, in the chapter entitled ‘Degrees of mutual 
recognition’ the Programme explains the ‘state of play’. It refers to the (then) existing 1968 
Brussels Convention as the ‘first degree’ of mutual recognition (containing a harmonized and 
simplified exequatur procedure) and to the (then) proposed Brussels I Regulation as the ‘second 
degree’, containing a ‘streamlined’ exequatur procedure. It then goes on to formulate goals and 
proposals for the enhancement of mutual recognition. In a rather technical-sounding section 
entitled “First series of measures: further streamlining of intermediate measures and 
strengthening the effects in the requested State of judgments made in the State of origin” it 
mentions the following measures for such streamlining: “Limiting the reasons which can be 
given for challenging recognition or enforcement of a foreign judgment (for example, removal 
of the test of public policy, taking account of cases in which this reason is currently used by 
the Member States’ courts).” It also removes all doubt as to the long-term goal (called ‘second 
series of measures’) of these efforts: “Abolition, pure and simple, of any checks on the foreign 
judgment by courts in the requested country”.66 
 
Two more recent Council Programmes, the 2004 Hague Programme and the 2010 Stockholm 
Programme, expand the line of reasoning of the Tampere Conclusions by placing cooperation 
on the basis of mutual trust (now explicitly stated) and mutual recognition within the 
framework of the protection of fundamental rights. Both documents start with an affirmation 
of the Union’s commitment to protecting fundamental rights, pointing out the introduction of 
the EU CFR and its intention to accede to the ECHR. The effective enforcement of rights is 
also placed in this context: the Stockholm Programme states in a section entitled “Promoting 
citizenship and fundamental rights” that “Citizens of the Union and other persons must be able 
to exercise their specific rights to the fullest extent within, and even, where relevant, outside 
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the Union.”67 It then reaffirms that mutual recognition facilitates cooperation between 
authorities and the judicial protection of individual rights.68 Next, in the section entitled 
“Furthering the implementation of mutual recognition” the Council states, “the process of 
abolishing all intermediate measures (the exequatur), should be continued”.  
 
This shift of focus is telling: instead of being a fundamental, yet pragmatic market-oriented 
measure to promote efficiency of cross-border trade, mutual recognition seems to have now 
taken on a normative value: it is necessary for the protection of fundamental rights, as 
differences in national procedures prevent Union citizens from exercising their rights 
effectively. Fundamental rights protection is thus presented as a reason for the introduction of 
mutual recognition. The question, of course, is whether legislation based on absolute mutual 
recognition which presupposes mutual trust between the Member States, especially when it 
does so by abolishing cross-border checks, is indeed the best way of protecting fundamental 
rights, or if it is even compatible with fundamental rights. This is because the cross-border 
checks that some Regulations abolished in favour of absolute mutual recognition protect the 
rights of the judgment debtor. These questions are central to the following Chapters. Chapter 
6 in particular examines whether the European legislature takes its commitment to fundamental 
rights seriously when it introduces legislation that abolishes grounds for refusal and relies on 
absolute mutual recognition.  
 
2.2.4 Practical arguments for increased free movement 
 
2.2.4.1 Recognition and enforcement under Brussels I in practice 
 
It was already touched upon above that the European Commission took the successful practical 
application of the exequatur procedure of Brussels I as a sign that the time was ripe to abolish 
it. The empirical data the Commission based its conclusion on were gathered in the 2007 Report 
on the Application of Brussels I in the Member States, commonly referred to as the Heidelberg 
Report.69 This Report was prepared in order to evaluate the application of the Brussels I 
Regulation as provided by its Article 73. The data were gathered through questionnaires and 
interviews with stakeholders engaged in European cross-border litigation: lawyers, judges and 
businessmen as well as organizations representing consumers.70 The data were collected from 
                                                 
 
67 European Council, The Stockholm Programme - an open and secure Europe serving and protecting citizens, OJ 
C/115/10. 2010 (the ‘Stockholm Programme’). 
68 Stockholm Programme, p. 11. 
69 Hess, Pfeiffer and Schlosser (2007). The paragraph numbers cited refer to Study JLS/C4/2005/03, published in 
September 2007, available on http://ec.europa.eu/civiljustice/news/docs/study_application_brussels_1_en.pdf. 
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70 Hess, Pfeiffer and Schlosser (2007) para. 4. 
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the (then) 24 EU Member States, although, as the authors admit, this proved difficult in the 
Member States that had only joined the EU in 2004, as not much practice could be reported.71 
Nevertheless, its empirical findings on the operation of the Regulation in practice are of 
considerable value. 
On the matter of the exequatur procedure, the conclusions were predominantly positive. The 
authors concluded that, as a rule, exequatur proceedings operated efficiently. The most 
influential of the Report’s conclusions on the matter of exequatur is probably the statistic that 
the great majority, more than 90% (and often 100%) of decisions on the declaration of 
enforceability were ultimately successful.72 The procedure for obtaining a declaration of 
enforceability was found to be “characterized by speed and simplicity”. In most Member States, 
the creditor could access the competent authorities without representation by a lawyer, and the 
review by the court of enforcement was restricted to formalities: the court would only review 
its territorial competence, the authenticity of the decision, the existence of a civil or commercial 
matter and the regularity of the required certificate.73 
The average time for obtaining a declaration of enforceability was deemed to be “fairly short”, 
even though the data show that the time periods differed considerably between the Member 
States (from 7 days to 4 months on average) and that even within Member States the margins 
were wide (Greece reported a time period of 10 days to 7 months).74 Another point of concern 
was the costs of the declaration of enforceability. In practice, most Member States levied costs, 
and the ways in which these were calculated differed considerably. The authors also 
highlighted the costs incurred by the representation by a lawyer as an obstacle: even though 
legal representation is not required by the regulation, practice shows that creditors appoint a 
lawyer because they are not sufficiently informed about the foreign procedural law. These 
findings led the authors to conclude that the situation was “unsatisfactory and even problematic 
with respect to the guarantee of due process”.75 
Another influential finding was that the great majority of decisions were not appealed: the 
percentage of appeals was found to be “between 1% and 5% of all decisions”.76 Appeal 
procedures were found to be handled efficiently, though the duration of appeal procedures 
could differ considerably.77 On the question of which grounds for refusal were most applied, 
the report found that though the “insufficient service in default procedures” provision of Article 
34(2) was most important, its practical impact had been reduced after it was amended with the 
introduction of the Brussels I Regulation. The report concluded that national courts generally 
                                                 
 
71 Hess, Pfeiffer and Schlosser (2007) para. 5.  
72 Hess, Pfeiffer and Schlosser (2007) para. 52. 
73 Hess, Pfeiffer and Schlosser (2007) para. 505. 
74 Hess, Pfeiffer and Schlosser (2007) para. 514. See for an interpretation Timmer (2013) p. 145. 
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only allow an objection on this ground in exceptional cases and that judges were in general 
rather favourable towards the recognition of European judgments and the granting of 
declarations of enforceability.78 Little use was also made of the provisions concerning 
irreconcilability (Arts. 34(3) and (4)). The report concluded that this was likely because the 
provisions on pendency of Articles 27-30 of Brussels I were generally respected, limiting the 
risk of irreconcilable judgments. The Report drew a similar conclusion with regard to Article 
35, which concerns review of jurisdiction of the court of origin. This was found to be of little 
practical importance – because the court of enforcement would be bound by the findings of 
fact of the court of origin – and because it was not in line with mutual trust, the authors of the 
report suggested its removal.79 
The report was more nuanced on the public policy exception. It concluded that the public policy 
exception was often invoked, but rarely successfully.80 At the same time, the reporters pointed 
out that public policy is of great value from a legal-political perspective,81 and that even though 
they are rare, there are still constellations in the European judicial area in which the application 
of the public policy exception is needed in order to adequately protect the rights of the 
defendant.82 
The Heidelberg Report thus reported favourably on the exequatur procedure as it functioned 
under the Brussels I Regulation. It showed its efficiency, but also pointed to the divergence in 
the time periods and costs incurred between the Member States. It also quite clearly looked for 
ways to limit the grounds for refusal, though it was quite nuanced on the value of the public 
policy exception. 
In 2013, Muller and Cuniberti published an empirical study on the functioning of the exequatur 
procedure in the so-called Grande Région, which encompasses Luxembourg and parts of 
France, Germany, and Belgium and within which economic and cultural relations are strong. 
The researchers point out that many people working in Luxembourg live within other parts of 
the region, so that the existence of borders has become almost irrelevant.83 This makes research 
into the practice of cross-border enforcement of judgments in this region especially interesting. 
By providing empirical data on the functioning of the exequatur procedure in a number of 
courts in the Grande Région, the researchers intended to add to the debate on whether the 
economic benefits of abolishing the exequatur would outweigh the risks posed to fundamental 
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rights protection.84 Their conclusions, based on data concerning costs, duration and success 
rate of the exequatur, are strongly in favour of its abolition. The researchers conclude that since 
the great majority of claims submitted for exequatur do not exceed EUR10,000 and are 
therefore relatively low, legal costs associated with the exequatur are likely prohibitive in many 
cases.85 On top of this, they conclude that since only in a small percentage of cases an appeal 
is brought, and that it is rarely successful, “the value of the exequatur procedure is statistically 
very weak”.86 This is exacerbated by the fact that exequatur proceedings result in delays for 
the judgment creditor.  
The researchers thus provide some strong critique of the costs and delays associated with the 
exequatur procedure. Their statistical evidence on the success rate of appeals is also 
remarkable, though without knowing in which cases an appeal was successful and why, it is 
difficult to draw substantiated conclusions as to the exequatur’s value for the protection of 
fundamental rights – something the researchers acknowledge with the qualification 
“statistically”. In order to draw conclusions as to whether the exequatur protects fundamental 
rights it is necessary to distinguish between different types of cases and degrees of fundamental 
rights infringements, as Cuniberti concluded in an earlier article.87 This problem is further 
considered below. 
The Heidelberg Report and the statistics gathered by Cuniberti and Muller lead to the 
conclusion that even if the exequatur procedure functions efficiently, and even in a region in 
which courts are presumably accustomed to dealing with these proceedings, the costs and 
delays associated with obtaining a declaration of enforceability are considerable. It is therefore 
no surprise that the European Commission has strongly emphasized the economic case for the 
abolition of exequatur. In its Impact Assessment, the Commission suggested that the overall 
annual cost exequatur proceedings in the EU amounts to approximately EUR 48 million and 
that this is a deterrent to cross-border trade.88 
It is more difficult, however, to draw conclusions from the statistical data as to the reform of 
grounds for refusal. The authors of the Heidelberg Report argue in favour of abolition of the 
review of jurisdiction, on the basis that it is statistically almost irrelevant, but more importantly 
because it does not comport with mutual trust. On the public policy exception, both reports are 
undecided. Though the data show that the public policy exception is rarely used successfully, 
both groups of researchers point out that statistics are of little use here and that the public policy 
exception has a primarily legal-political value.  
 
2.2.4.2 Recognition and enforcement under other instruments in practice 
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The Brussels II bis abolished exequatur and refusal grounds for decisions ordering the return 
of a child and those ordering access to a child. For decisions on divorce, legal separation or 
marriage annulment, and on parental responsibility, refusal grounds still apply and an 
exequatur is needed for judgments on parental responsibility. A 2015 evaluation of the 
Regulation found that the existence of these intermediate procedures “hindered smooth 
enforcement” and that the safeguards, particularly those protecting the best interests of the 
child, were not necessarily effective because they were not being applied by courts but by 
administrative personnel.89 The divergence in Member State practice concerning the hearing 
of the child proved created problems at the enforcement stage, because a failure to hear the 
child is a ground for refusal of enforcement.90 However, further on, the Study states: “the 
(automatic) recognition of judgments in matrimonial matters and cases of parental 
responsibility functions well in practice”.91 Apparently, some decisions on parental 
responsibility were never enforced due to practical obstacles during enforcement procedures, 
such as delays caused by lack of resources.92 Practical obstacles to the enforcement of child 
return orders, which should be enforced automatically, were also reported.93 The problems with 
the automatic enforcement of child return orders are discussed in more detail in Chapter 3, 
particularly in Chapter 3.5. It is clear that the abolition of exequatur for judgments within the 
scope of the Brussels II bis Regulation remains a priority. In a 2014 report, the European 
Commission stated that the fact that certain categories of judgments do not benefit from the 
abolition of exequatur leads to complex, lengthy and costly procedures, and to inconsistencies 
in application.94 The Commission did point out that, particularly in parental responsibility 
matters, there was great divergence in the interpretation of the public policy exception.95 It also 
acknowledged the varying interpretations of the child’s right to be heard. However, the 
Commission recommended extending the abolition of exequatur, in combination with the 
appropriate safeguards to take the place of these refusal grounds.96 A proposal for amendment 
of the Brussels II bis Regulation is being prepared.97 
 
The Insolvency Regulation was evaluated and the corresponding report published in 2012.98 
This report did not, however, cover recognition extensively. This was decided because the 
Regulation “already provides for the maximum solution that can be achieved in this context, 
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i.e. a direct recognition of foreign proceedings without intermediate steps” and because the 
reporters were not aware of any problems calling for fundamental changes.99 Some problems 
were reported, mainly to do with a lack of information on foreign proceedings and publication 
of decisions opening the proceedings100 and uncertainty as to the distinction between 
liquidation and reorganization proceedings.101 The report also found that the public policy was 
rarely raised successfully to prevent the recognition of insolvency proceedings, and that the 
guiding principles of the CJEU were generally applied.102 
No statistical evidence is yet available on the functioning of the exequatur procedure in the 
Regulation on Wills and Succession, because this Regulation has only applied since 2015 and 
will only be evaluated in 2025.103 
2.2.5 Concluding remarks 
 
Free movement of judgments is essential to guaranteeing legal certainty, which in turn fosters 
international trade and encourages free movement of businesses and people across borders 
within the EU. To facilitate free movement of judgments, the 1968 Brussels Convention and 
the 2001 Brussels Regulation, as well as a number of other instruments, contained a mechanism 
consisting of a uniform procedure for obtaining an exequatur, combined with refusal grounds 
that the Member State of enforcement could apply. This mechanism, which aimed at combining 
efficiency for the judgment creditor with protection of the debtor’s rights, was found to have 
functioned quite satisfactorily by the 2007 Heidelberg Report.  
The introduction of mutual recognition to the field of justice cooperation within the EU marks 
what may be termed a paradigm shift in the manner cross-border enforcement is organized in 
EU legislation. Mutual recognition, which is based on the assumption that sufficient mutual 
trust exists between the EU Member States as regards the quality of their legal system, has led 
to the gradual abolition of the exequatur but also, more controversially, to reform or abolition 
of refusal grounds. The following section explains how these changes were incorporated into 
current EU legislation on recognition and enforcement of civil judgments. 
 
2.3 Recognition and enforcement under current EU legislation 
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2.3.1 Features of recognition and enforcement in EU civil justice cooperation 
 
2.3.1.1 Definitions 
 
First, the scope of the following discussion needs to be determined. The instruments discussed 
in this research all facilitate the recognition and enforcement of judgments, namely, judicial 
decisions that have been, or have been capable of being, the subject of an inquiry in adversarial 
proceedings. This is to say that they have to be the outcome of a trial or procedure in which 
both parties appeared or were capable of appearing. The discussion does not include the 
recognition or enforcement of provisional or protective measures issued ex parte, where the 
defendant is not summoned to appear. It is important to establish this, since not only do such 
measures fall outside the scope of the Brussels I bis Regulation,104 the ECtHR also held that 
for such rules it may not be possible to comply immediately with all the requirements of Article 
6(1) ECHR, lest their effectiveness be impaired.105 Article 6(1) may therefore not apply in the 
same way to these ex parte measures, and they would need a separate discussion. This research 
is limited to the recognition and enforcement of judgments and decisions that fall within the 
scope of the regulations discussed. It is important to note that with regard to the Brussels I bis 
Regulation, this also includes judgments delivered by default,106 i.e., judgments where the 
defendant had the opportunity to appear, but chose not to. Such judgments are often given 
without a full hearing on or examination of the merits and may not contain any reasoning at 
the national level; yet this does not exclude them from the scope of the Regulation. Included in 
its scope are also provisional and protective measures that were issued with notice to the 
defendant,107 and judgments such as payment orders that are initially issued ex parte but can 
be opposed by the defendant.108 Judgments need not be res judicata or final and conclusive, 
though Article 33 of Brussels I bis requires that the judgment is enforceable in the Member 
State of origin. 
 
2.3.1.2 Judgment import and judgment inspection 
 
The EU mechanism of cross-border enforcement of judgments is characterized by a distinction 
between two elements: judgment import and judgment inspection. The distinction between 
these two elements has been a standard feature of the European instruments on recognition and 
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enforcement since the 1968 Brussels Convention. It is important to distinguish between these 
two elements and to discuss their functions separately, since both are important with a view to 
safeguarding the involved parties’ rights and interests.109 It is shown that the formal aspect of 
the mechanism (judgment import) is instrumental in this regard, but that the abolition of the 
grounds for refusal, or judgment inspection, has proved controversial. The preceding 
discussion showed that the introduction of mutual recognition aimed, on one hand, to abolish 
the exequatur or declaration of enforceability (judgment import); and on the other hand, to 
abolish or narrow the refusal grounds (judgment inspection). In policy documents, the 
distinction between these two goals was not always clear from the start.110 
The judgment import function of the mechanism for cross-border enforcement exists to allow 
the foreign decision to be accepted in the forum. This aspect or function of the procedure serves 
merely a formal goal, which is to import the foreign decision, so that it can be enforced. The 
judgment inspection is substantive: it offers the possibility to invoke grounds of refusal and 
thus inspect the decision’s conformity with certain important values such as public policy. 
The import function is most clearly important to legal practice: it would be incompatible with 
the principle of legal certainty, the principle of res judicata and the substantive rights of the 
judgment debtor if a decision obtained as a result of a lengthy legal procedure would have no 
effect across state borders.111 The EU regualations therefore provide a means of transferring a 
foreign judgment to the state where enforcement is sought. Under the Brussels Convention and 
the Brussels I Regulation, this procedural aspect consisted of obtaining a declaration of 
enforceability from the competent court in the Member State of enforcement. The term 
‘judgment import’ also signifies the import of a foreign judgment as it stands; this as opposed 
to mechanisms where a new procedure needs to be started which results in a national title, as 
is, for example, the case in the Netherlands112 and England113 (for judgments that do not fall 
within the scope of one of the EU Regulations or another international instrument).  
The second function of the mechanisms for cross-border recognition and enforcement is the 
judgment inspection function. It refers to the fact that a mechanism for cross-border 
enforcement provides an opportunity to inspect whether the decision meets certain important 
requirements. These are not merely formal requirements, such as whether the decision can 
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indeed be qualified as a judgment, but principles of fundamental value.114 Many European 
states that have an exequatur procedure for example require that the court of origin had 
jurisdiction,115 that the judgment does not infringe its national public policy,116 and that it does 
not conflict with an earlier proceeding started in that state.117 
In the European regime, this second function is operationalized in a limited number of grounds 
for refusal, which are explained below. The grounds for refusal are narrowly and exhaustively 
defined and must be applied restrictively. Nevertheless, the grounds of refusal are an important 
tool in the hands of the judgment debtor. Refusal of enforcement means that the judgment 
creditor is no longer able to take measures to enforce compliance by the judgment debtor with 
the judgment. This means that the judgment has essentially become without legal consequence 
in the Member State where enforcement is sought. On what grounds recognition and 
enforcement may be refused therefore has great significance, discussed in Section 2.2.2 
onwards. 
The EU Regulations on cross-border recognition and enforcement are characterized by a 
separation between the two functions: the procedure consists of a simplified, nearly automatic 
stage in which a declaration of enforceability is obtained (judgment import); and a second 
stage, in which the grounds for refusal may be examined if the judgment debtor chooses to 
invoke them (judgment inspection). Some, like Brussels I, abolish only the judgment import 
procedure, while others abolish both judgment import and judgment inspection, such as 
Brussels II bis (for certain decisions), the EEO Regulation and the uniform procedures. 
2.3.1.3 Recognition and enforcement 
 
A second feature of the EU instruments is the distinction between recognition and enforcement. 
Recognition means accepting the determination of rights and obligations made by the court of 
origin;118 in other words, accepting its legal effects. The parties may then invoke it, either by 
taking steps to enforce it, or raising it in another procedure. For example, a judgment granting 
a divorce may be used in order to obtain a maintenance order in a separate procedure. 
Enforcement presupposes recognition, but goes a step further: it allows the judgment creditor 
to take action in order to make sure that the debtor obeys the order of the court of origin.119 It 
implies that steps of an official nature are taken to ensure that the judgment is complied with, 
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whether that means that something should be done (such as the payment of a sum of money or 
the performance of a contract) or not be done (such as in the case of injunctions preventing the 
commission of an act which would constitute a tort or breach of contract). Enforcement is 
governed by the domestic law of the state in which enforcement is sought, meaning that only 
those measures that are provided for in domestic law (such as seizure of goods or the attachment 
of bank accounts) may be taken.120 It is clear that enforcement matters most to monetary 
judgments, though judgments in other areas of law may also require action from enforcement 
authorities, such as judgments ordering the return of a child. 
Recognition and enforcement are separated under the European instruments discussed below: 
recognition of judgments within the remit of these instruments is entirely automatic, while for 
enforcement the exequatur procedure needs to be followed in order to obtain a declaration of 
enforceability. It must be noted that while the European instruments all contain a section on 
‘enforcement’, they do not in fact harmonize enforcement procedures. What is meant is 
therefore only the procedure for obtaining permission for enforcement of condemnatory 
judgments – exequatur. Declaratory and constitutive judgments that fall within the scope of the 
European instruments are by their nature automatically recognized across the EU. However, 
the regulations that contain refusal grounds, such as Brussels I bis, do allow recognition to be 
refused (see below). 
2.3.1.4 Application of the refusal grounds and its consequences 
 
Under the Brussels regime, invoking the refusal grounds has increasingly become the 
responsibility of the judgment debtor or another interested party. Article 34 of the Brussels 
Convention of 1968 allowed the court to refuse to issue a declaration of enforceability when 
one of the refusal grounds of Article 27 applied. Refusal grounds could therefore be applied at 
the judgment import stage.  
Under Brussels I bis and Brussels I, examination of refusal grounds (judgment inspection) only 
takes place in the second instance. Under Brussels I, the court requested to issue a declaration 
of enforceability is expressly prohibited from applying the refusal grounds during that first 
stage of the proceedings (Art. 41). Examination of the refusal grounds may only happen in the 
second instance, when the judgment debtor applies for refusal of recognition or enforcement.121 
Under Brussels I bis, the refusal grounds can only be considered “on the application of any 
interested party”.122 The interested party must therefore take the initiative to invoke one of the 
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grounds. The burden of proving that the particular ground applies lies with the party who 
applies for refusal. Under Brussels I bis, judgment import has therefore become entirely 
automatic (though the requirement of a certificate could be seen as a form of judgment export), 
while judgment inspection takes place at the second instance. 
The refusal grounds can be invoked by applying for refusal of recognition or enforcement (Art. 
46). According to Article 47, the application shall be submitted by the court that the Member 
State of enforcement has designated to hear such applications. The decision on the application 
for refusal may be appealed by either party (Art. 49). The decision on appeal may then be 
contested only if the Member State where enforcement is sought has appointed a court to hear 
such contestations (Art. 50). The refusal grounds can also be invoked by applying for a pre-
emptive declaration that no refusal grounds apply (Art. 36(2)); this possibility may be used by 
a judgment creditor seeking to ascertain that enforcement of the judgment will not at a later 
stage be contested.  
The refusal grounds can also be raised incidentally during court proceedings. An example of 
the latter situation is the recent case of Diageo v. Simiramida,123 in which Simiramida claimed 
damages in the Netherlands from Diageo on the basis of a Bulgarian judgment that established 
that Diageo had wrongfully seized goods belonging to Simiramida. Diageo invoked the public 
policy exception against recognition of the Bulgarian judgment, stating that the judgment was 
contrary to EU law (though this appeal was unsuccessful). Since recognition of a judgment 
means that the determination of rights and obligations by the court of origin is accepted, refusal 
of recognition means that this determination is no longer accepted as having legal merit by the 
court deciding in the second procedure. This means that certain claims may have to be 
relitigated, to the expense of the parties involved. 
Article 22(1) of the ESCP Regulation and Article 22(1) of the EOP Regulation both provide 
that enforcement shall be refused upon application by the defendant by the Member State of 
enforcement if the judgment is irreconcilable with another decision, as specified in the Articles. 
Articles 22 and 23 of the Brussels II bis Regulation however can be applied at the first stage of 
enforcement proceedings. Article 28(1) requires a declaration of enforceability for judgments 
concerning parental responsibility, to be issued in the Member State of enforcement. Article 
31(2) allows the court to refuse the application for a declaration of enforceability on the basis 
of one of the grounds of Articles 22 and 23. In the case of judgments concerning divorce, legal 
separation or marriage annulment, refusal of recognition is most likely to take place 
incidentally, when the judgment is invoked in another procedure, for instance to claim alimony. 
The grounds for refusal are harmonized, strictly defined in the respective legal instruments, 
and restrictively applied, removing the possibility of arbitrary refusal of recognition or 
enforcement and reducing the chance that a judgment may not be invoked, increasing legal 
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certainty. The refusal grounds are thus limitative and must be interpreted restrictively. This 
means that a court may not use any of the grounds for a purpose for which it is not intended. 
Lack of jurisdiction of the court of origin is not a ground for refusal under any of the regulations 
and some even explicitly forbid it, save in certain exceptional cases.124  
Review of a foreign judgment on the merits is also prohibited.125 If it were not, the recognition 
and enforcement regime would make little sense, since if a court in the State addressed were 
allowed to review a case on the merits, this would amount to deciding the case anew. Not only 
would this undermine the efficiency of the regime, it would also amount to the court in the 
State addressed putting its decision above that of the court of origin, which is incompatible 
with the underlying idea of mutual trust.126 The prohibition of review on the merits means that 
a court must accept the findings of fact made by the court of origin, but also the findings of 
law: the court of the Member State addressed may not substitute its own discretion for that of 
the court of origin.127 An appeal for refusal of recognition or enforcement is not in any way an 
appeal on the merits. This means that the court addressed must not question the validity or 
correctness of the original decision, the substantive or legal soundness of the conclusions, or 
whether the correct substantive law was applied.128 
Notwithstanding these qualifications, the grounds for refusal are obligatory, which means that 
recognition or enforcement must be denied if one of them is found to apply.129 
Refusal of enforcement means that the judgment creditor is no longer able to take measures to 
ensure compliance by the judgment debtor with the judgment. This means that the judgment 
has essentially become without legal consequence in the Member State where enforcement is 
sought. It must be emphasized that refusal of recognition or enforcement does not affect the 
validity of the judgment as such: it remains valid in the Member State where it was delivered. 
It may still be invoked in other states, though there is of course the possibility that another state 
will also deny recognition or enforcement on the same ground, unless it upholds a different 
interpretation of the refusal ground, which may happen with public policy (see below). 
However, it is clear that refusal of recognition or enforcement has radical consequences for the 
judgment creditor. Unless the debtor has assets in another state, which may very well not be 
the case with many non-international businesses and consumers, enforcement of the judgment 
may have become impossible. This goes against the principle of res judicata and renders the 
exercise of the debtor’s right to enforcement utterly impossible. This explains why refusal of 
recognition or enforcement is only a proportional sanction in the most serious of cases, for 
                                                 
 
124 Article 45(3) Brussels Ibis Regulation. 
125 Article 52, Brussels Ibis Regulation; Article 22(2) ESCP Regulation; Article 22(2) EOP Regulation; Article 
21(2) EEO Regulation; Article 26, Brussels IIbis Regulation; Article 41, Succession Regulation. 
126 Mankowski (2016) p. 964; he posits that “the judiciary in the Member States is deemed equivalent and equally 
apt to decide cases which assertion in turn vastly disposes of a necessity for review and control. Whereas control 
freaks and Leninists might go berserk, European ideology demands so”, citing the dictum attributed to Lenin: 
“Trust is good, but control is better”.  
127 Mankowski (2016) p. 964. 
128 Mankowski (2016) p. 964-965. 
129 This is implied by the wording of, for instance, Article 45(1) Brussels Ibis Regulation, which provides that 
recognition ‘shall’ be refused if one of the refusal grounds is found to apply. 
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instance where the right to a fair trial was violated. The following provides an overview of the 
refusal grounds, whereas the following Chapter contains an extensive analysis as to how the 
refusal grounds have acted as a remedy for fundamental rights violations. 
2.3.1.5 Three ‘models’ of free movement of judgments  
 
The EU Regulations that facilitate cross-border enforcement can be divided into three ‘models’, 
according to the degree they have achieved complete free movement of judgments.  
First, there are regulations that require exequatur (for certain categories of judgments in their 
scope) and contain grounds for refusal of recognition and enforcement. This category includes 
the Succession Regulation, the Brussels II bis Regulation (for judgments concerning parental 
responsibility), and the two proposed regulations on matrimonial property130 and property 
consequences of registered partnerships.131 Because these instruments still operate on the basis 
of this traditional model and have not reformed or abolished the refusal grounds, they fall 
outside the scope of this research, which is concerned with the consequences of such reforms. 
They are therefore not discussed in detail in this section.  
The second model is the Brussels I bis Regulation, which has abolished the exequatur, instead 
requiring the court of origin of the judgment to issue a certificate. The grounds for refusal 
remain applicable. This model is discussed in Section 2.3.3. 
The third model is one where both exequatur and grounds for refusal have been abolished,132 
thus attaining complete free movement of judgments. Within this model there are variations. 
The Maintenance Regulation has abolished exequatur and all grounds for refusal completely. 
The Brussels II bis Regulation has abolished exequatur for judgments ordering the return of a 
child and those concerning access to children, but has replaced the judgment inspection 
function with a check of ‘minimum requirements’ (procedural standards) by the court of origin. 
The EEO operates in a similar manner, by essentially making the Member State of origin of 
the judgment responsible for both judgment import and judgment inspection.  
An entirely new approach can be observed in the uniform European procedures, the ESCP and 
the EOP. These instruments can be seen as circumventing exequatur by providing alternative 
procedures that result in a title that is immediately enforceable throughout the EU.  
 
2.3.2 Grounds for refusal 
 
                                                 
 
130 Proposal for a Council Regulation on jurisdiction, applicable law, recognition and enforcement of decisions in 
matters of matrimonial property regimes, COM (2011) 126 final. 
131 Proposal for a Council Regulation on jurisdiction, applicable law, recognition and enforcement of decisions 
regarding the property consequences of registered partnerships, COM (2011) 127 final. 
132 Except for the refusal ground pertaining to irreconcilability, as discussed under 2.3.2.3.  
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The exequatur procedure’s purpose of guaranteeing free movement is also borne out by the fact 
that recognition and enforcement can only be opposed on the basis of a limited number of 
grounds for refusal. This section provides a brief overview of the grounds for refusal that are 
found in the currently existing EU instruments. 
 
2.3.2.1 Public Policy 
 
The first, and most contentious, ground for refusal is the public policy exception (Art. 45(1)(b) 
of Brussels I bis).133 This entails that recognition or enforcement may be refused if it would be 
manifestly contrary to the public policy (ordre public) of the Member State addressed – to 
those principles that are believed to be of fundamental value in the legal order of that State, 
including internationally recognised fundamental rights. The words ‘of the Member State 
addressed’ indicates that it is primarily the national conception of the State in which 
enforcement is sought which determines the content of public policy; however, the limits of 
this concept have been defined by the CJEU in its case law and it must be interpreted 
restrictively.134 The court may also not use it to review whether the court of origin had 
jurisdiction.135 Public policy has two elements: substantive public policy, which concerns the 
substance of the foreign judgment; and procedural public policy, which concerns the procedure 
of which the judgment is the result. Since a court may not review a foreign judgment as to its 
substance,136 a successful objection on the basis of substantive public policy is rare.137 
Procedural public policy, however, is much more often invoked, though often 
unsuccessfully.138 In addition, the Brussels II bis Regulation provides that a review on the basis 
of public policy shall take into account the best interests of the child (Art. 23(a)).  
Though Chapter 3 discusses the application of the public policy exception in instruments of 
EU civil procedure in detail, some information as to its role is needed here in order to 
understand why its (proposed) abolition has proven to be so controversial. The public policy 
exception is often seen as an ‘emergency brake’:139 due to its general formulation, it may be 
used, in extreme cases, against violations of fundamental principles, including fundamental 
rights. The primary example of such a violation is the case Krombach v. Bamberski,140 which 
is discussed in detail in the following Chapter.  
                                                 
 
133 Article 40(a) of Regulation 650/2012; Articles 22(a) and 23(a) of the Brussels IIbis Regulation; the Insolvency 
Regulations and both proposed Regulations discussed earlier refer to the Brussels I Regulation. 
134 To be discussed in Chapter 3.2.5. 
135 Article 24 of the Brussels IIbis Regulation. 
136 Article 52, Brussels Ibis Regulation; Article 26, Brussels IIbis Regulation. 
137 Franq (2016) p. 883; Hess, Pfeiffer and Schlosser (2007) para. 559. 
138 Hess, Pfeiffer and Schlosser (2007) para. 548. 
139 Kramer (2011a) p. 640. 
140 CJEU Case C-7/98 Dieter Krombach v André Bamberski ECLI:EU:C:2000:164.  
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2.3.2.2 Insufficient service in default proceedings 
 
A second ground for refusal that is found in EU instruments141 is contained in Article 45(1)(b) 
of the Brussels I bis Regulation. This Article concerns the position of a defendant in case the 
judgment was delivered by default. It aims to protect the right of the defendant to a fair hearing 
at the stage of recognition and enforcement. The conditions for application are rather strict. A 
judgment may only be refused recognition or enforcement where: 
a) it was given in default of appearance;142 but, 
b) only if the defendant was not served with the document which instituted the 
proceedings or with an equivalent document in sufficient time and in such a way 
as to enable him to arrange for his defence;  
c) unless the defendant failed to commence proceedings to challenge the judgment 
when it was possible for him to do so.  
Article 45(1)(b) should be read in conjunction with Article 28(2) of Brussels I, which also aims 
to protect the rights of the defendant in default proceedings by enabling the court to stay 
proceedings until it is satisfied that the defendant has received the requisite documents. Article 
28(2) therefore concerns the proceedings before the court of origin, while Article 45(1)(b) 
provides a safety net at the court of enforcement, which explains why the latter only applies 
under very strict circumstances. 
The document instituting the proceedings must have reached the defendant not only in 
sufficient time for him to prepare his defence, but also in such a way as to enable him to do so, 
though these two aspects are often intertwined.143 This places the focus on the actual possibility 
of the defendant to prepare his defence: an irregularity of service may not prohibit recognition 
or enforcement if it did not in fact prevent the defendant from arranging his defence. 
Finally, if the defendant did not exercise his right to challenge the decision in the country of 
origin when he was able to do so, he loses the possibility of later raising Article 45(1)(b), or 
the corresponding article in other regulations, for opposing its recognition.144 The rationale 
                                                 
 
141 Article 40(b) of Regulation 650/2012. Articles 22(b) and 23(c) of the Brussels IIbis Regulation are a little more 
lenient: recognition and enforcement may only be refused if the first two conditions apply and if the person in 
default has accepted the judgment unequivocally. This means that inactivity on the part of the person in default 
does not necessarily preclude an appeal on the basis of these articles. 
142 The term ‘default of appearance’ is applied autonomously and independently of national procedural law. See 
further Franq (2016) p. 908, citing Kropholler (2005) Article 34 para. 27: “with respect to the aim of Article 
45(1)(b) the defendant cannot be considered as having failed to appear as soon as he or his counsel presented 
arguments before the court from which it can be deduced that he has actual knowledge of the proceedings and 
enjoyed enough time to prepare his defence”. 
143 The circumstances surrounding the delivery will often determine whether the defendant had enough time to 
prepare: for example, if the defendant was served with a document in a foreign language a longer period of time 
will have been necessary. Franq (2016) p. 913. 
144 Except under the Brussels IIbis Regulation, see footnote 71. 
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behind this is that it is deemed more effective if a defendant is able to challenge the decision 
in its country of origin, rather than at the stage of enforcement in another country, when there 
is only limited scope for review.145 Article 45(1)(b) thus encourages the defendant to actively 
exercise his rights if he is able to do so; passivity on his side to challenge the decision may later 
prevent him from opposing its recognition.  
This ground for refusal provides protection of the procedural rights of the defendant under 
specific circumstances. As was explained above, the public policy exception may also be used 
to protect procedural rights, but only as a subsidiary to Article 45(1)(b); that is, if the conditions 
of Article 45(1)(b) have not been met. 
2.3.2.3 Irreconcilability 
 
A final ground for refusal common to most instruments146 is that a decision may be denied 
recognition or enforcement if it is irreconcilable either with: 
a) a decision given in proceedings between the same parties in the Member States in which 
recognition is sought;147 or, 
b) with an earlier decision given in another Member State or a third state in proceedings 
involving the same cause of action and between the same parties, provided that the 
earlier decision fulfills the conditions necessary for its recognition in the Member State 
in which recognition is sought.148 
It should be noted that this ground for refusal is the only one that was not abolished by the 
regulations that otherwise allow for complete free movement, as enforcement of two 
irreconcilable decisions is simply practically impossible. As the ECJ explained, judgments are 
irreconcilable where they entail mutually exclusive legal consequences.149 Where the 
irreconcilability is between a judgment given in the Member State where enforcement is sought 
and one in another Member State, the judgment in the Member State of enforcement is 
prioritized:150 its existence precludes recognition or enforcement, even if it was delivered 
                                                 
 
145 CJEU Case C-123/91 Minalmet GmbH v Brandeis Ltd ECLI:EU:C:1992:432, para. 19.  
146 Article 45(1)(c) and (d) Brussels Ibis Regulation; Article 22(1) ESCP Regulation; Article 22(1) EOP 
Regulation; Article 21(1) EEO Regulation; Article 21(2) Maintenance Regulation; Article 40(c) Succession 
Regulation. Again, Regulation 2201/2003 provides an exception for judgments concerning parental responsibility: 
only irreconcilability with a later judgment can lead to refusal of recognition or enforcement. This shows that the 
Regulation accepts the inherent nature of custody orders, as being open to modification by reason of a subsequent 
change in circumstances. See Borràs (1998) para. 73.  
147 Article 25(3) of the Insolvency Regulation 1346/2000 (there is no such ground for refusal for judgments 
opening proceedings); Articles 22(c) and 23(e) of the Brussels IIbis Regulation; Article 40(c) of Regulation 
650/2012. 
148 Article 25(3) of Regulation 1346/2000 (there is no such ground for refusal for judgments opening proceedings); 
Articles 22(d) and 23(f) of Regulation 2201/2003; Article 40(d) of Regulation 650/2012. It should be noted that 
‘third State’ refers to a state that is not an EU Member State. 
149 CJEU Case C-145/86 Hoffman v Krieg ECLI:EU:C:1988:61. 
150 This is the situation covered by Article 45(1)(c) of Brussels Ibis and its equivalents. 
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later.151 In these situations, the judgments do need to concern the same parties, though they 
need not be on the same cause of action. Where the irreconcilability is with a judgment 
delivered in another Member State or a third state, the judgments do need to concern the same 
cause of action.152 In these situations, priority is given to the earlier judgment. 
2.3.2.4 No review of jurisdiction, with some exceptions 
 
As a rule, the court deciding on the declaration of enforceability may not review whether or 
not the court of origin had jurisdiction.153 Review of jurisdiction ‘through the back door’ by 
applying the public policy exception is also not permitted.154 However, there are some 
exceptions. The Brussels I bis Regulation contains a number of special rules of jurisdiction that 
are intended to protect the weaker party in certain legal relationships, namely matters relating 
to insurance, consumer contracts, employment and certain exclusive jurisdiction grounds, 
among others those that apply to immovable property (sections 3, 4, 5 and 6 of Chapter II). A 
judgment may not be recognized if it does not comply with these provisions, though the court 
of enforcement is bound by the findings of fact of the court of origin (Art. 45(2)).  
2.3.2.5 Specific grounds for refusal under Brussels II bis 
 
Finally, the Brussels II bis Regulation contains some specific grounds for refusal of recognition 
of judgments concerning parental responsibility, which are necessary considering the 
sensitivity of these matters. Recognition may be refused if the child concerned was not heard 
(Art. 23(b)), except when this was not possible due to urgency; and when any person claims 
that the judgment infringes his or her parental responsibility, if it was given without that person 
having been given an opportunity to be heard (Art. 23(d)). A final ground for refusal is where 
the special procedure laid down in Article 56 for the placement of a child in another Member 
State was not followed. As discussed, no refusal grounds apply to decisions ordering the return 
of a child or those ordering access to a child; see for a detailed discussion 2.2.5, below. 
2.3.2.6 Concluding remarks 
 
Under the Brussels I bis Regulation and other instruments of EU civil justice cooperation, 
recognition or enforcement may only be refused on the basis of a limited number of grounds. 
Of these grounds, irreconcilability and incorrect service in default proceedings are only 
applicable under very specific circumstances – especially the latter has been limited in its 
practical value with the addition that it may not be relied upon unless the judgment debtor has 
done everything in his power to make himself heard. The public policy exception is the only 
                                                 
 
151 CJEU Hoffman v. Krieg. 
152 This is the situation covered by Article 45(1)(d) of Brussels Ibis and its equivalents. 
153 Article 24 of the Brussels IIbis Regulation explicitly forbids review of jurisdiction of the court of origin.  
154 Article 45(3) Brussels I Regulation. This was affirmed by the CJEU in Krombach v. Bamberski, see the 
discussion under 3.2.5. 
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ground for refusal that provides some room for interpretation, though the threshold has been 
set very high by the CJEU, as is discussed in the next Chapter. 
The next sections discuss how the various regulations facilitate recognition and enforcement.  
 
2.3.3 The Brussels I bis Regulation 
 
The regime for recognition and enforcement under the Brussels I bis Regulation155 takes a step 
back from the radical 2010 Proposal.156 Brussels I bis abolishes the requirement for a 
declaration of enforceability, and therefore the judgment import aspect of the exequatur 
procedure; but the grounds for refusal, and the mechanism for invoking them, remain the same. 
In fact, a ground for refusal has been added, with the inclusion of a breach of the jurisdiction 
rules in employment cases as laid down in Section 5 of Chapter II of the Regulation, improving 
legal protection for employees.  
2.3.3.1 Steps required to achieve enforcement under Brussels I bis 
 
The new regime for recognition and enforcement takes place over four procedural steps.157 As 
under Brussels I, recognition of a judgment from one Member State in the other Member States 
is automatic (Art. 36(1)). Article 39 provides that “a judgment given in a Member State which 
is enforceable in that Member State shall be enforceable in the other Member States without 
any declaration of enforceability being required”. To streamline the process of cross-border 
enforcement, Article 42 prescribes the documents that need to be submitted to the enforcement 
authority. It provides that, at the request of any interested party, the court of origin shall first 
issue a certificate (Art. 42) using the form set out in Annex I (Art. 53). The purpose of this 
certificate is to certify that the decision is indeed enforceable, as well as providing information 
as to the costs of the procedure and interest. Next, the judgment creditor must submit this 
certificate to the enforcement authority along with a copy of the judgment which satisfies the 
conditions necessary to establish its authenticity (Art. 42(2)).  
According to Article 43, the certificate shall then be served on the defendant in reasonable time 
before the first enforcement measure, along with the judgment itself if it has not yet been 
served. The purpose of this provision is to inform the person against whom enforcement is 
                                                 
 
155 See for a general discussion Nielsen (2013) p. 524-528; Zilinsky (2014); Hazelhorst and Kramer (2013); 
Kramer (2013); Cadet (2013). 
156 As Section 2.2.2 discussed, the 2010 Proposal included, alongside the abolition of the exequatur a narrowing 
of the grounds for refusal. The public policy exception was to be replaced with a more narrow reference to 
‘fundamental principles underlying the right to a fair trial’. The 2010 Proposal also included a redistribution of 
the authority to apply refusal grounds between the Member State of origin and the Member State of enforcement: 
the ground for refusal of undue service upon the defendant in case of a default judgment (Article 34 (2) of Brussels 
I) would be applicable only in the Member State of origin. 
157 See for a general discussion Nielsen (2013); Beraudo (2013). 
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sought of the enforcement of a judgment given in another Member State (Recital 32). If the 
defendant so requires he may request a translation of the certificate (Art. 42(3)).  
It should be noted that the certificate is not comparable to an EEO, since its provision is not 
conditional on certain minimum requirements having been fulfilled. The certificate serves only 
to provide the enforcement authority in the Member State where enforcement is sought with 
relevant information about the judgment; it does therefore not as such constitute “permission” 
to enforce a judgment in another Member State. The function of the certificate is to aid 
communication between the court of origin and the enforcement authorities in the Member 
State of enforcement; it does not as such constitute an enforceable title.  
Finally, the judgment creditor must present the required documents to the enforcement 
authority in the Member State in which enforcement is sought, which may then take measures 
in order to enforce the judgment. According to Article 41 of the Regulation, the law of the 
Member State of enforcement shall govern enforcement. This provision likely leaves room for 
enforcement disputes that are provided for by national law, since the provision does not 
substantively differ from its equivalent provision under the Brussels I Regulation. On this 
provision the CJEU ruled in Prism Investments that it did not exclude national enforcement 
disputes on grounds not included in the Regulation, despite the limitative system of grounds 
for refusal.158 
2.3.3.2 Grounds for refusal 
 
The grounds for refusal are laid down in Article 45, which is found in Section 3, subsection 1, 
entitled “Refusal of recognition”. Evidently, the grounds of refusal can be invoked to oppose 
recognition, thus reversing the 2010 Proposal that limited the use of grounds for refusal only 
to the enforcement of judicial decisions. 
According to Article 45(1) recognition shall be refused: 
a) if such recognition is manifestly contrary to public policy (ordre public) in the Member 
State addressed; 
b) where the judgment was given in default of appearance, if the defendant was not served 
with the document which instituted the proceedings or with an equivalent document in 
sufficient time and in such a way as to enable him to arrange for his defence, unless the 
defendant failed to commence proceedings to challenge the judgment when it was 
possible for him to do so; 
c) if the judgment is irreconcilable with a judgment given between the same parties in the 
Member State addressed; 
d) if the judgment is irreconcilable with an earlier judgment given in another Member 
State or in a third State involving the same cause of action and between the same parties, 
                                                 
 
158 Hazelhorst and Kramer (2013). 
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provided that the earlier judgment fulfils the conditions necessary for its recognition in 
the Member State addressed; or 
e) if the judgment conflicts with:  
(i) Sections 3, 4 or 5 of Chapter II where the policyholder, the insured, a 
beneficiary of the insurance contract, the injured party, the consumer or the 
employee was the defendant; or 
(ii) Section 6 of Chapter II. 
The grounds for refusal have thus remained the same as under the Brussels I Regulation, apart 
from article 45(1)(e), which has extended the categories of jurisdiction rules whose obedience 
is required to Section 5 of Chapter II, which includes special jurisdiction rules in employment 
cases and thus creates additional legal protection for employees, the weaker party that this 
section is designed to protect. 
According to Article 46, enforcement may be refused when one of the grounds for refusal of 
Article 45 is found to exist. The application for refusal of enforcement shall be submitted with 
the court that the Member State concerned (that is, the Member State where enforcement is 
sought) has communicated to the European Commission as being authorized to examine such 
requests. As under the Brussels I Regulation, all grounds for refusal must be examined by a 
court – not an enforcement authority, as Article 45(2) of the 2010 Proposal would have it – in 
the Member State of enforcement. The division of tasks between courts in the Member State 
of origin and that in the Member State of enforcement as originally proposed, which was so 
severely criticized, has therefore been abandoned. 
 
2.3.4 Complete free movement of judgments: the Maintenance Regulation 
 
The Maintenance Regulation demonstrates the simplest approach towards the abolition of 
exequatur. This Regulation, which is of great practical importance, has abolished exequatur for 
decisions concerning maintenance obligations159 for states that have adopted the 2007 Hague 
Protocol to the Maintenance Convention.160 This means that for the enforcement of judgments 
that fall within the remit of this Regulation, declaration of enforceability is required.161 There 
are also no possibilities of opposing recognition or enforcement of such judgments, except in 
the case of irreconcilability.162 It does, however, provide for a review procedure in case the 
                                                 
 
159 Council Regulation (EC) 4/2009 of 18 December 2009 on jurisdiction, applicable law, recognition and 
enforcement of decisions and cooperation in matters relating to maintenance obligations, OJ L7/1 (the 
‘Maintenance Regulation’). According to the Proposal, the reasons for proposing abolition of exequatur were 1) 
simplifying the citizen’s life, 2) strengthening legal certainty, and 3) ensuring effectiveness and continuity of 
recovery. See Proposal for a Council Regulation on jurisdiction, applicable law, recognition and enforcement of 
decisions and cooperation in matters relating to maintenance obligations, COM(2005) 649 final, p. 4-6. 
160 Protocol of 23 November 2007 on the Law Applicable to Maintenance Obligations, concluded in the 
framework of The Hague Conference on Private International Law. All EU Member States and Serbia have ratified 
this Protocol. 
161 Article 17 Maintenance Regulation. 
162 Article 21(2) Maintenance Regulation. 
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defendant was not served with the document instituting the proceedings in such a manner as to 
allow him to prepare for his defence, or when he was prevented from doing so by reason of 
force majeure or other extraordinary circumstances without any fault on his part, unless he 
forewent his opportunity to challenge the decision (Art. 19(1)). Unlike the second-generation 
instruments, however, the Regulation does not contain minimum standards as to the way in 
which service is to be effected. 
The Regulation does not, as the Brussels II bis Regulation does, require that a judgment be 
certified in its state of origin before it can be enforced. According to Articles 20(1) and (2) of 
the Maintenance Regulation, all the creditor needs to do in order to enforce a maintenance order 
is to submit a copy of the judgment and an extract from it which is provided by the court of 
origin (Annex A to the Regulation). There is therefore no control of compliance with any 
standards regarding service of documents or otherwise. 
The Maintenance Regulation thus allows for complete free movement of decisions pertaining 
to maintenance. It is remarkable that all refusal grounds have been abolished for these 
decisions, because as Chapter 3 discusses, practice shows that the public policy exception was 
invoked in maintenance cases many times when these cases still fell within the remit of the 
Brussels I Regulation, at least once successfully.163 
2.3.5 Automatic enforcement with minimum standards under the Brussels II 
bis Regulation  
 
The Brussels II bis Regulation governs the recognition and enforcement of judgments 
concerning parental responsibility and those concerning divorce, legal separation or parental 
responsibility. Under this Regulation, recognition also does not require any special procedure 
(Art. 21(1)). It is, however, possible to oppose recognition under Brussels II bis (Art. 21(3)). 
The reason why this is possible is that recognition of the judgments that fall within the material 
scope of this Regulation may have far-reaching legal effects. For example, automatic 
recognition of a judgment granting divorce would enable an interested party to claim 
maintenance on the basis of that judgment. Article 28(1) requires a declaration of enforceability 
for judgments concerning parental responsibility. As under the Brussels I Regulation, neither 
the party against whom enforcement is sought, nor the child concerned, may make submissions 
at this stage (Art. 31(1)). Since judgments concerning divorce, separation or annulment do not 
require enforcement, no exequatur exists for these judgments. Finally, it should be pointed out 
that Brussels II bis does not contain an exequatur procedure for judgments concerning access 
rights (Art. 41(1)) and ordering the return of a child (Art. 42(1)). Chapter 3 discusses the 
practical consequences of this arrangement.  
                                                 
 
163 See Chapter 3.2.6.1. 
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To understand the changes brought about by the Brussels II bis Regulation, it must be 
considered in comparison with the 1980 Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of 
International Child Abduction164 (hereinafter: the 1980 Convention), which applies in the EU 
alongside Brussels II bis.165 The 1980 Convention provides a uniform rule on the conditions 
governing the return of an abducted child. Article 12 of the 1980 Convention requires the state 
to which the child was abducted to order the return of the child ‘forthwith’. Article 13(1) 
provides that that state may refuse to order the return of the child if:  
a) the person, institution or other body having the care of the person of the child was 
not actually exercising the custody rights at the time of removal or retention, or had 
consented to or subsequently acquiesced in the removal or retention; or, 
b) there is a grave risk that his or her return would expose the child to physical or 
psychological harm or otherwise place the child in an intolerable situation. 
The rule is therefore that an abducted child should be returned to its state of habitual residence 
without any delay, unless one of the grounds for refusal applies. The defences, especially the 
‘grave risk defence’, should be interpreted restrictively,166 in order to discourage abductors 
from claiming it too freely simply to gain time. 
The most important innovation when compared to the 1980 Convention is the reform of the 
enforcement regime of judgments requiring the return of a child. As explained above, under 
the 1980 Convention it was the court in the state to where the child was abducted which was 
obliged to order the child’s return (Art. 12), retaining the possibility to refuse such an order on 
the grounds of Article 13. Under the Brussels II bis Regulation, this system is replaced with 
one where the court of the Member State where the child was habitually resident should order 
his or her return; the Member State to where the child was abducted should then, on the basis 
of mutual recognition, enforce this order, without any possibility of refusing its enforcement.167 
Any discretionary powers to decide on the return of the child lie with the Member State where 
the child was habitually resident prior to the abduction.  
There are therefore no grounds in the Regulation on which the court in the Member State to 
where the child was abducted may refuse enforcement of a return order. It is important to note 
that the procedure of Articles 12 and 13 of the 1980 Convention remains applicable within the 
EU, but that a number of rules within Brussels II bis curtail its application. Article 11(4) of 
Brussels II bis provides that return may not be refused on the basis of Article 13(b) of the 1980 
                                                 
 
164 Convention of 25 October 1980 on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction.  
165 Because the 1980 Convention remains in force within the EU, the following discussion on the child abduction 
regime in the EU refers where relevant also to that Convention. See also Article 62(2) of Brussels IIbis that 
provides that “The conventions mentioned in Article 60, in particular the 1980 Hague Convention, continue to 
produce effects between the Member States which are party thereto” unless the Brussels IIbis Regulation takes 
precedence.  
166 Pérez-Vera (1982) para. 34. 
167 Article 41(1)) and 42(1) Brussels IIbis Regulation. Note that this only applies to those States that have ratified 
the 2007 Protocol to the Hague Convention on the law applicable to maintenance obligations: Protocol of 23 
November 2007 on the Law Applicable to Maintenance Obligations. 
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Convention if it is established that adequate arrangements have been made to secure the 
protection of the child after his or her return. Furthermore, a court cannot refuse to return a 
child unless the party that requested his or her return has been heard (Art. 11(5)). Finally, and 
vitally, Article 11(8) of Brussels II bis provides that a refusal by a state on the basis of Article 
13 1980 Convention can be trumped by a subsequent judgment requiring the return of a child 
from the Member State with jurisdiction (i.e., the state of habitual residence of the child prior 
to the abduction). Such a subsequent judgment is immediately enforceable throughout the EU 
pursuant to Article 42(1) of the Regulation once it has been certified by the court that ordered 
it. To safeguard the rights of the parties involved, as well as those of the child, the court is 
required to check whether they were given an opportunity to be heard prior to issuing the 
certificate. With this arrangement, the possibilities for Member States to where a child has been 
abducted to refuse return are therefore severely curtailed when compared to the 1980 
Convention.  
According to the Explanatory Memorandum to the Proposal for this Regulation,168 the decision 
to abolish exequatur for return orders was made on the basis of a French initiative.169 This 
initiative stated as reasons that the right of a child to maintain contact with both parents after a 
separation must be protected, while the parent with custody must also be guaranteed that the 
child will return.170 While the French proposal only proposed abolition of exequatur for 
judgments concerning rights of access,171 the Regulation abolished it for both these judgments 
and those ordering the return of a child. For these judgments, no declaration of enforceability 
is needed: such a judgment may be enforced immediately once it has been certified as being 
enforceable by the judge of origin. It has rightly been pointed out that because it was only 
achieved for these two categories of decisions, abolition of exequatur in family law has a very 
limited scope,172 but as already mentioned, it is seen as a step along the way. 
The certification of the judgment by the judge of origin has thus replaced the role of the 
declaration of enforceability for these judgments. Articles 41(2) and 42(2) contain certain 
minimum requirements that must be fulfilled before the judge of origin may issue a certificate. 
For judgments concerning rights of access, the judge must make sure that (a) if the judgment 
was given in default, the person defaulting was given sufficient opportunity to defend him or 
herself, or accepted the decision unequivocally; (b) that all parties were given the opportunity 
to be heard; and (c) the child was given an opportunity to be heard, unless such a hearing was 
considered inappropriate due to the child’s age or degree of maturity. For judgments ordering 
                                                 
 
168 Proposal for a Council Regulation concerning jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments 
in matrimonial matters an in matters of parental responsibility repealing Regulation (EC) No 1347/2000 and 
amending Regulation (EC) No 44/2001 in matters relating to maintenance, COM (2002) 222 final/2, p. 2. 
169 Initiative of the French Republic with the view to adopting a Council Regulation on the mutual enforcement 
of judgments on rights of access to children, OJ C 234/7. 
170 Initiative of the French Republic with the view to adopting a Council Regulation on the mutual enforcement 
of judgments on rights of access to children, OJ C 234/7, recitals 3 and 13. 
171 In order to ensure the return of a child to its state of residence, the initiative proposed that the authorities in the 
state where the child is staying order the prompt return on the application of the parent with custody. Articles 10 
and 11,  
172 Boele-Woelki and Gonzàlez Beilfuss (2007) p. 7. 
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the return of a child, the Regulation also requires that the child and parents were given an 
opportunity to be heard (Art. 42(2)(a) and (b)) and that the court has taken into account in 
issuing its judgment the reasons for and evidence underlying the order pursuant to Article 13 
of the 1980 Hague Convention on Child Abduction. 
Certification is done using standardized forms that are attached to the Regulation by way of 
Annexes (Annex III and IV). These certificates are very simple in that they only require the 
court to fill out some information such as the names and addresses of the parties concerned, 
and check some boxes saying that the minimum requirements have been observed. 
It is therefore not the case that a judgment can be enforced immediately once it has been 
delivered: it is still necessary to request a certificate from the court that rendered the judgment. 
However, the certification mechanism differs considerably from the procedure for obtaining a 
declaration of enforceability. The most significant difference is of course that a certificate is 
issued by the court of origin. This not only removes the cross-border element of the exequatur 
procedure, but by leaving this responsibility with the court of origin, also the opportunity of 
control by a court which was not involved in the original proceedings. 
Second of all, while the court of origin is required to check that the minimum requirements 
have been satisfied, there is no possibility for appeal if these requirements are thought to have 
been violated. It is thus entirely the court of origin’s responsibility and prerogative to check 
whether they have been complied with (Art. 43(2) of the Regulation). That this arrangement 
should be observed strictly was confirmed by the ECJ in its judgment in Zarraga,173 which is 
discussed in the following Chapter. 
It can be concluded that since the Regulation contains no requirement of a declaration of 
enforceability and no possibility to oppose enforcement in the Member State of enforcement 
the Brussels II bis Regulation allows for nearly complete free movement of judgments 
concerning rights of access and those ordering the return of a child. By introducing minimum 
standards that are checked by the court of origin, it has however retained some of its inspection 
function. The approach taken in this Regulation is therefore less radical than that chosen in the 
Maintenance Regulation. As Section 2.2.4.2 discussed, in its 2014 Report on Brussels II bis, 
the Commission recommended extending the abolition of exequatur, in combination with the 
appropriate safeguards to take the place of refusal grounds.  
2.3.6 Automatic enforcement with minimum standards under the European 
Enforcement Order 
 
                                                 
 
173 CJEU Case C-491/10 PPU Joseba Andoni Aguirre Zarraga v Simone Pelz ECLI:EU:C:2010:828. 
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The Regulation creating the EEO was introduced in 2004.174 This Regulation seeks to facilitate 
the cross-border enforcement of uncontested claims. If a claim is uncontested within the 
meaning of this Regulation,175 the court of origin may certify its decision as an EEO provided 
certain minimum standards are fulfilled. The certified decision can then be enforced throughout 
the EU. The certification as an EEO is an administrative procedure during which the judgment 
debtor is not heard. By means of compensation, the Regulation contains minimum standards 
relating to service of documents and provision to the debtor of due information about the 
claim,176 which the court of origin is required to check before issuing the certificate. In essence, 
the EEO thus places the responsibility for judgment inspection with the court of origin of the 
judgment. If these minimum standards have not been complied with, such non-compliance can 
be cured if it is proven that the debtor has failed to challenge the judgment even though he was 
able to do so (Art. 18(1)). If this is not the case, the judgment certified may be reviewed in the 
Member State of origin if (a) the debtor was not served with the documents in such a way to 
allow him to arrange for his defence, or (b) he was not able to object to the claim by reason of 
force majeure, in either case provided that he acts promptly (Art. 19(1)). 
As a judgment certified as an EEO, or a decision resulting from one of the two autonomous 
procedures, is immediately enforceable in all other Member States, a court or other judicial 
authority in the Member State of enforcement has no authority to review it in any way. All 
three instruments contain an article explicitly stating that exequatur has been abolished and that 
the decision in question “shall be recognized and enforced in the other Member States without 
the need for a declaration of enforceability and without any possibility of opposing its 
recognition”.177 The regulations therefore also do not contain any of the traditional grounds for 
refusal such as public policy review. The only ground on which enforcement may be refused 
is irreconcilability with an earlier judgment in the state of enforcement, but the reason why this 
ground remains is less to do with ideology than with the fact that enforcing two irreconcilable 
judgments is a logical impossibility. 
 
                                                 
 
174 See for a discussion of the instrument Bittman (2008); Zilinsky (2005); Zilinsky (2006). 
175 According to Article 3(1) of the EEO Regulation, a claim shall be regarded as uncontested if (a) the debtor has 
expressly agreed to it by admission or by means of a settlement which has been approved by a court or concluded 
before a court in the course of proceedings; or (b) the debtor has never objected to it, in compliance with the 
relevant procedural requirements under the law of the Member State of origin, in the course of the court 
proceedings; or (c) the debtor has not appeared or been represented at a court hearing regarding that claim after 
having initially objected to the claim in the course of the court proceedings, provided that such conduct amounts 
to a tacit admission of the claim or of the facts alleged by the creditor under the law of the Member State of origin; 
or (d) the debtor has expressly agreed to it in an authentic instrument. 
176 Article 16 EEO Regulation.  
177 EOP Regulation, Article 19; ESCP Regulation, Article 20(1); EEO Regulation, Article 5. 
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2.3.7 Automatic enforcement on the basis of common rules in the uniform 
procedures 
 
The EEO for uncontested claims paved the way for two autonomous harmonized EU 
instruments, the EOP and the ESCP.  
The EOP is aimed at swift and efficient recovery of outstanding debts “over which no legal 
controversy exists”.178 It can be characterized as a one-step procedure or as a primarily 
administrative nature, since all that is required from the claimant is to fill in a number of 
standard forms concerning information about the claim and a description of the evidence. On 
the basis of the information provided, a court then issues an order for payment. While there is 
some uncertainty as to the extent to which the court will review the case on the merits,179 the 
possibility to have the application reviewed through an automatic procedure (Art. 8) appears 
to preclude a thorough examination of the merits. This means that an EOP can be obtained 
fairly easily. It is then served on the defendant, and it becomes the defendant’s responsibility 
to oppose the order for payment if he deems it to be wrongfully granted. If no statement of 
opposition is lodged, the order is declared enforceable, and since the Regulation has abolished 
the exequatur (Art. 19), there is no possibility of opposing its enforcement in other Member 
States. This arrangement clearly favours the claimant, requiring the defendant to take action to 
oppose the Order to prevent it being enforced against him. To compensate this, the Regulation 
provides for a review procedure in the Member State of origin for cases in which the defendant 
was not served with the order in such a manner to allow him to arrange for his defence (Art. 
20(1)); or when the order for payment “was clearly wrongly issued, having regard to the 
requirements laid down in this Regulation, or due to other exceptional circumstances”. The 
Regulation does not further explain what “exceptional circumstances” are or when an order 
may be considered to have been “clearly wrongly issued”. It has been pointed out that this 
leaves a lot of room for interpretation,180 but given the “exceptional” nature of the review, a 
limited application seems appropriate.181  
The ESCP is the only real adversarial procedure of the three instruments and works in much 
the same way as corresponding procedures under national law.182 The claimant lodges his claim 
with the competent court in the Member State of his choosing. The claim form, which must 
                                                 
 
178 EOP Regulation, Recital 6. 
179 Article 8 does not make clear whether the claim is to be reviewed on the merits. Recital 16 of the Regulation 
provides that the court reviews the claim on the basis of the information provided by the claimant, which would 
allow it to review prima facie the merits of the claim and inter alia to exclude any unfounded or unmeritorious 
claims, yet goes on to state that “the examination should not need to be carried out by a judge”. This, combined 
with the provision in article 8 that the examination may be conducted automatically, appears to rule out a thorough 
examination of the merits. See Kramer (2010) p. 24. 
180 Kramer (2010) p. 26. 
181 Kramer (2007) p. 47-49 and Kramer (2009) p. 101-103. 
182 See for an analysis Kramer (2008a); Kramer (2008b). 
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include a description of the evidence, is served on the defendant, who may then submit a 
response. After having received this response and, if necessary, after an oral hearing, the court 
decides on the claim. Appeal is only possible if the law of the Member State in question 
provides for it. As under the EOP and EEO Regulations, review is possible if the defendant can 
show that he was not served with the order in such a manner to allow him to arrange for his 
defence (Art. 18(1)). In December 2015, a regulation was adopted which widened the scope of 
the review procedure for the ESCP Regulation.183 This amendment is discussed in Chapter 8.184 
By providing a – wholly European – alternative to existing national procedures and 
instruments, the ESCP, EOP and EEO Regulations adopt a new approach towards facilitating 
cross-border litigation and are therefore seen as “second-generation instruments”.185 All three 
result in a title which is immediately enforceable throughout the EU, and which cannot be 
reviewed across borders; the authority thus lies with the court of origin. Apart from 
irreconcilability, all grounds for refusal have been replaced with minimum requirements that 
are checked by the court of origin. As no declaration of enforceability is required and no cross-
border check of any kind is possible, the judgment import as well as the judgment inspection 
function of exequatur have been truly left behind under these instruments. The abolition of 
exequatur and, in particular, the abandonment of public policy review under these instruments 
have been criticized in literature,186 though as these objections relate more generally to the 
abolition of exequatur in EU legislation, they are discussed in Chapter 3.2.7 along with other 
criticisms on this development. 
 
2.3.8 Interim conclusion: the significance of the reforms for fundamental 
rights protection 
 
The previous sections have shown that it is difficult to detect a consistent approach towards the 
abolition of exequatur. The solutions chosen range from complete abolition of exequatur (the 
Maintenance Regulation) to abolition with some safeguards, checked by means of certification 
(Brussels II bis) to autonomous procedures, including minimum standards, which aim to 
replace (EEO) or circumvent (ESCP and EOP) the exequatur.  
What is especially remarkable is that the EEO Regulation has as of yet still to be evaluated by 
the European Commission. An evaluation of the abolition of exequatur under this instrument 
would have provided valuable information on the practical consequences this has had. The fact 
that the EEO Regulation has not been evaluated is especially regrettable because this 
instrument was used to clear the way for the abolition of exequatur on a larger scale. The 
                                                 
 
183 Regulation (EU) 2015/2421 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 2015 amending 
Regulation (EC) No 861/2007 establishing a European Small Claims Procedure and Regulation (EC) No 
1896/2006 creating a European order for payment procedure, OJ L 341/1. 
184 Article 18 ESCP Regulation, as amended by Regulation 2015/2421. See Chapter 8.5.2. 
185 Kramer (2011a) p. 633. 
186 Van der Grinten (2006); Van Bochove (2007); Cuniberti (2007-2008).  
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Maintenance Regulation, which achieved the most radical reforms, has also not yet been 
evaluated, though its evaluation is not due until 2016 (Art. 74).  
In conclusion, the only element all instruments have in common is the abolition of cross-border 
control of judicial decisions (save under certain “exceptional circumstances” under the EOP 
Regulation). Whether this element in itself has protective value is discussed in Chapter 3. 
 
2.4 Conclusion 
 
Free movement of judgments is essential to guaranteeing legal certainty, which is important to 
individual litigants, but also to the European legal order as a whole. Effective cross-border 
enforcement of civil judgments protects not only judgment creditor’s right to enforcement but 
also, in the greater scheme, creates faith in the efficiency of the justice system, which in turn 
stimulates intra-EU trade and other types of legal relationships. However, it was shown that 
efficiency of cross-border enforcement needs to be, and has been, combined with effective 
protection of debtor’s procedural rights as well. The next Chapter explains in detail why such 
safeguards are necessary to protect debtor’s rights. This Chapter showed that traditionally the 
grounds for refusal of recognition and enforcement acted as safeguards, but that these have 
been progressively abolished by the EU legislature as a result of the introduction of mutual 
recognition. The various regulations achieved this abolition in different ways, ranging from an 
abolition of exequatur combined with a retention of refusal grounds (Brussels I bis) to a 
complete abolition of both the exequatur and the refusal grounds (the Maintenance Regulation). 
The adoption of uniform European procedures, the ESCP and the EOP, but also the provisional 
instrument of the EAPO, shows the European legislature’s innovativeness and willingness to 
move beyond the traditional modes of cooperation in civil justice. 
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3. Protection of fundamental rights by EU instruments on 
cross-border recognition and enforcement 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
This Chapter discusses why the simplification of the European Union (EU) regime for 
recognition and enforcement of civil judgments is important to the protection of the 
fundamental rights of EU citizens. 
It starts by discussing the role of the public policy exception, which is arguably the primary 
tool for addressing fundamental rights violations in the context of cross-border recognition and 
enforcement. The previous Chapter showed that a large number of EU instruments abolished 
the public policy exception,1 while the Brussels I bis Regulation retained it after its proposed 
abolition was met with severe criticism.2 This Chapter goes deeper into the question of why 
the abolition of public policy was so controversial. It begins by discussing the public policy 
exception in its wider political and legal context (Section 3.2). It argues that the value of the 
public policy exception lies in its flexibility, its deference to national definitions of public 
policy and the fact that it protects against systemic failures. Next, the functioning of the public 
policy exception in instruments of EU private international law is explained to show how this 
protection is effected in practice.  
The scope of this Chapter is wider, however, than the role of the public policy exception in the 
protection of fundamental rights. Section 3.3 explains how other grounds of refusal also 
perform this role: namely, the possibility of refusal of recognition in case of ineffective service, 
the review of jurisdiction in certain cases, and the requirement to hear the child and the parents 
included in the Brussels II bis Regulation. Recent regulations that have abolished exequatur 
have also abolished these grounds for refusal. Though their abolition has not proved as 
politically controversial as the abolition of public policy review, the role of these grounds in 
the protection of fundamental rights needs to be considered. 
Section 3.4 discusses whether the cross-border review of civil judgment that refusal of 
recognition or enforcement entails is valuable in and of itself. This is an important question, 
because the EU instruments that abolished cross-border checks replaced them with common 
(‘minimum’) standards that are to be checked by a court in the Member State of origin of the 
judgment. It is discussed whether such home-state control is as effective a remedy for 
fundamental rights violations as refusal of enforcement by the state where recognition or 
enforcement is sought. 
                                                 
 
1 Chapter 2.3.3 onwards. 
2 Chapter 2.2.2.  
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Section 3.5 shows the relevance of this question by examining recent case law of the European 
Court of Justice (ECJ) and the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) in cases where 
exequatur has been abolished. The Court of Justice of the European Union’s (CJEU) judgment 
in Zarraga shows the possible consequences for fundamental rights protection if a court in the 
Member State of enforcement is no longer allowed to exercise any control on a foreign 
judgment because refusal grounds have been abolished (in this case under the Brussels II bis 
Regulation).  
 
3.2 The role of the public policy exception in the protection of 
fundamental rights 
 
As Chapter 2 explained, the move towards complete free movement of civil judgments within 
the EU was met with severe criticism regarding the possible consequences for fundamental 
rights protection, particularly in the context of the recast of the Brussels I Regulation. These 
concerns primarily centered on the abolition of the public policy exception,3 because, as will 
be shown, the public policy exception can play a vital role in the protection of fundamental 
rights.4 The Brussels I bis Regulation retains a public policy exception, after a proposal to 
reduce its scope was met with fierce academic and political criticism.5 Many other instruments 
have abolished refusal grounds however, including public policy. This development has been 
criticized on the grounds that the public policy exception allowed Member States to refuse 
enforcement of judgments that constituted fundamental rights violations, and that its abolition 
therefore creates a risk that such judgments could circulate across the EU without any 
possibility to prevent them from taking effect. This section therefore shows how the public 
policy exception has acted as a remedy for violations of fundamental rights. 
3.2.1 The concept of public policy 
 
To understand the link between public policy and fundamental rights, it is first necessary to 
define the concept and to explore its scope. Public policy, in the context of private international 
law, essentially refers to the fundamental principles underlying the legal order where a foreign 
law or foreign decision is to take effect. Public policy is used to avoid unacceptable results (in 
                                                 
 
3 See the literature discussed under 3.2.7. 
4 See in general Callsen (2011); Vlas (2013); Kinsch (2004); Kinsch (2011) p. 44-45; Fawcett (2007); Schilling 
(2012); Oster (2015); Wurmnest (2016).  
5 Chapter 2.2.2.  
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the view of the local forum) that would arise from the acceptance into the legal order of a 
foreign decision or foreign law.6 
In a recent and extensive exploration of the concept’s meaning in the EU, Corthaut defines 
public policy as “the complex of norms at the very heart of a political entity expressing and 
protecting the basic options taken by that entity in respect of its political, economic, social and 
cultural order”.7 This definition expresses the diversity of norms and principles which public 
policy may encompass. Public policy is clearly a living concept, whose content may evolve 
according to time and place.8  
What is also important is that this definition may apply to any political entity: a state quite 
clearly constitutes a political entity, but so does a political organisation like the EU. This means 
that in the multilevel and pluriform structure of EU public policy has a unique role: while it 
exists at the Member State level, the EU, being a political entity founded on common values, 
must also necessarily have its own concept of public policy.9 
Public policy plays a role in the internal legal order of many states, but it also plays a role in 
defining relationships between states. In private international law, states may apply public 
policy as a ground for refusing the recognition of foreign judgments, or against the application 
of foreign law that is deemed contrary to public policy. When a state applies public policy in 
this manner, it essentially imposes its national values on acts of foreign states. This form of 
public policy is therefore referred to as external public policy (ordre public externe) and is 
much narrower than the concept of public policy that states might apply internally.10 Within 
the EU, external public policy has taken on a new dimension by defining the relationship 
between the Union and its Member States. For instance, under the Treaties, public policy is 
one of the grounds Member States may invoke to block the application of free movement law.11 
A recent, and much discussed, example of a case where national public policy was applied to 
limit the free movement of services is Omega,12 in which the CJEU held that the objective of 
protecting human dignity was a legitimate interest which justified a restriction of the 
                                                 
 
6 Gebauer (2007) no. 1. In the European Union, Article 21 of the Rome I Regulation on the law applicable to 
contractual obligations, and Article 26 of the Rome II Regulation on the law applicable to non-contractual 
obligations, allow courts to refuse the application of a provision of foreign law “only if such application is 
manifestly incompatible with the public policy (ordre public) of the forum”. Regulation (EC) No 593/2008 of the 
European Parliament and of the Council of 17 June 2008 on the law applicable to contractual obligations (Rome 
I) OJ L 177/6; Regulation (EC) No 864/2007 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 July 2007 on 
the law applicable to non-contractual obligations (Rome II) OJ L 199/40. 
7 Corthaut (2012) p. 15.  
8 Kessedjian (2007) p. 28. See for a more in-depth discussion of the concept Chapter 7. 
9 Corthaut (2012) p. 16. 
10 Van Hoek (2001) p. 1018. 
11 Kessedjian (2007) p. 28; see articles 36 (free movement of goods) 45(3) (free movement of workers) 52 
(freedom of establishment and to provide services) and 65 (1) (freedom of capital) of the Treaty on the Functioning 
of the European Union. 
12 CJEU Case C-36/02 Omega Spielhallen ECLI:EU:C:2004:614. 
 76 
 
obligations imposed by EU law. In this way, principles regarded as fundamental to Germany’s 
legal order prevented provisions of EU law from taking effect. 
Fundamental principles of EU law may also come within the scope of Member State’s external 
public policy: in Eco Swiss China Time,13 the CJEU found that the EU prohibition on cartels 
was so fundamental that it should prevent the enforcement in an EU Member State of a Chinese 
arbitral award that contravenes this prohibition. In this case, principles of EU law were deemed 
to be part of Member State’s public policy, and as such prevented the foreign arbitral act from 
taking effect. 
Because public policy refers only to the most fundamental principles underlying a legal order, 
and because of the disruptive consequences its application may have,14 external public policy 
is normally quite closely circumscribed. It is generally accepted that it may only be applied in 
exceptional cases.15 At the same time, it is important to stress that when public policy is applied 
to refuse recognition or enforcement of a foreign judgment, it is only the recognition or 
enforcement of that judgment which is deemed to be contrary to public policy, not the judgment 
as such.16 The effects of a decision that a judgment may not be recognised or enforced therefore 
are therefore confined to the state where enforcement is sought; it does not purport to prevent 
or reverse the foreign judgment. Still, in a EU that aims to harmonise and stimulate free cross-
border movement of judgments, refusal of enforcement is in principle considered undesirable, 
and it is therefore not surprising that the CJEU has influenced the interpretation of the principle 
of public policy through its case law. 
3.2.2 Public policy and the European Convention on Human Rights 
 
Besides being interpreted by the CJEU, the content of public policy in the European states has 
been influenced by international human rights law, in particular by the European Convention 
on Human Rights (ECHR). In fact, the ECtHR has affirmed that the “Convention [is] a 
constitutional instrument of European public order (ordre public).”17 In this way the ECtHR 
has entrenched the values embodied in the Convention more firmly into the legal orders of the 
signatory states, enhancing its status. 
A second consequence, however, is that external public policy has also come under the 
influence of the ECHR. In its judgment in Drozd and Janousek v. France and Spain, the ECtHR 
held that signatory states could be prevented from transferring prisoners on the basis of a 
foreign judgment if that judgment was the result of a “flagrant denial of justice”, even if that 
                                                 
 
13 CJEU Case C-126/97 Eco Swiss China Time Ltd vs Benetton International NV ECLI:EU:C:1999:269, paras. 
36-37. 
14 As explained under 2.3.1.4.  
15 Corthaut (2012) p. 23. 
16 Franq (2016) p. 882. 
17 ECHR Loizidou v. Turkey (preliminary objections) appl. no. 15318/89, 1995, para. 75 
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judgment was rendered in a non-signatory state.18 ECHR signatory states are therefore in 
certain circumstances required to prevent decisions from non-signatory states from taking 
effect, if that effect is likely to result in violations of Convention rights. In this way, the rights 
protected by the ECHR became part of the ECHR signatories’ ordre public externe. In Drozd 
and Janousek and later cases the ECtHR was not however consistent on the question whether 
all (potential) violations of ECHR rights should lead to a refusal by the requested state to 
cooperate, or whether only certain very serious violations should give rise to such an obligation. 
This question of the appropriate yardstick gave rise to much discussion and is examined in 
Chapter 7.19 
In some circumstances, this obligation applies also to the enforcement of foreign civil 
judgments, as the ECtHR ruled in Pellegrini.20 This case concerned the recognition in Italy of 
a marriage annulment granted by the Ecclesiastical Court of the Vatican. The applicant in this 
case appealed against the permission for enforcement granted by the Italian courts on the basis 
that she had not been adequately informed of the proceedings in the Ecclesiastical Court, so 
that her right to a fair hearing under Article 6(1) ECHR had been violated. The ECtHR ruled 
that its task in the matter was not to examine whether the Vatican courts had acted in conformity 
with article 6(1) ECHR, given that the Vatican is not a signatory to the Convention. Rather, it 
had to examine whether the Italian court had adequately reviewed whether the applicant’s 
rights under the Convention had been observed prior to granting permission for enforcement. 
The ECtHR ruled that: 
In these circumstances the Court considers that the Italian courts breached their duty of 
satisfying themselves, before authorising enforcement of the Roman Rota’s judgment, 
that the applicant had had a fair trial in the proceedings under canon law. (para. 47).  
In this judgment, the ECtHR thus imposes on national courts a duty to verify, prior to 
recognizing a foreign judgment, whether the right to a fair trial was adequately protected. 
However, the judgment refers explicitly to judgments emanating from states that have not 
ratified the ECHR, in this case the Vatican.21 This requires countries that are signatories to the 
ECHR to apply their obligations under the ECHR to acts of foreign (non-signatory) states, 
effectively extending the territorial reach of the ECHR.22 Importantly, the ECtHR did not 
attenuate the scope of Article 6(1) in Pellegrini; namely, it did not indicate that only “flagrant” 
violations of Article 6(1) should lead to refusal of recognition or enforcement.23 
                                                 
 
18 ECHR Drozd and Janousek v France and Spain [GC], no. 12747/87, 1992; Lush (1993); De Schutter (2006) p. 
202-204. See also the earlier Soering case: ECHR Soering v. United Kingdom [GC], no. 14038/88, 1989. 
19 Kinsch (2004) p. 210-211; Fawcett (2007) p. 3-5; Schilling (2012). See Chapter 5.2. 
20 ECtHR Pellegrini v. Italy, appl. no. 30882/96 ECHR 2001-VIII. 
21 See Kinsch (2004) p. 228. 
22 Fawcett calls this the “indirect effect” of article 6 ECHR: Fawcett (2007) p. 3-5. 
23 ECtHR Pellegrini, para. 47. See Briggs (2005) p. 187; Cuniberti (2008) p. 33-34. 
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This raises the question of whether the obligation to refuse recognition or permission for 
enforcement under Pellegrini is limited to judgments from non-signatory states, or whether it 
also applies in the intra-EU context, where all Member States are by necessity signatories to 
the Convention. This question was debated during the recast process of the Brussels I 
Regulation.24 If an obligation to refuse enforcement of judgments that in some way infringe 
Convention rights could be inferred from Pellegrini, then complete free movement would 
deprive signatory states that are also EU Member States from the only available mechanism 
for fulfilling that obligation. Chapter 5.2 examines the Pellegrini judgment and later case law 
in more detail. It shows that the ECtHR applies a different framework in cases involving the 
enforcement of judicial decisions from one EU Member State in another on the basis of EU 
legislation: the Bosphorus doctrine. Thus, in light of this later case law, Pellegrini cannot be 
said to give rise to an obligation for EU Member States to refuse recognition or enforcement 
of judgments from other EU Member States if those judgments constitute a violation of one of 
the Convention rights.  
This finding does not refute the conclusion that the ECtHR has entrenched Convention rights 
into the application of external public policy by its signatory states. Though a general obligation 
to refuse enforcement even to judgments emanating from EU Member States cannot be derived 
from Pellegrini, there is no doubt that Convention rights must play a part in a national court’s 
decision to recognize or enforce a foreign judgment, as they are contained in their national 
public policy. That this conclusion holds for the recognition and enforcement of judgments 
under European instruments of civil procedure is clear from the CJEU’s judgment in Krombach 
v. Bamberski, discussed in detail further on.  
 
3.2.3 The inclusion of a public policy exception in instruments of EU civil 
procedure 
 
The foregoing discussed the concept of public policy and its function in classical private 
international law in general terms. The following discusses more specifically some of the 
features of the public policy exception as included in instruments of EU civil procedure. 
With regard to the protective function of the public policy exception, it is first of all worth 
noting that the public policy exception may only be examined when invoked by one of the 
interested parties. This was different under the 1968 Brussels Convention: under the 
Convention, the grounds for refusal could be invoked ex officio when deciding on the 
application for a declaration of enforceability (the judgment import stage). Brussels I forbade 
the examination of refusal grounds at the judgment import stage. Since Brussels I bis abolished 
the judgment import stage, grounds for refusal are only examined in the second, judgment 
                                                 
 
24 Schilling (2011); Kinsch (2004) p. 228. 
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inspection stage, if one of the parties applies for refusal of recognition or enforcement.25 Under 
Brussels II bis, refusal of recognition does appear to be applicable ex officio, since Articles 22 
and 23 of that Regulation do not require that an interested party invoke the refusal grounds. 
The same applies to the Succession Regulation.26 
A second limitation on the use of the public policy exception was introduced when the Brussels 
I Regulation came to replace the Brussels Convention. Since then, recognition or enforcement 
may only be refused when it would be manifestly against public policy. The Brussels 
Convention did not contain this qualification, which codifies the CJEU’s interpretation of the 
public policy exception in its judgment in Krombach v. Bamberski, which is discussed later on. 
However, since it was already concluded that public policy by definition consists only of 
principles that are considered to be of fundamental importance, its function as a last resort in 
extreme cases was already apparent. This qualification was therefore not considered to 
substantially reduce the scope of the public policy exception.27 
Finally it should be mentioned that the public policy exception under the European instruments 
has a residual function: it only applies in cases where the other, more specific, grounds for 
refusal do not apply.28 
 
3.2.4 Substantive and procedural public policy 
 
Public policy covers both procedural and substantive issues. The former concerns the substance 
of the judgment of which recognition or enforcement is requested; the latter concerns the 
procedure leading up to the delivery of that judgment. For the purposes of this thesis, which is 
concerned with the protection of the right to a fair trial in cross-border situations, the abolition 
of procedural public policy is clearly most relevant. The content of procedural public policy in 
relation to the right to a fair trial is the subject of Chapter 7. The substantive aspect of public 
policy is however also important in view of the protection of fundamental rights other than fair 
trial, and it is therefore worth briefly considering its application.29 
Substantive public policy may be applied in cases where the outcome is considered to be 
contrary to fundamental principles or mandatory provisions of the Member State of 
enforcement, such as where damages were awarded on a legal basis that is not recognized in 
                                                 
 
25 Chapter 2.3.3.2; Article 45, Brussels Ibis Regulation; Fitchen (2015) p. 437. 
26 Article 40, Succession Regulation. 
27 Franq (2012) p. 660. This is borne out by the 1999 Proposal which states that this adverb is intended to 
‘underscore” the exceptional nature of the public policy exception (p. 23). 
28 CJEU Case 145/86 Hoffman v Krieg ECLI:EU:C:1988:6. 
29 For instance Dickinson (2011) p. 8.  
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the Member State addressed.30 The leading European case on this matter is the CJEU’s 
judgment in Renault/Maxicar,31 in which the party opposing enforcement (Maxicar) held that 
the French law on intellectual property rights that was applied in the judgment to be enforced 
was contrary to Community law. The CJEU decided, reiterating the relative character of public 
policy, that a mere difference in the law between the Member State of origin and that of 
enforcement, or an alleged error in that law, does not justify recourse to public policy: it is only 
the result of recognition or enforcement which can be considered to be contrary to public 
policy, not the law as such. In this case, enforcement could therefore not be considered to be 
contrary to public policy.32 
Substantive public policy is applied only rarely, for two reasons. First, as Franq notes, is that 
the legal divergences between the EU Member States are rarely strong enough to bring about 
a contradiction with public policy.33 The second is quite obvious: the prohibition of review as 
to the substance of foreign judgments limits the situations in which a court may consider a 
contradiction to substantive public policy, as this prohibition precludes a court from examining 
the accuracy of the findings of law or facts which were made by the court of origin. A court 
may not refuse recognition or enforcement purely on the basis that it would have arrived at a 
different outcome; rather, it must assess whether the enforcement of the resulting judgment as 
it stands would be contrary to its country’s public policy. The focus is thus on the outcome of 
the foreign procedure, not on the way that outcome was arrived at, and the criterion is whether 
this outcome as such infringes national public policy.  
Substantive public policy therefore only applies in exceptional situations, and those in which 
fundamental rights may be at stake may be even rarer. It is however very much conceivable 
that such a situation may arise, especially in the context of family law, areas of which are 
                                                 
 
30 Hess and Pfeiffer (2011) p. 152-153, have shown that European national courts have repeatedly refused 
enforcement of judgments in cases where damages were awarded on legal bases which were considered against 
public policy in the Member States of enforcement, for instance in cases concerning liability in employment 
relations. Other potential sources of application of substantive public policy are cases involving the award of 
punitive damages: see on this matter Vanleenhove (2016). Dickinson (2011) names a number of other topics that 
could be considered part of substantive public policy, including matters relating to freedom of religious expression 
or the status or activities of religious bodies, liability for wrongful conception or “wrongful life”, disputes 
concerning the right to life or death and other questions of medical ethics, the use of gene technology and the 
operation of nuclear installations (p. 8-9). Other examples, such as disputes arising from trade in organs or 
questions on surrogacy, are imaginable.  
31 CJEU Case C-38/98 Régie nationale des usines Renault SA v Maxicar SpA and Orazio Formento 
ECLI:EU:C:2000:225. See also the CJEU’s more recent judgment in Diageo/Simiramida:CJEU Case C-681/13 
Diageo Brands v Simiramida-04 EOOD ECLI:EU:C:2015:471; Hazelhorst (2016).  
32 The relationship between this judgment and Eco Swiss/Benetton, in which the CJEU decided that principles of 
EU law were part of public policy was seen as unclear (Franq (2012) p. 664). The difference in treatment can 
however at least partly be explained by the fact that Eco Swiss/Benetton concerned the recognition of an arbitral 
award. Since arbitration tribunals cannot request preliminary rulings from the CJEU, refusal of enforcement is 
sometimes the only way of addressing the error in the application of EU law, since the CJEU cannot be relied on 
to correct the error. Vlas (2003) no. 6.  
33 Franq (2016) p. 883. 
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governed by EU Regulations such as Brussels II bis.34 It has been proposed that the recognition 
of divorce judgments, or those concerning marital property, pertaining to same-sex couples in 
states where same-sex marriage is not permitted could be considered contrary to substantive 
public policy. Seen from the perspective of the ECHR, in these situations a conflict with the 
right to family life (Art. 8 ECHR) could arise. Likewise, the right to family life could be at risk 
within the context of the enforcement of judgments ordering the return of a child or those 
granting access to a child. The compatibility of the enforcement of a return order under Brussels 
II bis with the right to family life was at issue in the ECtHR’s recent decision in Povse,35 though 
the question whether this could conflict with public policy could not be examined, because 
public policy as a ground for refusal no longer exists under this Regulation. 
Substantive public policy falls outside the scope of this research, which concerns the right to a 
fair trial. As is shown below, the right to a fair trial is for the most part encompassed by the 
procedural aspect of public policy. Substantive and procedural aspects may however be closely 
connected. For example, the recent case Diageo/Simiramida36 entailed the recognition in the 
Netherlands of a Bulgarian judgment. According to the party that invoked the public policy 
exception, the Bulgarian judgment relied on an incorrect interpretation of EU law. In the 
procedure it was alleged that the Bulgarian courts had knowingly misapplied EU law.37 While 
the CJEU in casu rejected the argument,38 the case raises the question whether a wilful mistake 
in the application of substantive law, which would come within the remit of the substantive 
aspect of public policy, can violate procedural public policy at the same time, since it denies 
litigants an impartial and fair examination of their case.  
 
3.2.5 Interpretation by the Court of Justice of the European Union 
 
The CJEU consistently rules that public policy must only be applied in exceptional cases, as 
its application restricts the attainment of one of the fundamental objectives of the EU regime: 
the unfettered recognition and enforcement of civil judgments across borders within the EU.39 
                                                 
 
34 See for instance Kiestra (2014) p. 307-317. 
35 CJEU Povse v. Austria [dec.] appl. no. 3890/11 ECHR 2013; see for an extensive discussion Chapter 5. 
36 CJEU Case C-681/13 Diageo Brands v Simiramida-04 EOOD ECLI:EU:C:2015:471. See Hazelhorst (2016). 
37 CJEU Diageo/Simiramida, para. 53. The case also raises interesting questions concerning the relationship 
between Member State and European Union public policy in the context of recognition and enforcement; see 
d’Oliveira (2015) and d’Oliveira (2014).  
38 CJEU Diageo/Simiramida, para. 54. 
39 CJEU Case C-420/07 Apostolides v. Orams ECLI:EU:C:2009:271, para. 55; CJEU Case C-145/86 Hoffman 
v Krieg ECLI:EU:C:1988:61, para. 21; CJEU Case C-78/95 Hendrikman and Feyen / Magenta Druck & Verlag 
ECLI:EU:C:1996:380, para. 23; CJEU Case C-302/13 flyLAL-Lithuanian Airlines, ECLI EU:C:2014:2319, para. 
47.  
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While the European Regulations refer to the public policy of ‘the Member State addressed’, 
the CJEU, as discussed, restricts its application by delineating its outer limits.40 
The role of the public policy exception in the protection of the right to a fair trial was addressed 
by the CJEU in two important judgments: Krombach v. Bamberski41 and Gambazzi.42 Both 
judgments concern cases in which the defendants were prevented from taking part in the 
proceedings by national procedural rules. These judgments therefore merit a detailed 
discussion. 
The Krombach v. Bamberski case is not only remarkable for its significance in the 
interpretation of the public policy concept, but also for its facts.43 The case arose out of criminal 
proceedings. Dr. Krombach, a German doctor, was accused of having caused the death of a 
girl, Mr. Bamberski’s daughter, who died after Mr. Krombach gave her an injection in 
Germany. The German prosecutor conducted an investigation but did not prosecute Mr. 
Krombach for lack of evidence, after which the Criminal Court in Paris (Cour d’Assises) took 
up the case, basing its jurisdiction on the French nationality of the victim (a ground for 
jurisdiction which was itself questioned during the CJEU proceedings). Mr. Krombach, afraid 
of being arrested if he entered French territory, did not appear in person before the Cour 
d’Assises but instead sent a lawyer on his behalf. The court nevertheless held him in contempt 
and convicted him in absentia of voluntary manslaughter. Additionally, it also decided on a 
civil claim brought by Mr. Bamberski, ordering Krombach to pay him FRF 350,000 as in 
compensation for the loss of his daughter. It was this judgment that Bamberski sought to 
enforce in Germany. Krombach appealed the declaration of enforceability granted by the 
German court at the Bundesgerichthof (BGH), complaining that he had had no opportunity to 
adequately defend himself before the French court. The BGH referred the question whether 
recognition of the judgment would be contrary to public policy as contained in Article 27(1) of 
the Brussels Convention (now Article 34(1) of the Brussels I Regulation) to the CJEU.  
The CJEU reiterated that the public policy exception, being an obstacle to the free movement 
of judgments, should only be applied in ‘exceptional cases’. It went on to elaborate on what 
circumstances would constitute such an exceptional case. It stated that recourse to the public 
policy exception would only be justified if recognition or enforcement of a foreign judgment 
would be, 
at variance to an unacceptable degree with the legal order of the State in which 
enforcement is sought inasmuch as it infringes a fundamental principle. In order for the 
                                                 
 
40 CJEU Case C-7/98 Dieter Krombach v André Bamberski ECLI:EU:C:2000:164, para. 21, and CJEU Renault v. 
Maxicar, para. 26. 
41 CJEU Case C-7/98 Dieter Krombach v André Bamberski ECLI:EU:C:2000:164; Van Hoek (2000).  
42 CJEU Case C-394/07 Marco Gambazzi v. DaimlerChrysler Canada Inc. and CIBC Mellon Trust Company 
ECLI:EU:C:2009:219. 
43 Corthaut deems them “worthy of a novel”: Corthaut (2012) p. 174. 
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prohibition of any review of the foreign judgment as to its substance to be observed, 
the infringement would have to constitute a manifest breach of a rule of law regarded 
as essential in the legal order of the State in which enforcement is sought or of a right 
recognized as being fundamental within that legal order.44 (Emphasis added) 
The CJEU then stressed the fundamental importance of the right to a defence and made clear 
that its violation may lead to a refusal of recognition or enforcement of a judgment: 
[the right to a defence] occupies a prominent position in the organization and conduct 
of a fair trial and is one of the fundamental rights deriving from the constitutional 
traditions of the Member States. More specifically still, the European Court of Human 
Rights has on several occasions ruled in cases relating to criminal proceedings that, 
although not absolute, the right of every person charged with an offence to be 
effectively defended by a lawyer, if need be one appointed by the court, is one of the 
fundamental elements in a fair trial and an accused person does not forfeit entitlement 
to such a right simply because he is not present at the hearing. (para. 38 et seq.) 
For that reason, the CJEU concluded that, 
a national court of a Contracting State is entitled to hold that a refusal to hear the 
defence of an accused person who is not present at the hearing constitutes a manifest 
breach of a fundamental right. (para. 40) 
The public policy exception may therefore be relied upon only when recognition or 
enforcement would constitute a manifest breach of an essential rule of law or fundamental 
right. The right to a defence is such a fundamental right, and the denial of an effective defence 
by a lawyer as punishment for not being present at the trial can be considered a manifest breach 
of that right, according to the CJEU. On the basis of its preliminary ruling the BGH therefore 
denied recognition of the French judgment.45 
The CJEU’s ruling in Krombach thus removes any doubt as to the public policy exception’s 
relevance for fundamental rights protection. It makes clear that infringements of fundamental 
procedural rights may come within the remit of public policy, something that had previously 
been doubted, because Article 27(2) Brussels Convention (now Article 45(1)(b) Brussels I bis) 
already provided protection for procedural mistakes.46 Yet Krombach makes abundantly clear 
that the ground for refusal contained in that article, which only concerns situations in which 
the defendant was not adequately informed of the trial and did not use his right to appeal, only 
provides protection in a very narrow category of situations, which does not include Krombach. 
The defendant in this case was perfectly aware of the trial taking place and had sent a lawyer 
                                                 
 
44 CJEU Krombach, para. 37. 
45 With the refusal to enforce the French civil judgment, the case of Krombach v. Bamberski was far from over; 
according to various media, Mr Bamberski took the drastic measure of kidnapping Mr Krombach and delivering 
him to French justice. See for an update Cuniberti, ‘Dr Krombach’s Final (?) Contribution to the European Judicial 
Area’, http://conflictoflaws.net/2009/dr-krombachs-final-contribution-to-the-european-judicial-area/, 21 October 
2009. 
46 Muir Watt (2001) p. 550. 
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to defend him, yet was actively prevented from taking part in his trial by French procedural 
law.  
What is also striking is that the CJEU in Krombach explicitly refers to the ECtHR’s case law 
as a means of identifying which rights are considered fundamental and when their infringement 
can be seen as manifest so that it should lead to refusal of recognition or enforcement. The 
connection between public policy and fundamental rights as protected by the ECHR is therefore 
recognized also by the CJEU.  
Not all procedural irregularities may be contrary to public policy, however. In Gambazzi, the 
CJEU explained what factors may count against the application of the public policy exception. 
This case originated from the Stolzenberg litigation concerning widespread fraud against 
Canadian pension funds and other trustees. One of the defendants was Mr. Gambazzi, a Swiss 
resident. The UK High Court of Justice delivered several orders against Mr. Gambazzi, 
including a freezing order (which restrained him from dealing with his funds) and a disclosure 
order (which instructed him to disclose some information concerning his assets and certain 
documents). Mr. Gambazzi did not comply with these orders, despite the High Court having 
made an order to exclude him from the further proceedings (debarment) unless he complied 
(the ‘unless order’). Finally, the High Court considered him to be in contempt of court and 
excluded him from the hearing, after which he was ordered via judgment by default to pay 
substantial damages. When enforcement of the judgment was sought in Italy, he appealed on 
the basis that his right to a defence had been violated by his exclusion from the proceedings. 
In its judgment, the CJEU was a little more nuanced than in its earlier judgment in Krombach, 
though it arrived at the same conclusion. It stated that the right to a defence occupies a 
‘prominent’ position in the organisation and conduct of a fair trial and is laid down in the ECHR 
as well as the constitutional traditions of the Member States. However, it also stated that, 
It should […] be borne in mind that fundamental rights, such as respect for the rights 
of the defence, do not constitute unfettered prerogatives and may be subject to 
restrictions. However, such restrictions must in fact correspond to the objectives of 
public interest pursued by the measure in question and must not constitute, with regard 
to the aim pursued, a manifest or disproportionate breach of the rights thus guaranteed.47 
While in Krombach the CJEU focused on the adequate protection of the right to a defence 
through the application of public policy, in Gambazzi it added weight to the other side of the 
balance, by distinguishing a number of factors that may justifiably restrict the rights of the 
defence. It stated that it is for the national court that decides on recognition or enforceability to 
investigate whether the defendant can be said to have enjoyed a fair trial, having regard to the 
proceedings as a whole in light of all relevant circumstances. The CJEU went on to state:  
Following completion of such verification, it is for the national court to carry out a 
balancing exercise with regard to those various factors in order to assess whether, in 
                                                 
 
47 CJEU Gambazzi, para. 29. 
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the light of the objective of the efficient administration of justice pursued by the High 
Court, the exclusion of Mr Gambazzi from the proceedings appears to be a manifest 
and disproportionate infringement of his right to be heard. (para. 47)  
The CJEU then provided some guidance for the national court to decide on the acceptability of 
the various orders that had been made against Mr. Gambazzi. The CJEU has been criticized for 
‘stating the obvious’ and not assessing whether the debarment order in fact infringed Article 6 
ECHR, instead deferring to the national court,48 whereas in Krombach it was more explicit. 
Others have pointed out that in Krombach the CJEU had access to directly relevant ECHR case 
law, whereas in Gambazzi it would have had to make its own autonomous interpretation, which 
is problematic from an institutional point of view.49 Though the reticence of the CJEU to give 
a definitive answer in this case is understandable from this point of view, it is nevertheless 
difficult not to see the debarment order as a violation of Mr. Gambazzi’s right to a fair trial. 
The similarities with Krombach v. Bamberski are after all striking: in both cases, the defendants 
were prevented from taking part in their own trial, thereby denying them the essential guarantee 
of access to justice. While Mr. Gambazzi was able to prevent the debarment order from being 
applied by complying with the order to disclose assets and evidence, it is not clear why this 
should lead to a different conclusion than the one reached in Krombach v. Bamberski. The 
sanction, a complete exclusion from the trial, is simply entirely disproportionate to the aim 
pursued.50 
While the CJEU concluded that the debarment order made by the UK High Court could indeed 
be a deciding factor in assessing the applicability of the public policy clause (para. 48), the 
focus of its analysis has shifted to the ‘balancing act’ to be performed by the national court, 
which needs to take into account both the importance of the protection of rights of the defence 
as well as objectives of public interest which may justify a restriction of those rights. The public 
policy exception therefore in effect provides a margin of appreciation for the national court. 
The Italian court finally used this margin of appreciation to decide that, in light of all 
circumstances of the case, Mr. Gambazzi had in fact been given, and exercised, the opportunity 
to be heard, so that the English debarment order was not a manifest and disproportionate breach 
of his rights to a defence. 
To conclude, both these cases show that the public policy exception may be used to refuse 
recognition or enforcement, but only in the most extreme of cases. While the Krombach 
judgment laid down the – very high – threshold to be crossed, the Gambazzi judgment 
additionally identifies a number of factors that may count against it being justified. Still, in 
both cases the CJEU stresses the ‘prominence’ of the right to a defence, which is embodied in 
the ECHR as well as Member States’ constitutional traditions, showing the link between public 
                                                 
 
48 Beaumont and Johnston (2010b) p. 256. 
49 Van Bochove (2009) p. 300. 
50 Andrews (2007) p. 42. See for a more detailed discussion 4.3.2.2. 
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policy and fundamental rights that was also recognized by the ECtHR in its case law. The 
public policy exception may only be applied when recognition or enforcement would constitute 
a ‘manifest breach’ of such a fundamental right. It is therefore up to the national court to decide 
not just whether a breach occurred, but whether, in light of all relevant circumstances, this 
breach can be considered manifest.  
The role of the ‘manifest’ requirement is not entirely clear. The word ‘manifest’ means ‘easily 
visible’ or ‘easy to understand or recognise’.51 It appears therefore to apply to the visibility or 
obviousness of the breach, not (directly) to its seriousness. The requirement that the breach be 
obvious is understandable, since a rigorous review of the proceedings before the court of origin 
would be at odds with the prohibition on substantive review of the foreign judgment.52 Because 
the prohibition on review on the substance has always been a feature of the EU regime on 
recognition and enforcement, it has been doubted whether the addition of the ‘manifest’ 
qualification by the 2001 Brussels I Regulation really added anything. It was clear from the 
start that the prohibition of review on the substance requires that only obvious breaches of a 
fundamental principle could lead to a refusal of enforcement.53 
Still, it is not immediately clear which violations of procedural rights could come within the 
scope of the public policy exception. If it is accepted that the right to a fair trial is as such a 
fundamental principle and therefore part of public policy, then manifest violations of the right 
to a fair trial should lead to a refusal of recognition or enforcement, if requested. However, if 
the justification for the ‘manifest’ requirement is the prohibition of review on the substance, 
then it is difficult to see why it should apply to a review of the procedure in the Member State 
of origin. As Chapter 2.3.1.4 explained, the prohibition of review on the substance refers to the 
findings of fact and law made by the court of origin. A thorough review of the procedure would 
certainly diminish the expediency of the regime for recognition and enforcement, slowing 
down the procedure and undermining mutual trust, and consequentially affecting the creditor’s 
right to enforcement. This is perhaps a more convincing explanation for the ‘manifest’ 
requirement for procedural violations than the prohibition of review on the substance. The fact 
remains however that it is not clear from the CJEU’s case law when a breach can be considered 
manifest, though it should be concluded that ‘manifest’ refers to the obviousness of the 
violation, not its seriousness (though in most cases a serious violation is also obvious). While 
the breaches that occurred in Krombach v. Bamberski and Gambazzi were certainly both 
obvious and serious, it can be questioned whether other obvious violations of the right to a fair 
trial, such as a clear transgression of the reasonable time requirement, should also come within 
the remit of procedural public policy. Aside from the ‘manifest’ requirement, does the concept 
of public policy have an inherent ‘threshold’ that the breach be sufficiently serious? Or does 
the concept of public policy itself provide that threshold, that is to say, should only certain 
fundamental elements of the right to a fair trial come within its scope, so that the right to a trial 
                                                 
 
51 Merriam-Webster Dictionary; Oxford Dictionary of English.  
52 Cuniberti (2008) p. 34. 
53 Franq (2016) p. 881. 
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within a reasonable time is excluded? These are difficult questions, which Chapter 7 examines 
in detail. 
To conclude, the public policy exception protects the right to a fair trial because this right falls 
within the category of fundamental principles that public policy encompasses. There is one 
important caveat to the conclusion that the public policy exception may be used to protect the 
right to a fair trial, which is that even though article 6 ECHR is used to define the content of 
the public policy exception, it is still applied only indirectly. If recognition or enforcement is 
refused, this should be done on the basis of 45(1)(a) of the Brussels I bis Regulation or a 
corresponding provision. Nowhere in its case law does the CJEU suggest that without the 
existence of a public policy exception in the applicable European Regulation a judgment could 
be refused recognition simply for being contrary to Article 6.54 What would happen if this 
ground for refusal were not available is left open. 
3.2.6 Application of the public policy exception in European Union 
instruments by Member State courts 
 
The application of the public policy exception in the European Regulations was evaluated by 
Hess and Pfeiffer in their 2011 Report for the European Parliament. The Report comprises of 
statistical data as well as an analysis of national case law on the public policy exception 
gathered in national reports from a representative number of Member States. It encompasses a 
number of the most pertinent EU Regulations that contain a public policy clause, including the 
Brussels I and Brussels II bis Regulations and the Insolvency Regulation. It also includes the 
Maintenance Regulation, despite the fact that it contains no public policy clause, for the 
purpose of scrutinizing the practical impacts of abolishing exequatur clauses. Likewise it also 
discusses the judgments for which exequatur has been abolished under the Brussels II bis 
Regulation.55 
The Report gives valuable information about the role of the public policy exception for the 
protection of fundamental rights. Most of the relevant CJEU and national case law on public 
policy concerns Article 34(1) of the Brussels I Regulation, which is understandable given that 
it is the instrument with the greatest practical importance. For this reason, it is given special 
attention in the Report.56 However, the CJEU case law on Article 34(1) also applies to other 
public policy provisions.57 The following analysis also incorporates case law from the 
Netherlands that was decided after the Report was published.58 
                                                 
 
54 Cuniberti (2008) p. 33. 
55 Hess and Pfeiffer (2011) p. 17. 
56 The Report does not concern the application of public policy under the Brussels Ibis Regulation, since this was 
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58 For more information on the methodology see Introduction (Chapter 1.5).  
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3.2.6.1 The Brussels I Regulation 
 
Concerning the Brussels I Regulation, the 2011 Report reinforces the general assumption that 
the use of substantive public policy is very limited, though there are examples of it having been 
successfully invoked. In total, the number of cases where public policy was successfully 
invoked run from zero to five in each of the Member States for which data is available. The 
public policy exception is applied only rarely, but one of the instances where it is applied is 
where serious violations of the right to a fair trial have occurred.  
The 2011 Report shows that the situations in which it is applied are very diverse. The following 
categories are distinguished:59 instances of procedural fraud; a judgment given without reasons; 
insufficient or even misleading information about the defence in the court of origin; violation 
of the rights of defence (language barriers); and unacceptably high litigation costs.  
So what caused the national courts to rule that a foreign judgment violated procedural public 
policy? In the first category, cases where the foreign procedural law as such was found to be 
problematic, courts have ruled that time limits for service of a claim form or for the preparation 
of a defence were prohibitively short; or that the rules concerning service of documents, 
translations and deadlines were lacking.60 Some of the national reports however stated that the 
courts of those Member States would refrain from criticizing foreign procedural law, but rather 
focus on the specific procedure at hand (see the UK response to question (c)).61 
The application of public policy in the second category is naturally very casuistic, but some 
examples are worth mentioning. The first is a judgment from a Dutch court where recognition 
of a German judgment was refused because it was not adequately motivated (though this was 
later overturned by the Dutch Supreme Court, since the violation of fair trial was not considered 
manifest).62 A French court also refused recognition on this basis.63 A second category of cases 
concerns incorrect, late, or absent delivery of documents or other procedural irregularities, 
leaving one party unable to adequately defend himself.64 In one German case, recognition was 
                                                 
 
59 Hess and Pfeiffer (2011) p. 65-67. 
60 Italy: Corte d’appello Milan, September 29, 1978, Jure id: 38703; Corte d’Appello Naples, February 20, 1982, 
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62 Netherlands: Hoge Raad 18 March 2011, ECLI:NL:HR:2011:BP0003.  
63 France: CA Colmar 25 March 2004, No 02/04955. That recognition of a judgment lacking reasons should be 
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64 France: Ca Versailles, 5 July 2006, No 05/04718; Ca Versailles, 21 december 2006, No 06/03801, Ca Reims, 7 
May 2007, No 06/01161.  
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refused because the applicant was only notified of the proceedings against her when 
enforcement measures were being taken.65  
The 2011 Report does not make explicit in what types of cases public policy was invoked, but 
some Member States report a relatively high incidence of it being invoked in maintenance 
cases.66 Germany reports fifteen instances of public policy being invoked in maintenance cases, 
while Austria, Sweden and the Netherlands also report such cases. Though it appears most of 
these cases involved substantive public policy (often an assessment of the amount of 
maintenance awarded),67 a striking example, where the appeal to public policy was upheld, is 
found in German case law. This case concerned the enforcement in Germany of a Polish 
judgment. The Polish court had established the defendant’s paternity of the child on the basis 
of testimony of the child’s grandmother; she had told the court that her daughter, the child’s 
mother, had told her the defendant was the child’s father. Though the defendant denied this, 
the Polish court established his paternity on the basis of the grandmother’s testimony. The 
defendant’s offer of paying for and submitting a paternity test was rejected by the Polish court, 
because such a test was not possible in Poland, and it would have to be done in Germany (even 
though this would have been possible by applying the Evidence Regulation).68 The German 
BGH refused enforcement of the final Polish judgment, which ordered the defendant to pay 
DM 500 per month to the mother. It held that it was contrary to German public policy that the 
defendant’s paternity had been determined on the basis of what amounted to hearsay evidence, 
without an expert opinion.69 That one of the few instances identified by the 2011 Report where 
public policy was successfully invoked involves a maintenance case is remarkable considering 
that the 2009 Maintenance Regulation has since abolished the public policy exception as well 
as all other grounds for refusal for such cases.70 
Another striking example of a case where procedural public policy was applied is Maronier v. 
Larmer, in which a Dutch judgment was deemed contrary to public policy by an English court. 
It provides a good illustration of how simple mistakes or carelessness may result in a serious 
violation of the rights of defence, and as such has been much discussed.71  
The facts of the case were simple. Mr. Larmer, the respondent in this appeal case, practiced as 
a denist in Rotterdam, Netherlands. In 1984 one of his patients, Mr. Maronier, claimed damages 
of EUR 26,800 from Mr. Larmer, in respect of the treatment he had received from him. After 
                                                 
 
65 Germany: OLG Zweibrücken 10.05.2005, 3 W 165/04. 
66 Prior to the entry into force of the Maintenance Regulation (Regulation 4/2009) judgments on maintenance fell 
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68 Siehr (2013) p. 535. 
69 Germany: BGH 26.8.2009, XII ZB 169/07; see for a discussion Siehr (2013) p. 533 onwards.  
70 Chapter 2.3.4. 
71 Court of Appeal, 29 March 2002, Unanimous opinion by Lord Philips MR - Maronier v. Larmer; Kramer 
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an exchange of pleadings and statements in 1986 the proceedings were stayed for a period of 
twelve years. After this period Mr Maronier instructed his lawyers to pursue the case. Mr 
Larmer had moved to England in the meantime, leaving his address with the Rotterdam City 
Hall and the Dutch Association of Dentists. His lawyer, who had not been informed of the new 
address, stated that he had not had contact with Mr Larmer for a number of years and that 
according to his information Mr Larmer was living in England. Whether the lawyer explicitly 
withdrew from the case is unclear. 
Despite recognizing that Mr Larmer was not represented in law, and (inaccurately) recording 
Mr Larmer as living in Rotterdam, the Rotterdam District Court nevertheless delivered 
judgment on 31 December 1999 and awarded Mr Maronier damages of EUR 33,000. Not 
having been served with any of the documents pertaining to the reactivation of the case Mr 
Larmer only found out about the reactivation of the procedure when enforcement measures 
were taken against him in England. Given that he had submitted a statement before the 
proceedings were stayed, the judgment was not a default judgment, and he was therefore not 
able to invoke the remedy of opposition (or verzet under Dutch law). He applied to the English 
court for refusal of enforcement on grounds of public policy. 
On appeal, Mr Maronier’s lawyer argued, along the lines of the CJEU’s judgment in Solo 
Kleinmotoren,72 that the purpose of the system of recognition and enforcement of the (then) 
Brussels Convention was to facilitate to the greatest extent possible the free movement of 
judgments. This objective would be frustrated if courts were required to carry out a detailed 
review of whether the procedures that resulted in the judgment had complied with Article 6 
ECHR. While the Court of Appeals sympathised with this view, it also stated that while courts 
should apply a strong presumption that the procedures of other signatories to the ECHR are 
compliant with the ECHR, this presumption cannot be irrebuttable. The Court goes on to 
conclude, on the basis of the CJEU’s judgments in Hendrikman v. Magenta Druck73 and 
Krombach v. Bamberski, that the right of a defendant putting his case to court is fundamental 
to a fair trial, and that in such cases enforcement can be refused on the basis of the public policy 
exception. 
Maronier v. Larmer provides a perfect example of a case where the safeguards that were in 
place to guarantee a fair hearing of both parties quite simply failed. It should also be noted that 
even though the conditions of Article 34(2) Brussels I (Art. 45(1)(b)) were satisfied (since the 
defendant was properly served with the document instituting the proceedings and was therefore 
in theory able to defend himself and invoke his right to appeal), the defendant nevertheless did 
not receive a fair trial.74 
The English Court of Appeal also concisely formulated the dilemma national judges are faced 
with when deciding whether to refuse enforcement: they must operate under an assumption 
that the court of origin adequately protected the right to a fair trial, which prevents them from 
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conducting a detailed review of the foreign procedure; yet this assumption may not be 
irrebuttable, and courts must therefore be vigilant about spotting circumstances that may rebut 
it. The Court of Appeal is clearly mindful of this dilemma, as it is quite careful to distinguish 
its own conclusion that Mr Larmer had not received a fair trial from its observations on the 
conduct of the Dutch courts or Dutch procedural law (“nothing that we have said should be 
taken as a criticism of the Rotterdam District Court or the procedure that it was applying”). It 
recognized that the circumstances of this case are unusual and therefore concludes that the 
public policy exception should be applied. 
A conclusion that can be found in the 2011 Report,75 but which is also borne out by the Court 
of Appeal in Maronier v. Larmer, is that courts generally use Article 6 ECHR in their 
assessment of whether procedural public policy is applicable.  
Finally, a special category of cases where public policy is relevant is mentioned: cases 
involving procedural fraud. Procedural fraud can be committed either by the parties (for 
example by falsifying signatures on documents used in the court proceedings) or by the court, 
for example by taking a bribe. The European instruments do not contain a separate refusal 
ground for cases involving procedural fraud. English courts have held that procedural fraud is 
encompassed by public policy, though only if there is no remedy in the country where the 
judgment was obtained,76 a condition that appears to be shared by Dutch courts77 but not 
German courts.78 In the common law tradition, for example under English law, procedural 
fraud constitutes a separate ground for refusal of enforcement.79 The 2011 Report showed that 
the public policy exception was invoked in cases involving fraud in at least eight instances,80 
though it appears that none of these were successful.81 The 2007 Heidelberg Report states that 
“the main practical problems relate to the allegation of procedural fraud”,82 referring to a Greek 
and an English case in which enforcement was refused because procedural fraud was 
detected.83 Procedural fraud is a complicated issue, since while it is certainly unfair to allow a 
judgment obtained by fraud to circulate freely, procedural fraud does not appear to be covered 
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by the right to a fair trial. Chapter 7 discusses the consequences of this conclusion in more 
detail. 
All in all, the Heidelberg Report concluded that the public policy exception was considered of 
great value from a legal-political perspective. It also concluded that, though rare, there are still 
constellations in the European judicial area in which the application of the public policy 
exception is needed in order to adequately protect the rights of the defendant.84 “In this 
respect”, the Heidelberg Report concluded, “Article 34(1) JR still permits a residual control 
which can be exercised by the Member State of enforcement in extreme cases. […] Seen from 
this perspective, it would be difficult to delete this provision entirely without any substitute”. 
It pointed out, however, that what matters for a judgment debtor is not the recourse to public 
policy, but the availability of effective remedies. As a result it concluded that a further 
reduction of the public policy exception seemed possible, “if Community law provides for 
efficient means of redress in the Member State of origin or in the enforcement proceedings of 
the Member State addressed.”85 
 
 
3.2.6.2 The Brussels II bis Regulation 
 
According to the 2011 Report by Hess and Pfeiffer on the interpretation of the public policy 
exception, there is very little pertinent case law pertaining to the use of the public policy 
exception in the recognition of divorce judgments. The general conclusions that national judges 
make a distinction between procedural and substantive public policy, and that provisions of the 
ECHR are relevant for determining their scope, are also applicable here.  
As to judgments on parental responsibility, the 2011 Report also shows little relevant case law, 
though it must be noted that there are no statistics available for the majority of the respondent 
states, and that – as the Report underlines – the available statistics should be read with caution 
as they may also include case law on return orders.86 
Yet, there are still some pertinent findings. An important conclusion is that the reference in 
Article 23(a) of the Brussels II bis Regulation to the ‘best interests of the child’ appears to 
create an increased relevance of the public policy exception (though there is some disagreement 
as to whether these are separate principles, or whether the best interests of the child are part of 
public policy).87 The best interests of the child have both a procedural and a substantive aspect. 
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From the case law analysis, it appears that enforcement had been refused on the basis of 
procedural public policy because the child had not been heard.88 Substantive public policy is 
invoked when it is argued that enforcement of a judgment would harm the child’s best interests 
in a wider sense, for example when the child’s attachment to his or her parents has not been 
adequately assessed,89 or when a risk of physical harm to the child is alleged.90 Both procedural 
and substantive public policy are therefore relevant. The report shows that in determining the 
content of these concepts, courts refer to ECHR provisions, especially Article 8 (the right to 
respect for family life) and Article 6. The report also concludes that Member States often refer 
to case law on Article 34(1) Brussels I in this regard. 
Interestingly, the report also comments on the mutual recognition of return orders under 
Articles 40 and 42 of the Brussels II bis Regulation, despite this being outside the scope of the 
report. The conclusions of the report on this matter are discussed in Section 3.5, below.  
 
3.2.6.3 The Insolvency Regulation 
 
The 2011 Report cites very little case law on the application of the public policy exception in 
the context of the Insolvency Regulation. It shows that while the exception is often invoked, 
its application is usually denied. The courts recognize the exceptional character of the public 
policy exception and apply it narrowly. It appears that the distinction between procedural and 
substantive public policy is also present here. Procedural public policy relates to the debtor’s 
and creditor’s rights to be heard91 and to appeal,92 while substantive public policy relates to 
preferential treatment of certain claims above others.93 The report notes that the narrow 
application of the exception in insolvency cases can be attributed to the special character of 
these cases: non-recognition of a judgment opening insolvency proceedings in one of the 
Member States where assets are located will automatically result in the creditors located in that 
Member State being at a disadvantage over other creditors, which infringes the principle that 
all creditors must be treated equally. Secondly, the refusal of recognition of a judgment opening 
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insolvency proceedings could affect a large number of creditors, and therefore be much more 
disruptive than the refusal to enforce a judgment that involves only two parties. 
Case law from the CJEU shows a similarly restrained approach. In Eurofood,94 the CJEU was 
asked whether a Member State could refuse recognition of insolvency proceedings on the basis 
of public policy if procedural rules had been disregarded. Eurofood was a company based in 
Ireland, which was wholly owned by Italian-based Parmalat. Insolvency proceedings were 
started against Eurofood in Ireland and a provisional liquidator was appointed. Insolvency 
proceedings were however also started in Italy, the Italian court ruling that it had jurisdiction 
since Eurofood’s main centre of activities was in Italy. An application for a declaration that 
Eurofood was insolvent was lodged with the Parma District Court in Italy, and a hearing was 
scheduled, of which the Irish provisional liquidator was informed only a few days beforehand. 
He also did not receive certain necessary documents. Ireland sought to refuse recognition of 
the insolvency proceedings in Italy because of these procedural irregularities. In its judgment, 
the CJEU first referred to the Krombach case, which it deemed ‘transposable’ to the 
interpretation of Article 26 of the Insolvency Regulation. The CJEU ruled that while the right 
of creditors and their representatives to participate in accordance with the equality of arms 
principle is of particular importance, restrictions are possible, but “any restriction on the 
exercise of that right must be duly justified and surrounded by procedural guarantees ensuring 
that persons concerned by such proceedings actually have the opportunity to challenge the 
measures adopted in urgency”.95 It stated explicitly that a national court should not substitute 
its own rules regarding the right to an oral hearing, but should assess whether the proceedings 
on a whole gave the provisional liquidator sufficient opportunity to be heard. 
The CJEU did not in this judgment go so far as to explicitly state a right of creditors to be heard 
in all phases of the procedure; rather it stateed that the right to be heard can be limited, albeit 
only for good reasons and only if the parties have the opportunity to challenge any adopted 
measures. Bariatti points out that under these rules it is possible for a judgment opening 
insolvency proceedings to be rendered after a hearing held in private, without all creditors being 
present.96 
This judgment does however show that the right to a fair trial is relevant in insolvency 
proceedings, with the CJEU explicitly citing the Krombach judgment and referring to the 
ECHR. The Report by Hess and Pfeiffer has shown that national courts interpret the public 
policy exception in the same way.97  
 
3.2.7 Conclusion: the value of the public policy exception 
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There is no doubt that the public policy exception, in its procedural as well as its substantive 
dimension, can plays a vital role in the protection of fundamental rights. Both the ECtHR and 
the CJEU have affirmed that fundamental rights, especially those laid down in the ECHR, must 
be an essential constitutive of the public policy of European states and of the EU itself. The 
CJEU has explicitly made the link with the Convention, in particular Article 6, in its case law 
in Krombach v. Bamberski and Gambazzi. National courts also reportedly apply Convention 
provisions in their assessment whether public policy is applicable. 
The cited case law also justifies the conclusion that the public policy exception is mainly 
important for the protection of procedural rights; it has been stated that procedural issues form 
‘the crux’ of Article 34(1) of Brussels I.98 The experience with public policy exceptions under 
other regulations also bears this out. First of all, it is established that courts apply these 
provisions analogously with Article 34(1) of Brussels I; secondly, the 2011 Report has shown 
a great number and diversity of procedural issues which are covered by the exception, in 
particular the right to be heard of affected parties. 
On the other hand, the public policy exception is inherently very limited in its application. 
Public policy refers to principles that are of fundamental importance in the legal order of the 
state concerned, and this definition in itself implies that it may only be applied in exceptional 
situations. EU and national case law bears this out: it has been repeatedly affirmed that courts 
may not refuse enforcement simply because a foreign judgment does not conform, 
substantively or procedurally, to national rules; the threshold is much higher, in that 
enforcement would constitute a manifest violation of public policy. Public policy is there to act 
as a safety valve in extreme cases, such as where a national rule of procedural law completely 
precludes a defendant from making himself heard (Krombach) or where guarantees offered by 
national procedural law simply failed, whether through malicious intent (fraud) or oversight 
(Maronier v. Larmer).  
These cases also show why sometimes control by a state other than the one that delivered the 
judgment is the only available remedy. Mr Krombach could not have been expected to seek a 
remedy against his judgment in France, because he was at risk of being arrested there. The 
French rule of procedure that forbade him to appear in the civil procedure, which was intended 
to prevent the accused of avoiding justice in this way, was exactly what triggered the 
application of the public policy exception in his case. Mr Larmer could also not have been 
expected to invoke a remedy against his judgment in the Netherlands, since what gave rise to 
the application of public policy was the fact that he was not informed of the reinstituted 
proceedings against him. By the time he became aware of the existence of the judgment, the 
time for appeal had expired. If no review at the enforcement stage in England had been 
                                                 
 
98 Beaumont and Johnston state that procedural issues are the crux of Article 34(1) and that its content essentially 
corresponds to Article 6 ECHR: Beaumont and Johnston (2010b) p. 261. 
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available, he would have had no effective remedy.99 The same goes for the (unnamed) 
presumed father in the German/Polish maintenance case, whose paternity had been accepted 
on the basis of little to no evidence: the case shows that the defendant’s attempt to submit 
conclusive evidence in the Polish courts was refused. It seemed clear that a judgment based on 
such questionable evidence did not merit enforcement.100 In this regard it is especially 
concerning that public policy was abolished for maintenance judgments, even though the 2011 
Report showed that the exception was clearly necessary for these types of cases. 
It is clear that the public policy exception has proven to act as a remedy for violations of 
fundamental rights in cases where no other remedy was available. The 2007 Heidelberg Report 
and the 2011 Report on the application of public policy show that it has done so in only very 
few cases. For the Brussels I Regulation, the number of successful appeals is in the single 
digits, and for the other regulations, the number is even lower. It may be concluded from these 
figures that in a purely statistical sense, the role of the public policy exception in the protection 
of fundamental rights is rather limited. Yet, this research suggests that, if anything, the small 
number of successful appeals to public policy does not show that the refusal grounds are 
irrelevant: it rather confirms the exceptional nature of public policy.  
The abolition of public policy as a refusal ground was severely criticized. They point to the 
existence of cases such as those discussed in this section to show that refusal of enforcement 
is sometimes the only adequate remedy.101 It was pointed out that a check in a Member State 
other than that which issued the judgment is sometimes necessary to detect a violation.102 This 
is not only because it may be practically or legally impossible for parties to seek remedies in 
the Member State of origin,103 but also because it may simply not be realistic to expect Member 
States to disqualify their own law.104 Overall, it is acknowledged that an ‘emergency brake’ 
such as the public policy exception is sometimes indispensable to remedy severe breaches of 
procedural standards.105 The 2007 Heidelberg Report also concludes that a residual control of 
foreign titles is clearly still needed. All in all, the value of the public policy exception in the 
protection of fundamental rights appears to be widely recognized.106 
The question remains whether a public policy exception, as it currently exists under Brussels I 
bis, is the only possible ‘emergency brake’. This question has three aspects. Firstly, the 
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European legislature has considered it possible to replace the refusal grounds, including public 
policy, with ‘minimum standards’, for instance in the European Enforcement Order (EEO), 
European Small Claims Procedure (ESCP), and European Order for Payment (EOP) 
Regulations. The idea is that such common procedural standards obviate the need for grounds 
of refusal that can be applied by the Member State of enforcement. Whether minimum 
standards can indeed adequately replace refusal grounds has been questioned,107 and is 
discussed below.108 
The second aspect is whether it is possible to replace ‘public policy’, with its national (i.e., 
domestic) connotations, with a reference to common (to all EU Member States) norms, such 
as the right to a fair trial. This was proposed both by academics,109 and by the European 
legislature. Chapter 7 discusses the concept of public policy vis-à-vis the right to a fair trial in 
great detail and aims to answer the question whether they are indeed interchangeable. The 
fundamental question here is whether public policy should be seen as embodying principles 
common to all EU Member States, such as fundamental rights, or whether Member States 
should still be able to apply their own definition of the concept.110 
The third fundamental aspect is which court or institution should provide the emergency brake. 
As discussed, the 2010 Proposal for the recast Brussels I Regulation proposed to transfer some 
of the refusal grounds to the Member State of origin. Some authors proposed a similar 
arrangement.111 However, the discussion of the application of public policy already shows that 
sometimes review in the Member State of enforcement is the only way of detecting a violation. 
This preliminary conclusion is discussed in more detail below.112 
 
 
3.3 The role of other grounds for refusal in the protection of 
fundamental rights 
 
3.3.1 The protection of the defendant in default proceedings 
 
Article 45(1)(b) of the Brussels I bis Regulation (formerly 34(2) of the Brussels I Regulation) 
and Articles 22(b) and 23(c) of the Brussels II bis Regulation all provide protection for 
defendants in cases where a judgment was delivered by default. As such, this provision is the 
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only one aiming specifically at protecting the defendant,113 whereas the public policy exception 
has a subsidiary character.114 
The provision protects defendants who do not appear at proceedings instigated against them. 
Such default proceedings allow courts to issue a judgment even if a defendant is absent from 
the proceedings. This benefits the claimant, who is able to obtain an enforceable title and does 
not have to suffer the consequences of a defendant’s inactivity. It also obviously creates a risk 
for the defendant of being faced with a judgment that is the result of proceedings he did not 
know about. For this reason, national and EU legislation provide that a default judgment can 
only be delivered (or declared enforceable) if it is shown that the defendant was served with 
documents instituting the proceedings in an appropriate way.115 Effective service, in such a 
manner and in sufficient time for the defendant to arrange for his defence, is however not 
always achieved, especially in cross-border cases. For this reason, the Brussels I bis Regulation 
provides additional protection, in the form of a refusal ground that can be invoked in the 
Member State of enforcement. 
This provision has proved very practically important. The 2007 Heidelberg Report concluded 
that the Article was “the most important provision for objecting to the recognition of a foreign 
judgment”.116 The Heidelberg Report does not provide statistics as to the application of the 
provision, but reports at least several cases in which it was invoked successfully.117 Dutch case 
law also provides at least one example of its application.118 
Article 45(1)(b) is formulated in such a way as to motivate the defaulting defendant to take 
action: the provision cannot be invoked if the defendant failed to take action against the 
judgment in the Member State of origin when it was possible for him to do so. This amendment, 
introduced by the Brussels I Regulation in 2001, significantly reduced the scope of the 
provision.119 Its introduction meant that the defendant could no longer profit from inactivity. 
He has to show that he invoked all possible means to challenge the judgment when he was able 
to do so; the protection of Article 45(1)(b) only applies when the defendant was unable to 
challenge the judgment, for reasons outside his control, i.e., where he was unaware of the 
proceedings, or where service was effected too late or in such a way as to prevent him from 
preparing for his defence. The amendment to this provision of the 2001 Regulation thus 
increased the burden on the defendant. 
                                                 
 
113 Franq (2016) p. 902. CJEU Case C-228/81 Pendy Plastic Products BV v Pluspunkt Handelsgesllschaft GmbH, 
ECLI:EU:C:1982:276, para. 13. 
114 The Jenard Report formulates the purpose of the as follows: “Where judgment is given abroad in default of 
appearance, the Convention affords the defendant double protection”. Jenard (1979) p. 44. 
115 Fitchen (2015) p. 451; EEO Regulation, Articles 13 and 14. The ESCP and EOP Regulations similarly contain 
rules on service.  
116 Hess, Pfeiffer, Schlosser (2007) para. 539.  
117 Hess, Pfeiffer, Schlosser (2007) paras. 540-541. 
118 Rechtbank Haarlem 25 April 2008, ECLI:NL:RBHAA:2008:BD0602.  
119 Hess, Pfeiffer, Schlosser (2007) para. 539. 
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The elements of the provision are all defined functionally, and allow for an interpretation 
specific to the circumstances of the case: what is decisive is what the defendant needed to 
arrange for his defence in terms of time and information in the case at hand. What is important 
is that the documents served contain sufficient information, and were served in sufficient time, 
for the defendant to understand the subject-matter and grounds of the claim and be aware of 
the proceedings, not that it conformed to certain formal requirements. In the cross-border 
context, this is especially important, since acquiring legal advice about a dispute taking place 
under foreign law in a foreign language may take considerable time and effort. 
The question of what it means to ‘appear’ in a meaningful sense has also come up in CJEU 
case law. In Hendrikman, it ruled that a mere ‘technical’ appearance of a party by reason of the 
appointment of lawyers on her behalf by the court did not suffice.120 The CJEU confirmed this 
in its recent judgment in A v B and others.121 In Sonntag, the CJEU rejected the defendant’s 
argument that he had not wanted to appear in the civil aspect of the proceedings, even though 
he had appointed and instructed legal representatives to act on his behalf in the criminal aspect 
of the proceedings.122 
The requirement of sufficient time is similarly casuistic: it must be determined by the court 
seized with recognition, on the basis of all factual and legal circumstances of the case, and 
independently of the law of the state where recognition is sought and the opinion of the 
adjudicating court.123 The conditions of the delivery of the document are likewise interpreted: 
if the documents are in a foreign language, more time will be allowed to the defendant to 
prepare for his defence.124 
In short, this provision is intended to protect the defendant’s right to ‘have his day in court’ 
(albeit in writing and not in person), by providing a remedy in cases where he did not appear 
because he was not properly informed of the proceedings. This applies under the condition that 
he acted in good faith and did everything in his power to make himself heard when he had the 
opportunity. Because of this last requirement the scope of application of this provision is rather 
limited; the discussion of the Maronier v. Larmer judgment (above) has shown that the public 
policy exception may still be necessary as a subsidiary means of protection. 
                                                 
 
120 CJEU Case C-78/95 Hendrikman and Feyen / Magenta Druck & Verlag, ECLI:EU:C:1996:380.  
121 CJEU Case C-112/13 A v B and Others ECLI:EU:C:2014:2195, paras. 55-58. CJEU Case C-112/13 A v B and 
Others ECLI:EU:C:2014:2195, paras. 55-58. In Hypoteční Banka the CJEU clarified that it should be possible to 
bring proceedings against a defendant whose domicile is unknown by the appointment of a guardian ad litem or 
another court-appointed representative, but that such an arrangement should be seen as a judgment by default 
against which Article 45(1)(b) can be invoked. CJEU Case C-327/10 Hypoteční banka a.s. v Udo Mike 
Lindner ECLI:EU:C:2011:745, para. 53-54. 
122 CJEU Case C-172/91 Volker Sonntag v Hans Waidmann ECLI:EU:C:1993:144., para. 39. 
123 CJEU Case 228/81 Pendy Plastic Products BV v Pluspunkt Handelsgesellschaft GmbH ECLI:EU:C:1982:276, 
para. 13. 
124 Franq (2012) p. 685. 
 100 
 
It is concluded that Article 45(1)(b) and its equivalents are specifically designed to protect the 
right to a defence at the enforcement stage, even if these provisions were greatly limited in 
scope when the obligation for the defendant to take action was introduced. The application of 
this provision is very case-specific and leaves it to a national judge to appreciate the relevant 
factual and legal circumstances to decide whether it is indeed applicable; for that reason it is 
difficult to extract from the relevant case law any hard and fast rules as to its application. 
The CJEU’s judgment in ASML however gives a good indication of how the provision is 
intended to protect the rights of the defence.125 In this case, SEMIS, the defendant in the 
original proceedings, appealed against the declaration of enforceability that had been served 
on it on the grounds that it had not been served with the default judgment, so it had not been 
able to apply for a review of the default judgment. ASML, the original claimant, argued that 
SEMIS could not invoke Article 34(2) because it had been aware of the original proceedings. 
SEMIS had received a summons, albeit after the hearing had taken place.  
The CJEU was asked to answer the question whether (then) Article 34(2) required that a 
judgment should have been duly served on the defendant, or whether it is sufficient that the 
defendant was aware of its existence at the stage of enforcement proceedings. The CJEU makes 
very clear that the purpose of the provision is to ensure that the rights of defence are effectively 
respected (para. 20), and that these rights may not be undermined by the considerations of 
mutual trust on which the Regulation is based (para. 24). It also invokes ECtHR case law to 
show that the rights of defence require special protection, and that it has been found that 
knowledge of a judgment’s contents is vital to allow a defendant to exercise their right to an 
appeal (para. 28).126 The Court states that because it is knowledge of the content of the 
judgment which is required, a mere procedural irregularity does not suffice to give rise to 
Article 34(2) (paras. 36 and 47); yet it answers the preliminary question by ruling that 
knowledge of the contents can only be acquired if the judgment was served on him in sufficient 
time to arrange for his defence before the court of origin (para. 39). It is not sufficient that the 
defendant was merely aware of the existence of the judgment.  
The CJEU decided in favour of the original defendant; yet what is more important is that it 
affirms that the purpose of Article 45(1)(b) is to protect the defendant’s right to a defence, 
citing ECtHR case law to interpret it. It also echoes the application of Article 6(1) ECHR by 
the ECtHR by stating that the application of the provision is dependent on whether the 
defendant effectively, not just formally, received a fair trial. The purpose and function of the 
provision in the protection of the defendant’s right under Article 6(1) ECHR are thus clear. 
 
                                                 
 
125 Case C-283/05 ASML Netherlands BV v Semiconductor Industry Services GmbH (SEMIS), 
ECLI:EU:C:2006:787. 
126 ECtHR Hadjianastassiou v Greece of 16 December 1992, ECHR. Series A. no 252, para. 29 to 37. 
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3.3.2 Special jurisdiction (Article 35 Brussels I, 45(1)(e) Brussels I bis) 
 
A good case can be made that the exclusive jurisdiction grounds encompassed in sections 3, 4 
and 6 of the Brussels I Regulation also protect the right to a fair trial of the weaker parties that 
are favoured by the jurisdiction clauses. It may be remembered that the 2010 Proposal for the 
Recast Brussels I Regulation originally sought to abolish this ground for refusal;127 the Brussels 
I bis Regulation instead expanded the categories of jurisdiction grounds that fall within the 
scope of the provision.128 
Article 45(1)(e) of the Brussels I bis Regulation provides that enforcement may be refused of 
judgments that violate the jurisdiction rules of sections 3, 4, 5 or 6 of Chapter II of the 
Regulation. These sections all contain rules that derivate from the general rule that a defendant 
be sued in the State where he is domiciled. Section 3 concerns insurance contracts and provides 
that an insurer may be sued by a policyholder, the insured, or a beneficiary in the Member State 
where the plaintiff is domiciled. The purpose of this rule is to protect the weaker parties (the 
policyholder, the insured, a beneficiary, or an injured party) by allowing them to start a 
procedure in their own domicile under their own legal system.129 Conversely, the dominant 
party has no choice under the provisions but to bring proceedings in the Member State of the 
weaker party’s domicile. The review of these jurisdiction grounds is an exception to the general 
rule that the jurisdiction of the foreign court is not reviewed,130 but with good reason: it would 
constitute too heavy a burden for the consumer to contest jurisdiction in a foreign court.131 The 
Brussels I bis Regulation has however made application of the provision dependent on it being 
invoked by an interested party; under Brussels I bis, the prevailing opinion was that the 
provision needed to be applied ex officio.132 
As stated, the special jurisdiction grounds aim to preserve procedural fairness by protecting the 
weaker party to a dispute. Section 3 of Chapter II allows a policy holder to bring proceedings 
against an insurer in the claimant’s own domicile (Art. 11(1)(b)). Section 4 protects the 
consumer in consumer contracts by giving the consumer a choice to sue the professional party 
of the contract either in the professional party’s domicile or in the consumer’s own domicile, 
while providing that the professional party may only sue the consumer in the consumer’s 
domicile.133 Section 5 provides greater protection for employees by providing that they may 
sue their employer not just in the Member State where they are domiciled but also in a Member 
State where they have a branch, agency or establishment; or in the courts of a Member State 
                                                 
 
127 See Dickinson (2011) p. 7. 
128 The scope now includes Section 5 of Chapter II of the Regulation, which concerns employment cases.  
129 Heiss (2016) p. 407; Mankowski and Nielsen (2016) p. 443; Esplugues Mota and Palao Moreno (2016) p. 539. 
130 Article 45(3) Brussels Ibis Regulation. 
131 Kramer (2011b) p. 216. 
132 Fitchen (2015) p. 474; Franq (2012) p. 391. 
133 Article 18(1) and (2) Brussels Ibis Regulation. 
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where the plaintiff habitually carries out his work.134 Finally, section 6 provides for exclusive 
jurisdiction, among other things in cases concerning immovable property for the courts of the 
Member State where that property is situated (Art. 24(1)).135 While the latter provision has a 
very practical purpose (it being logical for the court that is most closely connected to the subject 
matter to decide on conflicts relating to it), it by the same token protects procedural fairness.  
The possibility to refuse enforcement in cases where these rules were incorrectly applied is a 
departure from the principle that jurisdiction of the court of origin is not reviewed at the 
enforcement stage. The fact that these exceptions are made is indicative of the importance 
attached to them. 
 
3.3.3 Hearing of the child (23(b) Brussels II bis) or other interested person 
(23(d) Brussels II bis) 
 
The Brussels II bis Regulation contains two special grounds for refusal, which protect the right 
to the parties involved to be heard. The function of these provisions in the protection of 
procedural rights of interested parties is quite obvious: both provisions explicitly require that 
someone (the child, or a person claiming that his or her parental responsibility would be 
infringed, respectively) are given a fair hearing, which is an essential constitutive of the right 
to a fair trial.  
Article 23(b), which refers to the child’s right to be heard, implements Article 12 of the UN 
Convention of the Rights of the Child of 1989.136 This article requires that “the child who is 
capable of forming his or her own views is afforded the right to express those views freely in 
all matters affecting the child, the views of the child being given due weight in accordance with 
the age and maturity of the child”. It also requires that “for this purpose, the child shall in 
particular be provided the opportunity to be heard in any judicial and administrative 
proceedings affecting the child, either directly, or through a representative or an appropriate 
body, in a manner consistent with the procedural rules of national law”. Recognition or 
                                                 
 
134 Article 21(1)(a) and (b). 
135 The other sections of this Article confer exclusive jurisdiction: a) in proceedings which have as their object the 
validity of the constitution, the nullity or the dissolution of companies or other legal persons or associations of 
natural or legal persons, or the validity of the decisions of their organs, on the courts of the Member State in which 
the company, legal person or association has its seat (Article 24(2)); b) in proceedings which have as their object 
the validity of entries in public registers, on the courts of the Member State in which the register is kept (Article 
24(3)); c) in proceedings concerned with the registration or validity of patents, trade marks, designs, or other 
similar rights required to be deposited or registered, irrespective of whether the issue is raised by way of an action 
or as a defence, on the courts of the Member State in which the deposit or registration has been applied for, has 
taken place or is under the terms of an instrument of the Union or an international convention deemed to have 
taken place (Article 24(4)); and d) in proceedings concerned with the enforcement of judgments, on the courts of 
the Member State in which the judgment has been or is to be enforced (Article 24(5)). 
136 Borràs (1998) para. 73; UN Convention of the Rights of the Child, 1989. 
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enforcement of a foreign judgment relating to parental responsibility must be refused if: (1) the 
child has not been heard; provided that, (2) the child was capable of forming his or her own 
views at the time of the decision; and, (3) there was no case of urgency.137 
EU Member States have differing practices when it comes to hearing children in proceedings 
that concern them. It was foreseen when the Brussels II bis Regulation was adopted that these 
divergences would create problems at the enforcement stage.138 The 2015 Study on the 
assessment of the Brussels II bis Regulation shows that such divergences have indeed created 
problems at the enforcement stage: distrust between Member States on this matter has led to 
refusals of enforcement where the Regulation allows it.139 It has proven especially difficult to 
organise a hearing of the child if the abducting parent does not cooperate.140 Given that such 
divergences exist, it can be doubted whether the condition that the child be heard prior to 
issuing the certificate of Article 42(2)(a) is at all effective. Unfortunately, the 2015 Study does 
not provide conclusions as to whether the requirement of Article 42(2)(a) serves its purpose. 
 
 
3.4 The protective function of control by the Member State 
addressed 
 
3.4.1 The value of a cross-border check 
 
The previous sections showed the role of the various grounds of refusal contained in the 
existing regulations in the protection of the right to a fair trial. This role is quite self-
explanatory: the grounds for refusal discussed are all clearly intended to provide protection for 
the judgment debtor in some way. The existence of certain grounds for refusal which may be 
invoked at the recognition and enforcement stage is therefore one of the ways in which the 
exequatur procedure protects the right to a fair trial. 
At the same time the grounds for refusal are all embedded in the framework of the regulations 
of which they are part, even if some of them can be found across different legal instruments. It 
is important to take a more abstract view on the question of how the exequatur procedure 
protects fair trial, one that is not bound up with the technical issues pertaining to each separate 
piece of legislation: this book intends to discuss the fundamental rights consequences of the 
abolition of exequatur as a legal phenomenon, not the specific consequences this would have 
for each separate legal field.  
                                                 
 
137 This qualification is found in the Hague Convention on Parental Responsibility and Protection of Children, 
Article 23(b); see also Siehr (2012) p. 282. 
138 Kruger (2011) p. 37. 
139 Study on the assessment of the Brussels IIbis Regulation (2015) p. 43.  
140 Study on the assessment of the Brussels IIbis Regulation (2015) p. 48. 
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The question is therefore whether the cross-border character of the review mechanism provided 
by the refusal grounds provides some protective value in and of itself. Is the cross-border 
control inherently protective of fair trial rights, or can a check in the country of origin of a 
judgment really replace the exequatur as it exists now?  
It is submitted that in the cases discussed, the fact that review was carried out by a court in a 
Member State other than where the judgment was delivered was certainly necessary to address 
the problems that occurred. There is little doubt that the mechanism for recognition and 
enforcement as originally implemented by the EU regulations is intended, and effectively 
enables Member States, to ensure that foreign judgments conform to European fundamental 
rights, given that these are by necessity a constitutive of their public policy.141 It is incontestable 
that this mechanism serves a protective (judgment inspection) as well as a procedural 
(judgment import) function:142 the refusal of recognition or enforcement acts as a remedy to 
fundamental rights violations by limiting the effects of those violations to the jurisdiction where 
they were committed. 
There is also no question that the exequatur fulfils this function also in practice. The Maronier 
v. Larmer case offers a striking example of a procedural irregularity that had clearly gone 
unchecked in the Member State where it occurred,143 while Krombach has shown that an 
external perspective was the only way of calling into question the fairness of the French 
contumax procedure.144 It has been pointed out that in none of the cases which are discussed in 
this Chapter did the courts of the Member State of origin question whether the application of 
their national law was in any way incompatible with the right to a fair trial.145 This implies that 
in some cases review by a foreign court may be the only way to detect a fundamental rights 
violation.146 
This Chapter already raised the question whether this protection may be organized in some 
other way. It was discussed in the context of the public policy exception that the 2010 Proposal 
for a recast Brussels I Regulation moved control over the application of the provision that 
protects the defaulting defendant (now Article 45(1)(b) of Brussels I bis) to the Member State 
of origin of the judgment.147 This arrangement was criticized in various ways. It was seen as 
illogical that a defendant should need to rely on the review mechanisms in the Member State 
that had failed to protect his right to a fair trial in the main proceedings.148 This, it appears, is 
a fundamental objection to the abolition of cross-border control. As the analysis of the CJEU’s 
case law on public policy shows, in some cases the Member State of origin cannot be expected 
                                                 
 
141 See under 3.2.2, above, and the discussion in Chapter 7.2.2. 
142 See Section 2.3.1.2. 
143 Kramer (2003) expresses surprise that the case was allowed to progress in this way, even if Dutch procedural 
law technically allowed it, and states that “maybe, hopefully, under the new procedural rules a case like this would 
not have slipped through”. Kramer (2003) p. 18. 
144 Muir Watt (2001) p. 551. 
145 De Cristofaro (2011) p. 452; Kramer (2011a) p. 639-640; Cuniberti and Rueda (2011) p. 301. 
146 Muir Watt (2001) p. 551. 
147 Article 45, 2010 Proposal; see in general Dickinson (2011) p. 8-10; Layton (2011) p. 5-8. Something similar 
was proposed by Oberhammer (2010) p. 202. 
148 Layton (2011) p. 6-7. 
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to adequately review the application of its own laws; but more importantly, the litigants should 
not be required to rely on such review in a legal system that has failed to observe a fundamental 
right. This is also one of the objections against the mechanism of the EEO, which is discussed 
in Chapter 8.4.  
3.4.2 Replacement of refusal grounds with minimum standards  
 
It has been discussed that some of the regulations that have abolished refusal grounds (the 
ESCP, EOP, EEO, Brussels II bis, and Maintenance Regulation) have replaced the grounds for 
refusal with minimum standards. These minimum standards take different forms. 
Under the EEO Regulation, the minimum standards apply to service of the documents 
instituting the proceedings. The EEO Regulation requires the court asked to certify a judgment 
as an EEO to check whether the documents instituting the proceedings were served on the 
debtor in accordance with minimum standards on service, which are enumerated in Articles 13 
and 14 of the Regulation. Additionally, the Regulation provides that if service was effected by 
a method that is less certain to be effective (service without proof of receipt by the debtor), a 
judgment may only be certified as an EEO if the debtor is able to apply for review of the 
judgment in the Member State of origin (Art. 19).149 The underlying idea is that if the requested 
court, which may be the court that issued the judgment itself, checks that these minimum 
requirements were observed, this prevents judgments that do not respect the rights of the 
defendant from being declared enforceable. 
The Brussels II bis Regulation contains a similar mechanism for judgments concerning access 
to a child (Art. 41) or the return of a child (Art. 42).150 The minimum requirements should be 
checked by the judge in the Member State of origin prior to issuing a certificate that renders 
the judgment automatically enforceable throughout the EU. For judgments concerning rights 
of access, the judge must make sure that: (a) if the judgment was given in default, the person 
defaulting was given sufficient opportunity to defend him or herself, or accepted the decision 
unequivocally; (b) that all parties were given the opportunity to be heard; and, (c) the child was 
given an opportunity to be heard, unless such a hearing was considered inappropriate due to 
the child’s age or degree of maturity. For judgments ordering the return of a child, the 
Regulation also requires that the child and parents were given an opportunity to be heard (Art. 
42(2)(a) and (b)) and that the court has taken into account in issuing its judgment the reasons 
for and evidence underlying the order pursuant to Article 13 of the 1980 Hague Convention on 
Child Abduction. 
The EOP and ESCP Regulations also contain minimum standards, but these function 
differently. Rather than requirements that a judgment must fulfil before it is allowed to 
                                                 
 
149 The Maintenance Regulation contains a similar provision: Article 19.  
150 Chapter 2.3.5. See for a discussion of the effectiveness of this arrangement Chapter 8.6.3.  
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circulate, in the EOP and ESCP Regulations, the minimum standards can be invoked to apply 
for a review of the decision.151 The Maintenance Regulation contains a similar review 
procedure.152 This review procedure can be invoked by the debtor if the minimum standards 
were not observed and he was consequentially not adequately informed of the proceedings 
taking place against them. Its use is however limited to cases where service was effected in a 
manner without proof of receipt.153 
These minimum standards can be seen as a new remedy to replace the application for refusal 
of recognition or enforcement. The added value of minimum standards has however been 
questioned for various reasons, which are discussed in turn. 
For one, as was already stated above, the fact that these standards are introduced, together with 
a review mechanism, shows that the European legislature believes that even in the absence of 
a check in the Member State of enforcement, some remedy for the protection of fundamental 
rights is necessary. Other existing remedies against the violation of fundamental rights, for 
example those available under national procedural law, are clearly not considered sufficient.154 
This is somewhat incongruous with the principle underlying the instruments, which is mutual 
trust. 
Apart from these inconsistencies, the minimum standards and accompanying review 
mechanism were also criticized as to their substance.155 While the minimum standards in each 
specific regulation are discussed below, some criticisms apply to the idea of minimum 
standards in general. Cuniberti and Rueda rightly ask why the minimum requirements, 
especially the review procedure, are limited to only one aspect of the right to a fair trial: the 
right to receive prior notice.156 For the EEO and EOP Regulations, this is understandable 
because these procedures are in principle conducted without an appearance by the defendant. 
The right to, for example, an oral hearing only comes into play when the defendant enters an 
appearance, which in the context of an EOP he may very well not do. The right to effective 
service is pivotal to these procedures because this allows the defendant to decide whether or 
not to appear, which is why it is not strange that it was singled out. 
For the ESCP procedure, however, the question is appropriate. The scope of application of 
Article 6 ECHR, which safeguards the right to a fair trial, to civil cases is much wider: it 
encompasses the right to an impartial and independent judge, the right to a fair hearing, the 
                                                 
 
151 Article 20, EOP Regulation; Article 18, ESCP Regulation. Regulation (EU) 2015/2421 widened the scope of 
this review procedure for the ESCP Regulation, in order to address the lacuna identified by the CJEU in its 
judgment in eco cosmetics/Raiffeisenbank; see 8.5.1. 
152 Article 19(1) Maintenance Regulation. 
153 As provided for by Article 14 of the EEO Regulation; Article 18(1)(a) ESCP Regulation, Article 20(1)(a) EOP 
Regulation.  
154 Cuniberti and Rueda (2011) p. 298. 
155 E.g. Cuniberti and Rueda (2011); Stadler (2004a); Kramer (2008a); Zilinsky (2006); Ptak (2014). 
156 Cuniberti and Rueda (2011), p. 298. 
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right to equality of arms, the right to a reasoned judgment within a reasonable time, and so 
forth. The authors question why the European legislature chose only one of the many 
procedural rights as worthy of protection by means of minimum standards, and point out that 
this seems to imply that some procedural rights are more fundamental than others. They raise 
the question whether in this way the European legislature has tried to disconnect its own 
definition of fundamental rights from that of the ECtHR, and whether this is wise to cherry-
pick some rights and protections and neglect others.157 Finally, the CJEU’s judgment in eco 
cosmetics/Raiffeisenbank158 shows that the minimum standards on service and the review 
procedure currently contained in the EOP Regulation have proved insufficient to prevent or 
address certain failures to effect service. 
Yet perhaps the real problem with the concept of minimum standards, even if coupled with a 
review mechanism, is not how they are formulated, but the simple fact that they cannot be a 
replacement for the exequatur because they miss the – arguably vital – cross-border element. 
The Zarraga judgment, discussed in Section 3.5, below, is an example of a case where the 
capability of the minimum requirement that the child be heard to prevent an infringement of 
the child’s rights under Article 42(2) Brussels II bis was questioned. 
Another fundamental problem, it is submitted, is the ‘closed’ nature of the minimum 
requirements when compared with the ‘open’ nature of the refusal grounds. As Chapter 2.2 
explained, one of the valuable aspects of the public policy exception is its open nature. It can 
be applied in a wide variety of cases, thereby acknowledging that it is impossible to foresee in 
advance the types of procedural mistakes that may occur. The protection of the defendant in 
default proceedings is similarly open to interpretation, requiring the court to assess 
retrospectively whether the defendant was actually able to effectively prepare for his defence. 
By contrast, the minimum requirements of, for example, the EEO Regulation rely on the 
assumption that if these requirements were complied with, the defendant knew that proceedings 
were taking place and took a conscious decision not to appear. A case such as Maronier v. 
Larmer shows that service having been effected in accordance with the appropriate rules does 
not mean that the defendant knew about the proceedings. The mechanism whereby refusal 
grounds are replaced with an exhaustive and narrowly defined list of minimum requirements 
removes the potential for case-by-case review which proved essential in a case such as 
Maronier v. Larmer. It also places a great deal of trust in the legislature, who must foresee the 
potential problems that might arise and provide remedies for them. The case of eco 
cosmetics/Raiffeisenbank, discussed further on, shows that such trust may not always be 
justified.159 
There are therefore some significant doubts as to whether the exequatur can adequately be 
replaced with minimum standards to be checked in the court of enforcement. These doubts 
                                                 
 
157 Cuniberti and Rueda (2011) p. 298-300. 
158 CJEU eco cosmetics/Raiffeisenbank; see under 8.5.1. 
159 Joined cases C-119/13 and C-120/13 eco cosmetics GmbH & Co. KG v Virginie Laetitia Barbara Dupuy and 
Raiffeisenbank St. Georgen reg. Gen. mbH v Tetyana Bonchyk  ECLI:EU:C:2014:2144. See under 8.5.1. 
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concern both the minimum requirements included in the various regulations as well as the 
mechanism per se. 
 
3.4.3 Alternative remedies: appeal to the European Court of Human Rights 
 
Arguably, an alternative to refusal of cross-border enforcement would be for a judgment debtor 
to pursue an action against the Member State where the judgment originated before the ECtHR, 
if the procedural remedies available in that state would have been insufficient (which, as 
discussed above, they typically are in these cases). This of course conforms to the starting point 
of the ECHR that each signatory state is responsible for violations committed within its 
jurisdiction. Academics have however criticized the idea that an appeal to the ECtHR could 
adequately replace refusal of enforcement or recognition as a remedy.160 They point out that an 
appeal to the ECtHR would at best only result in a finding that the Member State concerned 
had violated one of the Convention rights, perhaps combined with a “just satisfaction” 
(damages).161 The ECtHR cannot in any way cancel the original judgment from which the 
violation resulted; the judgment will therefore remain in force and continue to produce legal 
effects, which is exactly what refusal of recognition or enforcement is intended to prevent. The 
following Chapter also explains that the ECtHR itself requires that violations of ECHR rights 
are remedied by the state that committed them; recourse to the ECtHR is only a last resort. The 
EU, being the legislature in the field of civil justice cooperation, is therefore still under an 
obligation to provide for adequate remedies in legislation, even if recourse to the ECtHR is 
available. As Chapter 5 explains, it is in itself highly doubtful that EU citizens would even have 
recourse to the ECtHR in matters governed by EU legislation. 
Additionally, Cuniberti and Rueda point to the reluctance of the ECtHR to become actively 
engaged in certain cases with an EU law element. They cite as an example the decision of the 
ECtHR in the previously discussed Gambazzi case that an application brought by Mr Gambazzi 
against the United Kingdom in this case was manifestly ill-founded.162 However, since the 
ECtHR’s decision on admissibility has not been published, it is impossible to know exactly 
why the ECtHR considered the application manifestly ill-founded.163 It is however certainly 
                                                 
 
160 Cuniberti and Rueda (2011); De Cristofaro (2011). 
161 Cuniberti and Rueda (2011) p. 295. 
162 Kuipers (2010) p. 44; Cuniberti (2010) p. 8. 
163 The admissibility decision was not published in the ECtHR’s reports or its online database. In response to a 
request by the author of this research, the ECtHR’s registry confirmed that ‘The case GAMBAZZI v. the United 
Kingdom has been declared inadmissible on the date of 09/01/2003.The Court does not give any justifications 
regarding an inadmissibility on a case. The HUDOC database provides access to the case-law of the Court (Grand 
Chamber, Chamber and Committee judgments, decisions, communicated cases, advisory opinions and legal 
summaries from the Case-Law Information Note), the European Commission of Human Rights (decisions and 
reports) and the Committee of Ministers (resolutions). Therefore, this case cannot be found in HUDOC and 
decisions are only sent to the applicants or their representatives.’  
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true that in the absence of ECtHR rulings on this matter the CJEU provides the more specific 
interpretation on this point. 
Finally, and most importantly, it must be emphasized that the availability of recourse to the 
ECtHR does not eliminate the need for effective remedies at the national level. Recourse to the 
ECtHR is a last resort. Article 13 of the ECHR requires that violations of the rights it protects 
are effectively remedied at the national level; a failure to provide an adequate remedy in itself 
gives rise to a violation. With regard to Article 6, the ECHR requires that procedural 
irregularities are in principle remedied within the procedure itself, while a failure to observe 
the reasonable time requirement may be remedied with monetary compensation.164 Leaving 
aside the difficulties associated with holding an EU Member State responsible for violations of 
the ECHR committed in the implementation of EU legislation (discussed in detail in Chapter 
5), the fact that recourse to the ECtHR is possible in no way means that EU or national 
legislation no longer needs to provide adequate remedies. On the contrary: effective remedies 
must always be available. As for the EU as an intitution, Article 47 EU CFR requires that 
anyone whose rights and freedoms guaranteed by EU law are violated has the right to an 
effective remedy before a tribunal in compliance with the conditions laid down in that Article. 
3.4.4 Interim conclusion 
 
There is no doubt that the exequatur provides an additional means of protection in cases where 
the person against whom enforcement is sought has not received a fair trial. Practice has shown 
that courts are generally reluctant to be very critical of their own procedural rules, and therefore 
unlikely to rule that a judgment from their country is contrary to public policy. In the context 
of the public policy exception, this is in fact logically impossible, because public policy – 
despite being closely circumscribed by the CJEU – necessarily refers to the public policy of 
the state where enforcement is sought.  
However, the protective value of the exequatur is not subject to debate. Even proponents of 
abolition recognize that the exequatur provides an additional check. The problem lies in the 
question whether this check is necessary in an EU where all Member States are expected to 
protect fundamental rights adequately. From the point of view of the judgment debtor, more 
protection will always seem better; but a balance needs to be struck between the debtor’s right 
to a defence, and the creditor’s right to access to justice, which includes having his judgment 
enforced. In this regard, it is submitted that there is at least one category of fundamental rights 
violations for which a cross-border check is necessary: those that are a result of corruption in 
the state of origin. Instances of corruption can never completely be prevented, and it is unlikely 
that they would be detected through self-examination; moreover, the judgment debtor can no 
longer be expected to have trust in the legal system in which they occurred.165 
                                                 
 
164 See Chapter 4.3.7.2.  
165 Stadler (2004b) p. 8. 
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Exequatur therefore certainly provides a layer of procedural protection, but whether it is 
indispensable has been questioned. From a purely legal perspective, it may not be; the debate 
about its value has therefore mostly been conducted in either very pragmatic or very idealistic 
terms. The following analysis of what happens when it is absent hopefully provides some 
clarity. 
 
3.5 Fundamental rights protection in the absence of refusal 
grounds: the Zarraga case 
 
This section discusses the CJEU’s Zarraga judgment,166 as it illustrates very well what the 
consequences of automatic enforcement without any refusal grounds may be. The Zarraga 
decision (also sometimes referred to as Aguirre v. Pelz) provides insight into what the abolition 
of exequatur means in practice. This judgment is a preliminary ruling on a question referred by 
the German Oberlandesgericht Celle. The Oberlandesgericht had been asked to enforce a 
judgment delivered by the Spanish Juzgado de Primera Instancia e Instrucción No 5. The 
judgment concerned the return of a child (Andrea) to her father in Spain.  
Andrea’s parents, Joseba Andoni Aguirre Zarraga (from Spain) and Simone Pelz (from 
Germany) married in 1998 and lived in Sondika, Spain. Their daughter Andrea was born on 31 
January 2000. Mr Zarraga and Ms Pelz separated in 2007. On 12 May 2008, Mr Zarraga was 
awarded provisional rights of custody over Andrea, with Ms Pelz being granted access rights. 
Ms Pelz moved to her home country of Germany in June 2008, and Andrea spent the summer 
holidays there; but when the holidays ended she did not return to her father in Spain. 
Mr Zarraga requested provisional measures from the Juzgado de Primera Instancia e 
Instrucción No 5 de Bilbao. This court handed down a judgment on 15 October 2008, in which 
it considered that Andrea had been living with her mother in breach of its judgment of 12 May 
2008, and subsequently imposed provisional measures including prohibiting Andrea from 
leaving Spanish territory with her mother or anyone close to her mother.  
Next the Juzgado de Primera Instancia e Instrucción No 5 de Bilbao continued the proceedings 
relating to custody over Andrea. The court considered that it was necessary to obtain both a 
fresh expert report and to hear Andrea and subsequently fixed dates for both in Bilbao. 
However – and this is the crux of the matter before the CJEU – the Bilbao court refused both 
Ms Pelz’s application that she and her daughter be permitted to leave Spanish territory after 
the expert report and Andrea’s hearing, as well as Ms Pelz’s request that Andrea be heard via 
video conference. Ms Pelz and Andrea therefore attended on neither of those dates, and on 16 
December 2009, the Juzgado de Primera Instancia e Instrucción No 5 de Bilbao awarded sole 
rights of custody in respect of Andrea to her father. An appeal by Ms Pelz, which included a 
request that Andrea be heard, was refused. 
                                                 
 
166 CJEU Case C-491/10 PPU Joseba Andoni Aguirre Zarraga v Simone Pelz ECLI:EU:C:2010:828. 
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Mr Zarraga subsequently took action to have his daughter returned to him. First, on 30 January 
2009, he brought an application for the return of his daughter on the basis of the 1980 Hague 
Convention. That application was first upheld by the Amtsgericht Celle, but subsequently 
refused on appeal by the Oberlandesgericht Celle by decision of 1 July 2009. It dismissed Mr 
Zarraga’s application on the basis of Article 13(b) of the Hague Convention, which prohibits 
the return of a child if this would entail a “grave risk” that the child would be exposed to 
physical or psychological harm. The Oberlandesgericht based its decision in particular on the 
fact that, when Andrea was heard by that court, she had shown to be resolutely opposed to 
returning to Spain and had categorically refused to do so. The Oberlandesgericht found that 
Andrea’s opinion should be taken into account based on both her age and her maturity. 
In a second set of proceedings, Mr Zarraga obtained a certificate pursuant to Article 42 of 
Regulation 2201/2003 from the Juzgado de Primera Instancia No 5 de Bilbao, on the basis of 
the judgment of 16 December 2009. The Amtsgericht Celle was asked to enforce this judgment, 
but refused on the ground that the Spanish court had not heard Andrea prior to delivering its 
judgment. Mr Zarraga appealed against this decision before the Oberlandesgericht Celle and 
requested enforcement of the Spanish judgment. 
The Oberlandesgericht Celle then turned to the CJEU for clarification on the powers, if any, it 
enjoyed to refuse enforcement. The Oberlandesgericht made two observations: first, that the 
Juzgado de Primera Instancia e Instrucción No 5 de Bilbao did not obtain Andrea’s current 
views and was therefore unable to take into account those views in its 2009 judgment; and 
second, that the efforts made by the Spanish court to hear Andrea were insufficient to satisfy 
the requirements of Article 24(1) of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights (EU CFR).  
Consequently, the Oberlandesgericht wondered whether it could be held to enforce a certificate 
of which the contents were ‘manifestly inaccurate’, given that it stated that Andrea had been 
heard, whereas she was not. It asked the CJEU, essentially, whether it could refuse enforcement 
of the Spanish judgment on the basis of one of two grounds: that the judgment contained a 
‘serious infringement of fundamental rights’, or that it was ‘manifestly inaccurate’. 
The questions posed by the Oberlandesgericht and the answers provided by the CJEU boil 
down to the following two issues. Firstly, they concern an interpretation of the Brussels II bis 
Regulation to ascertain whether there is any discretion left to the enforcing court to refuse 
enforcement, on either of the two grounds named above. Secondly, they concern the 
interpretation of the obligation to check whether the child was given an opportunity to be heard, 
as laid down in Article 42(2) of the Brussels II bis Regulation. 
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The CJEU already addressed the first problem in two earlier preliminary rulings: Povse167 and 
Rinau.168 Both of these preliminary rulings concerned the court of enforcement’s powers of 
review under the Regulation. In Rinau, but more explicitly in Povse, the CJEU gave a strict 
interpretation of the system of jurisdiction introduced by the Brussels II bis Regulation which 
can be summed up as follows: the Regulation, and in particular the provisions concerning the 
enforcement of return orders, are based on the principle of mutual trust of Member States in 
one another,169 meaning that grounds for refusal should be kept to a minimum. The system of 
jurisdiction has resulted in a clear division of tasks between the court of origin and the court of 
enforcement. In this system, only the former is entitled to hear all appeals and applications 
pertaining to the child’s return, while the latter is simply obliged to enforce any decisions 
handed down by the court of origin without any powers of review. Essentially, the abolition of 
exequatur including grounds for review is exactly what it looks like: the courts of the Member 
State where enforcement is sought have no discretion to refuse enforcement, no matter what 
the circumstances are. 
What distinguishes Zarraga from the Rinau and Povse judgments is the issue of when the 
alleged interference with fundamental rights occurred. Rinau concerned the more technical 
question of whether the fact that the judgment was subsequently overturned could lead to 
refusal of enforcement; Povse concerned the possible (future) consequences of enforcement 
for the concerned parties’ family life. Zarraga, by contrast, concerns a case where the 
fundamental rights interference (whether it was a violation is discussed further on) was already 
apparent at the time when the judgment was handed down, and therefore obvious to the court 
responsible for enforcement. It is therefore a case in which, arguably, enforcement would 
previously have been refused under the public policy exception, and for that reason it 
demonstrates very well the consequences of abolition of this refusal ground. 
Even so, the CJEU’s answer to the first problem was, if anything, more explicit than the ones 
it gave in Rinau and Povse. After reaffirming that the principle of mutual trust forms the basis 
of the Regulation, and after reiterating the division of tasks achieved by the Regulation, the 
CJEU states: 
52 [Mutual trust and the clear division of jurisdiction] are the principles which must 
guide the interpretation of the first subparagraph of Article 42(2) of Regulation 
No 2201/2003, which provides that the court of the Member State of origin is to issue 
the certificate referred to in paragraph 1 of that article only if the child was given the 
opportunity to be heard, unless a hearing has been considered inappropriate having 
regard to the child’s age or degree of maturity (Art. 42(2)(a)), if the parties were given 
the opportunity to be heard (Art. 42(2)(b)) and if that court has in handing down its 
                                                 
 
167 CJEU Case C-211/10 PPU, Doris Povse v Maura Alpago, ECLI:EU:C:2010:400, not to be confused with 
ECtHR Povse v. Austria (dec.) no. 3890/11, ECHR 2013.  
168 CJEU Case C-195/08 PPU Inga Rinau, [2008] ECLI:EU:C:1998:608. 
169 CJEU Povse para. 40. 
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judgment taken into account the reasons for and evidence underlying the order issued 
pursuant to Article 13 of the 1980 Hague Convention (Art. 42(2)(c)).  
53 It must be observed at the outset that the first subparagraph of Article 42(2) of 
that regulation has no purpose other than to inform the courts of the Member State 
of origin of the minimum content required in the judgment on the basis of which 
the certificate provided for in Article 42(1) is to be issued.  
54 Moreover, having regard to the case-law cited in paragraphs 48, 50 and 51 of 
this judgment, it must be held that the first subparagraph of Article 42(2) in no way 
empowers the court of the Member State of enforcement to review the conditions 
for the issue of that certificate as stated therein.  
55 Such a power could undermine the effectiveness of the system set up by 
Regulation No 2201/2003, as described in paragraphs 44 to 51 of this judgment.  
56 It follows that, where a court of a Member State issues the certificate referred 
to in Article 42, the court of the Member State of enforcement is obliged to enforce the 
judgment which is so certified, and it has no power to oppose either the recognition 
or the enforceability of that judgment. [Emphasis added] 
The CJEU interpreted the Regulation very strictly: the absence of refusal grounds means, quite 
simply, that enforcement cannot, under any circumstances, be refused. According to the CJEU, 
this reasoning is bolstered by an a contrario interpretation of the refusal grounds incorporated 
in the Regulation for other categories of judgments: the fact that these exist for certain 
judgments, but not for return orders, means that they were deliberately excluded (para. 57). 
This reasoning is entirely in line with what could be expected on the basis of the two earlier 
judgments. 
Perhaps remarkably, therefore, the CJEU continued to examine whether Article 42(2) of the 
Regulation, which requires that the court of origin satisfies itself that the child was given an 
opportunity to be heard prior to certifying the return order as enforceable, gives rise to an 
absolute duty to hear the child, and whether this was respected. One could ask why the Court 
considered this analysis necessary, given that it had already concluded that a possible violation 
of the child’s right to be heard could not play any part in the decision to enforce the resulting 
judgment anyway. Perhaps we should therefore see this part of the CJEU’s ruling as a signal 
that it took the German court’s complaint seriously, and used the opportunity to clarify how 
Article 42(2) should be interpreted. The CJEU began by stating that Article 42(2) should be 
interpreted in the light of Article 24 of the EU CFR. It went on to state that 
62 In that regard, it must first be observed that it is clear from Article 24 of that charter 
and from Article 42(2)(a) of Regulation No 2201/2003 that those provisions refer not 
to the hearing of the child per se, but to the child’s having the opportunity to be heard. 
 114 
 
This interpretation of Article 24 of the EU CFR appears to be in line with Article 12 of the UN 
Convention on the Rights of the Child, which was the basis for Article 24.170 Article 12(2) of 
the UN Convention provides that “the child shall in particular be provided the opportunity to 
be heard in any judicial and administrative proceedings affecting the child”, which according 
to the Implementation Handbook “implies an active obligation on the State to offer the child 
the opportunity to be heard, although, […] it is important to emphasize that there is no 
requirement that the child express views.”171 
There is therefore no obligation to hear the child, only to actively provide it with the 
opportunity to be heard. However, the right of the child to be heard in procedures such as these, 
which greatly affect him or her, is protected by the UN Convention and – accordingly - the 
Charter for a very important reason:172 to allow the child to participate in procedures which 
concern him or her, to respect his or her autonomy, and to prevent the child being pressured or 
influenced by other parties.173 This element seems especially important in cases where the 
parents have separated, as was the case in Zarraga, because in such cases both parents clearly 
have opposing interests, which do not necessarily correspond to those of the child. 
It is submitted that it is at least questionable whether the Spanish court fulfilled this “active 
obligation”, given that it rejected two of Ms Pelz’s requests that were aimed at facilitating the 
hearing of Andrea, including a request that she be heard through videoconferencing. It is not 
difficult to understand that Ms Pelz did not want to take Andrea to Spain to be heard by the 
court, if no guarantee could be given that they would be allowed to leave together.  
It can therefore be argued, even if the CJEU did not arrive at this conclusion, that the Spanish 
court was certainly capable of doing more to allow Andrea to make her views heard,174 and 
moreover, that Andrea’s views were of central importance to the decision whether or not to 
order her return, given that both parents clearly had opposing interests. The CJEU recognizes 
that a court may use “all means available to it under national law as well as the specific 
instruments of international judicial cooperation” to obtain a child’s views, and that a “genuine 
and effective opportunity” must be provided to the child to express those views. 
                                                 
 
170 Explanations relating to the Charter of Fundamental Rights, OJ C 303/17, p. 25 (relating to Article 24 of the 
Charter). 
171 Hodgkin and Newell (2007) p. 155-156. 
172 The UN Committee has even recognized the right of the child to be heard as one of four “general principles” 
of the Convention, which according to the General Comments of the Committee on that article “highlights the 
fact that this article establishes not only a right in itself, but should also be considered in the interpretation and 
implementation of all other rights.” The right of the child to be heard is therefore clearly of central importance to 
protecting the child’s autonomy. United Nations Committee on the Rights of the Child, Convention on the Rights 
of the Child. General Comment No. 12: the right of the child to be heard. 2009, p. 3. See also Kruger (2011) p. 
37-39; Chapter 7.5.3. 
173 United Nations Committee on the Rights of the Child, Convention on the Rights of the Child. General Comment 
No. 12: the right of the child to be heard, 2009. 
174 Beaumont and Walker (2011) 244-245. 
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Furthermore, no pressing reasons seem to have been given as to why Ms Pelz’s requests which 
would have facilitated Andrea’s hearing were rejected, even though the Spanish court was 
clearly allowed to use all available means to obtain her views. Hearing Andrea would have 
been even more important considering that she had expressed a clear wish not to return to Spain 
when she was heard by the Oberlandesgericht.  
The fact that the CJEU offers its interpretation of the right of the child to be heard at length in 
its preliminary ruling, even though this interpretation could not influence the outcome of the 
enforcement proceedings either way, may be taken as a sign that it at least takes the German 
court’s complaint very seriously. This is also clear from the fact that the CJEU did not accept 
Advocate General Bot’s conclusion that Spain was not obliged to hear Andrea because the 
German court deciding on the first application for Andrea’s return had already done so.175 This 
result shows a belief that each court is in principle obliged to obtain its own information 
concerning the child’s views, especially considering that these may change over time.176 
It has therefore been observed that Zarraga demonstrates the “near-absolute rule” of mutual 
trust in the area of judicial cooperation in civil matters,177 which has in Zarraga been 
interpreted to the detriment of fundamental rights.178 For that reason commentators have 
concluded that the system of certification under Article 42 has shifted the balance too far in 
favour of the court of origin, and that it is unfortunate that the CJEU did not use the opportunity 
to correct it.179 
Another question is what, if any, is the added value of incorporating a minimum requirement 
that the child be given an opportunity to be heard in a regulation, if this requirement cannot be 
invoked in any way by the parties it seeks to protect. Article 42(2)(a) of the Brussels II bis 
Regulation requires a court to ensure that the child was given an opportunity to be heard prior 
to certifying the order as enforceable. Zarraga shows this provision does not provide the child 
any procedural opportunities to invoke the protection of this provision for the child – even 
though it is the party whose rights this provision intends to protect. Article 43(2) explicitly 
prohibits an appeal against the issuing of a certificate by the court of origin, while Zarraga 
excludes any possibility of invoking the minimum requirements in the member state of 
enforcement.180 This raises the question what the practical added value is of the incorporation 
                                                 
 
175 View of Advocate General Bot, delivered on 7 December 2010, Case C-491/10 PPU, Joseba Andoni Aguirre 
Zarraga v. Simone Pelz, para. 95 et seq. 
176 De Boer, Th. M. (2011) p. 4644; Holliday (2012) p. 130. 
177 Peers (2011) p. 693. 
178 Holliday (2012) p. 132. 
179 Beaumont and Walker (2011) p. 245. 
180 The CJEU does note that an appeal against the custody decision of the Juzgado de Primera Instancia e 
Instrucción No 5 de Bilbao was still pending with the Audiencia Provincial de Biskaya, so a procedural remedy 
is still open to Ms Pelz and her daughter, which may eventually lead to a review before the Constitutional Court. 
However, while the appeal on the merits of the custody decision was indeed still pending, the Audiencia Provincial 
had already explicitly refused a request that Andrea be heard on appeal. Whether this possibility would eventually 
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of minimum requirements such as those contained in Article 42(2) of Brussels II bis. If they 
are intended to impel the court that delivered the return order to exercise self-examination, then 
the experience of Krombach, Maronier v. Larmer and Gambazzi may show this to be illusory, 
given that in none of these cases the court of origin considered itself to be at fault.181 Given this 
conclusion, do the minimum requirements of Articles 41(2) and 42(2) really add anything of 
value, or do they merely exist to pay lip-service to the EU’s commitment to fundamental rights? 
From the viewpoint of the parties concerned they probably do not add anything practical; yet 
the examination of the Povse decision of the ECtHR in the following Chapter will make clear 
why they may nevertheless play a role in the ECtHR’s assessment.182 Practice has also shown 
that the divergence in interpretation regarding the hearing of children between the Member 
States are so large that this creates problems at the enforcement stage.183 The 2015 Study on 
the Evaluation of the Brussels II bis Regulation concluded that the differing interpretations 
gave rise to reservations and refusals to enforce (where this was allowed by the Regulation), 
which undermines “legal certainty and predictability for citizens”.184 
The conclusion must be that Zarraga illustrates the consequences for the protection of 
fundamental rights when exequatur is abolished: a judgment that previously would have been 
rightfully refused is now considered enforceable. Any discretion the court of enforcement 
would previously have enjoyed is removed; together, Rinau, Povse and Zarraga cover a range 
of factors, from technical to fundamental, which can no longer lead to refusal of enforcement. 
The likelihood of an exception being allowed in the future is therefore slim.  
As discussed,185 the authors of the 2011 Report on the Interpretation of the Public Policy 
Exception commented on the application of the automatic enforcement mechanism of articles 
41 and 42 of Brussels II bis. Citing Zarraga as a “prominent, but typical” example, the reporters 
stated that the application of these provisions has been “difficult”: 
For national courts, ordering the return of a (minor) child (even against his or her will) 
to the Member State of its former habitual residence appears problematic. Normally, 
the emotional conflict between the parents strongly affects the child who becomes 
entrapped in a difficult situation. Deciding upon such issues is a challenging situation 
for the courts of EU Member States confronted with highly emotional situations. Taking 
these concerns into account, it comes as no surprise that the ECJ has been repeatedly 
requested by national courts on the interpretation of Regulation (EC) No 2201/2003.186 
                                                 
 
provide Andrea with an opportunity to be heard is therefore unclear, since the Spanish courts are clearly of the 
opinion that they have already satisfied their legal obligation by inviting her to a hearing which she did not attend. 
181 See under 3.4.1. 
182 Chapter 5.4.3. 
183 Study on the assessment of the Brussels IIbis Regulation (2015) p. 43 onwards; see Chapter 7.5 below. 
184 Study on the assessment of the Brussels IIbis Regulation (2015) p. 29. 
185 Chapter 3.2.6.2. 
186 Hess and Pfeiffer (2011) p. 159. 
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The researchers conclude later on that given the difficult and emotionally charged situations 
families are confronted with, many find it hard to accept the preference of a foreign judge, 
leading them to instigate “satellite litigation” in the Member State of enforcement. “This 
practice”, according to the researchers, “demonstrates that the abolition of review proceedings 
– at least in sensitive areas of law – should be carried out with great caution”.187  
  
3.6 Conclusion 
 
This Chapter demonstrated how EU legislation on civil justice cooperation has generally 
proved to protect fundamental rights. Its protective function is most apparent in the existence 
of grounds for refusal. The public policy exception, the protection of defendants in default 
cases, and the right of the child to be heard are the clearest examples, and it has been shown 
that they contribute also in practice to the protection of fundamental rights. The special 
jurisdiction rules are more tangentially connected but are also clearly intended to provide 
protection for a weaker party. 
Section 3.4 demonstrated that the value of the regime for cross-border recognition and 
enforcement introduced by the Brussels Convention lies not just in these specific grounds for 
refusal. In fact, grounds for refusal have changed over time, and may be interpreted differently 
in different contexts. This means that it is very difficult to replace them with common minimum 
standards, as these cannot possibly be drafted in such a manner as to cover the wide variety of 
potential problems that have in the past led to the application of the public policy exception or 
other grounds for refusal. 
It was also proposed that cross-border review provides a remedy that cannot be replaced by a 
check against minimum standards in the Member State of origin of the judgment. Cases such 
as Maronier v. Larmer and the Polish paternity case show that even when adequate procedural 
safeguards are in place, they are not always respected, and that only an independent observer 
may be capable of noticing that a violation occurred. It is submitted that it can never be assumed 
that all Member States always protect procedural rights adequately, it is a task for the EU 
legislature to provide for adequate remedies. Since refusal of recognition or enforcement on 
the basis of common refusal grounds has proved an effective remedy in the past, it is difficult 
to defend the abolition of this mechanism. Many commentators have expressed their belief that 
to prioritise free movement over fundamental rights protection is fundamentally wrong,188 or 
at least unwise in the current political situation, where differences in language, legal culture 
                                                 
 
187 Hess and Pfeiffer (2011), p. 162. 
188 De Cristofaro (2011) p. 451; Beaumont and Johnston (2010a) p. 106; Muir Watt (2001) p. 554; Cuniberti and 
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and national procedural law are simply too great to allow exequatur to be abolished.189 Cross-
border checks sometimes simply remain necessary to address fundamental rights violations.190 
                                                 
 
189 Stadler (2004b) p. 7. 
190 Hess (2012) p. 1103; Kramer (2011b) p. 230. 
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Conclusion to Part I  
 
Chapters 2 and 3 discussed how European Union (EU) legislation on free movement of civil 
judgments evolved and what potential consequences the developments in this field have for the 
protection of the fundamental rights of EU citizens and businesses. This conclusion presents 
the most pertinent findings from the two Chapters, and explains why these support the 
conclusion that complete free movement of civil judgments is a potential problem from a 
fundamental rights perspective.  
A. European Union legislation increasingly allows for complete free 
movement of judgments 
 
Chapter 2 showed the evolution of free movement of civil judgments in EU legislation. It 
explained that the cross-border recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and 
commercial cases has been within the purview of the EU for a long time due to its importance 
to the realisation of the internal market.1 Since the creation of an express legal basis in the EU’s 
founding Treaties, but especially as a result of the introduction of mutual recognition by the 
1999 Conclusions of Tampere,2 the EU legislature’s objective became much more ambitious 
than it was previously: to remove all legal obstacles to the recognition or enforcement of 
judgments across borders within the EU. This objective led to both the abolition of formal 
requirements for cross-border enforcement in some instruments (judgment import, or the 
exequatur) and the abolition of grounds for refusal (judgment inspection). The latter removed 
all possibilities for the Member State where recognition or enforcement was sought to exercise 
control. This was despite the fact that the 2007 Heidelberg Report concluded that the existing 
procedure for cross-border enforcement of Brussels I functioned quite effectively, with over 
90% of judgments being enforced without difficulty,3 and that the refusal grounds were only 
rarely applied.4 
Currently, the Maintenance Regulation5 and the two uniform procedures (the European Small 
Claims Procedure (ESCP) and the European Order for Payment Procedure (EOP))6 have 
abolished both judgment import and judgment inspection. Judgments falling within the scope 
of (or resulting from) one of these Regulations can therefore be enforced automatically 
throughout the EU, and there are no possibilities for the Member State addressed to refuse 
recognition or enforcement. 
                                                 
 
1 Chapter 2.2.1. 
2 Chapters 2.2.2 and 2.2.3. 
3 Chapter 2.2.4. 
4 Chapter 2.2.4.1; the 2011 Report on the application of the public policy exception, discussed in Chapter 3.2.6, 
supports this conclusion with regard to the public policy exception. 
5 Chapter 2.3.4. 
6 Chapter 2.3.7.  
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The European Enforcement Order for Uncontested Claims (EEO)7 and the Brussels II bis 
Regulation8 replaced the judgment inspection previously provided by refusal grounds with 
minimum standards that need to be fulfilled before a judgment is declared enforceable. The 
responsibility to check whether they are fulfilled lies with the court in the Member State of 
origin of the judgment. The new Brussels I bis Regulation retained the grounds for refusal9 
after a proposal to reform them was met with academic and political criticism.10 Apart from 
Brussels I bis, the Insolvency Regulation and the Succession Regulation still contain refusal 
grounds, although this may change.11 
To conclude, the abolition of both formal and substantive checks on the cross-border 
recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil cases is a clear priority for the EU 
legislature, which has so far been achieved for a considerable number of Regulations in all 
fields of civil law.  
 
B. Refusal of enforcement is effective as a remedy for fundamental 
rights violations 
 
Chapter 2 showed that the substantive checks on cross-border recognition and enforcement 
have been shown to act as a remedy for violations of the right to a fair trial. Grounds for refusal 
– the public policy exception, the protection of the defaulting defendant, and the requirement 
that the child or parents be heard of the Brussels II bis Regulation – enabled courts in the 
requested Member State to identify fundamental rights violations and to remedy them by 
preventing the judgment from taking effect. Both the Heidelberg Report (2007) and the Report 
on the functioning of the public policy exception (2011) demonstrated that the public policy 
exception was and is applied by national courts in order to address procedural defects and, 
comparatively rarely, substantive issues.12 Most of the cases in which public policy was 
invoked successfully, as reported in the 2011 Report on the public policy exception, concerned 
the Brussels I Regulation. Cases such as Krombach v. Bamberski,13 Maronier v. Larmer,14 and 
the small, yet considerable, number of national cases15 cited in both the Heidelberg Report and 
the Report on the public policy exception show that procedural defects occur from time to time. 
They can be the result of an unacceptable rule of procedure (Krombach) or of an incorrect 
application of rules that may, in principle, be considered adequate (Maronier v. Larmer). The 
                                                 
 
7 Chapter 2.3.6. 
8 Chapter 2.3.5. 
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10 Chapter 2.2.2. 
11 Chapter 2.2.2. 
12 Chapter 3.2.6. 
13 Chapter 3.2.5. 
14 Chapter 3.2.6. 
15 Chapter 3.2.6. 
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number of cases is ‘small, yet considerable’, because it must be stressed that the fact that a 
safeguard such as the public policy exception is applied only rarely does not mean it is 
unimportant or that it can be done away with. It should not be forgotten that public policy is an 
‘emergency brake’, only to be applied in the most extreme of cases; the fact that there are cases 
that are sufficiently serious to warrant its application is itself telling. The fact that they occurred 
at all, even if there were only few, should therefore be cause for concern for the European 
legislature. 
Chapter 2 also concluded that in cases such as Krombach v. Bamberski, Maronier v. Larmer 
and the Polish/German paternity case16 the cross-border check by means of refusal of 
enforcement was necessary to address the violation that occurred. This is not only because the 
parties affected were unable to invoke a remedy in the Member State of origin, but also because 
it is highly doubtful whether courts in the Member State of origin are capable of disqualifying 
their own legislation and practice. It is submitted that the value of a cross-border check is 
precisely to address the application of rules that may be legal in the Member State of origin, 
but that are unacceptable when regarded objectively.17 
The 2011 Report also discussed, as this research has done,18 the ‘difficult’ application of mutual 
recognition of judgments concerning access and return of children. In the absence of refusal 
ground such as public policy, national courts are clearly hesitant to apply mutual trust. This 
research has argued that their reluctance can be justified. Especially in the sensitive context of 
the return of abducted children, adequate safeguards need to be in place to ensure that the 
interests of all parties, but primarily that of the child, are taken into consideration. The case of 
Zarraga shows that minimum requirements in the Member State of origin cannot adequately 
replace a public policy (or similar) exception in the Member State of enforcement.19 
 
C. Mutual trust does not make cross-border checks obsolete  
 
The European Commission contended in its proposal for a recast Brussels I Regulation that 
“the level of trust among Member States has reached a degree of maturity which permits the 
move towards a simpler, less costly, and more automatic system of circulation of judgments”.20 
It is submitted that even if this is true, it cannot justify the complete abolition of cross-border 
checks. The question is not whether mutual trust exists: it is not contested that EU legislation 
on recognition and enforcement is based on mutual trust and that Member State courts apply 
the provisions in conformity with this principle.21 The 2007 Heidelberg Report showed that the 
refusal grounds were applied restrictively and only in a small number of cases, and therefore 
                                                 
 
16 Chapter 3.2.6. 
17 Chapter 3.4.1.  
18 Chapter 3.5.  
19 Chapter 3.4.2.  
20 Chapter 2.2.2. 
21 Chapter 2.2.3. 
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do not considerably reduce efficiency. The question is rather whether mutual trust can be 
assumed to exist, and be justified, at all times. Chapter 3 showed that serious problems simply 
sometimes occur. When these are detected and remedied, this is not an expression of distrust, 
but rather an incidental rebuttal of the strong presumption that trust is justified. Even the 
existence of common minimum standards, as in the EEO, ESCP and EOP Regulations, cannot 
prevent occasional misunderstandings or misapplications of these rules that could lead to a 
rebuttal of trust in a concrete case. It is therefore submitted that in some cases refusal of 
recognition or enforcement by the requested Member State may be the only way of remedying 
a serious violation of a fundamental rights. This is especially so in situations where the 
judgment debtor cannot be expected to put his trust in the effectiveness of the justice system 
of the Member State of origin, for example where the judgment was delivered as a result of 
bribery or other forms of corruption.22 
D. Conclusion: complete free movement of civil judgments is a 
fundamental rights question 
 
Complete free movement of civil judgments, obtained by a reduction in checks pertaining to 
cross-border recognition and enforcement, is problematic from a fundamental rights 
perspective because these checks were shown to both detect and remedy violations of 
fundamental rights. For that reason alone, free movement of civil judgments is a topic that 
merits close examination from a fundamental rights perspective. The following three Chapters 
provide such an examination: Chapter 4 shows which obligations flow from the right to a fair 
trial in civil cases, while Chapters 5 and 6 explore who is responsible for fulfilling these 
obligations in the multilevel legal order of the EU. 
This is not, however, the only question pertaining to the protection of the right to a fair trial 
raised by the EU legislation on free movement of judgments. The EOP and ESCP Regulations 
aim to provide complete and uniform European civil procedures. For these procedures, 
fundamental rights problems do not only result from the abolition of refusal grounds, but also 
from the fact that they aim to create simple and efficient procedures; whether this quest for 
efficiency has come at the expense of procedural fairness is a question that merits 
examination.23 The EEO Regulation likewise raises questions as to its conformity with the right 
to a fair trial that go beyond the mere abolition of refusal grounds.24 
The abolition of cross-border checks also raises questions regarding the obligations of the EU’s 
Member States to protect fundamental rights. Under regulations such as those named above, 
Member States are required to trust that decisions from other EU Member States conform to 
fundamental norms; they are not allowed to check whether these norms have actually been 
observed. This raises questions with regard to the Member States’ responsibilities under the 
European Convention on Human Rights, since as Chapter 2 discussed, the ECtHR has 
considered the Convention rights to be part of states’ ordre public externe, obligating them to 
                                                 
 
22 Chapter 7.1. 
23 Chapter 8.5. 
24 Chapter 8.4. 
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refuse enforcement of foreign judgments. The question is whether this obligation exists where 
EU legislation requires Member States to enforce each other’s decisions on the basis of trust. 
Finally, it should be emphasised that abolition of obstacles to cross-border enforcement of 
judgments does not only create risks that violations of fair trial might go unchecked; it also 
potentially greatly benefits judgment creditors and therefore contributes to the effective 
protection of their right to enforcement, which is also part of the right to a fair trial. The 
question is therefore not only how to safeguard debtor’s rights in the context of cross-border 
enforcement, but also how to ensure that creditors can effectively exercise their right to 
enforcement. In the following Chapters, the question is therefore not only how fundamental 
rights limit free movement of judgments, but also how fundamental rights create a positive 
obligation to facilitate free movement of judgments. 
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4. The right to a fair trial in civil cases 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
The previous Chapter introduced the move towards complete free movement of civil judgments 
as a development that raises profound questions concerning the protection of fundamental 
rights. It was discussed that safeguards such as grounds for refusal are increasingly being 
abolished. This means that judgments that are the result of unfair civil proceedings, which 
previously would have been caught by these refusal grounds, may now be immediately 
enforced and recognised throughout the European Union (EU). To show why this is a potential 
problem, it is necessary to understand why it is important to safeguard the right to a fair trial in 
civil procedures, and what this entails. This Chapter shows which requirements the right to a 
fair trial, as protected by both the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) and in the 
EU fundamental rights framework, imposes on the civil trial.1 It specifically explores how the 
right to a fair trial informs the enforcement stage of the civil trial, and what this means for a 
legal regime on cross-border recognition and enforcement.  
The goal of this exploration is threefold. First, it provides a context in which to place the cases 
that were presented in the introduction and the previous Chapter as examples of violations of 
the right to a fair trial that should be remedied through the application of refusal grounds. This 
Chapter aims to show why the violations that occurred in those cases were sufficiently serious 
to trigger the application of those grounds.  
The second goal of this Chapter is to provide a framework for the following chapters by looking 
at the structure and character of the right to a fair trial, and the principles underlying it. This is 
especially important with a view to exploring in what cases refusal of recognition or 
enforcement is an appropriate remedy. It was previously discussed that the public policy 
exception should only be applied in exceptional cases, as should the protection of the defaulting 
defendant. This Chapter aims to provide a basis for distinguishing between violations of the 
right to a fair trial that can only be remedied by the application of a refusal grounds, and those 
that can be remedied in other ways. It also makes it possible to explore where the concepts of 
public policy and the right to a fair trial overlap, and where they do not. 
Third, this Chapter serves the very practical purpose of providing an overview of the case law 
that the European courts have handed down concerning the right to a fair trial. This case law 
provides specific interpretations of the right to a fair trial that are of great importance with 
regard to the design of legislation intended to prevent violations from occurring. Chapter 7 uses 
                                                 
 
1 This Chapter only discusses what an enforcement procedure should look like, based on the ECtHR’s and 
CJEU’s case law on the right to a fair trial. Whether the ECHR requires a form of cross-border judgment 
inspection at all is discussed in Chapter 5. 
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the identified standards to evaluate the existing safeguards in the current regulations and to 
provide suggestions on how these could be improved. 
The structure of this Chapter is as follows. Section 4.2 presents the primary sources for the 
right to a fair trial in Europe: Article 6(1) of the ECHR and Article 47 of the EU Charter of 
Fundamental Rights (EU CFR). This Article is a codification of the Court of Justice of the 
European Union’s (CJEU) case law in which it developed the right to a fair trial as a general 
principle of EU law, so this case law remains applicable. Article 47 of the EU CFR is, by virtue 
of Article 52(3) of the EU CFR, directly connected to Article 6(1) and its interpretation; this 
connection is explained in Section 4.2.3. Section 4.2.4 then discusses in general terms how the 
right to a fair trial has been applied; in particular, to what extent it is considered absolute and 
whether a margin of appreciation applies. 
Section 4.3 discusses the elements of the right to a fair trial and how they apply to civil cases. 
The elements of the right to a fair trial are examined in turn and it is shown how the CJEU and 
European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) apply these elements in their case law. The case 
law from the CJEU and the ECtHR are discussed together, since for the purposes of EU 
legislation they are equally relevant. 
Section 4.4 then is an attempt to understand the principles behind the fair civil trial as it has 
been developed in the Western constitutional tradition. The purpose of this section is to 
understand better why the civil trial took on its current form. It is argued that the civil trial, 
with its emphasis on equality between the parties and adversity, and presided over by an 
independent and impartial judge, serves a dual purpose. On one hand, it allows parties to protect 
or exercise their subjective rights under civil law; in order to achieve this objective, the civil 
trial facilitates a fair outcome that is true to the facts.2 At the same time, the fair trial as 
guaranteed by Articles 6(1) ECHR and 47 EU CFR is arguably an expression of the principle 
of human dignity, in which each party to a conflict should be treated as having a good faith 
position worth taking into consideration.3 
This exploration of the principles behind the fair civil trial serves as a framework for following 
chapters, in which it is used to provide some insight into what elements of the right to a fair 
trial require more protection, in the specific context of cross-border recognition and 
enforcement of judgments, than others. It should be noted that these principles are not intended 
as a general theory on the hierarchy of elements of the right to a fair trial or as a comment on 
the courts’ case law. Rather, it is an attempt to understand the function of certain elements of 
the right to a fair trial and the consequences of disregarding them. These conclusions are then 
used in Chapter 7 to show how conflicts between these elements may be resolved, and in 
Chapter 8 to reflect on the best way to incorporate these elements into legislation. 
 
                                                 
 
2 See 4.4.2. 
3 See under 4.4.3. 
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4.2 The right to a fair civil trial in the European treaties 
 
4.2.1 Article 6(1) of the European Convention on Human Rights 
 
The European Convention on Human Rights is the primary source of fundamental rights in 
Europe.4 All EU Member States are Contracting Parties to the ECHR; its ratification is a 
prerequisite for joining the Union. Furthermore, Article 2 of the Treaty on European Union 
(TEU) expresses that the EU is founded on, among others, respect for human rights, while 
Article 6 TEU provides that fundamental rights as guaranteed by the ECHR shall constitute 
general principles of the EU. As is further explained below, the CJEU has consistently drawn 
on the ECHR and the ECtHR’s case law in cases involving fundamental rights. The EU CFR 
has, by virtue of Article 52(3), effectively made the ECHR’s sunstantive provisions directly 
binding on the EU institutions and its Member States when they implement EU law, at least in 
so far as its provisions correspond to those of the ECHR. While the EU CFR is therefore the 
primary reference point when considering the compatibility of EU legislation with fundamental 
rights, its corresponding provisions are interpreted in accordance with the ECHR. 
Within the ECHR, Article 6 holds a prominent place, because of its importance in a democratic 
society and as a central element of the rule of law.5 Its practical importance is also considerable: 
Article 6 has attracted more applications and resulted in more judgments than any other right.6 
Only its first section applies to the civil trial; sections 2 and 3 contain specific guarantees for 
the criminal trial. Article 6(1) reads as follows: 
Article 6 
Right to a fair trial 
1. In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge 
against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable 
time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law. Judgment shall 
be pronounced publicly but the press and public may be excluded from all or part 
of the trial in the interests of morals, public order or national security in a democratic 
society, where the interests of juveniles or the protection of the private life of the 
parties so require, or to the extent strictly necessary in the opinion of the court in 
special circumstances where publicity would prejudice the interests of justice. 
 
                                                 
 
4 The Convention’s territorial scope is wider than the European Union, as it applies in all countries that are 
members of the Council of Europe. Currently, the Council of Europe has 47 Member States, that are all 
Contracting Parties to the Convention. See http://echr.coe.int/en/web/human-rights-convention.  
5 Rainey et al. (2014) p. 247; Janis et al. (2008) p. 719.  
6 Harris et al. (2014) p. 370; Grotian (1994).  
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A. Scope of application 
 
The scope of this Article includes all civil rights and obligations, which may be taken to mean 
all rights and obligations that apply in the relation between private persons (though relations 
between private persons and public institutions are not entirely excluded). It also applies in 
civil matters only where there is a dispute between private parties whose intended outcome is 
the determination of those civil rights and obligations. It appears evident that Article 6(1) 
covers ordinary civil litigation between private individuals, such as those arising out of tort, 
contract, and family law.7 The requirement of a ‘dispute’ is derived from the French text of the 
Convention, which uses the word ‘contestation’ instead of ‘determination’.8 The dispute must 
be one that lends itself to judicial resolution: for example, the ECtHR once ruled that an 
examination aimed at assessing the candidate’s competence as an accountant did not come 
within the scope of Article 6, because the examination was more akin to school or university 
examining than judging.9 There must therefore be some sort of legal question that may be 
resolved through a judicial procedure for Article 6 to be applicable. The dispute must also be 
‘genuine and serious’, i.e., there must be something at stake for the applicant.10 Moreover, the 
decision resulting from the procedure must be directly decisive for the civil rights and 
obligations concerned.  
It can be assumed that Article 6 in principle applies to all matters that come within the material 
scope of the Regulations discussed in this research.11 The Brussels I bis, II bis, Insolvency, 
European Order for Payment (EOP), European Small Claims Procedure (ESCP) and European 
Enforcement Order for uncontested claims (EEO) Regulations all apply to civil matters, while 
Brussels I bis explicitly excludes certain administrative disputes12 and all regulations exclude 
disputes against the State.13 
It can also be assumed that most of the procedures that benefit from the application of the 
regulations can also be considered disputes. Brussels I bis regulates the recognition and 
enforcement of ‘judgments’, which as Chapter 2 explained, only applies to judicial decisions 
which have been, or were capable of being, the result of an inquiry in adversarial proceedings.14 
It seems likely that all judgments that fit this definition will also be deemed to concern the 
                                                 
 
7 Rainey et al. (2014) p. 252. ‘Civil rights and obligations’ is an autonomous concept, though in König v. 
Germany the ECtHR ruled that a right’s classification under domestic law can be relevant: ECtHR König v. 
Germany, appl. no. 6232/73 ECHR A27, para. 89.  
8 ECtHR Benthem v. Netherlands appl. no. 5548/80 ECHR A97.  
9 ECtHR Van Marle v. The Netherlands, appl. nos. 8543/79 8674/79 8675/79 8685/79, ECHR A101. 
10 ECtHR Kienast v. Austria appl. no. 23379/94, 23 January 2003. 
11 See also 2.3.1.1. 
12 Article 1(1) Brussels Ibis Regulation. 
13 Article 2(1) EEO Regulation; Article 2(1) EOP Regulation; Article 2(1) ESCP Regulation; Article 1(1) 
Brussels Ibis Regulation; Article 1(1) Brussels IIbis Regulation.  
14 Chapter 2.3.1.1; CJEU Case 125/79 Denilauler v SNC Couchet Frères, ECLI:EU:C:1980:130. 
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‘determination of civil rights and obligations’. It is also clear from the ECtHR’s case law that 
the matters covered by the Brussels II bis Regulation (divorce, separation, marriage annulment, 
and parental responsibility) can be considered civil rights and obligations for the purpose of 
Article 6(1).15 Finally, there can be no question that the procedures of the ESCP and EOP 
Regulations,16 which are designed to result in a judgment determining the rights and obligations 
of parties vis-à-vis each other, should in their entirety conform to Article 6(1). 
B. Stages of proceedings covered by Article 6(1) 
 
While all disputes covered by the Regulations can therefore be regarded ‘determinations of 
civil rights and obligations’ within the meaning of Article 6(1), a more difficult question is 
whether enforcement proceedings, and in particular exequatur proceedings, should conform to 
Article 6(1). Article 6(1) applies from the moment court proceedings are instituted (normally 
when a writ of summons is served),17 and prescribes the manner in which judgments should be 
handed down and motivated. It is not clear from the wording of Article 6(1) whether it applies 
to procedural steps that are taken after the judgment has been delivered.  
The ECtHR however ruled in the landmark case of Hornsby v. Greece that Article 6 also applies 
to the execution of judgments. According to the ECtHR, the ‘right to a court’ would be 
‘illusory’ if the final judgment were allowed to remain inoperative to the detriment of one of 
the parties, and that this would contravene the principles underlying the ECHR.18 The extent 
to which the right to enforcement is protected under Article 6 is extensively discussed in 4.3.6 
below.  
Exequatur proceedings, meaning proceedings in which a court decides whether a foreign 
judgment should be allowed to be enforced, have also been ruled to come within the remit of 
Article 6. In McDonald v. France,19 the ECtHR first accepted that a refusal to enforce a foreign 
judgment could amount to a violation of Article 6(1), though it did not find a violation in that 
case. In ECtHR Saccoccia v. Greece,20 the ECtHR ruled that the proceedings for obtaining an 
exequatur should in their entirety conform to Article 6(1).  
                                                 
 
15 See for example ECtHR Airey v. Ireland appl. no. 6289/73 ECHR A32, on separation, and ECtHR Mizzi v. 
Malta, appl. no. 26111/02, ECHR 2006-I, on paternity. 
16 The European Order for Payment (EOP) Procedure is in principle a one-sided procedure that does not require 
the appearance of the defendant (Chapter 2.3.7). It should nevertheless be considered as a ‘dispute’ within the 
scope of Article 6(1) ECHR, since the procedure clearly determines the civil rights and obligations of the 
claimant and defendant vis à vis each other. The ECtHR has ruled that a procedure cannot be regarded as a 
dispute when it is non-contentious and unilateral and does not involve opposing parties (ECtHR Alaverdyan v. 
Armenia (dec.) appl. no. 4523/04, 24 August 2010) but this is clearly not the case in an application for an EOP. 
That the presence of the defendant is not required to issue an EOP does not negate its status as a dispute. 
17 E.g. ECtHR Guincho v. Portugal 8990/80 ECHR A81.  
18 ECtHR Hornsby v. Greece appl. no. 18357/91 ECHR 1997-II. 
19 ECtHR McDonald v. France [dec.] appl. no. 18648/04, 29 April 2008. 
20 ECtHR Saccoccia v. Austria, appl. no. 69917/01, 18 December 2008.  
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The mechanisms for recognition and enforcement contained in these regulations, including the 
EEO, should therefore conform to Article 6(1) ECHR. Section 8.4, below, explores the 
implications of this conclusion in greater detail. 
 
4.2.2 EU law and Article 47 of the EU Charter on Fundamental Rights 
  
The second relevant source of the right to a fair trial for EU legislation is to be found within 
EU law itself: Article 47 of the EU CFR and the case law of the CJEU.21 
Article 47 reads as follows: 
Article 47 
Right to an effective remedy and to a fair trial 
Everyone whose rights and freedoms guaranteed by the law of the Union are violated 
has the right to an effective remedy before a tribunal in compliance with the conditions 
laid down in this Article. 
Everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an 
independent and impartial tribunal previously established by law. Everyone shall have 
the possibility of being advised, defended and represented. 
Legal aid shall be made available to those who lack sufficient resources in so far as 
such aid is necessary to ensure effective access to justice. 
Since the wording of Article 6(1) ECHR is identical to the second paragraph of Article 47 EU 
CFR, it can be concluded that it corresponds to that Article, which is confirmed by the 
Explanations to the EU CFR.22 According to Article 52(3) of the EU CFR, this means that it 
shall be interpreted in the same way as Article 6(1) ECHR (see below). A clear difference is 
that the scope of Article 47 is not limited to the determination of civil rights or obligations, or 
of a criminal charge. This limitation is absent from the Article, which means that administrative 
disputes are also included in its scope. For the purpose of civil proceedings however, Article 
47 corresponds to Article 6(1), though the CJEU may provide more extensive protection in its 
case law (see below).  
                                                 
 
21 The status of the EU CFR in the wider EU fundamental rights framework is discussed in Chapter 6.2; the 
following concerns only Article 47. 
22 Explanations relating to the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, OJ C 303/17, 2007. These Explanations do 
not as such have the status of law, but they are a valuable tool of interpretation intended to clarify the provisions 
of the EU CFR. 
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Notably, Article 47 expressly provides a right to legal aid. Article 6(1) does not explicitly refer 
to the right to legal aid, but the ECtHR accepted in its judgment in Airey23 that Article 6(1) 
includes a right to legal aid in certain circumstances as part of the right to access to justice. The 
final sentence of Article 47 of the EU CFR is, according to the Explanations, a codification of 
that judgment.24 
 
4.2.3 Relationship and interplay 
 
Since the second sentence of Article 47 therefore corresponds to Article 6(1) ECHR, it must 
be interpreted in the same way. Article 52(3) of the EU CFR provides the following on EU 
CFR rights that correspond to ECHR rights: 
 
In so far as this EU CFR contains rights which correspond to rights guaranteed by the 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, the 
meaning and scope of those rights shall be the same as those laid down by the said 
Convention. This provision shall not prevent Union law providing more extensive 
protection. 
 
The Explanations to the EU CFR confirm that Article 47 indeed corresponds to Article 6(1) 
and needs to be interpreted accordingly: 
 
Article 52(3) is intended to ensure the necessary consistency between the EU CFR and 
the ECHR by establishing the rule that, in so far as the rights in the present EU CFR 
also correspond to rights guaranteed by the ECHR, the meaning and scope of those 
rights, including authorised limitations, are the same as those laid down by the ECHR. 
 
[…] Article 47(2) and (3) corresponds to Article 6(1) of the ECHR, but the limitation 
to the determination of civil rights and obligations or criminal charges does not apply 
as regards Union law and its implementation. 
 
The combined consequence of these provisions is essentially that Article 6(1) ECHR has 
become directly binding on the EU and its Member States when they apply EU law,25 though 
the Union is free to provide more extensive protection.26 The previous section concluded that 
the legal instruments on judicial cooperation that are in force within the EU must conform to 
Article 6(1) ECHR. They clearly must also conform to Article 47 of the EU CFR. Since Article 
52(3) of the EU CFR allows the Union to provide more extensive protection, the implications 
of both articles for the regulations on civil justice cooperation must be considered together in 
                                                 
 
23 ECtHR Airey v. Ireland. 
24 Explanations to the EU CFR, p. 30. 
25 Article 51(1) EU CFR; see for a discussion of its scope Chapter 6.2.2. 
26 Explanations to the EU CFR, p. 33; Heringa and Verhey (2001) p. 17.  
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order to conclude which provides the most extensive protection. Section 3 provides an 
overview of the most important case law from both the CJEU and ECtHR on the right to a fair 
trial that is of relevance to the civil trial.  
 
 
4.2.4 Structure, internal connections, and interpretation 
 
Before going into detail, it is useful to briefly discuss the interpretation guidelines with regard 
to the right to a fair trial. According to the ECtHR, 
In a democratic society within the meaning of the Convention, the right to a fair 
administration of justice holds such a prominent place that a restrictive interpretation 
of Article 6(1) would not correspond to the aim and purpose of that provision.27 
As opposed to other rights laid down in the ECHR, Article 6(1) has been applied extensively 
by the ECtHR. It is only to a limited extent subject to what is called the ‘margin of appreciation 
doctrine’, by which the ECtHR determines to what extent the States Parties may legitimately 
restrict the exercise of ECHR rights.28 
Such a margin is not considered to play a significant role in the application of Article 6.29 The 
reason for this is that the application of Article 6 does not, unlike other ECHR rights, allow 
limitations on grounds of public safety, health, morals or other grounds relating to morals and 
values that differ across Member States. In relation to these grounds for limitation, the 
argument is made that States are better placed to decide whether limitations are justified, and 
that the ECtHR should therefore only carry out a marginal review.30 With regard to Article 6, 
the ‘better placed’ argument does not apply, since as a judicial authority, the ECtHR is in a 
good position to review a national procedure for its compatibility with Article 6. Consequently, 
the ECtHR stated from the outset, in its judgment in Delcourt,31 that Article 6 does not lend 
itself to a restrictive interpretation. However, certain elements of the right to a fair trial may be 
subject to a certain degree of discretion: the ECtHR has accepted that in particular the right to 
access to a court (which is not explicitly included in Article 6(1)) may be restricted, though 
only if certain conditions are met.32 Similarly the ECtHR has acknowledged a certain discretion 
as regards the degree to which judgments must contain reasoning.33 
                                                 
 
27 ECtHR Delcourt v. Belgium appl. no. 2689/65 ECHR A11, para. 25. 
28 See for a discussion Chapter 7.2.3.2. 
29 Gerards (2011) p. 185-190; Legg (2012) p. 210. 
30 ECtHR Handyside v. UK, appl. no. 5493/72 ECHR A24 para. 48; see Chapter 6.2.3. 
31 ECtHR Delcourt v. Belgium, appl. no. 2689/65 ECHR A11, para. 25. 
32 ECtHR Ashingdane v. UK appl. no. 8225/78 ECHR A93.  
33 See section 4.3.2.7.  
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The Contracting States are also accorded considerable leeway as to the manner in which they 
guarantee a fair trial. It has been argued that in this regard the rules of Article 6(1) are as much 
obligations of result as of conduct, with national courts being allowed whatever particular rules 
they choose as long as the end result can be considered fair.34 Consequently the ECtHR bases 
its assessment of a trial’s fairness on the proceedings in their entirety. The ‘extensiveness’ of 
its assessment is expressed in the fact that the trial must always be fair: since there are no 
grounds for limitation and no margin of appreciation, it is never acceptable to grant a less than 
fair trial; and what is ‘fair’ in a given case is decided by the ECtHR. 
What is ‘fair’ may differ according to the circumstances of the case. When the ECtHR is called 
upon to review whether a procedure was fair, it will look at the trial in its entirety.35 There are 
few procedural defects that will conflict with a fair trial to such an extent that an opinion can 
be given about the fairness of the trial irrespective of the further course of the proceedings. One 
example may be national legislation that completely prevents a person from being effectively 
defended36. In most cases it will be possible for procedural defects to be effectively repaired at 
a later stage of the trial, for example during appeal, so that the procedure as a whole can be 
considered fair.37 This approach means that there is not one correct way of conducting a fair 
civil trial. The ECtHR has avoided giving an enumeration of criteria in the abstract by which 
the fairness of a procedure can be assessed.38 This means that Contracting States are free to 
shape the civil trial in such a way as they consider appropriate, and that the ECtHR will assess 
on a case-by-case basis whether the requirements of a fair trial were met. 
There is also no hierarchy between the elements of the right to a fair trial; in principle, a failure 
to observe any of the elements may result in a finding that Article 6(1) was violated. Section 
4.4 of this Chapter and Chapter 7.3 further discuss the question of hierarchy in the context of 
conflicts between elements of Article 6(1).39 
 
4.3 The right to a fair civil trial in the case law of the European courts 
 
                                                 
 
34 Harris et al. (2014) p. 371; ECtHR Schenk v. Switzerland appl. no. 10862/84 ECHR A140; ECtHR De Cubber 
v. Belgium (merits) appl. no. 9186/80 ECHR A124-B, para. 35. 
35 ECtHR Barberà, Messegué and Jabardo v. Spain, appl. no. 10590/83 ECHR A146; ECtHR Kostovski v. The 
Netherlands (merits) appl. no. 11454/85 A166. 
36 See under 4.3.2.2. 
37 Mole and Harby (2006) p. 6. 
38 Van Dijk and Viering (2006) p. 579; Smits (2008) p. 99. 
39 Section 4.4 of this Chapter explores whether it is possible to distinguish a ‘core’ and a ‘periphery’ within 
Article 6(1); Chapter 7.3.2.1 explores whether such a distinction may help determine when refusal of 
recognition or enforcement is an appropriate remedy. 
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4.3.1 Elements of the right to a fair civil trial 
 
The following discusses the elements of Article 6(1) one by one.40 For each element of Article 
6(1), its implications for the civil trial is discussed, using the ECtHR’s and the CJEU’s case 
law as a guide to interpretation. To what extent any of the elements leave a margin of 
appreciation to the domestic legal systems is also considered.  
After having discussed how the ECtHR has applied each element, the same is done for the 
CJEU. It was discussed above that the EU CFR allows for EU law to provide more extensive 
fundamental rights protection than required by the ECHR. This means that whichever of the 
two systems provides the more extensive protection should be considered the standard that EU 
legislation in the field of civil justice should adhere to. It is often difficult to speak of ‘more 
extensive’ protection. This is because sometimes a case has come before one of the courts, 
where the other court has not yet had an opportunity to rule on the same matter. In such cases 
it is perhaps more appropriate to speak of a more specific, rather than a more extensive, 
interpretation. An example is the rights of defaulting defendants; whereas there is no ECtHR 
case law explicitly dealing with this matter, the CJEU has been able to rule on it several times 
due to the existence of EU legislation that includes rules on the protection of defaulting 
defendants.41 
Selection of case law 
 
As stated before, the right to a fair trial has been acknowledged as a general principle of EU 
law in the CJEU’s case law for a long time. However, owing to the limitations to the CJEU’s 
jurisdiction, which extends only to those cases that fall within the scope of EU law, the right to 
a fair trial was initially developed as ancillary to other substantive or material questions of EU 
law. This is illustrated by cases such as Les Verts42 and Factortame,43 in which the CJEU held 
that substantive rights provided by EU law must always be enforceable before a national court, 
which in turn may require that effective remedies are implemented at the national level. This 
line of case law was built on in DEB,44 discussed below, which provided that legal aid must be 
made available in the Member States to litigants who seek to enforce rights emanating from 
EU law before the national courts. In a similar vein, the CJEU ruled that in case of uncertainties 
regarding the application of EU law, access to national courts, and in particular the CJEU, must 
                                                 
 
40 There are different ways of presenting these aspects and the interrelations between them: for example, 
sometimes the right to a reasoned judgment is presented as part of the right to a fair hearing (e.g. Van Dijk and 
Viering (2006) p. 430) sometimes as an element in its own right (Leanza and Pridal (2014)). 
41 See under 4.3.2.3. 
42 CJEU Case 294/83 Les Verts ECLI:EU:C:1986:166. 
43 CJEU Joined Cases C-46/93 and C-48/93 Brasserie du Pecheur and Factortame ECLI:EU:C:1996:79. 
44 CJEU Case C-279/09 DEB ECLI:EU:C:2010:811. 
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be guaranteed.45 Likewise, the effective enforcement of EU rights at the national level requires 
a right to be heard46 and a right to access to documents.47 
Not surprisingly, there is a lot of case law concerning the right to a fair trial to be found in the 
field of competition law, where the European Commission has the authority to impose fines on 
undertakings found to have taken part in a cartel or to have abused their dominant position. 
The procedural rights of these undertakings in proceedings before the CJEU and the General 
Court have been subject to litigation in numerous cases, which has yielded rulings on such 
matters as the right to be heard,48 the right not to incriminate oneself (nemo tenetur) and the 
right to a judgment within a reasonable time.49 
The cited case law shows that the notion of a right to a fair trial is firmly established in the 
CJEU’s case law. However, as mentioned earlier, the development of that notion has primarily 
taken place in the field of administrative law (the EU CFR contains a separate codification of 
the right to a fair trial in administrative cases – Article 41). It is not immediately certain that 
rights which have been developed to govern the vertical relationship between administrative 
authorities and their subjects are also applicable in the horizontal situation between two private 
parties, especially given that the procedural rights in administrative cases have been codified 
separately in Article 41 EU CFR (the right to good administration). However, it is submitted 
that it is possible to deduce from the CJEU’s case law rules that are also relevant to the civil 
trial. This is because the CJEU has often framed certain rights as expressions of general 
principles of the EU, which may be applied more broadly than the specific case in which they 
were pronounced. There is however also a large number of cases where the applicability to the 
civil trial is immediately clear. The following section discusses the cases in which, is it 
submitted, the CJEU gave an interpretation of the right to a fair trial that should be taken into 
account in the context of future EU legislation in the field of civil procedure. 
Since the EU CFR entered into force the EU courts primarily apply Article 47 of the EU CFR 
and use ECtHR case law to interpret this provision.50 However, the EU CFR is explicitly not 
intended to replace the fundamental rights jurisprudence of the CJEU that was delivered prior 
                                                 
 
45 CJEU Case 77/83 CILFIT, ECLI:EU:C:1984:91. 
46 CJEU Case C-135/92 Fiskano, ECLI:EU:C:1994:267; CJEU Case C-32/95 P Lisrestal, ECLI:EU:C:1996:402. 
47 GC Case T-23/99 LR af, ECLI:EU:T:2002:75; Joined cases T-10/92, T-11/92, T-12/92 and T-15/92 
Cimenteries CBR and others v. Commission ECLI:EU:T:1992:123. 
48 CJEU Case 17-74 Transoceanic Marine Paint Association, ECLI:EU:C:1974:106; CJEU Joined Cases 46/87 
and 227/88 Hoechst, ECLI:EU:C:1989:337; CJEU Case 107-76 Hoffman-la Roche, ECLI:EU:C:1977:89. 
49 Famously, in Baustahlgewebe the CJEU for the first time ruled that the European Commission had failed to 
respect the reasonable time requirement and annulled the Commission decision in that case; CJEU Case 185/95 
P Baustahlgewebe, ECLI:EU:C:1998:608. 
50 CJEU Case C-199/11 Otis, ECLI:EU:C:2012:684, para. 47. 
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to the EU CFR entering into force.51 This means that older CJEU case law remains relevant. 
The following sections therefore contain, where relevant, both pre- and post-EU CFR case law. 
Another note on the selection of case law must be made: the following is intended to give an 
overview of case law that is most relevant for civil cases. A large number of ECtHR judgments 
on Article 6(1) concern criminal cases.52 As for the EU, there is, of course, a wealth of case 
law on the procedural rights of undertakings who are the subject of an investigation by the 
European Commission under the EU competition rules or on whom a fine has been imposed.53 
Likewise, there is a great deal of case law dealing with the procedural rights of accused persons 
in criminal cases and in asylum cases,54 on judicial review in cases involving EU external 
relations policy,55 on rights of employees of EU institutions,56 and so on.  
For the purposes of the following analysis, a selection has been made of the case law that is 
most relevant to civil justice. It has been well documented that certain elements of the right to 
a fair trial are interpreted differently in civil cases then they are in criminal cases. For example, 
in criminal cases the ECtHR nearly always requires a hearing in the presence of the accused, 
whereas this is not generally necessary in civil cases.57  
All this means that even though Articles 6(1) and 47 provide the same requirements for both 
civil and criminal cases, the way in which these requirements can be fulfilled may differ 
according to the type of case.58 This is a direct consequence of the notion of ‘fairness’, which 
forms the cornerstone of these provisions: what is needed to achieve fairness is dependent on 
the circumstances of the case. Because one of the stated goals of this analysis is not to give a 
comprehensive overview of all ECtHR and CJEU case law on the principle of a fair trial, but 
to identify the standard that EU legislation on civil justice must comply with, only those cases 
have been selected that are most relevant to civil cases. This Chapter does therefore not contain 
a comprehensive discussion of the right to a fair trial as it applies in competition cases or other 
types of cases outside the scope of this research. Where there is no CJEU judgment on a specific 
                                                 
 
51 Article 53 of the Charter provides that “nothing in the Charter shall be interpreted as restricting or adversely 
affecting human rights and fundamental freedoms as recognised […] by Union law’.  
52 CJEU Case C 396/11 Ciprian Vasile Radu, ECLI:EU:C:2013:39; CJEU Case C 399/11 Stefano Melloni v. 
Ministerio Fiscal, ECLI:EU:C:2013:107. 
53 See e.g. Kowalyk-Bańczyk (2015).  
54 Case C-562/13 Centre public d'action sociale d'Ottignies-Louvain-La-Neuve v Moussa Abdida, 
ECLI:EU:C:2014:2453; CJEU Case C-249/13 Khaled Boudjlida v Préfet des Pyrénées-Atlantiques, 
ECLI:EU:C:2014:2431. 
55 Cases C-402 and 415/05 P Yassin Abdullah Kadi and Al Barakaat International Foundation v Council and 
Commission ECLI:EU:C:2008:461 (Kadi I); Case T-85/09 Kadi v Commission and Council 
ECLI:EU:T:2010:418 (Kadi II) and Case C-584/10 Commission v Kadi ECLI:EU:C:2013:518 (Kadi II).  
56 See for an overview Gattinara (2015). 
57 Harris et al. (2014) p. 410. 
58 It is however important to note that Article 6(1) itself does not, in principle, distinguish between civil and 
criminal cases, and that the elements of Article 6(1) therefore all apply to both types of proceedings, though 
their implementation may differ: see Rozakis (2004) p. 97. 
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element of the right to a fair trial that emanates from a civil case, judgments from other types 
of cases are analysed and interpreted by analogy in so far as possible. 
  
4.3.2 The right to a fair hearing 
 
 
4.3.2.1 The right to access to a court 
 
ECtHR 
 
Though Article 6(1) does not explicitly guarantee it, the ECtHR acknowledged that access to a 
court is an essential prerequisite of the right to a fair trial, and may therefore be inferred from 
the Article.59 The right to access to a court includes the right to commence civil proceedings;60 
however, it is difficult to imagine this becoming a problem at the stage where enforcement is 
sought, because presumably where a judgment was given, the creditor must have had access to 
a court. However, the right to access to a court also applies to the defendant, who derives from 
it a right to participate effectively in the proceedings. This means that a lack of access may 
become an issue at the enforcement stage, where a judgment debtor claims that though he was 
aware of the proceedings instituted against him, he was prevented from participating, for 
example because he was wrongfully refused legal aid.61 This happened in Steel and Morris v. 
UK,62 where the fast-food chain McDonald’s brought a claim for defamation against two 
Greenpeace campaigners and was awarded a total of £76,000 against them. The defendants had 
no legal representation and were therefore placed at a considerable disadvantage compared to 
their opponent. The ECtHR ruled that the United Kingdom had infringed Article 6(1) by 
refusing them legal aid.  
An implication of the right to access to a court is also that court fees may not be 
disproportionately high. According to the ECtHR, the amount of the charges by the state for 
taking a case to court must be related to the particular circumstances, including the applicant’s 
ability to pay.63 It is imaginable that a judgment debtor may oppose enforcement of a judgment 
                                                 
 
59 ECtHR Golder v. UK, appl. no. 4451/70 ECHR A18. See Francioni (2007). 
60 ECtHR Airey v, Ireland, supra note 14. 
61 Other situations are imaginable, for example where the defendant was barred from participating due to 
excessive formality; see for example ECtHR Sergey Smirnov v. Russia, appl. no. 14085/04, in which the 
applicant was not allowed to bring a case because he could not provide a residential address, though he could 
provide a correspondence address. 
62 ECtHR Steel and Morris v. UK, appl. no. 68416/01 ECHR 2005-II. 
63 ECtHR Weissman v. Romania, appl. no. 63945/00 ECHR 2006-VII, para. 37. 
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where he was, by virtue of losing the case, condemned to pay the creditor’s costs. This question 
is considered in more detail in Chapter 7.2.4.4. 
The right to access to a court also has implications for the way documents should be filed. In 
Lawyer Partners A.S. v. Slovakia,64 the Slovakian court had refused to allow the applicant to 
digitally submit his dossiers, instead requiring him to file the printed documents, which would 
amount to 43,800,000 pages in total. The ECtHR ruled that since in this case electronic 
submission of the files was the only way for the applicant to present his cases to the court in an 
effective manner, the refusal to receive the electronic files amounted to a violation of Article 
6(1) ECHR. The court took into account the fact that Slovakian law allowed for the electronic 
filing of documents; the court’s objection that its computers were not capable of processing the 
volume of documents was therefore no longer valid.65 This aspect of the right to access is 
especially relevant with regard to the functioning of the ESCP and EOP, which allow the 
procedure to be conducted digitally. 
CJEU 
 
As Section 4.2.2 above discussed, the CJEU since long requires that substantive rights provided 
by EU law must always be enforceable before a national court (see cases such as Les Verts66 
and Factortame67), which in turn may require that effective remedies are implemented at the 
national level. In DEB, the CJEU ruled that legal aid must be made available in the Member 
States to litigants who seek to enforce rights emanating from EU law before the national 
courts.68 In a similar vein, the CJEU ruled that access to national courts, and in particular the 
CJEU in case of uncertainties regarding the application of EU law, must be guaranteed.69 
Another iteration of the right to access to a court can be found in the obligation of Member 
State courts to request a preliminary ruling from the CJEU; the ECtHR has confirmed that a 
refusal to request such a ruling may amount to an unacceptable limitation of the right to access 
to a court.70 
 
4.3.2.2 The right to a fair hearing 
 
                                                 
 
64 ECtHR Lawyers Partners A.S. v. Slovakia, appl. no. 54252/07 ECHR 2009. 
65 ECtHR Lawyers Partners A.S. v. Slovakia, para. 54. 
66 CJEU Case C-294/83 Les Verts, ECLI:EU:C:1986:166. 
67 CJEU Joined Cases C-46/93 and C-48/93 Brasserie du Pecheur and Factortame. 
68 CJEU Case C-279/09 DEB, ECLI:EU:C:2010:811. 
69 CJEU Case 77/83 CILFIT, ECLI:EU:C:1984:91. 
70 ECtHR Dhahbi v. Italy appl. no. 17120/09, 8 April, 2014, para. 33. 
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ECtHR 
 
The right to a fair hearing can be seen as the overarching notion behind Article 6(1). 
Compliance with specific rights set out in the Article is not sufficient to guarantee a fair trial: 
there is an overarching requirement that the proceedings as a whole should be fair.71 This 
requirement serves not only the interests of the parties but also the general interest in a fair 
administration of justice.72 
The requirement of fairness implies that the parties to the conflict must be given sufficient and 
adequate opportunity to present their views on both the legal and factual aspects of the case.73 
‘Hearing’ does not only refer to the hearing in person or oral hearing, but to the proceedings as 
a whole; it can therefore be equated with the notion of ‘trial’.74  
The ECtHR has applied the requirement as a residual guarantee, providing an opportunity for 
adding particular rights that are not explicitly mentioned in Article 6(1). In its case law the 
ECtHR has distinguished a number of more specific aspects of the right to a fair hearing. These 
include the right to adversarial proceedings and the principle of equality of arms, which are 
discussed below.75 Other elements of a fair hearing are inter alia a right to be adequately 
informed of the proceedings, the right to an oral hearing (if necessary, and if need be in 
person),76 and the right to an adequately reasoned judgment.77 
Aside from these specific aspects, the ECtHR has abstained from providing a list of guarantees 
that must be complied with in order to provide a fair hearing; rather, the hearing in its entirety 
should be fair. However, some guarantees are so essential that without them a trial most likely 
can no longer be considered fair. An example is the right to be defended by a lawyer, during 
the trial and/or at the oral hearing. In Poitrimol v. France the ECtHR ruled that this right is so 
fundamental to a fair trial that refusing legal assistance can under no circumstances be 
considered a proportionate sanction for failing to appear in person at a hearing.78 Depriving a 
litigant from the opportunity to be effectively defended during the trial can thus by itself 
constitute a violation of the right to a fair trial. It is this case law that the CJEU relied on when 
                                                 
 
71 ECtHR Ankerl v. Switzerland appl. no. 17748/91 ECHR 1996-V para. 38; Centro Europa 7 S.R.L. and Di 
Stefano v. Italy appl. no. 38433/09 ECHR 2012 para. 197; Harris et al. (2014) p. 409, Smits (2008) p. 99, 
Rainey et al. (2014) p. 263. 
72 ECtHR Nideröst-Huber v. Switzerland appl. no. 18990/91 ECHR 1997-I, para. 30. 
73 See the European Commission of Human Rights in, among others, X v. Belgium, appl. no. 7450/46, D.R. 9 p. 
108; Bricmont v. Belgium appl. no. 9938/82 D.R. 48 p. 28.  
74 Van Dijk and Viering (2006) p. 578. 
75 See under 4.3.2.4 and 4.3.2.5, respectively. 
76 Smits (2008) p. 113; Van Dijk and Viering (2006) p. 589-590. ECtHR Helmers v. Sweden, appl. no. 11826/85 
ECHR A212-A; discussed below under 4.3.2.6.  
77 See under 4.3.2.7. 
78 ECtHR Poitromol v. France appl. no. 14032/88 ECHR A277-A, para. 34.  
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concluding in Krombach v. Bamberski that the exclusion of Mr Krombach, as a sanction for 
failing to appear in person, should be considered contrary to public policy.79 
While there is therefore no abstract definition of what constitutes a fair hearing, the following 
can be said in general about the requirement of fairness. It provides parties with a right to 
present all observations and evidence that they consider relevant to their case, and places on 
courts a “duty to conduct a proper examination of the submissions, arguments and evidence 
adduced by the parties, without prejudice to its assessments whether they are relevant to its 
decision”.80 It also involves a duty for the court to communicate, on its own initiative, all 
documents that it has at its disposal, so that parties are given an effective opportunity to 
comment on all available information.81 Litigants should be able to exercise their right to a fair 
hearing effectively. For example, in H. v. Belgium, a disbarred avocat (attorney) sought 
readmission to the bar. The ECtHR ruled that Article 6(1) was breached because the procedure 
that needed to be followed to achieve such readmission were unclear and that there were no 
precise rules governing the situations in which such readmission would be allowed. Moreover, 
the applicant in that case did not have a right to challenge the decision on his request to be 
readmitted. Together, these circumstances made for a trial that was, as a whole, unfair.82 
CJEU 
 
The right to a fair hearing has been recognized by the CJEU, albeit formulated in various ways 
(notably ‘respect for the rights of the defence’ or the ‘right to effective judicial protection’). 
There are a number of important rulings of the CJEU on this aspect, some of which provide 
specific interpretations of the right to a fair hearing that are relevant to the civil trial. In some 
cases, these interpretations are in fact more specific than the existing case law of the ECtHR. 
The right to be heard in cases where a decision will be taken that might affect a litigant has 
been developed in competition cases, but it is derived from a more general principle that the 
rights of the defence should be respected, which is a “fundamental principle of Community 
law”, as the CJEU ruled in Michelin.83 According to the Court, respect for the rights of the 
defence includes that the person concerned must have been enabled to express his views 
effectively.84 While this case law pertains to administrative proceedings, its underlying 
                                                 
 
79 CJEU Case C-7/98 Dieter Krombach v André Bamberski ECLI:EU:C:2000:164, para. 39. 
80 ECtHR Kraska v. Switzerland appl. no. 13942/88 ECHR A254-B (see Van Dijk p. 578-9). See also Van der 
Hurk v. Netherlands, appl. no. 16034/90 ECHR A288 para. 59; ECtHR Perez v. France appl. no. 47287/99 
ECHR 2004-I para. 80; and ECtHR Dombo Beheer B.V. v. the Netherlands, appl. no. 14448/88 ECHR A274 
para. 33 in fine. 
81 ECtHR Kerojärvi v. Finland appl. no. 17506/90 ECHR A322 para. 42; ECtHR Göç v. Turkey appl. no. 
36590/97 ECHR 2002-V para. 57. 
82 ECtHR H. v. Belgium appl. no. 8950/80 ECHR A127-B para. 53. 
83 CJEU Case C-322-81 Michelin ECLI:EU:C:1983:313, building in turn on CJEU Case 17-74 Transoceanic 
Marine Paint Association ECLI:EU:C:1974:106 para. 15. 
84 CJEU Michelin, para. 8.  
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principles can be applied to civil cases as well, considering how they were conceived by the 
CJEU as fundamental principles of EU law. CJEU case law certainly supports the existence of 
the right to a fair hearing, in the sense of having an effective opportunity to make one’s views 
known, in civil cases. 
That this is true is evident from the CJEU’s case law on the application of the European 
instruments of civil procedure. As discussed in Chapter 3.2.5, the CJEU held in Krombach v. 
Bamberski that a national rule which prevented a person from being effectively defended at 
trial simply because he was not present at the hearing could be considered incompatible with 
the right to a fair trial.85 The CJEU even effectively set aside a Protocol to the Brussels 
Convention that allowed such rules for certain offenses. It cited the judgments in Lisrestal and 
Fiskano86 (which are administrative cases) to conclude that the fundamental principle of EU 
law that a fair trial must be guaranteed “in all proceedings initiated against a person which are 
liable to culminate in a measure adversely affecting that person” prohibited such a rule.87 In 
this case the CJEU quite closely followed the guidance of the ECtHR.88 
In Gambazzi, the CJEU was asked to consider whether an English ‘debarment order’ (which 
forbade the defendant from being included in the further proceedings if he refused to cooperate) 
infringed the right to a fair trial. It may be recalled that in that judgment the CJEU allowed the 
national court to decide that such a debarment order could be considered contrary to public 
policy, only providing some factors that a national court might take into consideration.89 As 
such, the CJEU allowed a national court to declare a debarment order contrary to the right to a 
fair trial, though it did not take a definitive position on this matter. Perhaps this was because 
there was no ECtHR case law available to the CJEU at that point which could have influenced 
the decision either way.90 Yet even in the absence of such case law, it is clear that a debarment 
order is an extreme measure that may render a party completely incapable of taking part in the 
proceedings in any way whatsoever. Though measures that coerce the parties to litigation into 
cooperation and discourage abuse of process may be compatible with the right to a fair trial, a 
complete debarment would deprive the affected party completely of his right to access to a 
court. While it was discussed that the right to access to a court may be subject to limitations, 
these must not only serve a legitimate goal, but must also be proportionate. It is possible to 
apply measures with a view to encouraging a party to participate in the proceedings that do not 
deprive him of his right to access.91 Furthermore, whereas such coercive measures are perhaps 
                                                 
 
85 Case C-7/98 Dieter Krombach v André Bamberski ECLI:EU:C:2000:164. 
86 CJEU Case C-32/95 P Lisrestal ECLI:EU:C:1996:402; CJEU Case C-135/92 Fiskano ECLI:EU:C:1994:267. 
87 CJEU Krombach v. Bamberski, para. 42. See further Chapter 3.2.5. 
88 CJEU Krombach v. Bamberski para. 39.  
89 CJEU Case C-394/07 Marco Gambazzi v. DaimlerChrysler Canada Inc. and CIBC Mellon Trust Company 
ECLI:EU:C:2009:219 para. 47; see for a discussion Chapter 3.2.5. 
90 Van Bochove (2009) p. 299. 
91 For example a limitation of the right to appeal, as applied in ECtHR Eliazer v. The Netherlands, appl. no. 
38055/97 ECHR 2001-X. See also Andrews (2007) p. 41-42. 
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more easily acceptable in criminal cases where there is a strong societal interest in preventing 
evasion of justice, they must be applied with more reticence against a party to civil proceedings 
who refuses to disclose evidence.92 This research suggests that application of the public policy 
exception and refusal of enforcement of the judgment against Mr Gambazzi would have been 
justified.93 
It has also been argued that on this point the CJEU provided a more extensive, or at least more 
specific, interpretation of the right to a fair hearing. Before pursuing his case in Luxembourg, 
Mr Gambazzi filed an application with the ECtHR against the United Kingdom, which was 
declared inadmissible for being manifestly ill-founded.94 Some authors have concluded from 
this that the CJEU provided more extensive protection of the right to a fair trial than the ECtHR 
in this case,95 though because the ECtHR’s decision on admissibility has not been published, it 
is impossible to know exactly why the ECtHR considered the application manifestly ill-
founded. It is however certainly true that in the absence of ECtHR rulings on this matter the 
CJEU provides the more specific interpretation on this point.  
A matter which has not yet come before the ECtHR, but which the CJEU has extensively 
considered, is the implications of the right to a fair hearing for cases in which a defendant does 
not appear. Many of these judgments are also relevant with regard to the right to effective 
service.96 In ASML, the CJEU ruled provides that a defendant can only be considered capable 
of defending himself when he is aware of the contents of a default judgment rendered against 
him; it is not sufficient that he was aware that the proceedings had commenced.97 The CJEU 
based this ruling on a judgment from the ECtHR that concerned a criminal case. With its ruling 
in ASML the CJEU therefore extended the protection provided by the ECtHR to the civil trial. 
In Trade Agency the CJEU again ruled on the question of default judgments, this time in 
relation to the right to a reasoned judgment.98 In that judgment the CJEU first ruled that when 
a defendant challenges the enforcement of a judgment on the basis that he was not served with 
the document instituting the proceedings, so that a judgment was delivered against him in 
default, the court deciding on the enforceability is entitled to review whether this is supported 
by evidence.99 This interpretation of Article 34(2) Brussels I Regulation (now Article 45(1)(b) 
Brussels I bis Regulation) favours the defendant, because it ensures that when he invokes the 
                                                 
 
92 Andrews (2007) p. 41. 
93 Though the Italian court did allow enforcement: Corte d’appello di Milano (court of appeal, Milan) Section I, 
14 December 2010, reported at http://conflictoflaws.net/2011/gambazzi-looses-in-milan/ (last visited 
27/01/2016). 
94 See the discussion in Chapter 3.4.3.  
95 Kuipers (2010) p. 44; Cuniberti (2010) p. 8. See Chapter 2.4.3. 
96 See Chapter 4.3.2.3. 
97 CJEU Case C-283/05 ASML Netherlands BV v Semiconductor Industry Services GmbH (SEMIS) 
ECLI:EU:C:2006:787, para. 36. See Section 3.3.1. 
98 Case C-619/10 Trade Agency Ltd v Seramico Investments Ltd ECLI:EU:C:2012:531. 
99 CJEU Trade Agency Ltd v Seramico Investments, paras. 26-46. 
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protection of this Article by stating that he was not properly served, the court deciding on 
enforceability must satisfy itself that this is indeed the case, and cannot simply rely on the 
assessment made by the court of origin. The CJEU applied the right to a fair trial to reach this 
conclusion, stating that the objective of facilitating cross-border enforcement “cannot be 
attained by undermining in any way the right to a fair hearing”.100 In Apostolides v. Orams the 
CJEU however emphasized that the protection provided by Article 34(2) of Brussels I can only 
be relied upon when the defendant was unable to challenge the judgment; in other words, it 
may not be relied upon when the defendant had some other opportunity to challenge a defective 
service.101 
Also on the topic of default judgments, the CJEU ruled in Hendrikman that a defendant who 
had not been represented during the proceedings should benefit from the protection of Article 
34(2) Brussels I, even if the court originally thought they had been represented by a lawyer 
who later turned out not to be authorized to represent the defendant.102 Again, in other words 
this means that defendants must enjoy a real and effective opportunity to defend themselves, 
and that a national court must ascertain whether they did so. Equally importantly, in 
Hendrikman the CJEU ruled that “the proper time for the defendant to have an opportunity to 
defend himself is the time at which proceedings are commenced”;103 the availability of a 
remedy against a judgment rendered in default which has already become enforceable “cannot 
constitute an equally effective alternative to defending proceedings before judgment is 
given”.104 As illustrated by the earlier judgment in Minalmet v. Brandeis, once a judgment has 
become enforceable, the only options open to the defendant are generally a suspension of 
enforcement, which is usually difficult to obtain, so that the defendant’s possibilities to defend 
himself are diminished.105 For this reason the CJEU considered that the defendant should in 
principle be entitled to defend himself at the initial stage of proceedings.  
 
In a more recent judgment, A v. B and others, the CJEU ruled that under the Brussels I 
Regulation, defendants are entitled to contest the jurisdiction of the court seised of their case. 
To this end, they must have entered an appearance in person. It is not sufficient that a court-
appointed representative entered an appearance on behalf of the defendant, since jurisdiction 
is based on the defendant’s domicile, and it is therefore necessary that the defendant himself 
enters an appearance.106 As the CJEU points out in this judgment, if a court-appointed guardian 
was to be allowed to enter an appearance on behalf of the defendant, this would deprive the 
                                                 
 
100 CJEU ASML v. SEMIS, para. 24.  
101 CJEU Case C-420/07 Apostolides v. Orams, ECLI:EU:C:2009:271, para. 77. 
102 CJEU Case C-78/95 Hendrikman and Feyen / Magenta Druck & Verlag, ECLI:EU:C:1996:380. See Chapter 
3.3.1. 
103 CJEU Hendrikman, para.  
104 Ibid., para.  
105 CJEU Case C-123/91 Minalmet GmbH v Brandeis Ltd ECLI:EU:C:1992:432, para. 20. 
106 CJEU Case C-112/13 A v B and Others ECLI:EU:C:2014:2195, paras. 55-58. 
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defendant of his opportunity to challenge recognition of the judgment on the basis that 
judgment was delivered against him by default.107 This provides additional protection to the 
defendant within the system of EU civil justice regulations.  
 
4.3.2.3 The right to effective service 
 
ECtHR  
 
The right to a fair hearing also includes a right to effective service. The ECtHR has 
acknowledged in Beer v. Austria that a lack of service prevents a party from being informed of 
and reacting to an appeal brought by the other party.108 The ECtHR explicitly stated in this 
judgment that “what is at stake is the litigants’ confidence in the workings of justice, which is 
based on, inter alia, the knowledge that they have had the opportunity to express their views 
on every document in the file”.109 Without effective service, this cannot be achieved. Article 
6(1) ECHR does not prescribe one method of service. The question is rather whether an 
individual’s right to access to justice has been denied in a specific case. The ECtHR’s case law 
provides that authorities must show that they acted with diligence in ensuring that persons are 
informed of any court proceedings against them.110 The Court has consistently reviewed 
whether authorities took all the necessary steps to ensure the documents reached the person 
concerned.111 This may involve searching for his address,112 or publishing a notification in 
mass media.113 Documents must also be sent in sufficient time to allow defendants to attend 
the hearing.114 Sending a letter to the defendant without proof of delivery has not been 
considered sufficient.115 The fact that a defendant is aware of the proceedings taking place is 
also no substitute for service.116 On the other hand, defendants are expected to be reasonably 
diligent, for example by ensuring access to their mail.117  
 
                                                 
 
107 CJEU A v B and Others, para. 60. 
108 ECtHR Beer v. Austria appl. no. 30428/96, 6 February 2001.  
109 ECtHR Beer v. Austria, para. 18; see also ECtHR Nideröst-Huber, para. 29; and ECtHR Kenzie Global 
Limited Ltd. B. Republic of Moldova, appl. no. 287/07, para. 18. 
110 E.g. ECtHR Colozza v. Italy, appl. no. 9024/80 ECHR A89, para. 28. 
111 ECtHR Petroff v. Finland, appl. no. 31021/06, 3 November 2009 para. 22. 
112 ECtHR Dilipak and Karakaya v. Turkey Application nos. 7942/05 24838/05 ECHR 2014, para. 83. 
113 ECtHR Zavodnik v. Slovenia Application No. 36261/08 ECHR 2013, paras. 79-81. 
114 ECtHR Yakovlev v. Russia, appl. no. 72701/01, 15 March 2005.  
115 ECtHR Godorozea v. Moldova Application No. 17023/05 ECHR 2009, para. 31; Russu v. Moldova, appl. 
no. 7413/05, para. 23-28; ECtHR Bucuria v. Moldova, appl. no. 10758/05, 5 January 2010, para. 22-24. 
116 ECtHR F.C.B. v. Italy, appl. no. 12151/86 ECHR A208-B, para. 33. 
117 ECtHR Hennings v. Germany, appl. no. 12129/86 ECHR A251-A. 
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CJEU 
 
The right to effective service has arguably been more extensively developed in EU law. The 
European instruments on civil procedure place great emphasis on the importance of effective 
service as a precondition for the enforcement of judgments, especially those delivered in 
default of the defendant. 
To this end, the Brussels I bis Regulation and the other Regulations enable courts to refuse 
enforcement or recognition of a judgment if it was given in default of appearance, if the 
defendant he is able to show that there was a defect in service which rendered him incapable 
of defending himself effectively. The EEO Regulations operate on a similar basis. Moreover, 
the right to effective service is protected by the existence of the Service Regulation,118 and 
specific rules on service in the EOP and ESCP Regulations. 
The right to effective service is therefore recognized in EU law, and its importance has been 
confirmed by the CJEU in its judgments in Trade Agency119 and Hendrikman.120 The CJEU in 
these two cases specified that the right to effective service includes a duty for the requested 
court applying the previously mentioned refusal ground to satisfy itself, if necessary on the 
basis of evidence, that service was indeed effected. Furthermore, in Hypoteční Banka, the 
CJEU ruled that a court may continue proceedings if it is not clear that the defendant is aware 
of the proceedings. This is only allowed, however, “if all necessary steps have been taken to 
ensure that the defendant can defend his interests. To that end, the court seised of the matter 
must be satisfied that all investigations required by the principles of diligence and good faith 
have been undertaken to trace the defendant”.121 
With these judgments the CJEU emphasizes that parties should be able to exercise their right 
to a fair hearing effectively. The court at issue should review whether the defendant was able 
to exercise his right in view of all the circumstances of the case. This contrasts with the very 
formal interpretation of this clause by the ECtHR in Avotins v. Latvia.122  
To conclude, both the ECHR and EU law recognize the right to a fair hearing. Both the CJEU 
and ECtHR apply an open-ended definition of the notion of fairness, with both courts 
emphasizing that what matters is that participants in a procedure must be able to express their 
views effectively, and that it is for the courts to ensure that this happens in each case. It also 
                                                 
 
118 See for an interpretation of the right to effective service under this Regulation C-14/07 Ingenieurbüro 
Michael Weiss und Partner GbR v Industrie- und Handelskammer Berlin ECLI:EU:C:2008:264; CJEU Case C-
443/03 Götz Leffler v Berlin Chemie AG ECLI:EU:C:2005:665 (the recipient of documents instituting 
proceedings may not refuse those documents because they are not in the language of the Member State 
addressed); CJEU Case C-473/04 Plumex v Young Sports NV ECLI:EU:C:2006:96 (no hierarchy between the 
methods of service provided for in the Regulation). 
119 CJEU Case C-619/10 Trade Agency Ltd v Seramico Investments Ltd, ECLI:EU:C:2012:531. 
120 CJEU Hendrikman. 
121 CJEU Case C-327/10 Hypoteční banka a.s. v Udo Mike Lindner, ECLI:EU:C:2011:745, para. 52. See also 
CJEU Case C-292/10 G v Cornelius de Visser, ECLI:EU:C:2012:142, para. 60. 
122 ECtHR Avotins v. Latvia, appl. no. 17502/07, 25 February 2014. This case was referred to the Grand 
Chamber and is currently under consideration. See for a discussion Requejo Isidro (2015). 
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appears that on some points the CJEU has provided more specific protection than the ECtHR. 
In particular, EU law provides more extensive rules on effective service than the ECtHR has 
been able to provide. With its Gambazzi ruling the CJEU has provided more specific guidance 
than the ECtHR on the matter of the exclusion of parties from the proceedings as a coercive 
measure. 
 
4.3.2.4 The right to adversarial proceedings 
 
ECtHR 
 
The right to a fair hearing includes a right to adversarial proceedings, which the ECtHR has 
defined as follows: 
The right to an adversarial trial means the opportunity for the parties to have knowledge 
of and comment on the observations filed or evidence adduced by the other party.123 
This consideration from the ECtHR’s judgment in Ruiz-Mateos can be considered settled case 
law, as it has been utilized in many subsequent judgments.124 Parties should be able to exercise 
this right in a satisfactory manner: a party to the proceedings should have an effective 
opportunity to familiarise himself with the evidence before the court, as well as the possibility 
to comment on its existence, contents and authenticity in an appropriate form and within an 
appropriate time, if need be, in a written form and in advance.125 It is for the parties themselves 
to decide whether evidence produced or statements provided by a witness requires their 
comment.126 It also means that parties must be allowed to present any evidence that they feel 
is necessary to substantiate their claim.127 Furthermore, a court must, of its own initiative, 
communicate to the parties all information in its possession,128 whether it influences the court’s 
decision or not.129 
                                                 
 
123 ECtHR Ruiz-Mateos v. Spain appl. no. 12952/87 ECHR A262; see for a discussion Van Dijk and Viering 
(2006) p. 584-589; Leanza and Pridal (2014) p. 126-128; Harris et al. (2014) p. 416-418. 
124 Smits (2008) p. 116. 
125 ECtHR Krcmar and others v Czech Republic, appl. no. 35376/97, 3 March 2000, para. 42; see also Immeuble 
Groupe Kosser v. France, appl. no. 38748/97, para. 26; McMichael v. UK, appl. no. 16424/90 ECHR A307-B 
para. 80; Vallauri v. Italy appl. no. 39128/05 para. 71. 
126 ECtHR Nideröst-Huber, p. 22; ECtHR Zagrebacka banka v. Croatia appl. no. 39544/05 para. 203. 
127 ECtHR Clinique des Acacias and others v. France appl. Nos. 65399/01 65405/01 65407/01 65406/01, 13 
October 2005, para. 37. 
128 ECtHR Kerojärvi v. Finland appl. no. 17506/90 ECHR A322 para. 42; ECtHR Goç v. Turkey para. 57. 
129 ECtHR Nideröst-Huber, para. 27. 
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CJEU 
 
On this point, the CJEU’s judgment in Varec is relevant.130 In that case, the CJEU was asked 
to rule whether the right to a fair trial permitted that a contracting authority could keep certain 
information from their adversary in a procedure for reasons of fair competition. The CJEU 
acknowledged that the principle of adversarial proceedings is an important aspect of the right 
to a fair trial, though it may be balanced against other considerations. According to the Court, 
the principle includes: 
[A]s a rule, that the parties have a right to a process of inspecting and commenting on 
the evidence and observations submitted to the court. However, in some cases it may 
be necessary for certain information to be withheld from the parties in order to preserve 
the fundamental rights of a third party or to safeguard an important public interest.131 
Having established this, the Court further addressed some of the factors that may be taken into 
account in the balancing act, which the court seized of the procedure must perform.132 In this 
regard it followed quite closely the case law of the ECtHR.133 The CJEU further developed the 
principle in its Unitrading judgment. In Unitrading, it ruled that the right to an adversarial trial 
was not infringed because a third party who had been asked to provide evidence would not 
disclose additional and commercially sensitive information to support its evidence. The CJEU 
ruled that this did not make for an unfair trial given that the court which had to examine the 
evidence also did not have access to that information.134  
 
4.3.2.5 The principle of equality of arms 
 
ECtHR 
The right to an adversarial trial is closely connected to the principle of equality of arms.135 The 
difference is that the principle of equality of arms requires that both parties are treated equally, 
                                                 
 
130 CJEU Case C-450/06 Varec SA v Belgian State ECLI:EU:C:2008:91. 
131 CJEU Varec para. 47. 
132 CJEU Varec paras. 48-54. 
133 Rowe and Davis v The United Kingdom [GC] no 28901/95, ECHR 2000-II, para.61; V v Finland 
no 40412/98, para.75; Edwards and Lewis v. UK, nos. 39647/98 40461/98 ECHR 2004-X. 
134 Case C-437/13Unitrading ECLI:EU:C:2014:2318, para. 23-24. 
135 See for a discussion of the principle Van Dijk and Viering (2006) p. 580-584; Janis et al. (2008) p. 792-816; 
Harris et al. (2014) p. 413-416; Rainey et al. (2014) 263-264. 
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while the right to an adversarial trial requires access to all relevant information whether the 
other party has access to it or not.136 
The principle of equality of arms implies, with regard to civil cases,  
[T]hat each party must be afforded a reasonable opportunity to present his case – 
including his evidence – under conditions that do not place him at a substantial 
disadvantage vis-à-vis his opponent.137 
Dombo Beheer, the case from which this consideration was taken, concerned the opportunities 
provided to both parties to summon witnesses. This case centred on the question of whether a 
certain agreement had been concluded between the applicant company and its bank. The bank 
had been allowed to summon the person who had represented the bank during the meeting. 
However, the applicant company had not been allowed to summon the person who had 
represented the company during the meeting, because this person was identified by the court 
with the bank itself. This, the ECtHR ruled, placed the company “at a substantial disadvantage” 
vis-à-vis the bank during the proceedings. Another example is Feldbrugge, in which the ECtHR 
ruled that there had been a violation of Article 6 because the person concerned had not been 
able to comment on two reports of medical experts, which were of decisive importance for the 
outcome of the proceedings.138 Not all limitations on the right to summon witnesses amount to 
a violation of the equality of arms. In Ankerl, the ECtHR ruled that Mr Ankerl’s right to equality 
of arms had not been violated as a result of the court’s refusal to allow his wife to give evidence. 
As is the case in many legal systems, spouses were not allowed to testify under national law, 
and so her testimony could not have influenced the outcome of the proceedings. The court did 
have access to other evidence rather than just the witness statements in this case.139 
The ECtHR’s interpretations of both elements show that what matters is that both parties are 
treated fairly and equally. This entails that both parties are allowed to summon witnesses,140 
                                                 
 
136 The difference between the two elements is illustrated by the Krcmar judgment of the ECtHR: in this case, 
neither of the parties had been able to comment on evidence gathered by the court itself. This was deemed a 
violation of the right to an adversarial trial. However, because neither of the parties had been able to comment, 
they had been treated equally, so there was no violation of equality of arms; ECtHR Krcmar; Mole and Harby 
(2006) p. 49. See also ECtHR Nideröst-Huber. 
137 ECtHR Dombo Beheer, para. 88. 
138 ECtHR Feldbrugge v Netherlands (merits) appl. no. 8562/79, ECHR A99. See also ECtHR 44962/98 ECHR 
2003-V; ECtHR Platakou v. Greece appl. no. 38460/97 ECHR 2001-I; ECtHR Apeh Uldozotteinek Szovetsege 
and others v. Hungary, appl. no. 32367/96 ECHR 2000-X; ECtHR K.H. and others v. Slovakia appl. no. 
32881/04 ECHR 2009-II.  
139 ECtHR Ankerl v. Switzerland, appl. no. 17748/91 ECHR 1996-V.  
140 Though Article 6(2) which explicitly guarantees a right to call witnesses, applies only to criminal cases, the 
ECtHR has found it to have a ‘certain relevance’ outside criminal cases. Courts do have more discretion in civil 
cases in this respect, though of course the proceedings as a whole, including the manner in which evidence was 
gathered, should be fair: ECtHR Dombo Beheer, para. 32. 
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are given the time and opportunity to comment on evidence that has been submitted by the 
other party,141 and that documents are served on them in a timely manner.142 It is also not 
necessary for a party to prove that he or she suffered actual prejudice; the inequality in itself 
may give rise to a violation of Article 6(1).143 There are no “hard and fast rules” on this point: 
all depends on the circumstances of the case.144  
CJEU 
 
The CJEU has also recognised the importance of the principle of equality of arms. In Eurofood, 
the CJEU was asked to decide whether the alleged unfairness of the procedure leading up to 
the opening of insolvency proceedings could trigger the application of the public policy clause. 
It held that “in the context of insolvency proceedings, the right of creditors or their 
representatives to participate in accordance with the equality of arms principle is of particular 
importance.”145 For that reason, it allowed the national court to apply the public policy 
exception if it was convinced that a fair hearing had not been granted in the state where 
insolvency proceedings were opened. 
  
4.3.2.6 The right to be present at the trial/right to an oral hearing 
 
ECtHR 
According to the ECtHR, an oral, and public, hearing constitutes a fundamental principle of 
Article 6(1). That said, the obligation to hold a hearing is not absolute. In Jussila v. Finland 
the ECtHR ruled that: 
There may be proceedings in which an oral hearing may not be required: for example 
where there are no issues of credibility or contested facts which necessitate a hearing 
and the courts may fairly and reasonably decide the case on the basis of the parties’ 
submissions and other written material.146  
                                                 
 
141 ECtHR Dombo Beheer. 
142 ECtHR Beer v. Austria, para. 19. 
143 ECtHR A.B. v. Slovakia appl. no. 41784/98, 4 March 2003.  
144 Smits (2008) p. 117. 
145 CJEU Case C-341/04 Eurofood IFSC Ltd, ECLI:EU:C:2006:281, para. 66. 
146 ECtHR Jussila v. Finland (merits) appl. no. 73053/01 ECHR 2006-XIV, para. 41. 
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In earlier case law, the ECtHR recognised a right to an oral hearing in at least one instance, 
unless ‘exceptional circumstances’ allowed a national court to dispense with an oral hearing.147 
In Jussila, the ECtHR clarified this stance by ruling that whether an oral hearing may be 
dispensed with essentially comes down to the nature of the issues to be decided by the 
competent national court, not to the frequency of such situations.148 It does not mean that a 
refusal to hold an oral hearing may be justified only in rare cases, and regard may be had to 
considerations of “efficiency and economy”.149 However, litigants may always request a 
hearing on the grounds that the case presents special features; the state may refuse such a 
request after proper consideration of it.150 In Miller v. Sweden, the ECtHR considered that 
certain social security cases are better dealt with in writing due to the technical nature of such 
disputes,151 while in Schuler-Zgraggen v. Austria the privacy of the applicant in a case of a 
medical nature was also found to be a reason for dealing with the dispute in writing.152 
In some, but not all, civil trials, a fair hearing also requires that the litigant should be present 
in person. The ECtHR has held that in civil cases it is only necessary for the litigant to be 
present where “personal character and manner of life” of the party concerned are relevant for 
the decision,153 or where the case involves an assessment of the applicant’s ‘conduct’.154 For 
example, in the Helmers case, the ECtHR ruled that in light of the seriousness of what was at 
stake – the applicant’s professional reputation and career – the court should have conducted a 
direct assessment of the evidence given in person by the applicant.155  
The right to be present at the trial as well as the right to an oral hearing can be waived, provided 
that the waiver is made “of his own free will, either expressly or tacitly”, is “established in an 
equivocal manner”, is “attended by minimum safeguards commensurate to its importance”, and 
“does not run counter to any important public interest”.156 Article 6(1) does not therefore 
exclude the possibility of delivering a judgment by default. In such cases safeguards need to 
be in place to ensure that the person in question has been adequately summoned.157 Non-
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appearance of a litigant, provided he has the required knowledge of the case, may thus 
constitute a waiver, though non-appearance in itself may not.158 In criminal cases the ECtHR 
has examined whether the procedure by which a person was summoned to appear was adequate, 
if it is not clear whether he was aware of the proceedings taking place against him;159 though 
no such case law exists for civil cases.160  
CJEU 
 
In Eurofood, the CJEU was asked to rule on the recognition of a judgment opening insolvency 
proceedings which had been given without the creditor having been present at the hearing. The 
CJEU ruled (without giving a definitive answer) that the right to be present at a hearing is not 
absolute; it did however hold that “though the specific detailed rules concerning the right to be 
heard may vary according to the urgency for a ruling to be given, any restriction on the exercise 
of that right must be duly justified and surrounded by procedural guarantees ensuring that 
persons concerned by such proceedings actually have the opportunity to challenge the measures 
adopted in urgency”.161 With this ruling the CJEU appears to follow quite closely the line of 
the ECtHR, which also allows for restrictions on the right to a hearing but requires that the state 
should justify the restrictions.  
 
4.3.2.7 The right to a reasoned judgment 
 
ECtHR 
Though it is not explicitly included in Article 6(1), the ECtHR has derived from the right to a 
fair trial an obligation for courts to provide sufficient reasons for their decisions.162 According 
to the ECtHR, courts must “indicate with sufficient clarity the grounds on which they base their 
decision”.163 The justification for this obligation seems mainly to lie in the interests of the 
parties.164 An adequately reasoned decision allows parties to see whether they have indeed been 
given a fair hearing. It also enables them to make effective use of the possibilities for appeal.165 
                                                 
 
158 ECtHR Godlevskiy v Russia appl. no. 14888/03, 23 October 2008; ECtHR Hermi v. Italy appl. no. 18114/02 
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The ECtHR has furthermore acknowledged the interest of the public in a democratic society in 
knowing the reasons for judicial decisions given in the name of the public.166 
The domestic court is required to provide a justification for its actions, though it has a certain 
margin of appreciation in when choosing arguments and admitting evidence.167 It is not 
required to give a detailed answer to every argument.168 However, submissions that would have 
been decisive for the outcome of the case, had they been accepted, may require a ‘specific and 
express reply’ by the court. For example, it is not enough for a court to merely state that a party 
had been grossly negligent without citing evidence for that statement.169 The extent to which a 
judgment should be motivated is therefore determined by what the parties need to exercise the 
right to an effective remedy.170 
There also appears to exist a certain margin of discretion for the States in this regard. In Ruiz 
Torija v. Spain, the ECtHR ruled that in the assessment whether a judgment has been 
sufficiently reasoned, what matters is not only the nature of the decision and the submissions 
that a litigant may have brought before the court, but also “the differences that may existing in 
the Contracting States with regard to statutory provisions, customary rules, legal opinion and 
drafting of judgments.”171 This implies that the extent to which a judgment is motivated will 
also be compared to what is customary in the State where it was rendered. This ‘relativity’ of 
the obligation to provide an adequately reasoned judgment may become a problem in the 
context of cross-border enforcement.172  
CJEU 
In Trade Agency,173 the CJEU was asked whether a national court would be allowed to refuse 
enforcement of a judgment because it did not contain reasons. The CJEU allowed the national 
court to do so, but only if, after an overall assessment of the proceedings and in the light of all 
the relevant circumstances, the judgment was considered “a manifest and disproportionate 
breach of the defendant’s right to a fair trial”.174 The CJEU therefore does not consider a 
judgment that does not contain reasons an infringement of the right to a fair trial per se: it 
depends on the circumstances of the case. Here it is difficult to compare the standards set by 
the CJEU with those provided by the ECtHR. It was discussed above that the ECtHR requires 
courts to motivate their judgment to the degree necessary to ensure parties are able to invoke 
any available remedies effectively. In doing so it has not however provided a clear lower limit. 
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The question of the compatibility of judgments lacking reasons with European fundamental 
rights is discussed in detail in Chapter 7.3.7.3. To conclude, while the right to a reasoned 
judgment is recognized within the EU legal system, the standards set are not clearly different 
from those emanating from the ECtHR’s case law.  
4.3.2.8 The principle of legal certainty and consistency 
 
The ECtHR has also found violations for failures to observe the principle of legal certainty. 
This principle as applied by the ECtHR requires that judgments are final, and that they cannot 
be reversed,175 unless necessary to address “circumstances of a substantial and compelling 
character.”176 The principle of legal certainty thus protects res judicata. 
Additionally, the ECtHR has derived from Article 6(1) a kind of right to consistent 
adjudication: a protection against conflicting court decisions. Though it has been derived from 
the right to a reasoned judgment, the ECtHR has also emphasized its link with the principle of 
legal certainty. The leading case is Albu and Others v. Romania, in which the Court developed 
a number of principles for dealing with conflicting court decisions.177 Though it is not for the 
Court to deal with errors of fact and law, and although it acknowledges that irregularities are a 
necessary element of each justice system, the Court may nevertheless find a violation if 
“profound and long-standing differences”178 exist within the case law of the domestic courts. 
In such cases it will review “whether the domestic law provides for machinery for overcoming 
these inconsistencies, whether that machinery has been applied and, if appropriate, to what 
effect”.179 If such machinery has been applied insufficiently, this may lead to a violation of 
Article 6(1). For example, a violation was found in Borovská and Ferrai v. Slovakia.180 In this 
case the Court found “profound and long-standing differences” in the way courts decided 
whether or not to grant an easement in respect to land owned by the applicants. These decisions 
were based on a piece of legislation aimed at reforming Slovakian property rights in order to 
remedy the expropriation of property during the socialist regime. According to the Court, this 
piece of legislation was “rather fundamental” and was part of a “transformation of the 
respondent State’s legal and constitutional systems, which has been in force for about two 
decades”. The Court then concluded that “even assuming that the domestic law provides for 
machinery for overcoming the impugned inconsistencies and that that machinery has been 
applied, it cannot be said to have had any consolidating effect.”181 
                                                 
 
175 ECtHR Brumarescu v. Romania, 28342/95 ECHR 2001-I; ECtHR Esertas v. Lithuania, appl. no. 50208/06. 
176 ECtHR Pravednaya v. Russia, appl. no. 69529/01, 18 November 2004; Nikitin v. Russia appl. no. 50178/99 
ECHR 2004-VIII. 
177 ECtHR Albu and others v. Romania, appl. no. 34796/09 and 63 other cases, 10/05/2012.  
178 ECtHR Albu and others v. Romania, para. 34.  
179 Ibid.  
180 ECtHR Borovská and Ferrai v. Slovakia, appl. no. 48554/10, 25 November 2014. 
181 ECtHR Borovská and Ferrai v. Slovakia, para. 67. 
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4.3.3 Right to a public trial and public pronouncement of the judgment 
 
ECtHR 
 
As the ECtHR itself put it, “justice must not only be done, it must also be seen to be done.”182 
The right to a public trial contributes to a fair hearing because it increases transparency for the 
litigants and consequently increases both their and the general public’s confidence in the 
courts.183 The right to a public hearing requires that when an oral hearing take place (see on 
that topic 4.3.2.6, above), the hearing is held in public.184 Article 6(1) also requires that the 
judgment be pronounced publicly. Both elements are discussed in this section. 
The publicity of the hearing is essential to guarantee the trial’s fairness: the ECtHR has found 
that “given the possible detrimental effects that the lack of a public hearing could have on the 
fairness of the proceedings, the absence of publicity could not in any event be remedied by 
anything other than a complete re-hearing before the appellate court”185. A private hearing 
behind closed doors is therefore almost by definition incompatible with Article 6(1), unless 
one of the grounds for limitation applies, which are exhaustively listed in the Article. The 
restrictions may only be applied proportionately in response to a pressing social need.186 The 
ECtHR has not allowed states a margin of appreciation on this point; rather it has consistently 
made its own assessment of the necessity and proportionality of any restrictions.187 
Examples of cases in which a restriction of the right to a public hearing may be allowed in civil 
cases is where it is required to protect the privacy of those involved. For example, in divorce 
proceedings or hearings concerning the residence of children following a divorce, privacy 
might be necessary to allow people to express themselves freely on highly personal and 
sensitive issues.188 There are cases in which a hearing in public could even amount to a 
violation of the right to a fair hearing or the right to privacy (Art. 8 ECHR), for example where 
                                                 
 
182 ECtHR Delcourt v. Belgium, para. 31. 
183 ECtHR Malhous v. Czech Republic [GC], 33071/96, ECHR 2000-XII. 
184 Given the fact that the word ‘hearing’ in Article 6(1) has been taken to refer to the entire trial, it has been 
questioned whether the ‘right to a public hearing’ also requires that all aspects of the trial, including the 
documents submitted by the parties, should be open to the public. Though the inference is justified, there is no 
ECtHR case law which affirms this viewpoint. Smits (2008) p. 167-170. 
185 ECtHR Riepan v. Austria, appl. no. 35115/97, ECHR 2000-XII, para. 40. 
186 Harris et al. (2014) p. 434.  
187 Harris et al. (2014) p. 434. 
188 ECtHR B and P v. UK, appl. nos. 36337/97 35974/97 ECHR 2001-III; ECtHR X v UK, appl. no. 7366/76, 2 
Digest 452 (1977); see also European Commission on Human Rights, Guenoun v. France [dec.] 13562/88, D.R. 
No. 66, p. 184, and Imberechts v. Belgium [dec.] 15561/89 D.R. No 69, p. 314 on medical disciplinary 
proceedings in which the privacy of patients constituted a legitimate ground on which to limit publicity.  
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the youthful age of the accused in a criminal case necessitates protection from the press.189 It 
can be concluded that if a hearing is held, it should be public, unless there are particularly 
pressing circumstances that mean that a public hearing could harm the rights or interests of 
those involved. 
The right to public pronouncement of the judgment is somewhat less absolute and more subject 
to interpretation. The wording of this element suggests that the judgment should be read out in 
public, but other ways exist of rendering a judgment public that are compatible with Article 
6(1); some flexibility is applied. For civil cases, the judgment in Ryakiv Burdakov v. Russia is 
relevant; in this case the Court found a violation because only the operative part of the judgment 
was read out, with no opportunities for finding out the reasons.190 It may also be incompatible 
with Article 6(1) if in such cases the full judgment is available, but only to those whose rights 
and interests were affected by the judgment.191 This means that a litigant can suffer a violation 
of Article 6(1) of the judgment was not made available to the public, even if he himself had 
access to the full judgment.192 The requirement of publicity may also be fulfilled when the full 
judgment is deposited in the court registry193 or where the judgment concerns the upholding of 
a lower court’s judgment which itself was pronounced publicly.194  
CJEU 
 
There currently appears to be no case law from the CJEU dealing specifically with the right to 
a public hearing. 
4.3.4 The right to adjudication by an impartial and independent tribunal 
 
ECtHR 
 
Article 6(1) guarantees a fair trial by an “independent and impartial tribunal established by 
law”. Independence and impartiality of the judiciary are closely interlinked. Independence 
refers primarily to the independence from the executive and legislative powers195 but also vis-
                                                 
 
189 ECtHR V. v. United Kingdom [GC], appl. no. 24888/94, ECHR 1999-IX.  
190 ECtHR Biryukov v. Russia, 14810/02 ECHR 2008-I, para. 45. 
191 ECtHR Malmberg and Others v. Russia, appl. Nos. 23045/05 21236/09 17759/10 48402/10, 15 January 2015 
para. 55; however, such restrictions may be acceptable in sensitive cases (for example those involving the 
residence of children) provided there is some way for the public to gain insight into how courts deal with such 
cases: see ECtHR B and P v. UK, para. 47 (no violation) and Moser v. Austria, appl. no. 12643/02, para. 102-
103 (violation).  
192 ECtHR Biryukov v. Russia. 
193 ECtHR Pretto v. Italy, appl. no. 7984/77 ECHR A71, para. 27-28. 
194 ECtHR Axen v. Germany, appl. no. 8273/78 ECHR A72, para. 32. 
195 ECtHR Beaumartin v. France, appl. no. 15287/89 ECHR A296-B, para.38; ECtHR Ringeisen v. Austria, 
appl. no. 2614/65 ECHR A13; ECtHR Procola v. Luxembourg, appl. no. 14570/89 ECHR A326. 
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à-vis the parties.196 To guarantee an independent tribunal, there must be organisational 
safeguards, for example on the manner of appointment of judges and their term of office,197 
and protection against outside pressures.198 Tribunals must also give the appearance of 
independence: circumstances giving rise to legitimate doubts about a judicial body’s 
independence can also lead to a violation on this point.199 
Impartiality denotes the absence of prejudice or bias on the part of the judge. This prejudice 
and bias may be both apparent from the personal conviction and behaviour of the judge himself 
(subjective test) but also from the existence of objective factors that may give rise to doubt as 
to the impartiality of the judicial body (objective test).200 It seems clear that impartiality and 
independence will be absent when the judge is shown to have been corrupt, for example when 
he or she has taken a bribe. Whether a judge or a judicial body can be considered impartial and 
independence requires a careful assessment of the facts of the case: it is decided on a case by 
case basis and it must be shown that there were concerns as to one of these requirements in the 
particular case at hand.201 
Such concerns may arise from personal connections between the judge and the parties. In 
Micallef v. Malta there was a lack of objective impartiality because one of the judges hearing 
the case was a family member of one of the advocates of the applicant’s opponent.202 Prior 
involvement of one or more judges in the case in some form may also be problematic. In 
Aslaner v. Turkey, there was a lack of impartiality because three judges (out of a chamber of 
31) had previously been involved in the case; they could therefore be considered biased.203 
However, it is not in itself incompatible with the right to an impartial tribunal if judges are 
involved in a case in multiple stages of the proceedings: what matters is the degree of their 
involvement. According to the ECtHR, the mere fact that a judge has already taken pre-trial 
decisions cannot by itself be regarded as justifying concerns about his impartiality; likewise, 
the fact that the judge has detailed knowledge of the case file does not entail any prejudice on 
his part that would prevent his being regarded as impartial when the decision on the merits is 
taken.204 
                                                 
 
196 ECtHR Sramek v. Austria, 8790/79 ECHR A84 para. 42. 
197 ECtHR Agrokompleks v. Ukraine (merits) appl. no. 23465/03; Campbell and Fell v. UK, appl. Nos. 7819/77 
7878/77 ECHR A80. 
198 ECtHR Engel v Netherlands (merits) appl. nos. 5100/71 5101/71 5102/71 5354/72 5370/72 ECHR A22. 
199 ECtHR Findlay v. UK, appl. no. 22107/93 ECHR 1997-I. 
200 ECtHR Kyprianou v. Cyprus [GC], 73797/01 ECHR 2005-XIII, para. 118; ECtHR Gautrin and Others v. 
France, appl. Nos. 21257/93 21258/93 21259/93 21260/93, ECHR 1998-III, para. 58. 
201 Ibid. 
202 Micallef v. Malta [GC], appl. no. 17056/06 ECHR 2009-V, para. 93. 
203 ECtHR Aslaner v. Turkey, appl. no. 36073/04, 4 March 2014 para. 35.  
204 ECtHR Morel v. France, appl. no. 34130/96 ECHR 2000-VI, para. 45; see also ECtHR Ökten v. Turkey, 
appl. no. 22347/07.  
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Doubts may also arise when a judge has made pronouncements about the case in the press,205 
where he or she has a personal interest in the outcome,206 or where the rules on allocation of 
cases between judges are capable of being abused.207 
CJEU 
 
The CJEU has dealt with the right to an impartial tribunal in several cases. In Chronopost and 
La Post v. UFEX and Others,208 a case concerning state aid, the appellant (Chronopost) 
complained that the Chamber of the Court of First Instance which had ruled on its application 
had not been impartial, because two of the judges sitting in the Chamber had been involved (as 
President and Judge-Rapporteur) in a related case (in which its subsidiary was involved). The 
CJEU considered that the right to an impartial tribunal constitutes the “cornerstone” of the right 
to a fair trial, which is a general principle of EU law.209 However, the Court ruled on the basis 
of ECtHR case law that it is not in itself incompatible with the objective of impartiality if judges 
are involved in multiple stages of the proceedings.210 It is up to the parties to present objective 
arguments that give rise to legitimate doubts about their impartiality; according to the Court, 
Chronopost failed to do so. The CJEU later applied the same approach in Gorostiago 
Atxandalabaso v. European Parliament.211 In this case, a former member of the European 
Parliament appealed against a decision on the repayment of improperly reimbursed expenses. 
In this case too the Court came to the conclusion that the appellant had failed to show arguments 
giving rise to legitimate doubts concerning the judges’ impartiality.212 
4.3.5 The right to a trial within a reasonable time 
 
ECtHR 
Article 6(1) provides parties with a right to a trial within a reasonable time. This element 
protects the litigants from having to wait an excessively long time for a decision in their case. 
Excessive delays jeopardize the credibility and effectiveness of the trial.213 The ECtHR found 
more violations of the reasonable time requirement than of all other elements of Article 6(1) 
                                                 
 
205 ECtHR Buscemi v. Italy 29569/95 ECHR 1999-VI. 
206 ECtHR Sigurdsson v. Iceland, appl. no. 39731/98 ECHR 2003-IV; ECtHR D. v. Ireland, appl. no. 26499/02; 
Demicoli v. Malta, appl. no. 13057/87 ECHR A210. 
207 ECtHR DMD Group v. Slovakia, appl. no. 19334/03. 
208 Joined Cases C-341/06 P and C-342/06 P Chronopost and La Poste v UFEX and Others 
ECLI:EU:C:2008:375. 
209 CJEU Chronopost and La Poste v UFEX and Others, para. 46. 
210 CJEU Chronopost and La Poste v UFEX and Others, para. 59. 
211 General Court Case T-146/04, Gorostiaga Atxandalabaso v. European Parliament, ECLI:EU:T:2005:584. 
212 General Court Gorostiaga Atxandalabaso v. European Parliament, para. 46-49. 
213 ECtHR Stögmüller v Austria appl. No 1602/62 ECHR A9; ECtHR H. v France appl. no. 10073/82 ECHR 
A162-A. 
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combined,214 and failures to observe the requirement are the cause of 26% of all applications 
to the ECtHR.215 
What constitutes a ‘reasonable time’ within which a trial should be conducted varies according 
to the circumstances.216 According to the ECtHR, the following factors need to be taken into 
account: the complexity of the case; the conduct of the applicant and of the relevant authorities; 
and what was at stake for the applicant in the dispute.217 These factors have in turn been fleshed 
out in case law. The complexity of the case may lie in the facts or in the law.218 It may for 
instance relate to the number of parties involved in the case,219 or the complexity of obtaining 
evidence.220 The conduct of the applicant may be relevant in assessing the reasonableness of 
the period it took for the case to be resolved, though parties cannot be blamed for making full 
use of the procedural remedies available to them.221 They only need to show diligence in 
carrying out the procedural steps required of them and to refrain from using delaying tactics.222 
Although the domestic authorities cannot be held responsible for the conduct of a defendant, 
the delaying tactics used by one of the parties do not absolve the authorities from their duty to 
ensure that the proceedings are conducted within a reasonable time.223 
On the other hand, the applicants’ behaviour constitutes an objective fact that cannot be 
attributed to the respondent State and which must be taken into account for the purpose of 
determining whether or not the reasonable time referred to in Article 6(1) has been exceeded.224 
A delay in the proceedings that is primarily caused by the applicant’s own conduct may 
therefore lead to the conclusion that the time it took to resolve the case was not unreasonable.225 
                                                 
 
214 The ECtHR’s Table of Violations 1959-2011 shows that in this period the length of proceedings had resulted 
in 4810 violations, more than any other Article of the ECHR; other elements of the right to a fair trial combined 
were found to have been violated 3672 times. 
215 The European Court of Human Rights, 50 Years of Activity: Some Facts and Figures, p. 6, available at 
http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Facts_Figures_1959_2009_ENG.pdf.  
216 See for an overview e.g. Mole and Harby (2006) p. 24-28; Lawson and Teuben (2004) p. 161; Édel (2007) p. 
34 onwards.  
217 ECtHR Comingersol S.A. v Portugal [GC] 35382/97 ECHR 2000-IV; ECtHR Frydlender v France appl. no. 
30979/96 ECHR 2000-VII; ECtHR Sürmerli v. Germany appl. no. 75529/01 ECHR 2006-VII. 
218 ECtHR Katte Klitsche de la Grange v. Italy, appl. no. 12539/86 ECHR A293-B, para. 55; ECtHR 
Papachelas v. Greece [GC], appl. no. 31423/96 ECHR 1999-II, para. 39. 
219 ECtHR H. v. the United Kingdom 9580/81 ECHR A120, para. 72. 
220 ECtHR Humen v. Poland [GC], appl. no. 26614/95, 15 September 1999 para. 63. 
221 ECtHR Erkner and Hofauer v. Austria, appl. no.no. 9616/81 ECHR A117, para. 68. 
222 ECtHR Unión Alimentaria Sanders S.A. v. Spain, appl. no. 11681/85 ECHR A157, para. 35. 
223 ECtHR Mincheva v. Bulgaria, appl. no. 21558/03, 2 September 2010 para. 68. 
224 ECtHR Poiss v. Austria, appl. no. 9816/82 ECHR A117 para. 57; Wiesinger v. Austria, appl. no. 11796/85 
ECHR A213 para. 57; ECtHR Humen v. Poland [GC], para. 66. 
225 ECtHR Vernillo v. France, appl. no. 11889/85 ECHR A198; Janis et al. (2008) p. 819. 
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What is at stake for the applicant also plays an important role. For example, employment 
cases226 and cases concerning custody over a child227 require a speedy resolution. 
What constitutes a reasonable time within a given case therefore depends greatly on the 
circumstances; a period of time which is deemed excessive in a relatively simple case may be 
considered reasonable for a more complicated case. Still, the reasonable time requirement is 
the element of Article 6(1) that is most often violated; so often in fact that violations of this 
element are counted separately from violations of other elements of Article 6.228 The ECtHR 
has also ruled on the consequences that should be attached to a failure to observe the 
requirement: states should provide for an effective remedy which parties can use to either 
achieve an acceleration of the procedure or (in any case) to obtain monetary compensation for 
the delay.229 
CJEU 
 
In Baustahlgewebe the CJEU recognized, albeit in an administrative (competition) procedure 
that the right to a fair process within a reasonable time exists as a general principle of EU law, 
and held the General Court accountable for exceeding it.230 It ruled that proceedings of a 
considerable length may be considered reasonable in the light of the circumstances specific to 
each case, in particular the importance of the case for the person concerned, its complexity and 
the conduct of the applicant and of the competent authorities. It based this approach on a 
number of judgments from the ECtHR.231 The CJEU’s judgment in Der Grüne Punkt is also 
remarkable. Firstly, because it is the first judgment in which the procedure before the General 
Court was found to have exceeded a reasonable period which did not concern a competition 
case. Secondly, because the CJEU explained what the consequences under EU law should be 
of a failure to observe the reasonable time requirement. Whereas in competition cases an 
exceedance of the reasonable time requirement may result in a lowering of an imposed fine, in 
other cases the affected party may commence an action for compensation against the EU 
itself.232 This corresponds to the measures required by the ECtHR as discussed above. 
 
                                                 
 
226 ECtHR Vocaturo v. Italy, appl. no. 11891/85 ECHR A206-C, para. 17. 
227 ECtHR Hokkanen v. Finland, appl. no. 19823/92 ECHR A299-A, para. 72; ECtHR Niederböster v. 
Germany, appl. no. 39547/98 ECHR 2003-IV, para. 39. 
228 ECHR, Violations by article and by state 1959-2011, 31 December 2011, available at 
http://www.echr.coe.int.  
229 ECtHR Kudla v. Poland, appl. no. 30210/96 ECHR 2000-XI; ECtHR Mifsud, appl. no. 57220/00 ECHR 
2002-VIII.  
230 CJEU Baustahlgewebe, para. 21. Since then the CJEU has found more violations of the reasonable time 
requirement in competition cases, for instance in C-385/07 P Der Grüne Punkt - Duales System Deutschland 
GmbH v Commission of the European Communities ECLI:EU:C:2009:456. 
231 Ibid, para. 29. 
232 CJEU Der Grüne Punkt para. 195. 
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Because the conclusion whether the reasonable time requirement has been respected is 
dependent on a number of factors, it cannot be said that the CJEU was more lenient or more 
stringent in this judgment than the ECtHR would have been. It can, however, be concluded that 
in its approach and the factors it took into account the CJEU essentially followed the ECtHR. 
 
4.3.6 The right to enforcement 
 
ECtHR 
 
The scope of right to a fair trial does not end with the pronouncement of the judgment. In 
Hornsby v. Greece, the ECtHR ruled that Article 6(1) also encompasses a right to enforcement 
of a judicial decision.233 According to the ECtHR, the right to access to a court “that right 
would be illusory if a Contracting State’s domestic legal system allowed a final, binding 
judicial decision to remain inoperative to the detriment of one party”.234 In McDonald v. 
France, the ECtHR then extended this reasoning to the enforcement of foreign decisions. In 
this case, Mr McDonald requested an exequatur in France of a divorce granted in America. The 
ECtHR acknowledged that enforcement of foreign decisions could come within the scope of 
Article 6(1); yet it declared the application inadmissible, because the reason that France had 
refused enforcement was that the applicant had committed fraud. According to ECtHR case 
law, no one can complain about a situation to which they themselves had contributed.235 Also 
on the question of enforcement of foreign decision, in Négrépontis-Giannisis v. Greece the 
Court derived from Article 6(1) a right to enforcement of a foreign judgement. It ruled that 
though Greece had significant margin of appreciation in the application of the requirement that 
the judgment should not violate Greek ordre public, it should nevertheless not apply that 
condition in an arbitrary or disproportionate manner. The Court ruled that the principle of 
proportionality had not been respected and that there had therefore been a violation of Article 
6(1).236 Finally, in Saccoccia v. Austria the ECtHR ruled that the proceedings for obtaining an 
exequatur should also in their entirety conform to the requirements of Article 6(1).237 
Aside from these judgments on the right to enforcement of foreign decisions, there is a great 
deal of case law on the compatibility of national enforcement proceedings with Article 6(1). 
As in Hornsby v. Greece, the ECtHR generally derives the right to enforcement from the right 
to access to a court, though it is not entirely consistent on this point.238 Article 6(1) imposes on 
                                                 
 
233 See for a discussion Kiestra (2014) p. 203-216; Kinsch (2014); Kodek (2005).  
234 ECtHR Hornsby v. Greece, para. 40; see also ECtHR Marinkovic v Serbia, appl. no. 5353/11, 22 October 
2013. 
235 ECtHR McDonald v. France. 
236 ECtHR Négrépontis-Giannisis (merits) appl. no. 56759/08, 3 May 2011, para. 91. 
237 ECtHR Saccoccia v. Greece.  
238 Kiestra (2014) p. 204. 
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states a positive obligation to have an effective system in place for the enforcement of 
judgments.239 The ECtHR will review whether the assistance provided by the state’s authorities 
have been adequate and sufficient.240 There are, however, certain limitations to the right to 
enforcement. Firstly, a state cannot be held responsible if enforcement is impossible due to the 
debtor’s lack of funds. Secondly, the right to enforcement does not preclude the existence of 
statutory limitation periods, though the nature of such measures and the manner in which they 
are applied must be compatible with the Convention.241 Also, the judgment creditor may be 
expected to take action.242 Finally, authorities are provided some margin of appreciation where 
enforcement could disturb the public order or where rights of others are involved. For example, 
in Sud Est Réalisations,243 and in Cofinfo,244 the applicants claimed that the authorities had 
violated their right to enforcement by failing to take measures to (forcibly) evict residents from 
properties belonging to the applicants. The Court ruled that in such cases authorities are granted 
a reasonable time period in order to achieve an acceptable solution (for example rehousing 
residents elsewhere). However, after such a period has elapsed, all necessary measures must 
be taken to enforce the decision. A continued inactivity on the part of the authorities may 
amount to a violation of Article 6(1). 
It may be derived from the preceding case law that the right to enforcement does not entail an 
absolute right to obtain what was awarded by the decision; rather, the ECtHR reviews whether 
the authorities acted adequately and sufficiently. As the ECtHR ruled in Sanglier v. France, 
the right to access to a court does not oblige a state to have every civil judgment executed, 
whatever the circumstances.245 Where enforcement cannot be obtained due to circumstances 
beyond the control of the authorities, this cannot be attributed to the state. Finally, the ECtHR 
has recommended specific measures to guarantee enforcement decisions in a timely manner; 
see under 4.3.7.2, below. 
CJEU 
 
Obviously, EU citizens enjoy a right to enforcement across the Union of judicial decisions by 
virtue of the extensive EU legislation in this field, which the preceding Chapter discussed in 
depth. It should perhaps be repeated that the regulations do not prescribe the actual enforcement 
proceedings as these are governed by Member States’ legislation. If the EU Member State 
where enforcement was sought would fail to take adequate measures to obtain enforcement, 
the creditor could therefore still file an application against that state with the ECtHR. If the 
application concerned a failure to provide permission for enforcement, which should have been 
provided on the basis of one of the regulations, the ECtHR may also have jurisdiction 
                                                 
 
239 ECtHR Matrakas and others v. Poland and Greece, appl. no. 47268/06, 7 November 2013. 
240 ECtHR Románczyk v. France, 7618/05, 18 November 2010.  
241 ECtHR Vrbica v. Croatia appl. no. 32540/05, 1 April 2014, para. 66. 
242 ECtHR Scollo v. Italy 19133/91 ECHR A315-C, para. 44; ECtHR Fuklev v. Ukraine appl. no. 71186/01, 7 
June 2005.  
243 ECtHR Sud Est Réalisations v. France, appl. no. 6722/05, 2 December 2010. 
244 ECtHR Société Cofinfo v. France, appl. no. 23516/08, 12 October 2010. 
245 ECtHR Sanglier v. France appl. no. 50342/99, 27 May 2003, para. 39. 
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depending on whether the obligation was absolute or whether there were grounds for refusal. 
The complicated matter of EU Member State responsibility under the ECHR for carrying out 
their obligations under EU law are extensively discussed in Chapters 3 and 4. 
 
4.3.7 Consequences of a failure to observe the right to a fair trial 
 
This research concerns the appropriate remedies in for a failure to observe the right to a fair 
trial that should be available in EU legislation on cooperation in civil justice. It is therefore 
useful to see what remedies have been considered appropriate in such cases by the European 
courts. 
4.3.7.1 General 
 
The most obvious consequence of a violation of Article 6(1) is that the affected litigant may 
file an application with the ECtHR, which, if it is well-founded, will find that a violation has 
occurred and may award just compensation under Article 41 ECHR. The enforcement of 
ECtHR judgments is monitored by the Committee of Ministers, which may recommend 
measures such as changes in domestic legislation.246 The finding of a violation by the ECtHR 
does not as such invalidate the domestic judgment or otherwise influence the legal position of 
the parties at the domestic level. 
At the national level, Article 13 ECHR provides that states are under an obligation to provide 
an effective remedy for a violation of one of the Convention rights. However, as is explained 
below, Article 13 has not been applied to cases falling within the scope of Article 6. Of course, 
where a national court finds that a procedural irregularity has occurred before the remedies at 
the national level have been exhausted, it may be repaired at a later stage of the proceedings: 
for example, if a hearing was denied in the first instance, it may be granted at the appeal stage, 
which means the proceedings as a whole have been fair. A violation is then avoided and a 
remedy unnecessary.  
Within the multi-layered EU legal system, things are more complicated. The first paragraph of 
Article 47 of the EU CFR guarantees that, echoing Article 13 ECHR, an effective remedy 
before a court shall be available to those whose rights under the EU CFR have been infringed. 
Yet, the question remains of who should provide this remedy and what it should consist of. In 
principle, Member States are responsible for exercising their obligations under EU law in such 
a way that they do not infringe fundamental rights.247 Violations of EU CFR rights should 
therefore be addressed at the Member State level when they result from Member State actions. 
                                                 
 
246 Article 46 ECHR. 
247 CJEU Case C-101/01 Criminal proceedings against Bodil Lindqvist, ECLI:EU:C:2003:596, para. 87. 
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If Member States believe that there is no way of complying with their EU CFR obligations 
without having to set aside EU legislation, they must first seek a preliminary ruling from the 
CJEU,248 which can declare legislation that does not comply with fundamental rights invalid.249 
Where the actions of EU institutions, such as the European Commission, are deemed to be in 
violation of the EU CFR, recourse can be had to the General Court of the Court of Justice, 
within the limits of their jurisdiction as defined by Articles 251 to 281 TFEU.250 
Both the ECHR and the EU CFR therefore require an effective remedy for a violation of Article 
6(1) ECHR, and Article 47 EU CFR. Since the first paragraph of Article 47 EU CFR 
corresponds to Article 13 ECHR, the ECtHR’s case law on that article must be looked at for 
guidance. In general, the ECtHR has ruled that remedies should be “effective in practice as 
well as in law”251 and should either prevent violations or their continuation, or provide 
“adequate redress for any violation that has already occurred”.252 There no case law on what 
constitutes an effective remedy for a violation of Article 6(1).253 The reason for this is that 
Article 6(1) was for a long time seen as a lex specialis of Article 13, in which the requirements 
of Article 13 were absorbed. Violations of Article 6(1) therefore did not require a separate 
consideration of Article 13. The exceptions are violations of the reasonable time requirement 
and violations resulting from failures to enforce judgments (see below); for these cases, Article 
13 does require specific remedies.  
 
4.3.7.2 Remedies for violations of the reasonable time requirement 
 
Both within the EU and the Council of Europe, specific remedies have been developed or 
recommended for dealing with violations of the reasonable time requirement.254 In Kudla v. 
Poland, the ECtHR ruled that Article 13 imposes on states an obligation to provide remedies 
specifically for addressing the excessive length of proceedings, by which a litigant can either 
achieve an acceleration of the procedure (thus preventing a violation of the reasonable time 
requirement) or obtain compensation. According to the Court, these must be provided at the 
                                                 
 
248 CJEU Case C-77/83 CILFIT ECLI:EU:C:1984:91; see also specifically on Article 47 A v. B and others, in 
which the CJEU ruled that the right of domestic courts to refer questions for a preliminary ruling may not be 
limited by a national rule which authorises the national constitutional court to generally strike down legislation 
deemed to be contrary to Article 47. CJEU Case C-112/13 A v B and Others ECLI:EU:C:2014:2195. 
249 CJEU Joined Cases C-92/09 and C-93/09 Volker und Schecke ECLI:EU:C:2010:662. This is an exclusive 
competence of the CJEU: CJEU Case C-314/85 Foto-Frost ECLI:EU:C:1987:452. 
250 Article 47 of the EU CFR is explicitly not intended to change the system of judicial review within the EU: 
Explanations on Article 47. 
251 ECtHR Kudla v. Poland, para. 157. 
252 ECtHR Kudla v. Poland paras. 157-8.  
253 The Guide to good practice in respect of domestic remedies, adopted by the Council of Europe’s Committee 
of Ministers, also does not contain specific remedies for violations of Article 6(1).  
254 Chapter 7.3 discusses when refusal of enforcement can be considered appropriate as a remedy. 
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national level, as states are better placed than the ECtHR to deal with such complaints.255 
Additionally, the Venice Commission (an advisory body to the Council of Europe) undertook 
a study that assessed the effectiveness of remedies that states offer in their national law to 
address excessive length of proceedings. The study shows that many states offer both 
preventative remedies, aimed at acceleration of the proceedings, and compensatory remedies. 
Compensation can take such forms as pecuniary compensation, disciplinary sanctions to the 
dilatory judge, or exemption of legal costs.256  
As addressed above, the CJEU has also considered what remedies should be available within 
the EU framework for a failure to comply with the reasonable time requirement. In Der Grüne 
Punkt, the CJEU ruled that where EU institutions exceed the reasonable time, the affected party 
may commence an action for compensation against the EU.257 Most likely, the CJEU would 
consider that when Member States fail to observe the reasonable time requirement in their 
application of EU law, they must provide remedies at the national level.  
It can be concluded that appeals and other procedural remedies are generally not considered 
appropriate remedies for exceeding the reasonable time requirement. The ECtHR has expressed 
a preference for measures that prevent violations from occurring and addresses the root cause 
of the problem, instead of requiring the affected litigant to pursue even further procedures to 
obtain compensation.258 
4.3.7.3 Remedies for violations of the obligation to enforce 
 
Finally, specific remedies have been recommended for failures to enforce national judgments. 
As was concluded earlier, a failure to enforce a judgment can amount to a violation of Article 
6(1). As an example, in Nesevski v. FYR Macedonia,259 the applicant had successfully 
submitted a claim against a school which had rejected his application for a teaching job, hiring 
someone unqualified instead. The Supreme Court upheld the applicant’s appeal, but the school 
then appealed to halt the enforcement proceedings and reappointed the unqualified candidate. 
The ECtHR ruled that the Macedonian authorities’ failure to enforce the Supreme Court 
judgment amounted to a violation of Article 6(1). The respondent government then argued that 
the applicant did not suffer a lack of effective remedies because he was able to start a fresh 
civil action against the decision to reappoint the unsuitable candidate. The ECtHR ruled that 
                                                 
 
255 ECtHR Kudla v Poland, para. 154-155. 
256 Venice Commission (2007) para. 69-78. The Report also mentions assumption of a decision in the 
applicant’s favour as a sanction, but this applies only in administrative cases: see para. 79. 
257 CJEU Der Grüne Punkt, para. 195. 
258 ECtHR Sürmerli v. Germany, para. 100. 
259 ECtHR Nesevski v. FYR Macedonia, appl. no. 14438/03, 24 April 2008. See also Burdov v. Russia, appl. no. 
59498/00 ECHR 2002-III; ECtHR Gerasimov v. Russia, appl. no. 29920/05, 1 July 2014; ECtHR Nosov v. 
Russia appl. no. 9117/04 and 10441/04, 20 February 2014. 
 167 
 
this could not amount to an effective remedy, because the applicant had already successfully 
gone down this route yet been denied enforcement of the resulting judgment. 
Clearly, where a judgment has already been obtained but enforcement is denied, the possibility 
to litigate even further is not an effective remedy.260 For that reason the Committee of Ministers 
proposes in its aforementioned Guide to good practice in respect of domestic remedies that 
remedies that expeditious enforcement, thus preventing a violation, is to be preferred.261 There 
are clear parallels with the problem of excessive length of proceedings, which is why similar 
remedies are recommended.262 
 
4.4 Theoretical foundations for the right to a fair trial in civil cases 
 
4.4.1 Introduction: the need to delve further into the right to a fair trial 
 
The following sections aim to take the discussion of the values underlying the fair civil trial 
further. The purpose of this discussion is to provide a framework for Chapter 7, which aims to 
create guidelines for the application of refusal grounds. It can be derived from the preceding 
discussion that when a court applies the public policy exception, it essentially has to decide 
whether the (alleged) violation of the right to a fair trial suffered by the person who invokes 
the exception is sufficiently serious to justify that the judgment creditor is no longer able to 
exercise his right to enforcement. This is a difficult choice for the judge to make. Essentially, 
what will happen is that the judgment creditor suffers the consequences of the State’s failure 
to protect his counterparty’s right to a fair trial. A refusal to recognise or enforce a foreign 
judgment renders the exercise of the creditor’s right to enforcement completely impossible.  
This makes the refusal of enforcement or recognition much more impactful than other available 
remedies. The person who claims to have suffered a violation of his right to a fair trial can also 
file an application with the ECtHR against the State where the litigation took place, but this 
can only result in the finding of a violation. This will not invalidate the original domestic 
judgment and therefore will not hinder enforcement. Alternatively, a remedy might be available 
under national law, such as recourse against the judgment in the state where it was rendered, 
or an enforcement dispute in the state of enforcement. None of these remedies however have 
the effect of rendering enforcement completely impossible. An appeal against the judgment 
does not prohibit enforcement, though it may result in a new judgment that overturns the 
                                                 
 
260 See also ECtHR Garcia Mateos v. Spain, appl. no. 38285/09, para. 48, in which the ECtHR considered that a 
constitutional complaint (recurso de amparo) was not effective, because it was not capable of providing the 
applicant with the appropriate remedy, which should have involved restoring her rights in full. 
261 Council of Europe Guide to good practice in respect of domestic remedies p. 39. 
262 Council of Europe Guide to good practice in respect of domestic remedies p. 40-41. 
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previous one; however, this is a possibility in any civil litigation. Enforcement disputes may 
have the effect of prohibiting enforcement, but strict conditions usually apply, and they are 
generally not intended for addressing procedural irregularities, even if they are serious.263 
The possibility of refusing enforcement or recognition is therefore a uniquely radical sanction, 
and it follows that its application is only justified in exceptional cases. In order to decide 
whether it should be applied in a particular situation, the judge has to examine whether the 
violation suffered by the judgment debtor outweighs the consequences for the creditor. A 
considerable body of literature exists on the problem of resolving conflicts between 
fundamental rights. It is generally proposed that when resolving such conflicts, regard should 
be had to such considerations as whether the element at issue forms the ‘core’ or the ‘periphery’ 
of the right as such.264 To assess which elements of the right to a fair trial could, when violated, 
supersede the right to enforcement, it is important to analyse what role the elements of Articles 
6(1) ECHR and 47 EU CFR play in achieving a fair trial. How essential is it whether a judgment 
is adequately reasoned, or whether the trial was concluded within a reasonable time? 
Conversely, is it appropriate if a judgment creditor is allowed to enforce the judgment he 
obtained, even if it was obtained unfairly? In order to answer such questions, it may be helpful 
to explore why the fair civil trial is as it is: if we know what goals the fair civil trial is intended 
to achieve, it is also possible to determine which elements are essential to achieving those goals, 
and which are not. The following sections discuss two goals, or sets of goals, of the civil trial: 
on one hand, the goal of allowing litigants to protect or acquire private law positions, and to 
establish the truth to make that possible (means to an end); and on the other, the goal of 
protecting the dignity of the litigants by taking them seriously (end in itself). 
It should be stressed that the following sections are not an attempt to provide an interpretation 
of ‘the civil trial’ in a general sense, but of the civil trial as protected by Article 6(1) ECHR 
and 47 EU CFR. There are many possible ways to design a civil trial, and ideas as to what it 
should look like may vary across time and place. The following sections therefore only concern 
the perception of the fair trial that is embodied in Articles 6(1) ECHR and 47 EU CFR, as 
demonstrated by the European courts’ case law. 
 
4.4.2 The fair civil trial as a means to an end 
 
Though ‘fairness’ in the context of Articles 6(1) ECHR/47 EU CFR refers only to procedural 
fairness, there can be no doubt that the manner in which a fair trial is to be organised is intended 
to contribute to the substantive fairness of the outcome as well. This section argues that many 
                                                 
 
263 In the Netherlands, enforcement may only be refused in a domestic enforcement dispute if enforcement 
would amount to an abuse of rights by the creditor, for example where the debtor would be made homeless 
through eviction from his home, where the judgment is manifestly legally or factually wrong, or where there has 
been a significant change in the circumstances after the delivery of the judgment. See Hoge Raad 22 April 1983, 
Ritzen v. Hoekstra. ECLI:NL:HR:1983:AG4575. 
264 Brems (2005) p. 303-304; Sullivan (1991-1992) p. 821-823. 
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elements of a fair trial contribute not just to the fairness of the proceedings, but also to the 
fairness of the outcome. The following are therefore goal-oriented, or consequentialist, views 
on the civil trial as protected by Articles 6(1) and 47.  
4.4.2.1 The civil trial as a means of protecting or acquiring rights 
 
In many ways, the right to a fair trial is an auxiliary fundamental right, in the sense that it 
contributes to protecting other fundamental rights or the values embodied in them. For 
example, Van Kempen, in his inaugural lecture on positive obligations, argues that the right to 
a fair trial is ‘dependent’ on the infringement of another fundamental right.265 In criminal cases, 
the accused should be granted a fair trial to compensate for the (potential) infringements of his 
right to liberty and privacy he may suffer during or after the trial. Analogously, it can be argued 
that private parties have a right to a fair trial in order to protect their fundamental rights in so 
far as they give rise to claims under civil law. For example, many claims under civil law could 
be seen as expressions of the right to property (such as a claim for compensation arising out of 
damage to one’s property), the right to privacy (defamation), the right to family life (custody 
of or access to children); and more examples are imaginable, especially under the EU CFR.266 
The only problem is that fundamental rights protected by the ECHR and the EU CFR do not 
create obligations for private parties but are addressed to the State. Van Kempen argues that a 
right to a fair trial in civil cases can therefore not directly be derived not from the provisions 
themselves, but that it is possible to derive them from the principles underlying those 
provisions.267 
Robert Alexy’s theory on constitutional rights268 offers a more direct way of linking 
fundamental rights to the right to a fair civil trial. According to Alexy, subjective rights 
emanating from civil law are a means of guaranteeing constitutional (fundamental) rights.269 
After all, there can be no right to property (under the constitution or under the ECHR) without 
the legal institution of ‘property’, its acquisition, and its relinquishment. Likewise, the right to 
marry is meaningless if the law does not provide for ways in which to attain a married status. 
The same argument can be made for the right to privacy, the right to family life, and so on. 
According to Alexy, “there is a subjective right to the validity of those private law norms which 
are necessary to make possible what the constitutional right guarantees.”270 Procedures, 
particularly the civil trial, are thus necessary to protect, exercise or enforce these subjective 
rights.271 
4.4.2.2 The importance of uncovering the truth 
 
                                                 
 
265 Van Kempen (2008). 
266 Van Kempen (2008) p. 16. 
267 Ibid., p. 21-24. 
268 Alexy (2002). 
269 Alexy (2002) p. 325. 
270 Alexy (2002) p. 326. 
271 Ibid.  
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The foregoing provides a justification for the existence of a fair trial in civil cases: it serves to 
enable parties to either protect or acquire subjective rights under civil law. But what 
implications does it have for the manner in which that trial should be organised? It can be 
argued that in order to determine whether the litigants in fact legally enjoy the rights they claim 
(whether they are indeed entitled to ownership, compensation for damage, etc.), it must first be 
determined what the factual and legal situation is which provides the basis for their claim. If 
the facts have not been established, it is impossible for the judge to accurately apply the law to 
the facts. A judgment that is based on an incorrect presentation of the facts cannot be just; a 
fair trial should therefore serve to uncover the truth. 
Though the ECtHR and CJEU have not stated this in so many words, the importance of 
uncovering the truth does seem to be one of the underlying notions of Articles 6(1) and 47. As 
has been described, Article 6(1) ECHR/47 EU CFR places great emphasis on the notion of an 
adversarial trial, in which litigants are able to see and comment on all evidence and arguments 
presented.272 They should also be able to do so in equal measure (equality of arms). Clearly, a 
fair trial is one that facilitates a dialectic: a process of assertion and refutation. This idea has 
close similarities to Karl Popper’s theory of scientific rationality, which proposes that the truth 
is most likely to emerge if each side of the conflict attempts to prove its case, while the other 
attempts to refute the arguments and evidence presented.273 If a trial is conducted in this way, 
it is most likely that all aspects of the matter are presented. It can be argued that the impartiality 
and independence of the judge also contribute to finding the truth: only an objective and neutral 
observer would be able to see clearly the picture that emerged from the debate between the 
parties. If a judge were biased, the dialectic process would essentially be disturbed. 
Though the ECtHR does not explicitly refer to uncovering the truth as a purpose of the fair 
trial, its case law does provide innumerable examples that support this notion. As stated above, 
the principles of an adversarial trial and of equality of arms are conducive to uncovering the 
truth. The ECtHR’s case law on these principles offers many examples of cases that 
demonstrate this connection. Though Article 6(1) does not oblige parties to a civil trial to 
submit evidence to support their claim and thus prove its truthfulness, it does allow parties to 
present all evidence they consider necessary,274 and to familiarise themselves with, and 
comment on, all evidence presented by their opponent.275 It also places a duty on judges to 
examine all evidence,276 to craft their judgments on the basis of what has been presented,277 
and if necessary to explain why they considered certain arguments or allegations unfounded or 
                                                 
 
272 See on the connection between the adversarial trial and establishing the truth De Bock (2011) p. 66-67. 
273 Luban (1988) p. 69, referring to Popper (1963). 
274 ECtHR Clinique des Acacias, para. 37. 
275 ECtHR Krcmar and others v Czech Republic, para. 42; see also Immeuble Groupe Kosser v. France, para. 
26; McMichael v. UK, para. 80; ECtHR Vallauri v. Italy, para. 71. 
276 Harris et al (2014) p. 429. 
277 ECtHR H. v. Belgium. 
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unacceptable.278 The ECtHR has found violations in cases where courts completely ignored 
important evidence,279 or did not refer to the facts as established by a lower court.280 The right 
to an oral hearing is also a clear example of the truth-finding purpose of the fair civil trial: as 
the ECtHR has emphasised, an oral hearing can be necessary for establishing the truth 
regarding the certain claims, especially those concerning a person’s personal life281 or 
conduct.282 
One may ask whether all these guarantees actually contribute to uncovering the (objective) 
truth. For instance, Luban has argued that a trial modelled on the adversarial principle allows 
parties to advance arguments they know to be untrue and then use procedural rules to exclude 
probative evidence.283 A trial conducted in that manner therefore only produces the parties’ 
version of the truth (the subjective truth), which may not be what really happened (the objective 
truth). However, what seems important here is not whether a trial conducted along the lines of 
Article 6(1) ECHR/47 EU CFR produces a judgment that most closely resembles the objective 
truth. What matters is that establishing the truth is clearly one of the objectives behind the fair 
trial as proscribed, whatever ‘truth’ may mean in that context. It can therefore be concluded 
that when certain elements of the right to a fair trial have been violated, it can be doubted, 
within the framework of Article 6(1), whether the judgment accurately reflects the facts of the 
case, and therefore also whether its application of the law to those facts was correct. Of course, 
it needs to be examined in each case whether the violation committed was great enough to cast 
substantial doubt on the accuracy of the judgment.  
 
4.4.3 The fair civil trial as an end in itself 
 
Though some have argued to the contrary,284 it can be argued that the fair civil trial has a 
purpose in and of itself, apart from uncovering the truth or protecting parties’ rights under civil 
law (the nonconsequentialist view). This section proposes that the fair trial as protected by 
Articles 6(1) ECHR and 47 EU CFR also has an intrinsic value: it protects the litigant’s right 
to human dignity by treating him with respect, and in so doing increases his sense of procedural 
justice. The following sections explain why this should be seen as an independent objective of 
the civil trial. 
                                                 
 
278 ECtHR Georgiadis v Greece appl. no. 21522/93 ECHR 1997-III.  
279 ECtHR Khamidov v. Russia appl. no. 72118/01, 15 November 2007, para. 174. 
280 ECtHR Andelkovic v. Serbia, appl. no. 1401/08, 9 April 2013, para. 27. 
281 See section 4.3.2.6.  
282 ECtHR Muyldermans v. Belgium. 
283 Luban (1988) p. 69. 
284 Ten Kate (1983); De Bock (2011) p. 65. 
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4.4.3.1 The civil trial and human dignity 
 
The connection between the civil trial and human dignity was elaborated upon by David Luban 
in Legal Ethics and Human Dignity.285 In this book, Luban advocates an understanding of 
human dignity that can be summed up as follows: to respect human dignity is to take a person 
seriously.286 This involves treating his views, however subjective, as credible until proven 
otherwise, assuming him to be acting in good faith, and not humiliating him. According to 
Luban, 
society respects our human dignity by provisionally treating the positions we maintain 
in legal disputes (criminal or civil) as good faith positions, even when they are not. 
Respect for human dignity demands that only after a trial can it be concluded that we 
were not arguing in good faith. The legal system must therefore allow us to articulate 
our view of the facts and the law in court: that is why we have an adversary system in 
which parties present their own cases, rather than, say, on official inquiry into the matter 
conducted by the State.287 
The fact that the civil trial facilitates the presentation by both parties of their subjective views 
shows that the trial is more than a way of attaining legal justice, or of establishing the truth in 
a ‘wholehearted dialectic of refutation and discussion’ similar to Karl Popper’s theory of 
scientific rationality. While the result of the trial – the judgment – is, at least in the ideal 
situation, based on the objective truth and a fair representation of the parties’ substantive rights 
(therefore attaining legal if not also moral justice), the process leading up to that result leaves 
room for the expression of the parties’ subjective viewpoints.  
4.4.3.2 The civil trial and procedural justice 
 
Research in the field of social psychology has also confirmed that the civil trial serves not only 
to allocate legal rights and obligations, but also has intrinsic value to the participants. Studies 
show that participants more easily accept the outcome of a procedure if it is perceived as fair.288 
A fair procedure is one that allows parties, 
 
                                                 
 
285 Luban (2009). 
286 The concept of human dignity has been given extensive attention in legal philosophy and within the context 
of fundamental rights. It has been defined in various ways according to its context. Though this is not the place 
for an extensive discussion on its various meanings, it can be said that most definitions emphasize the autonomy 
of the person. Dignity is an intrinsic value or quality that each person possesses by virtue of being a human, that 
acknowledges his consciousness, freedom, and responsibility and allows him to be the bearer of legal rights and 
obligations. See Rendtorff and Kemp (2000) p. 31-32. 
287 Luban (1988) p. 85. 
288 Klaming and Giesen (2008) p. 4. 
 173 
 
to present their case, in which the decision-maker is unbiased and neutral and relies on 
accurate information when deriving an outcome. Furthermore, the decision-maker 
needs to be consistent and to consider ethical and moral standards. The individual using 
a procedure should have the right to correct statements and to appeal against an 
unfavourable decision.289 
 
As is readily apparent from this statement, these ‘indicators’ of procedural justice largely 
correspond to the requirements of Articles 6(1) ECHR and 47 EU CFR.290 It was also shown 
that parties value the opportunity to comment on all arguments and evidence submitted, even 
if those do not influence the decision, thus reinforcing the conclusion that the outcome is not 
all that matters. 
4.4.3.3 Nonconsequentialist views in the case law of the ECtHR 
 
The ECtHR’s case law shows that a fair trial should allow parties to present their subjective 
version of events. This is reflected most clearly in the Court’s finding that parties should have 
the opportunity to comment on all arguments and evidence submitted, even if that evidence has 
not been decisive for the outcome of the case.291 It is also reflected in the principle that it is up 
to the parties, not the court, to decide what evidence to present and whether to comment on 
evidence presented.292 The principle of equality of arms can also be seen as an expression of 
the litigant’s dignity, in the sense that it does not merely serve a fair outcome of the case. The 
ECtHR ruled that the inequality in itself may constitute a violation of Article 6(1), even if the 
party concerned did not suffer actual prejudice.293 So, while the outcome of the proceedings 
may still be fair, a lack of equality in the procedure may also by itself give rise to a violation. 
The ECtHR’s case law also produces some arguments to the contrary. The civil trial as 
understood by the ECtHR does not in every case facilitate the subjective wishes and desires of 
the parties. For example, courts may reject a party’s request for an oral hearing; such a denial 
will only constitute a violation of the party’s rights under Article 6(1) if an oral hearing was 
required to establish certain facts.294 One may argue that an oral hearing increases a party’s 
sense of procedural justice because it provides him with an additional opportunity to present 
his views. However, the ECtHR clearly does not consider this objective paramount, as it allows 
states to refuse a request for an oral hearing for reasons of ‘efficiency and economy’; instead it 
applies an objective test concerning the necessity of a hearing for deciding the case.295 Here, 
the goal-oriented (consequentialist) view on the civil trial arguably outweighs the 
nonconsequentialist view: not every feature of the civil trial that may increase a litigant’s sense 
of procedural justice is in fact necessary to conduct a fair civil trial. 
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292 EctHR Nideröst-Huber p. 22; ECtHR Zagrebacka banka v. Croatia, para. 203. 
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4.4.4 Is it possible to distinguish a ‘core’ and a ‘periphery’ within Article 6(1)?  
 
The preceding sections presented consequentialist and nonconsequentialist interpretations of 
the civil trial as distinct, but in reality the two sets of objectives are connected and mutually 
reinforcing. It is clear that many of the factors that increase parties’ sense of procedural 
justice296 also contribute to an outcome that correctly reflects the facts of the case and is 
therefore likely to be just.297 Procedure and outcome are often inseparable and mutually 
reinforcing. The principles of an adversarial trial, independence and impartiality of the judge, 
the right to reasons, and the requirement of publicity can all be seen as both contributing to a 
fair outcome and to the parties’ (subjective) sense of justice.  
In some cases one objective overrides the other, for example in the case of oral hearings 
discussed above. Another possible example is found in the ECtHR’s case law on the right to a 
reasoned judgment: perhaps the litigant’s sense of procedural justice would be increased if 
judges answered every argument presented, but this is not necessary to satisfy the requirements 
of Article 6(1).298 Conversely, the nonconsequentialist view takes precedence over the 
consequentialist view where the ECtHR finds a violation in the unequal treatment of parties 
even if they did not suffer actual prejudice, or where parties were denied the opportunity to 
comment on a piece of evidence even if that did not influence the decision.  
Does this exploration provide some way of solving conflicts between elements of the right to 
a fair trial? The introduction to Section 4.4.1 stated that one way of solving conflicts is to assess 
what elements of a right belong to the ‘core’ of that right and which belong to the ‘periphery’. 
Can some aspects of the right to a fair trial be seen as more ‘essential’ than others? It transpires 
from the preceding analysis that this is hardly possible. As previously stated, all elements of 
Article 6(1) contribute to the trial’s fairness. Moreover, it was shown that the fair trial serves 
different purposes: it serves to protect litigants’ legal rights, but it also serves the inherent 
purpose of providing procedural justice. Some elements of Article 6(1) may be peripheral to 
one of those objectives, but essential to the other. On the other hand, perhaps in the specific 
context of the decision as to whether refusal of enforcement or recognition of a foreign 
judgment is an appropriate remedy, a judge could take into account what objective of the trial 
is at issue. This is discussed further in Chapter 7. 
 
4.5 Conclusion 
 
                                                 
 
296 As cited under 4.4.3.2.  
297 See also De Bock, p. 67, who speaks of the ‘procedural value’ of establishing the truth: the parties’ sense of 
procedural justice is increased if the judge is seen to carry out a careful investigation into the facts.  
298 ECtHR Van der Hurk v. Netherlands, para. 61; Garcia Ruiz v. Spain [GC], para. 26; Jahnke and Lenoble v. 
France (déc.); Perez v. France [GC], para. 81. 
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This Chapter aimed to provide three things. First, it has provided a context in which to place 
the judgments that were discussed in the preceding Chapters as examples of the application of 
the public policy exception. This Chapter demonstrated why the procedural irregularities in 
Krombach, Gambazzi, Maronier v. Larmer, Eurofood, Trade Agency, and so on could amount 
to violations of Articles 6(1) ECHR or 47 EU CFR, and why, consequently, application of the 
public policy exception was justified. Chapter 7 discusses in depth why indeed in these types 
of cases application of that exception is the appropriate remedy. 
Second, this Chapter aimed to provide a basis for discussing which of the elements of Article 
6(1) could or should trigger the application of a refusal ground, and under what circumstances. 
Section 4 found that it is difficult to determine a ‘core’ of the right to a fair trial, but instead 
suggested that one should look at the objectives that the fair trial is intended to fulfil. In 
determining how a violation of the right to a fair trial should be remedied, it should be 
considered which element has been violated, and which objective has by consequence become 
unattainable. Chapter 7 uses the findings of that section to discuss when application of the 
public policy exception might be appropriate. 
Third, this Chapter aimed to provide an overview of the ECtHR’s and CJEU’s case law on the 
right to a fair trial in so far as it applies to civil cases, in order to assess what legislation is 
needed to safeguard it. In particular, this Chapter aimed to establish two things: firstly, whether 
the CJEU’s or the ECtHR’s case law provided more specific standards with regard to each 
element; and secondly, whether a margin of appreciation applies. These elements also play a 
part in Chapters 7 and 8. 
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5 Free movement of judgments and the European 
Convention on Human Rights 
 
5.1 Introduction 
  
This Chapter discusses whether and how free movement of judgments within the European 
Union (EU) is limited by the EU Member States’ obligations as Contracting Parties to the 
European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). Chapter 3 discussed that in Pellegrini the 
European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) required ECHR Contracting Parties to check 
whether foreign judgments conformed to the standards of the ECHR (see Section 5.2). The 
question this Chapter addresses is whether this obligation also applies in situations where the 
recognition or enforcement of judgments is governed by EU legislation. The difficulty here is 
that while EU Member States must respect the rights contained in the ECHR, they may have 
little or no discretion when they implement EU legislation. This situation raises the question 
how the fact that EU law governs Member States’ actions relates to their individual 
responsibility under the ECHR. 
An analysis of ECtHR case law shows that the frame of reference differs according to whether 
the Member State enjoys discretion in their decision to enforce a judgment from another 
Member State. If no discretion remains for the Member States, the ECtHR applies what is 
called the ‘Bosphorus doctrine’. In its Bosphorus judgment, the ECtHR held that when Member 
States do no more than fulfil their obligations under EU law, they are presumed to act in 
accordance with the ECHR, provided that they enjoy no discretion, and that no ‘manifest 
deficiency’ is apparent (Section 5.3).1 In its Povse decision, the ECtHR clarified that this frame 
of reference also applies in the context of cross-border enforcement in the absence of refusal 
grounds (Section 5.4). However, the Bosphorus doctrine, and in particular its application to 
cross-border situations, raises a number of important questions. This Chapter analyses the 
Povse decision against the background of the Bosphorus judgment and other rulings in which 
the doctrine was applied. This Chapter concludes that while the Povse decision leaves a number 
of matters unclear, it nevertheless provides valuable guidance for future legislation which 
facilitates free movement. The Chapter concludes with the preconditions Povse imposes on 
free movement of civil judgments. 
The previous Chapter discussed that the grounds for refusal confer on the enforcing court 
discretionary powers to refuse enforcement. According to the ECtHR in Cantoni and Avotins2, 
                                                 
 
1 Chapter 6 discusses in detail how the CJEU interpreted this element in its case law, and what its implications 
are for civil justice cooperation. See Chapter 6.3.  
2 As case law research for this research was concluded on 1 February 2016, Grand Chamber’s important judgment 
in Avotins v. Latvia could not be taken into consideration. This judgment is very relevant to EU Member States’ 
obligations under the ECHR. The reader should be aware that some of that Chapter’s observations are affected by 
the Grand Chamber ruling. ECtHR Avotins v. Latvia [GC], appl. no. 17502/07, 23 May 2016. 
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in such cases Member States are considered to be acting of their own accord, and so in these 
situations Member States’ actions are subject to full scrutiny by the ECtHR (Section 5.4.5). 
Finally, the EU’s accession to the ECHR has long been on the political agenda. Such accession 
would radically alter the framework discussed in this Chapter, as the EU would then become 
accountable under the ECHR, as would its Member States when they apply EU legislation. 
Yet, in light of the Court of Justice of the European Union’s (CJEU) negative Opinion as to the 
compatibility of the recent Accession Agreement with the autonomy of the EU’s legal order it 
is questionable when, if ever, accession will happen. This Chapter briefly discusses the CJEU’s 
Opinion, since it illustrates the sensitivity of the question whether mutual recognition of 
judicial decisions within the EU is compatible with fundamental rights (Section 5.5).  
 
5.2 The scope of application of Pellegrini 
 
5.2.1 Application of Pellegrini to situations where both states are party to the 
ECHR 
 
To reiterate, in Pellegrini the ECtHR imposed on national courts a duty to verify, prior to 
recognizing a foreign judgment, whether the right to a fair trial was adequately protected.3 In 
doing so it entrenched the ECHR into the external public policy of the Contracting Parties to 
the ECHR. Since Pellegrini concerned the recognition by a Contracting Party to the ECHR 
(Italy) of a judgment from a third state (the Vatican), the question remains as to whether it 
applies where both states are ECHR Contracting Parties.  
This question was debated in the negotiations leading to the recast Brussels I Regulation. If an 
obligation to refuse enforcement of judgments which in some way infringe Convention rights 
could be inferred from Pellegrini, then complete free movement of judgments, with no 
possibility to refuse recognition or enforcement, would deprive signatory states who are also 
EU Member States from the procedural mechanism allowing them to fulfil that obligation. 
Abolition of refusal grounds would therefore be problematic in view of protection of 
Convention Rights.4 
Literature is divided on the question of Pellegrini’s scope of application. Some authors have 
argued that Pellegrini does not give rise to an obligation for Contracting Parties to review 
judgments from other contracting states but that this is optional.5 Another argument is that an 
obligation to review Convention compliance for the enforcing state is of little added value when 
                                                 
 
3 See section 5.2. 
4 Kramer (2011b) p. 220. 
5 Stein (2004) p. 187; Hess (2001) p. 394; Kinsch (2004) p. 228. 
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the state of origin is also accountable to the ECtHR.6 Some argue that Pellegrini only applies 
when no remedies remain in the state of origin of the judgment: refusal of enforcement is in no 
way an alternative to an available appeal in the home state, and that the available local remedies 
must first have been exhausted.7  
On the other hand, it has been argued that if there were no obligation for the enforcing court to 
refuse enforcement from another signatory state, this would allow judgments that are contrary 
to the Convention to be enforced. This would be at odds with an obligation to refuse 
enforcement of judgments that emanate from states that are not even signatories to the 
Convention.8 Moreover, while the Pellegrini judgment concerned a third-state judgment, the 
ECtHR did not explicitly exclude judgments from Contracting Parties from its scope. Some 
therefore consider it arguable that the ECHR’s obligation to refuse enforcement extends also 
to signatory states.9 
In light of later case law, however, it appears that the ECtHR did intend Pellegrini to be 
applicable only to judgments emanating from third states. The next sections of this Chapter 
discuss the Bosphorus judgment, which concerns the responsibilities of states under the ECHR 
when they act in the implementation of EU law. In this judgment, the ECtHR considered that 
Pellegrini is distinguishable: the State responsibility issue raised by the enforcement of 
a judgment not of a Contracting Party to the Convention […] is not comparable to 
compliance with a legal obligation emanating from an international organisation to 
which Contracting Parties have transferred part of their sovereignty.10 (emphasis added) 
With this statement, the Court retrospectively frames the problem as one raised by the 
enforcement of a judgment from a third state that is not a Contracting Party to the ECHR – 
though as was explained earlier, some commentators considered this obvious from Pellegrini 
itself. 
Strictly speaking, this does not exclude the possibility that Pellegrini may be applicable to 
intra-ECHR situations; the ECtHR did not explicitly exclude intra-ECHR situations, which is 
understandable, given that the case at hand did not require it to do so. The Court would have 
                                                 
 
6 Christians (2004) p. 119. 
7 Schilling (2011) p. 35.  
8 Costa (2002) p. 475; Fawcett (2007) p. 43. See also Judge Matscher’s Concurring Opinion in Drozd and 
Janousek v. France and Spain, in which he holds that “Thus, for example, a State may violate Articles 3 and/or 
6 (art. 3, art. 6) of the Convention by ordering a person to be extradited or deported to a country, whether or 
not a member State of the Convention, where he runs a real risk of suffering treatment contrary to those 
provisions of the Convention” (emphasis added). ECtHR Drozd and Janousek v France and Spain [GC], no. 
12747/87, ECHR 1992. 
9 Van Bochove (2007) p. 337; Kramberger Skerl (2011) p. 470. 
10 ECtHR, Bosphorus Hava Yollari Turizm ve Ticaret Anonim Sirketi v. Ireland, appl. no. 45036/98, ECHR 
2005-VI. 
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gone beyond the legal questions it was asked to decide upon if it had made explicit in which 
situations its findings would not apply. 
However, there is one other ECtHR judgment that deals with cross-border enforcement of civil 
judgments between ECHR Contracting Parties: Lindberg v. Sweden.11 In that case, Mr 
Lindberg, a Norwegian national residing in Sweden, had been found liable for defamation in 
Norway and ordered to pay compensation. The judgment creditors sought enforcement of this 
judgment against Mr Lindberg in Sweden. Mr Lindberg held that Sweden’s failure to refuse 
enforcement to this judgment on his request amounted to a violation of his right to freedom of 
expression (Art. 10 ECHR) and his right to an effective remedy (Art. 13 ECHR). The ECHR 
declared his application against Sweden inadmissible because Mr Lindberg had, and availed 
himself of, the opportunity to challenge the judgment before the Norwegian court and, when 
that proved unsatisfactory, bring an application against Norway in Strasbourg. According to 
the ECtHR,  
A contrary approach would give an applicant the undue possibility of having reopened 
matters already finally settled, at the risk of upsetting the coherence of the division of 
roles between national review bodies and the European Court, making up the system of 
collective enforcement under the Convention.12 (emphasis added) 
The ECtHR considers the fact that the applicant was able to pursue an application against 
Norway, a Contracting State to the ECHR, a reason to declare his complaint against Sweden 
inadmissible. It did not however exclude the possibility that a Contracting Party might be found 
to have violated the ECHR by enforcing a judgment from another Member State; it did review 
the Swedish enforcement procedure, ruling that there were no compelling reasons against 
enforcement.13 It declared itself satisfied that the Swedish courts reviewed the substance of the 
applicant’s complaint against the requested enforcement of the Norwegian judgment, to a 
sufficient degree to provide him an effective remedy for the purposes of Article 13 of the 
Convention.14 For those reasons, the Court did not deem it necessary to determine what 
standard should apply15 where the enforcing State as well as the State whose court gave the 
contested decision is a Contracting Party to the Convention and where the subject-matter is one 
                                                 
 
11 ECtHR Lindberg v. Sweden [dec.], appl. no. 48198/99, 15 January 2004. 
12 ECtHR Lindberg v. Sweden, para. 1 (under ‘(b) The Court’s assessment’). 
13 ECtHR Lindberg v. Sweden, para. 1 (under ‘(b) The Court’s assessment’). 
14 ECtHR Lindberg v. Sweden, para. 1 (under ‘(b) The Court’s assessment’). 
15 The matter of which standard should be applied in the context of judicial cooperation between states has 
repeatedly come before the ECtHR. In Drozd and Janousek v. France and Spain [GC], appl. no. 12747/87, ECHR 
1992, the ECtHR ruled that enforcement of foreign decisions (in that case an arrest warrant pertaining to the 
execution of a prison sentence by a judgment in a criminal case) should be refused if the foreign proceedings 
constituted a “flagrant denial of justice” (para. 110). While this qualification is absent from Pellegrini, the ECtHR 
indicated in Lindberg that this was not deliberate (ECtHR Lindberg v. Sweden, para. 1 (under ‘(b) The Court’s 
assessment’). From these judgments it can be concluded that very serious infringements of the right to a fair trial 
in the foreign proceedings should therefore lead to non-enforcement. See for an analysis Kiestra (2014) p. 252; 
Schilling (2012) p. 566 onwards; Oster (2015) p. 561-565. 
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of substance (i.e., here, the freedom of expression) rather than procedure.16 As for matters of 
procedure, it referred to Pellegrini.17 
Lindberg v. Sweden indicates that it is possible for a Contracting State to the ECHR to violate 
the ECHR by enforcing a judgment from another Contracting Party. The threshold for finding 
a violation is likely to be high, since the ECtHR aims to protect the coherence of the 
enforcement system under the ECHR, which entails that a remedy must first be sought in the 
State of origin of the judgment (the ‘local remedy rule’).18  
5.2.2 Application of Pellegrini to situations governed by EU law 
 
When the two states involved are both not only ECHR Contracting Parties, but also EU 
Member States applying EU law, another layer of complexity is added. Within the EU, 
recognition and enforcement of civil judgments are governed by EU Regulations, which either 
contain an exequatur or require automatic enforcement where exequatur has been abolished. 
The question is therefore not whether the ECHR requires cross-border control as regards the 
enforcement of judgments among ECHR Contracting Parties, but whether it does so in 
situations where the enforcement is governed by EU law. In this context, the ECtHR has shown 
to take a different approach from that which it adopted in Pellegrini. Its conclusions in 
Pellegrini are still largely based on the principle of individual responsibility of each signatory 
state for the protection of its subjects: it follows from this principle quite logically that a 
signatory state may not avoid responsibility by claiming that it is simply ‘importing’ a faulty 
foreign judgment. 
In the intra-EU context, the situation is different in this regard in that the interactions between 
Member States are no longer ruled by classic principles of international law, but by obligations 
imposed on them by a supranational organization: the EU. With their accession to the EU, 
Member States effectively transferred a degree of sovereignty to the Union. Whether or not 
there is an exequatur, refusal grounds or any other kind of discretion left to them to decide on 
the enforceability of judgments emanating from other EU Member States is from that moment 
no longer exclusively up to them. It may be recalled from Chapter 2 that judicial cooperation 
in civil matters has been an EU competence since the Treaty of Amsterdam, which entered into 
force in 1999. 
The ECtHR has therefore examined the question of the abolition of the exequatur and refusal 
grounds in EU law from a different angle by applying the by now well-established Bosphorus 
doctrine. In its recent Povse decision, the Court applied the Bosphorus doctrine to decide that 
the abolition of exequatur and refusal grounds under the Brussels II bis Regulation was, under 
certain conditions, compatible with the ECHR. This decision and its implications are examined 
in detail in this Chapter. 
                                                 
 
16 ECtHR Lindberg v. Sweden, para. 1 (under ‘(b) The Court’s assessment’). 
17 ECtHR Lindberg v. Sweden, para. 1 (under ‘(b) The Court’s assessment’).  
18 Kiestra (2014) p. 277. 
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5.3 A different frame of reference for intra-European Union 
situations: the Bosphorus test 
 
5.3.1 Review by the ECtHR of matters relating to EU law prior to Bosphorus 
 
Prior to Bosphorus, the ECtHR’s competence to review matters relating to EU law had already 
been the subject of several rulings. The foundation for the ECtHR’s approach can be found in 
M & Co v. Federal Republic of Germany, a decision of the (now defunct) European 
Commission on Human Rights delivered in 1990.19 This case concerned the imposition by the 
European Commission of a fine for a violation of (then) Article 85(1) European Community 
(EC) Treaty (the prohibition on cartels, now Article 101 Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union (TFEU)). The respondent State held that it could not be held responsible for 
this action of a EC institution. The Commission held that 
[T]he Convention does not prohibit a Member State from transferring powers to 
international organisations. Nonetheless, The Commission recalls that “if a State 
contracts treaty obligations and subsequently concludes another international 
agreement which disables it from performing its obligations under the first treaty it will 
be answerable for any resulting breach of its obligations under the earlier treaty […].” 
The Commission considers that a transfer of powers does not necessarily exclude a 
State's responsibility under the Convention with regard to the exercise of the transferred 
powers. Otherwise the guarantees of the Convention could wantonly be limited or 
excluded and thus be deprived of their peremptory character. The object and purpose 
of the Convention as an instrument for the protection of individual human beings 
requires that its provisions be interpreted and applied so as to make its safeguards 
practical and effective. Therefore the transfer of powers to an international organisation 
is not incompatible with the Convention provided that within that organisation 
fundamental rights will receive an equivalent protection. 
 
In this decision, the Commission for the first time expressed the notion of equivalent protection. 
The idea is that individual states should not be held accountable under the Convention for 
actions that are performed either by or in the context of an international organisation, provided 
that the organisation itself protects fundamental rights in a manner that is considered 
‘equivalent’ to that of the Convention. To hold Member States responsible under the ECHR 
                                                 
 
19 European Commission of Human Rights, M & Co. v. Federal Republic of Germany (dec.) appl. no. 13258/87, 
D.R. No. 64 p. 138. 
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for carrying out obligations resulting from their membership of international organisations 
would be at odds with the principle of pacta sunt servanda, as well as with the growing 
importance of international cooperation and the need to secure the proper functioning of 
international organisations.20 However, Member States could not escape responsibility for 
safeguarding fundamental rights simply by transferring powers to an international organisation: 
the ECtHR requires that the international organisation itself provides protection that is 
equivalent – though not identical – to that provided by the Convention.21 
In M. & Co., the Commission went on to analyse the different ways in which the (then) EC 
protected fundamental rights and came to the conclusion that both the substantive guarantees, 
as well as the procedural protection offered by the CJEU through its preliminary ruling 
mechanism, could be considered equivalent to the protection offered by the ECHR. 
An important reason for the ECtHR to consider the EU system ‘equivalent’ to that of the 
Convention is the availability of a form of procedural protection, namely a preliminary ruling, 
within the EU system. This was affirmed by the ECtHR in Matthews v. United Kingdom.22 The 
ECtHR was asked to rule whether the United Kingdom’s (UK) failure to organise European 
Parliament elections in Gibraltar amounted to a violation of Article 3(1) ECHR. At issue was 
whether the UK could be held responsible for this failure under the ECHR, given that it was a 
Council Decision (and the accompanying Act) which provided that the elections should only 
be organised in the United Kingdom. The Act had the status of a Treaty. The violation was, the 
UK government argued, therefore a direct result of EU primary legislation. 
In its judgment, the ECtHR found that the Act was concluded on the basis of the European 
Ecconomic Community (EEC) Treaty. It could, the ECtHR found, not be challenged before the 
European Court of Justice “for the very reason that it is not a “normal” act of the Community, 
but is a treaty within the Community legal order”.23 For this reason, the UK itself remained 
responsible ratione materiae under Article 1 of the ECHR for the consequences of the Act. The 
Commission consequently found that the UK had indeed violated Article 3(1). 
Matthews affirmed that what is decisive for the question of accountability of states for applying 
EU law is whether the specific piece of legislation can be reviewed within the EU legal system. 
In its reasoning, the Court distinguished between primary law, such as the Council Decision 
that was at issue in Matthews, and secondary law (“normal acts of the Community”). 
International treaties should be considered as primary law, freely entered into by the 
contracting parties; for this reason, they cannot be challenged before the European Court of 
Justice, unlike secondary EU law. It appears from the judgment that the lack of legal protection 
against primary law offered within the EU system is the reason for the ECtHR to hold the UK 
                                                 
 
20 ECtHR Bosphorus, para. 150. 
21 ECtHR Bosphorus, para. 152. 
22 ECtHR Matthews v. United Kingdom [GC], appl. no. 24833/94, ECHR 1999-I. 
23 ECtHR Matthews v. United Kingdom [GC], para. 33. 
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responsible: if the UK could not be held accountable, no legal recourse would be available to 
the applicant, neither in the EU system nor under the ECHR.24 This conclusion is however not 
explicit from the judgment, and confusion on this point remained. 
 
5.3.2 Bosphorus: facts and procedure 
 
The ECtHR’s Bosphorus judgment is important because it clarified the Court’s approach 
regarding Member State responsibility for acts of secondary EU law.25 Moreover, it affirmed 
that the availability of judicial review within the EU system itself was indeed the decisive 
factor. In Bosphorus, the Court explicitly enumerated the conditions under which a state could 
be exempt from responsibility under the ECHR. This approach is often referred to as the 
‘Bosphorus test’.  
At issue in Bosphorus was the impoundment of an aircraft by the Irish authorities on the basis 
of an EC Regulation. The aircraft was leased by the Turkish company Bosphorus Hava Yollari 
Turizm ve Ticaret Anonim Şirketi, but it was owned by a Yugoslav company. At the time, the 
United Nations (UN) Security Council had adopted a Resolution ordering sanctions against 
Yugoslavia. The Resolution was implemented in the EC through the EC Regulation, which of 
course had direct effect in Ireland’s legal order, unlike the UN Resolution. The Turkish 
company claimed that the impoundment of the aircraft was a violation of their right to free 
enjoyment of property, guaranteed by Article 1 of the First Protocol to the ECHR. The matter 
reached the Irish Supreme Court, which asked preliminary questions to the CJEU. In its 
judgment,26 the CJEU considered the compatibility of the sanction with the right to property, 
though it did not refer to the ECHR, only to its own case law on the matter.27 The CJEU 
concluded that the impounding of the aircraft was not disproportionate or inappropriate with 
regard to the aim of the measure.28 The Turkish company next brought their case to the ECtHR. 
First, the ECtHR affirmed that the impoundment of the aircraft fell within the jurisdiction of 
the Irish State; apparently, for this finding it did not matter that Ireland’s actions were based 
on EU (at the time EC) law, and the applicant was justified in bringing its case against Ireland. 
The Court also quite quickly established that the impoundment constituted an interference with 
the company’s right to free enjoyment of their property.  
                                                 
 
24 This narrow reading of Matthews was suggested by Lenaerts: Lenaerts (2000) p. 575. 
25 The narrow reading suggested by Lenaerts was thus affirmed; see Douglas-Scott (2006a) p. 249, and 
Hinarejos Parga (2006) p. 255. 
26 CJEU Case C-84/95, Bosphorus Hava Yollari Turizm ve Ticaret AS v. Minister for Transport, Energy and 
Communications, Ireland and the Attorney General, ECLI:EU:C:1996:312. 
27 CJEU Bosphorus, para. 21. 
28 Ibid., para. 26. 
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Next, the ECtHR examined whether this interference was justified. The Court started by stating 
that the fulfilment of obligations resulting from a state’s membership to an international 
organisation can be considered a “legitimate interest of considerable weight”.29 Whether this 
legitimate interest could justify the interference with property rights was made dependent on 
whether the Court could review Ireland’s actions (even though the Court had already 
established jurisdiction over the matter).30 The Court started by reaffirming the principle 
expressed in Matthews: that while the Convention does not prohibit states from transferring 
their sovereign powers to international organisations, they nevertheless remain responsible for 
safeguarding the rights laid down in the Convention.31 Incidentally, this is what distinguishes 
it from Pellegrini, according to the Court. With the citation quoted under 5.2.1, above, the 
Court stated that the questions raised by the enforcement of judgments from third states is “not 
comparable” to the transfer of competences to an international organisation.32 
The Court then formulated the presumption of Convention compliance. This entails that state 
action taken in compliance with legal obligations emanating from their membership to 
international organisations is compatible with their obligations under the Convention, but only 
as long as the relevant organisation is considered to protect fundamental rights in a manner that 
is at least equivalent to that for which the Convention provides. If the organisation is considered 
to provide such equivalent protection, the state in question will be presumed to have acted in 
conformity with the Convention provided it had no discretion (the ‘presumption of Convention 
compliance’). This presumption may however be rebutted if, in the circumstances of a 
particular case, the protection of Convention rights was manifestly deficient. 
The Bosphorus test therefore consists of three elements: 1) the organisation in question must 
protect fundamental rights, both materially and procedurally, to an equivalent degree; 2) the 
state must have had no discretion in the matter (i.e., done no more than implement legal 
obligations flowing from its membership of the organisation; and 3) there is no apparent 
‘manifest deficiency’ in the protection of Convention rights in the circumstances of a particular 
case. 
The Court addressed these three elements in turn. First, it established that the EU, as an 
organisation, adequately protects fundamental rights. What mattered, according to the ECtHR, 
is not whether fundamental rights protection is identical, but whether it can be considered 
comparable to that provided by the Convention, because to require identical protection would 
“run counter to the interest of international cooperation pursued” (para. 155). The Court stated 
that “any such finding of equivalence could not be final and would be susceptible to review in 
the light of any relevant change in fundamental rights protection”.33 Yet further on in the 
                                                 
 
29 ECtHR Bosphorus, para. 150. 
30 Besselink notes in this regard that “what the ECtHR granted with one hand, it took away with the other”; 
Besselink (2008) p. 298. 
31 ECtHR Bosphorus, para. 152-154. 
32 According to the Court, “the State responsibility issue raised by the enforcement of a judgment not of a 
Contracting Party to the Convention is not comparable to compliance with a legal obligation emanating from 
and international organisation to which Contracting Parties have transferred part of the sovereignty”, para. 157. 
33 ECtHR Bosphorus, para. 155. 
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judgment, the Court applied a rather abstract analysis in finding ‘equivalence’. It considered 
not whether the regulation at issue adequately protected fundamental rights, but whether the 
Community as an organisation does so. In a relatively brief segment, it first referred to the 
CJEU’s case law, which incorporated fundamental rights into the general principles of 
Community law and indicated the ECHR as having “special significance” as a source of such 
rights. Furthermore, the Treaty of Amsterdam affirmed the Union’s adherence to fundamental 
rights by introducing Article 6(1) Treaty on European Union (TEU), and the EU Charter of 
Fundamental Rights (EU CFR) (although at the time not binding) is ‘substantially inspired’ by 
the Convention (para. 159). The abstract and general nature of this analysis proved 
controversial: see Section 5.3.3, below.  
Next, the Court analysed the mechanisms of control that are available to ensure the observance 
of fundamental rights. It acknowledged that individuals have limited standing before the 
European Court of Justice (para. 162), but it found that it is essentially through the national 
courts that individuals are protected against their Member States or other individuals for a 
breach of Community law. The CJEU exercises supervision through the mechanism of 
preliminary rulings. The Court acknowledged that preliminary rulings are limited to answering 
the interpretative or validity questions posed by the national courts, but that they are 
nevertheless often determinative of the final outcome of the proceedings (para. 164).  
Consequently, the Court found that the protection of fundamental rights by EC law could be 
said to have been equivalent at the relevant time. Without any further analysis, the Court then 
found that Ireland had done no more than implement legal obligations flowing from its EC 
membership (para. 165), satisfying the “no discretion” requirement. It concluded that the 
presumption therefore arose that Ireland acted in conformity with the Convention. 
In a final paragraph, the Court then found that there was no dysfunction in of the mechanisms 
of control of Convention rights in the particular case. It simply referred to “the nature of the 
interference, the general interest pursued by the impoundment and by the sanctions regime and 
to the ruling of the ECJ [European Court of Justice] […] with which the [Irish] Supreme Court 
was obliged to comply” (para. 166). Unanimously, the Court then found that no violation of 
Article 1 of Protocol no. 1 to the ECHR had occurred. 
 
5.3.3 Bosphorus: impact and open questions 
 
The impact of Bosphorus is considerable. With this judgment, the ECtHR redefined the 
constitutional framework of Europe, by accommodating the autonomous legal order of the EU 
without relinquishing control over the application of Convention standards, and providing an 
incentive for the CJEU to incorporate those standards into its case law.34 What Bosphorus does, 
in essence, is to give rise to a presumption that states acted in conformity with the ECHR when 
                                                 
 
34 Costello (2006) p. 91. 
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EU law obliges them to act in a certain way. This presumption is conditional, because it only 
applies when three conditions are fulfilled. The first is that the organisation in question provides 
equivalent protection. The second is that the state may not have had any discretion in the 
fulfilment of the obligations imposed on it by EU law. Together, these two factors give rise to 
a presumption of Convention compliance (also sometimes called the “presumption of 
equivalent protection’,35 though the ECtHR does not use this term). The third is that must be 
no evidence of a ‘manifest deficiency’ in the protection in a certain case that may rebut the 
presumption. These three conditions are examined at three stages (the ‘equivalence’ stage, the 
‘discretion’ stage, and the ‘rebuttal’ stage). 
Some of the elements of this test were already controversial at the moment it was announced. 
While the finding that no violation had occurred was unanimous, seven of the seventeen judges 
that made up the Grand Chamber submitted concurring opinions, six of them, including 
President Rozakis, together (the “Rozakis opinion”), while judge Ress submitted his own 
concurring opinion. This section does not aim to give a comprehensive overview of all the 
arguments raised in these opinions and in the literature,36 but highlights some aspects that 
proved to be problematic when applied in the Povse case. Since the main goal of this Chapter 
is to offer an interpretation of the decision in that case, the purpose of this section is to explain 
those aspects in more detail. 
A contentious point was whether the judgment gave rise to a blanket presumption that EU law 
protects fundamental rights to an equivalent degree, or whether this should be checked on a 
case-by-case basis; and whether such a check should be abstract or concrete. While the Court 
emphasized, as cited, that “any such finding of equivalence could not be final and would be 
susceptible to review in the light of any relevant change in fundamental rights protection”, and 
that in Bosphorus the protection was found to be sufficient “at the relevant time”, its subsequent 
analysis was rather short and general in nature, and paid no attention to the relevant secondary 
legislation.37 The authors of the Rozakis opinion stated in this regard that they were “not 
entirely convinced by the approach that was adopted in order to establish that such protection 
existed in the instant case”.38 They recalled the limited standing of the individual before the 
CJEU and pointed out that the protection offered by the preliminary ruling mechanism “is not 
of the same nature and does not replace the external, a posteriori supervision of the European 
Court of Human Rights, carried out following an individual application”.39 This means that the 
ECtHR cannot apply a blanket presumption that fundamental rights are adequately safeguarded 
within the EU legal system, and that it must check in each instance whether the protection 
afforded was sufficient. The authors stated that 
                                                 
 
35 Besselink (2008) p. 300. 
36 See for comments on this judgment among others Douglas-Scott (2006a); Peers (2006); Hinarejos Parga 
(2006); Besselink (2008); Costello (2006); Lock (2010a); Eckes (2007); Lawson (2010). 
37 See for criticism on the ECtHR’s approach in this regard also Douglas-Scott (2006a) p. 250-251; Costello 
(2006) p. 103; Lawson (2010) p. 234. 
38 Joint concurring opinion of Judges Rozakis, Tulkens, Traja, Botoucharova, Zagrebelsky and Garlicki, para. 3. 
39 Ibid., para. 3. This proved to be a controversial aspect of the Povse decision; see further under 5.4.4). 
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For the Court to leave to the Community’s judicial system the task of ensuring 
“equivalent protection”, without retaining a means of verifying on a case-by-case basis 
that that protection is indeed “equivalent”, would be tantamount to consenting tacitly 
to substitution, in the field of Community law, of Convention standards by a 
Community standard which might be inspired by Convention standards but whose 
equivalence with the latter would no longer be subject to authorised scrutiny.  
The critique offered in the Rozakis opinion thus boils down to two points: firstly, that the 
preliminary ruling mechanism cannot offer individual applicants the same degree of protection 
that recourse to the ECtHR can;40 and secondly, that for this reason it needs to be examined in 
each individual case whether the applicant’s rights were adequately protected by the EU 
system.41 Judge Ress, in his opinion, added to this criticism that this examination should not 
only be conducted on a case-by-case basis, but should also involve an assessment of whether 
the protection of the fundamental right at issue was substantively equivalent in the concrete 
case. According to Judge Ress, the Court should not just look at the formal and procedural 
mechanisms for fundamental rights protection, but should also examine whether the protection 
of the relevant right was in concreto equivalent. This element is discussed with regard to the 
Povse decision under Section 5.4.3, below. 
Another important unanswered question raised in the Rozakis opinion, but examined in more 
detail by Judge Ress, is what exactly a “manifest deficiency” in protection would entail. The 
presumption of Convention compliance may only be rebutted if such a manifest deficiency is 
found to exist, so it is important to know precisely what this means. Judge Ress, in his 
concurring opinion, submits that this would occur if: 1) the CJEU had no jurisdiction, as was 
the case at the time for second- and third-pillar EU law; 2) when the CJEU has been too 
restrictive in its interpretation of individual access to it; or 3) when there has been an obvious 
misinterpretation or misapplication by the European Court of Justice of the guarantees of the 
Convention right. Essentially, a ‘manifest deficiency’ thus refers to either a lack of jurisdiction 
of the CJEU, or a wrongful decision of the CJEU; Ress does not discuss whether a manifest 
deficiency could be found in the relevant secondary legislation, or in the procedural protection 
available at the national level. 
A second problematic aspect of the “manifest deficiency” criterion is whether it would result 
in a double standard for cases that fall within the remit of EU law. On this the authors of the 
concurring opinions disagree: the Rozakis opinion states that “the criterion […] appears to 
                                                 
 
40 These worries are shared by Peers (2006) p. 454, while Eckes cites a diversity of sources which have 
expressed their concerns on this point: Eckes (2007) p. 56-57. 
41 See on this ambiguity also Eckes (2007) p. 62-63. 
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establish a relatively low threshold, which is in marked contrast to the supervision generally 
carried out under the European Convention on Human Rights”.42 
Finally, the judgment left unanswered when, exactly, a Member State would be found to have 
done no more than implement obligations emanating from its EU Membership.43 When does 
the Member State have enough discretion for it to be considered responsible under the ECHR? 
This aspect proved to be problematic in MSS v. Belgium and Greece, which is discussed 
below.44 This case is important not just for this reason, however, but also because it gave rise 
to the CJEU’s judgment in N.S. and M.E. and others. In this judgment the CJEU allowed a 
Member State to deviate from the obligations imposed on it by mutual recognition.45 In the 
Povse case, the element of discretion did not prove problematic, because the free movement of 
judgments was absolute for return orders within the remit of the Brussels II bis Regulation; yet 
this test may yield different results for Regulations that facilitate free movement in different 
ways. It is therefore important to analyse precisely how much discretion a Member State should 
have in order to be considered responsible by the ECtHR in order to establish the impact of the 
Povse decision. 
In conclusion, Bosphorus shows that when faced with the question of Member States’ 
responsibilities towards the ECHR when they act under EU law, it will apply a substantively 
different approach than it did in the Pellegrini case. The lesson from Pellegrini seemed to be 
that Contracting Parties cannot escape their responsibilities under the ECHR by importing 
judgments from non-Contracting Parties. As was explained in the previous section,46 a dispute 
remained as to whether this would also apply between Contracting Parties. Bosphorus – 
confirmed by Povse – provides the answer for situations where the states concerned are also 
EU Member States acting in the implementation of EU law: Pellegrini does not apply to these 
situations.  
According to the Court, therefore, Pellegrini is only considered relevant in situations where 
Contracting Parties enforce judgments or sentences from outside ECHR territory. When both 
states concerned are EU Member States enforcing a judgment under an EU Regulation, then 
the Bosphorus test is used to establish responsibility.  
 
                                                 
 
42 Costello also calls the standard required to rebut the presumption “worryingly high” (Costello (2006) p 102) 
while Eckes suspects that the high threshold is intended to address the Court’s workload, and that it does not 
provide full Convention protection: Eckes (2007) p. 64. See further under 5.4.6. 
43 Peers (2006) p. 452-453. 
44 See under 4.4.5. 
45 The significance of this judgment for cross-border enforcement is examined at length in 6.3. 
46 Chapter 3.2. 
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5.4 Applying Bosphorus to free movement of civil judgments: the 
Povse decision 
 
The Povse decision47 is of great significance, because it affirms that the ECtHR will apply the 
Bosphorus test also to the context of cross-border enforcement of judgments on the basis of 
EU Regulations.48 The case concerned the application of Article 42 of the Brussels II bis 
Regulation, which allows judgments ordering the return of an abducted child to be enforced 
without exequatur and without any grounds for refusal being available.49 Before exploring in 
depth the conditions under which it allows the abolition these safeguards, the facts and 
procedure are discussed.  
5.4.1 Povse: background to the decision 
 
5.4.1.1 Facts and procedure in the Member States 
 
The two applicants in this case, Sofia Povse (S.P.) and Doris Povse (D.P.), are daughter and 
mother, respectively. S.P. was born in Italy in 2006 as the daughter of D.P. and M.A., an Italian 
national. The family lived together in the city of Vittorio Veneto. The relationship between 
Doris Povse and M.A. deteriorated and on 4 February 2008, M.A. requested the Venice Youth 
Court (tribunale per I minorenni di Venezie) to award him sole custody of his daughter. It also 
appears that the Venice Youth Court issued a travel ban in respect of the child on 8 February 
2008. On the same day, however, D.P. took her daughter to Austria, of which Doris Povse is a 
national, where they took up residence with D.P.’s parents. On 23 May 2008 the Venice Youth 
Court lifted the travel ban, granted preliminary joint custody to both parents, and authorized 
the child’s residence with her mother in Austria. M.A. was granted access rights in a neutral 
location twice a month. M.A. exercised his access rights, until, in June 2009, he declared that 
he would no longer visit his daughter, and indeed did not do so. 
From this moment onwards, a legal battle over custody and the return of the child ensued. Doris 
Povse, now living in Austria with her daughter, obtained an interim injunction against M.A. 
from the Judenburg District Court (Austria), prohibiting M.A. from contacting her and her 
daughter. She also obtained a judgment awarding her sole custody from the same court, which 
based its jurisdiction on Article 15(5) of the Brussels II bis Regulation (8 March 2010).  
In the meantime, M.A. had applied to the Venice Youth Court (Italy) for his daughter’s return 
(9 April 2009). In its judgment of 10 July 2009, the court granted this request. On 21 July 2009, 
                                                 
 
47 ECtHR Povse v. Austria [dec.], appl. no. 3890/11, ECHR 2013; see Cuniberti (2014), Hazelhorst (2014).  
48 In his comment on the Bosphorus judgment, Peers already foresaw the relevance of that judgment to cross-
border enforcement: Peers (2006) p. 453. 
49 See Chapter 2. 
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the Venice Youth Court issued a certificate of enforceability under Article 42 of the Regulation, 
and on 22 September, M.A. requested the enforcement of the return order. The Leoben District 
Court (Austria) attempted to refuse enforcement, but this decision was quashed by the Leoben 
Regional Court, which found that there was no room to refuse enforcement given that the Italian 
court had declared the order enforceable, and that the Italian court had jurisdiction because 
Italy was the child’s habitual residence immediately prior to her removal.50 The matter reached 
the Austrian Supreme Court, which requested a preliminary ruling from the CJEU. 
 
5.4.1.2 The CJEU preliminary ruling 
 
The Austrian Supreme Court posed five questions to the CJEU.51 The first of these questions 
was whether the Austrian courts could be deemed to have jurisdiction under Article 10(b)(iv) 
of the Regulation. The second question was whether for a return order to be enforceable, it is 
necessary under Article 11(8) of the Regulation that the court ordering the return has already 
decided on custody. Questions four and five52 asked whether enforcement can be refused on 
the basis of either of two grounds: (1) that a subsequent judgment from the Member State of 
enforcement awarded custody to the abducting parent, (2) there was a change of circumstances 
after the delivery of the return order, which means that its enforcement would result in a 
violation of fundamental rights. 
 
Without analyzing in depth the answer to each question, the general line of reasoning of the 
Court is the same as that in the Zarraga judgment.53 The CJEU firmly stated that the Brussels 
II bis Regulation, and in particular the provisions concerning the enforcement of return orders, 
are based on the principle of mutual trust of Member States in one another (para. 40), meaning 
that grounds for refusal should be kept to a minimum. This meant, for the Court, that questions 
four and five must be answered in the negative. Secondly, the Regulation has introduced a 
system in which the court of the Member State where the child was habitually resident before 
its removal (in this case Italy) has jurisdiction, meaning that this court is entitled to hear all 
appeals and applications pertaining to its return (para. 41). This is the basis for answering 
questions one and four in the negative and for affirming that jurisdiction lies with the Italian 
courts. Question two is also answered negatively. Following the reasoning of the CJEU, the 
Brussels II bis Regulation therefore grants no discretion to Austria in enforcing the Italian 
court’s return order. 
 
 
5.4.1.3 Continuation of the proceedings and application to the ECtHR 
 
                                                 
 
50 On the basis of Art. 10 of the Brussels IIbis Regulation. 
51 CJEU Case C-211/10 PPU Doris Povse v. Mauro Alpago, ECLI:EU:C:2010:400. See section 5.4. 
52 Since question three is not answered by the CJEU, because it is dependent on an affirmative answer to the first 
two questions, it is not discussed here. 
53 CJEU Case C-491/10 PPU Joseba Andoni Aguirre Zarraga v. Simone Pelz, ECLI:EU:C:2010:828. See 3.5. 
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On the basis of the preliminary ruling, the Austrian Supreme Court dismissed D.P.’s appeal 
and preparations were made to enforce the return order.  
Next, in a second set of proceedings, on 23 November 2011 the Venice Youth Court awarded 
M.A. sole custody of his daughter. It withdrew Doris Povse’s custody rights as granted in its 
judgment of 23 May 2008 and ordered her to return the child to Italy. 
M.A. notified the Leoben District Court of the Venice Youth Court’s judgment and, on 19 
March 2012, submitted a certificate of enforceability. Despite D.P.’s appeals – and after a 
change of address by Doris Povse and Sofia Povse – on 15 June 2012 the Wiener Neustadt 
District Court ordered Doris Povse to hand over Sofia to her father, stating that enforcement 
measures would be taken if she failed to comply. It was this final decision of the Wiener 
Neustadt District Court to enforce the Venice Youth Court’s judgment of 23 November, which 
was the subject of the application to the Human Rights Court. 
A final footnote to the story is that at the time the decision was delivered, two sets of criminal 
proceedings against Doris Povse were pending before the Treviso Court (Italy), one for 
removing a minor and failing to comply with court orders and one for child abduction. This 
was used as an argument during the proceedings, as the removal of Sofia to Italy would in 
effect separate her completely from her mother, since her mother could not visit her in Italy for 
fear of being arrested. 
 
5.4.1.4 The decision of the ECtHR 
 
The Doris and Sofia Povse attempted to hold Austria accountable before the ECtHR for the 
enforcement of the contested return order. They complained that the enforcement of the return 
order would violate their right to respect for their family life as protected by Article 8 of the 
Convention. In particular, they argued that the Austrian courts had simply ordered the 
enforcement of the Italian return order without examining their argument that Sofia’s return to 
Italy would constitute a serious threat to her well-being, and would in effect permanently 
separate mother and daughter. Notwithstanding the reasoning of the CJEU in its preliminary 
ruling, the applicants stated that the Austrian courts’ failure to acknowledge these matters 
resulted in a violation of Article 8 of the Convention. 
In its assessment, the Court first established that there had been an interference with the 
applicants’ right to respect for their family life under Article 8 of the Convention. This was not 
in dispute (paras. 70-71). The second element of the assessment, whether the infringement was 
in accordance with the law, was also clear: the decisions of the Austrian court ordering 
enforcement were in accordance with Article 42 of the Brussels II bis Regulation (para. 72). 
This in itself constituted the required legitimate aim;54 moreover, the enforcement of the return 
                                                 
 
54 Compliance with EU law by a contracting party constitutes a legitimate general-interest objective; ECtHR 
Michaud v. France, appl. no. 12323/11, ECHR 2012-VI, para. 100; ECtHR Bosphorus, paras. 150-151.  
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order also protected the right of the father to have access to his child and is therefore also a 
legitimate aim as required by paragraph 2 of Article 8 of the Convention (para. 73). 
The Court then turned to the question whether the interference was necessary. Given that the 
respondent government submitted that the Austrian courts had simply fulfilled the obligations 
flowing from Austria’s membership of the EU by applying relevant provisions of the Brussels 
II bis Regulation as explained by the CJEU, the Court examined this question by applying the 
Bosphorus test, discussed above.  
For the first element, the Court established whether the international organization, the EU, 
could be said to protect fundamental rights to an adequate degree. This question had already 
been examined and answered in the affirmative in its previous judgments in Bosphorus and 
Michaud,55 so the Court swiftly concluded that the requirement of equivalence was fulfilled 
(para. 77). The Court also examined whether the EU legislative act in question – the Brussels 
II bis Regulation – protects fundamental rights. Further on, it also noted that the Regulation 
requires the court that orders a child’s return to hear all parties and to examine the evidence. 
Perhaps a little confusingly, however, the Court only examined this element in the part of the 
decision where it looked whether the court of enforcement enjoyed discretion, so that the 
precise implications of this finding are doubtful (see further under 5.4.3, below).  
Next, the Court reiterated the importance of the preliminary ruling mechanism in the EU system 
of fundamental rights protection, and pointed out that the Austrian Supreme Court had “duly 
made use of the control mechanism provided for in European Union law” (paras. 80-81). This 
distinguished the case from Michaud, in which the Court found that the presumption did not 
apply because no preliminary ruling had been requested and the control mechanism had not 
been fully brought into play (para. 83).  
On the basis of these three determinations, the Court concluded that the presumption of 
Convention compliance was applicable. 
In examining the second element of the Bosphorus test, the Court concluded from a brief 
examination of the rules on the enforcement of return decisions laid down by the Brussels II 
bis Regulation that the Austrian courts had no discretion in ordering the enforcement. It 
deferred to the CJEU’s preliminary ruling for affirmation of this finding (para. 81), and found 
that the second condition of the Bosphorus test was fulfilled (para. 82). 
Having concluded that a presumption of compliance applied, the Court turned to the third 
element of the Bosphorus test to ask whether there were circumstances that could rebut the 
presumption. The applicants argued that they had been deprived of the protection of their 
Convention rights because the CJEU did not examine the alleged violation of those rights. The 
Court rejected this argument (para. 84). It reiterated the principle, expressed by the CJEU in its 
                                                 
 
55 ECtHR Michaud, paras. 102-104.  
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preliminary ruling, that the Brussels II bis Regulation has introduced a strict division of tasks 
between the courts of the Member State of origin and those of the court of enforcement. Any 
objections to the judgment in question should be brought before the court of origin, in this case 
the Venice Youth Court, which would be accountable to the ECtHR.56 Given that the applicants 
did not appeal against the return order before this court, but argued their case instead before 
the Austrian courts, the Court decided that there had been no dysfunction in this control 
mechanism. In essence, the ECtHR applied the “local remedy rule”, which provides that refusal 
of enforcement is only an option when the perceived injustice can no longer be remedied in the 
state of origin.57 This also means that the CJEU was only called upon to rule on the 
interpretation of the Brussels II bis Convention and that there was no basis for it to examine 
the Austrian courts’ decision and whether or not it infringed the applicant’s Convention rights. 
In the end, the ECtHR concluded that the mechanism for the protection of Convention rights 
had not failed. Austria, which did no more than to fulfil its obligations under Brussels II bis, 
could therefore be presumed to have acted in accordance with the Convention. As such, the 
Court ruled, the application was manifestly ill-founded and had to be rejected. 
 
5.4.2 General comments 
 
The importance of the Povse decision for the compatibility of free movement of civil judgments 
with the ECHR should not be underestimated. Though there are some reservations concerning 
its impact, it is nevertheless significant simply for the fact that it affirmed that the ECtHR will 
apply the Bosphorus doctrine to the context of cross-border cooperation in civil justice cases 
under EU law. 
Before it is examined what lessons can be derived from Povse, some preliminary remarks 
should be made. Firstly, and importantly, Povse is a decision on admissibility, which by 
necessity carries less weight than a judgment on the merits, especially a Grand Chamber 
judgment. On the other hand, there is no clear distinction between cases that are found to be 
manifestly ill-founded at the admissibility stage, and those which are considered on the merits 
but where no violation is found. The Court admits as much in its own Guide on Admissibility: 
“the reasons given for the inadmissibility decision in such a case will be identical or similar to 
those which the Court would adopt in a judgment on the merits concluding that there had been 
no violation”.58 It cannot therefore be concluded that a decision on admissibility in which an 
application is found to be manifestly ill-founded is of less value than a judgment on the merits. 
                                                 
 
56 Reiterating its judgment in ECtHR Šneersone and Kampanella v. Italy, appl. no. 14737/09, 12 July 2011. 
57 This argument is referred to as the “local remedy rule”: see Kiestra (2014) p. 301. See ECtHR Lindberg: the 
refusal of recognition may not be used as an alternative for remedy in the country of origin. See under 5.2.1. 
58 European Court of Human Rights, Practical Guide on Admissibility Criteria, 2011, (available at 
http://www.echr.coe.int) para. 370; see Gerards (2014) p. 8.  
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Also, the Povse decision was taken by a chamber of 7 judges, rather than a committee of three 
judges or a single judge, indicating its significance. At the same time, for the individual 
applicant, the difference between an admissibility decision and a judgment is significant, 
because after a decision, no referral to the Grand Chamber is available.59 The Court, being 
aware of this procedural constraint, must therefore be convinced that the application has no 
chance of succeeding in order for it to dismiss it on grounds of admissibility. This may be a 
signal that the Court considers the Bosphorus line of case law by now so well-established that 
cases which satisfy the Bosphorus test can now be declared inadmissible at an early stage60 – 
though it is of course impossible to know exactly why the Court chose to dismiss the case on 
grounds of admissibility, instead of on the merits, in this particular case. 
A remarkable, and potentially problematic, aspect of Povse is that it applies the Bosphorus 
doctrine to the context of cross-border cooperation under EU law. Whereas Bosphorus 
concerned the straightforward situation of a Member State implementing EU law, another layer 
of complexity is added in these cross-border situations. In these cases the obligation imposed 
on Member States is not simply to apply EU law, but to recognize, on the basis of EU law, a 
decision from another Member State. By applying the Bosphorus test to this type of case, the 
ECtHR recognizes that cooperation on the basis of mutual recognition is an essential 
component of the EU legal order, and accepts that it imposes nondiscretionary obligations on 
the Member States. In fact, a precedent was already set in M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece 
(discussed below), though in that case the presumption of Convention compliance was found 
not to apply because the Member State in question enjoyed discretionary powers.61 Both M.S.S. 
and Povse make no mention of any doubts as to the applicability of Bosphorus to these 
situations, so it appears that the ECtHR considers this matter uncontroversial. 
The application of the Bosphorus test to ‘indirect’ situations (where Member States cooperate 
with each other on the basis of EU law) as opposed to ‘direct’ situations (where Member States 
simply act in the implementation of EU law) does however raise some difficult questions. 
Firstly, as will be discussed in more detail further on, the Court has applied the requirement 
that a preliminary ruling be requested in a confusing, perhaps even inconsistent manner, when 
compared to Bosphorus and the later ruling in Michaud. This inconsistency arguably gives rise 
to a hierarchy between direct and indirect violations (see Section 5.4.4, below). 
Secondly, there is the question what circumstances would give rise to a ‘manifest deficiency’ 
in the cross-border context.62 The Court’s analysis seems to imply that a deficiency in the 
available procedural remedies in the state of origin – Italy – could also be seen as a manifest 
deficiency. However, the explanation of this concept offered by Judge Ress in his concurring 
opinion to Bosphorus, and the Bosphorus judgment itself, do not support this. Rather, the 
                                                 
 
59 Article 43(1) ECHR. 
60 This conclusion is also supported by the Court’s decision on admissibility in Biret, which was also declared 
inadmissible after a very brief consideration of the Bosphorus test. ECtHR La Société Établissements Biret et 
Cie S.A. et la Société Biret International c. 15 Etats [dec.], appl. no. 13762/04. 
61 ECtHR, Case of M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece, appl. no. 30696/09, ECHR 2011-I. 
62 The broader problem of the definition of “manifest deficiency” is explored in Chapter 5.4.6. 
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concept of ‘manifest deficiency’ seems to apply to a deficiency in the EU system itself, such 
as the unavailability of a preliminary ruling. On the other hand, it is difficult to see how the 
procedural protection available in the state of origin could not be considered part of the EU 
system for fundamental rights protection. The Brussels II bis Regulation has devised a system 
whereby jurisdiction over the return of a child lies exclusively with the court of the state in 
which the child was habitually resident. It is therefore this court that is entitled to hear all 
appeals and applications pertaining to the child’s return. Under this system, procedural 
protection is thus concentrated with the court of origin. This system was affirmed in the CJEU’s 
preliminary rulings in Povse, Rinau, and Zarraga, and the ECtHR clearly sanctions it in its 
Povse decision. It points towards the wording of Article 42 of Brussels II bis, and to the CJEU’s 
ruling, for confirmation. Moreover, the ECtHR considers that this system was not manifestly 
deficient because there was procedural protection available in Italy in the present case. This 
cannot lead to a different conclusion than that the procedural remedies available in Italy are 
part of the EU system for the protection of fundamental rights. If so, logically, if in Povse a 
serious deficiency in Italy’s judicial system was found, this would have led to the conclusion 
that the EU system for the protection of fundamental rights protection was manifestly deficient, 
which would cause the presumption of Convention compliance to be rebutted. If this had 
happened, Austria could have been held accountable for a deficiency in Italy’s judicial system. 
This shows the problem with applying the Bosphorus doctrine to the cross-border situation. In 
Bosphorus the situation was quite clear: the state applying EU law was also responsible for 
providing procedural protection against that application of EU law through its own courts with 
the assistance of the CJEU if necessary. In cross-border cases, the enforcing state essentially 
has to rely on the procedural protection granted in the state of origin; its own courts cannot 
provide protection because it has no jurisdiction in the matter. Essentially, the elements of the 
Bosphorus test, which are intended to apply to one individual state, are in the context of the 
complete free movement of judgments divided across two Member States: the member state of 
origin provides procedural protection (fulfilling the ‘equivalence’ requirement), while the 
member state of enforcement fulfils the requirement of non-discretion. 
A strict application of Bosphorus could lead to the enforcing state being held responsible for 
violations committed by the state of origin, even though the state of enforcement has no say in 
the matter whatsoever. The ECtHR clearly wanted to avoid this conclusion. 
This might explain the somewhat twisted logic the ECtHR applies in the decision when it 
comes to Austria’s duty to request a preliminary ruling. The Court appears less strict on this 
point than it was in previous case law. As is explained in Section 5.4.4 below, the only 
explanation for this inconsistency is that it wanted to avoid giving any indication that the 
enforcing state could be held accountable. It also explains the confusing manner in which the 
Court addresses the existence of minimum requirements for certification in Article 42 of 
Brussels II bis in paragraph 80 of its decision. This element of protection is discussed at the 
‘discretion’ stage of the Bosphorus test, even though, strictly speaking, these minimum 
requirements have no bearing on the discretion left to the enforcing court. 
It is therefore submitted that the ECtHR’s Povse decision is best understood as an expression 
of both the presumption of ECHR compliance offered by the Bosphorus doctrine, as well as 
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the “local remedy rule” which is found in the ECHR itself,63 but also in international law.64 In 
fact, although the ECtHR does not cite it in Povse, the ECtHR itself had already applied this 
local remedy rule in its decision in Lindberg v. Sweden.65  
This segment of the ECtHR’s reasoning provides a much more satisfying explanation for the 
Court’s approach in Povse. It is not only the nature of the law that is applied by the Austrian 
court (being EU law) that exonerates it under the ECHR, but also the fact that remedies were 
available in the state of origin. If these were not sufficient, the applicants would have been able 
to file an application against Italy. The ECtHR has shown in Šneersone and Kampanella v. 
Italy that it will indeed hold the state of origin accountable for a violation resulting from a 
wrongfully granted return order.66  
The overarching conclusion of all this must be that, whatever its underlying motivations, the 
ECtHR in Povse clearly wanted to avoid the possibility that the enforcing state could be held 
accountable for enforcing judgments in a situation where it had no discretion, i.e., where the 
exequatur and refusal grounds have been abolished. Though there are some conditions, the 
following discussion of various elements of the Court’s analysis shows that these in fact do not 
seem likely to become a problem in the future. It can therefore be stated that the ECtHR has 
sanctioned the automatic enforcement of access and return orders as it was accomplished in 
Brussels II bis. 
To understand the impact of Povse, its outcome should be contrasted with the ECtHR’s case 
law on the enforcement of child return orders that are not based on the Brussels II bis 
Regulation, but on the 1980 Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction 
(the 1980 Convention).67 This Convention, which in the European Union applies alongside the 
Brussels II bis Regulation, also contains a mechanism for the cross-border enforcement of 
return orders. However, contrary to the Brussels II bis Regulation, it allows for refusal of 
enforcement if return of the child would constitute a grave risk to his or her physical or 
psychological health and safety (Article 13). The ECtHR requires courts that are to decide on 
the enforceability of the return order to exercise the discretion granted by this provision in 
accordance with their obligations under Article 8 ECHR. To fulfil these obligations, courts are 
required to “genuinely take into account […] the factors capable of constituting an exception 
to the child’s immediate return”68 and to “take a decision that is sufficiently reasoned on this 
point, in order to enable the [ECtHR] to verify that those questions have been effectively 
examined”69. In other words, where courts have the possibility to refuse enforcement of a return 
order, a failure to carefully consider whether there are reasons for doing so may result in a 
violation of Article 8 ECHR. The fact that courts operating on the basis of Article 42(1) of the 
                                                 
 
63 Art. 35(1) ECHR. See Kiestra (2014) p. 301. 
64 See Amerasinghe (2004); Kiestra (2014) p. 301. 
65 ECtHR Lindberg v. Sweden; see the discussion under 5.2.1. 
66 ECtHR Šneersone and Kampanella v. Italy. 
67 See in more detail under 8.6.1.1. 
68 ECtHR X. v. Latvia para. 106. See Beaumont, Trimmings et al. (2015) p. 43. 
69 Ibid.  
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Brussels II bis Regulation are not at risk of violating the ECHR when they apply this provision 
shows that EU law is clearly treated differently in this regard. In the context of the 1980 
Convention, the ECtHR requires courts to abide by the ECHR when they apply its provisions; 
for the EU instrument, they are under no such obligation. 
5.4.3 The presumption of equivalent protection: abstract or concrete? 
 
It was already noted above that the ECtHR paid attention to the fundamental rights protection 
offered by Regulation 2201/2003 in its Povse decision. It may be recalled that the Bosphorus 
judgment was criticized for looking at the EU mechanism for fundamental rights protection in 
a very general manner. The ECtHR did not examine the EC Regulation that was at issue to see 
whether it materially offered the same protection as the ECHR would have done. Instead, it 
looked only at the more general ways in which the EU has affirmed its adherence to 
fundamental rights, and to the procedural framework available (the national courts, 
supplemented by the preliminary ruling mechanism). In Povse, the ECtHR also paid attention 
to the Regulation at issue, implying a more concrete appraisal; but it did in a slightly confusing 
manner. 
The ECtHR started with the general assessment of the EU system for fundamental rights 
protection that it first gave in Bosphorus. In Povse, it sufficed with literally citing the summary 
it gave of the relevant case law in its judgment in Michaud, without adding to it. It stated that 
“[the Court] has already found that the protection of fundamental rights afforded by the 
European Union is in principle equivalent to that of the Convention system as regards both the 
substantive guarantees offered and the mechanisms controlling their observance”. So far the 
reasoning is therefore equally abstract as it was in the earlier case law. 
Next, the Court analysed whether Austria had any discretion in the application of EU law. It 
first established that the wording of Article 42 Brussels II bis leaves no room for discretion by 
the enforcing court. Next, however, the Court stated the following: 
In this connection, the Court notes that under Article 42(2) of the Brussels [II bis] 
Regulation, the court ordering a child’s return under Article 11(8) of the Regulation 
shall issue a certificate of enforceability only if the parties have been heard, as well as 
the child – if appropriate in view of its age and maturity – and if the reasons for and the 
evidence underlying a previous refusal of return under Article 13 of the Hague 
Convention have been taken into account. In other words, in a context like the present 
one, the court ordering the return has to have made an assessment of the question 
whether the return will entail a grave risk for the child (para. 80). 
The words “in this connection” seem to imply that the finding that the Regulation contains 
requirements that are to be checked in the Member State of origin is somehow connected with 
the matter of discretion of the court of enforcement. But the ECtHR had already concluded this 
simply by looking at the wording of Article 42(1). Moreover, it is unclear why the Court needs 
to look at the obligations imposed on the court of origin in order to draw conclusions as to the 
discretion left to the court of enforcement – unless it is to show that there was no need for any 
 199 
 
discretion to refuse enforcement, because the court of origin had already performed the control 
that the Austrian courts wished to exert.  
If this is conclusion is correct, then it shows that the Court does indeed pay attention to the 
fundamental rights protection incorporated into the Regulation at issue, albeit in a roundabout 
way – not at the ‘equivalence’ stage of the Bosphorus test, but at the ‘discretion’ stage.70 It 
should be mentioned that the Court follows this paragraph with the statement that the Austrian 
courts “duly made use” of the preliminary ruling mechanism. Though this is then used to affirm 
that Austria had no discretion (because this was the conclusion of the preliminary ruling), the 
message of these paragraphs is clearly that there was nothing wrong with the fundamental 
rights protection offered by the EU system in this particular case. Austria could indeed not 
refuse enforcement on the basis that the applicants’ right to respect for their family life would 
be harmed, but there are other safeguards in the Regulation that prevent that from happening; 
moreover, the Austrian courts requested a preliminary ruling and therefore did everything in 
their power. Together, these circumstances allow the presumption of Convention compliance 
to apply. 
Without trying to read too much into it, it appears that the Court gave weight to the existence 
of procedural safeguards (minimum requirements) in the Brussels II bis Regulation. It may be 
recalled that the added value and practical importance of minimum requirements was doubted 
in legal literature.71 The fact that the Court nevertheless looks positively at the existence of 
minimum requirements is a sign that they are valuable after all; they are a signal that 
fundamental rights protection has been adequately taken care of in the relevant piece of 
legislation. 
It cannot however be concluded that the abstract analysis of the EU’s protection mechanism 
has been replaced with a more concrete one. The Court is careful not to examine the safeguards 
of the Regulation at the stage where it establishes the equivalence of the EU’s protection 
mechanism, but at the second stage, which concerns the discretion left to the Member State. 
Even though this looks confusing, the reason might be that the Court did not want to disregard 
the legislative efforts made to safeguard fundamental rights in the absence of refusal grounds, 
but also did not want to give the signal that it now required additional evidence to consider the 
protection offered by the EU as equivalent to the Convention. This would constitute a break 
with all the Court’s earlier case law, which it was careful to cite nearly word for word (paras. 
76-77). Also, it has already been concluded under Section 5.4.2 that the Court wanted to avoid 
giving any indication of criticizing the free movement of judgments achieved by the Brussels 
II bis Regulation. 
For the purposes of legislation, the conclusion must therefore be that minimum requirements 
are certainly seen as having added value for the protection of fundamental rights. They are not 
                                                 
 
70 This in itself could also be seen as a sign that the ECtHR does not want to question the “equivalence” of the 
protection provided by the system introduced by Brussels IIbis; see under 5.4.2. 
71 See 3.4.2 above. 
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necessary to fulfil the condition of equivalence, but the Court does see them as a signal that in 
the absence of cross-border control fundamental rights are nevertheless adequately protected. 
It must be noted however that the Court makes no mention of the fact that the minimum 
requirements of Article 42(2) cannot be invoked by any of the parties which the article is 
intended to protect. While it seems possible to conclude that the Court does not consider this a 
problem, it must be remembered that Article 42(2) was not examined in detail in this decision, 
because the obligations of the court which declared the return order in the Member State of 
origin were not at issue. Rather, Article 42(2) was used as an additional argument in favour of 
the finding that the absence of discretion on the part of the enforcing court was not problematic. 
Perhaps not too much should be read into the fact that the Court refrained from commenting 
on this aspect. 
 
5.4.4 Equivalent protection: the importance of the preliminary ruling mechanism 
 
In Povse, the Court continued with the line of reasoning it established in Bosphorus that the 
procedural protection of fundamental rights within the EU is offered primarily through the 
Member States’ courts, complemented by the preliminary ruling mechanism. The ECtHR has 
consistently emphasized that it considers the preliminary ruling an essential component of the 
control mechanism provided for in EU law. Indeed it found in Michaud that if a national court 
refrained from requesting a preliminary ruling, this would mean that the protection offered by 
EU law could not be considered equivalent to that of the Convention. However, when the 
various judgments are examined in turn, the Court’s inconsistency in the standards it applies is 
shown. 
Starting with Bosphorus, it was already stated that in this case the Court considered it sufficient 
that the Irish Supreme Court requested a preliminary ruling, though the CJEU did not apply 
ECHR case law in its examination, but only its own case law on the right to free enjoyment of 
property.72 Nevertheless, it is clear that the CJEU considered in some detail the question 
whether the impoundment of the aircraft constituted an infringement of Bosphorus’ right to 
free enjoyment of property, in the light of the specific circumstances of the case. 
A subsequent decision of the ECtHR implied that a preliminary ruling is not always necessary. 
In Cooperative des Agriculteurs de Mayenne v. France,73 the Court found that there was no 
deficiency in the EU mechanism for the protection of fundamental rights, even though no 
preliminary ruling had been requested. As the Court remained entirely silent on the matter in 
its decision, there is no way of knowing why the Court did not consider a preliminary ruling 
                                                 
 
72 ECtHR Bosphorus para. 21. 
73 ECtHR, Cooperative des Agriculteurs de Mayenne et la Cooperative Laitière Maine-Anjou v. France [dec.], 
no. 16931/04, ECHR 2006-XV. 
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necessary in this case. However, the Court repeatedly referred to a decision of the (now 
abolished) European Commission on Human Rights in Procola v. Luxembourg,74 in which the 
matter at hand – the compatibility of a levy for exceeding milk quotas with the right to free 
enjoyment of property – had already been examined. The Court stated that in Mayenne that 
“the Convention institutions have already had occasion to stress the public interest of curbing 
milk production,” describing the policy to that effect as “in the public interest, given that it is 
aimed at stabilising the market”.75 This reasoning implies that a preliminary ruling may not be 
necessary when the fundamental rights concern at issue was already dealt with in earlier case 
law; in other words, the simple absence of a preliminary ruling is not enough to conclude that 
the protection offered by the EU was deficient. This makes sense, given that the ECtHR 
stressed that, within the EU system, protection is primarily offered through the national courts, 
while the CJEU has a complementary role.76 To declare that the protection offered was 
inadequate simply because of the lack of reference alone would be overly formalistic and 
disregard whether the Convention rights at issue were substantively respected. 
In Michaud,77 the ECtHR did find that the presumption of Convention compliance did not apply 
because the national court had failed to request a preliminary ruling, and it showed itself to be 
quite stringent. Michaud concerned the application by France of two EU Directives aimed at 
preventing the use of the financial system for money laundering. The French National Bar 
Council adopted a number of regulations designed to implement these Directives, which 
included among other things a duty to report suspicious activity. A Parisian lawyer applied to 
the Conseil d’Etat to have these regulations set aside. He argued that the obligation to report 
suspicions was incompatible with Article 8 of the ECHR as it jeopardized legal professional 
privilege and attorney-client confidentiality. He also asked that the Conseil d’Etat request a 
preliminary ruling from the CJEU on the question whether the “declaration of suspicion of 
criminal offence” was in conformity with Article 6 TEU and Article 8 of the ECHR. The 
Conseil d’Etat however refused to refer the matter to the CJEU. 
The Belgian Constitutional Court did, however, refer a question to the CJEU. This question 
concerned the conformity of the obligation to report suspicious activity with Article 6 ECHR 
(the right to a fair trial), since clients would no longer be able to rely on attorney-client 
confidentiality. The CJEU ruled that this obligation did not jeopardize the right to a fair trial of 
the clients, since the obligation to report suspicions only applied only where lawyers were 
helping their clients to carry out certain financial or real estate transactions, not in contexts 
relating to any judicial proceedings.78 
In Michaud, the respondent government, France, then argued that it had acted in the application 
of EU law and that the presumption of Convention compliance was applicable. According to 
                                                 
 
74 European Commission on Human Rights, Procola v. Luxembourg [dec.], no. 14570/89. 
75 ECtHR, Cooperative des Agriculteurs de Mayenne et la Cooperative Laitière Maine-Anjou v. France [dec.].  
76 See Lock (2010a) p. 540. 
77 ECtHR Michaud v. France. 
78 CJEU C-305/05 Ordre des barreaux francophones et germanophone and Others v. Conseil des Ministres, 
ECLI:EU:C:2007:383. 
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France the ECtHR had given the EU human rights protection system “a certificate of 
conventionality” in terms of both its substantive as its procedural guarantees (para. 73), so that 
there was no deficiency in the protection system. It also held that Advocate General Poiares 
Maduro had in his conclusions in Ordre des barreaux francophone et Germanophone and 
Others v. Conseil des Ministres concluded that the Directives respected client confidentiality 
not just in respect of Article 6 but also of Article 8. 
The ECtHR however ruled that the French Conseil d’Etat should nevertheless have requested 
a preliminary ruling on the matter of the compatibility of the reporting obligations with Article 
8 ECHR. It stated that the fact that a preliminary ruling of the CJEU already existed was not 
sufficient because this concerned a different question: 
The Court observes that in its judgment in the case of Ordre des barreaux francophone 
et Germanophone and Others […] the Court of Justice examined the compatibility of 
the obligation for lawyers to report suspicions only in respect of the requirements of the 
right to a fair trial within the meaning of Article 6 of the Convention. In so doing, it 
ruled solely on the rights of the lawyer’s client. The question is different, however, 
when approached from the angle of Article 8 of the Convention: here the issue is not 
just the rights of the lawyer’s client under this provision, but also the rights of the lawyer 
himself […] (para. 114). 
The ECtHR therefore found that the question of the compatibility of the obligation to report 
with Article 8 ECHR should have been referred to the CJEU by the Conseil d’Etat, because it 
concerned a matter that had not been addressed by the CJEU. Because the Conseil d’Etat did 
not do so, it had ruled: “without the full potential of the relevant international machinery for 
supervising fundamental rights – in principle equivalent to that of the Convention – having 
been deployed. In the light of that choice and the importance of what is at stake, the 
presumption of equivalent protection does not apply” (para. 115).  
From these three judgments, Bosphorus, Mayenne, and Michaud, the following rule can be 
derived. The preliminary ruling mechanism forms an essential,79 yet complementary, element 
of the EU mechanism for the protection of fundamental rights; the primary control is exercised 
by the national courts. This means that if a national court did not request a preliminary ruling, 
even though this was necessary, this will mean that the presumption that the EU system 
provided equivalent protection was not applicable (Michaud). A preliminary ruling may not be 
necessary when the matter has already been dealt with in an earlier ECtHR (or European 
                                                 
 
79 Apart from the case law cited here, there are numerous other judgments in which the ECtHR affirmed 
importance of the the preliminary ruling mechanism. In Pafitis, it ruled that a delay resulting from a request for 
a preliminary ruling could not result in a violation of the reasonable time requirement of Article 6(1) ECHR: 
ECtHR Pafitis and Others v. Greece, appl. no. 20323/93, ECHR 1998-I, para. 95. Recently the Court ruled that 
a failure to motivate why no preliminary ruling had been requested could in itself constitute a violation of article 
6(1): ECtHR Dhahbi v. Italy, appl. no. 17120/09, para. 33. See on the obligation to refer preliminary questions 
also ECtHR Vergauwen and others v. Belgium, appl. no. 4832/04, 4 April 2012.  
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Commission on Human Rights) decision or judgment (Mayenne), but this ruling needs to 
concern the same Convention right that is at issue (Michaud). Finally, the preliminary ruling is 
also used as evidence as to whether any discretion is left to the Member State (Bosphorus).80 
The Court’s decision in Povse however does not appear to be consistent with these rules. The 
Court begins its examination by distinguishing Povse from Michaud: the difference, it states, 
is that in Michaud the control mechanism had not been fully brought into play, because in that 
case the Conseil d’Etat had refused to request a preliminary ruling (para. 83). This had caused 
the presumption of equivalent protection to be rebutted.81 The Court then goes on to examine 
whether the presumption of Convention compliance could also be rebutted in Povse.  
In this regard, the applicants claimed – citing Bosphorus – that the presumption had been 
rebutted because the preliminary ruling of the CJEU in their case did not deal with the alleged 
violation of their Convention rights. On the basis of the ECtHR’s ruling in Michaud, it would 
be expected that this would indeed constitute a ground to consider the presumption rebutted (or 
inapplicable). However, the ECtHR states that the Brussels II bis Regulation, in contrast to the 
Regulation at issue in Bosphorus, does not constitute a direct basis for the alleged violation; 
rather, the Court seems to be saying, if the Brussels II bis Regulation gave rise to a violation, 
this would be the responsibility of the state of origin (Italy), because its courts had jurisdiction 
under the Brussels II bis Regulation. According to the ECtHR: 
The CJEU was called upon to interpret the Brussels [II bis] Regulation and to clarify 
the scope of jurisdiction of the Italian courts on the one hand and the Austrian courts 
on the other. It follows that the present case differs from the Bosphorus case in that the 
CJEU was not required to rule on the alleged violation of the applicant’s fundamental 
rights.82 
It is difficult to interpret what exactly the reason is for the difference between the Court’s 
findings in Michaud and Povse. Two alternative, or perhaps cumulative, explanations can be 
derived from the text of the Povse decision. The first is that it appears that the Court considers 
the “indirect” nature of the alleged violation in Povse to be of importance.83 The line of 
reasoning is that the Brussels II bis Regulation gave the Italian courts exclusive jurisdiction. 
That means that if Brussels II bis resulted in a violation, it would be Italy that would need to 
answer for it, either before the CJEU or before the ECtHR. Therefore, it does not matter that 
the CJEU’s preliminary ruling did not concern the alleged fundamental rights violation at issue, 
because Austria would not have been responsible anyway. The problems with this reasoning 
could be, firstly, that this distinction between direct and indirect violations was entirely 
unforeseeable from earlier case law. Moreover, this reasoning seems to disregard the lessons 
of Michaud and Mayenne about the purpose of preliminary rulings: they should not be 
                                                 
 
80 See Costello (2006) p. 110. 
81 Though, confusingly, in the Michaud judgment itself it stated that the presumption had been found not to 
apply – which is different from saying it did apply but was rebutted, because this would imply a manifest 
deficiency. See ECtHR Michaud, para. 115. 
82 ECtHR Povse, para. 85. 
83 Cuniberti (2014) para. 23. 
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requested simply to satisfy a procedural requirement, but to clarify an important legal question. 
It would certainly have been worthwhile to hear the CJEU’s views on the compatibility of the 
abolition of refusal grounds with the Convention, regardless of whether Austria would then be 
held responsible. Perhaps, though it is nowhere explicitly mentioned, the fact that the CJEU 
had delivered a preliminary ruling in Zarraga in which it explicitly excluded all possibilities 
of discretion for the enforcing court played a role here. The ECtHR may have felt that to impose 
on national courts the obligation to refer for a preliminary ruling in matters which had already 
been clarified by the CJEU would not be opportune. If so, it would have been preferable if the 
Court had made this explicit.84 
Finally, if it is accepted that Austria did not need to request a preliminary ruling at all, it is a 
mystery why the Court on numerous occasions affirms that Austria “duly” made use of the 
control mechanism, which seems to imply an obligation (“duly” is synonymous with “rightly” 
or “properly”). 
A second possible reading of the Court’s reasoning is the following: the Court states that the 
difference with Bosphorus is that that case concerned a regulation which provided a “direct 
basis” for the impoundment of the aircraft (and therefore for the violation), whereas the 
Brussels II bis Regulation needed to be interpreted. The Court states that in Povse the CJEU 
was “called upon” only to interpret the Regulation, so that “it follows […] that the CJEU was 
not required to rule on the alleged violation of the applicant’s fundamental rights.” Taken 
literally, this seems to imply that the CJEU did not have to rule on the alleged violations simply 
because it was not asked to do so. In Bosphorus, the question of conformity with the ECHR 
could be asked directly because there was no disagreement over the matter of responsibility; in 
Povse, this matter was not clear, so it is logical that the referring court would ask for an 
interpretation rather than a direct assessment of the compatibility with the ECHR. 
If this interpretation of the ECtHR’s reasoning is correct, then the ECtHR has offered a very 
formalistic and potentially dangerous reformulation of the rules as explained above. It implies 
that the CJEU is only required to rule on compatibility of rules of EU law with the Convention 
if the referring court explicitly asks for it. The argument that the Austrian court was not required 
to ask about ECHR compatibility because the Regulation first required clarification is not 
convincing, as referring courts frequently ask multiple, sometimes cumulative, preliminary 
questions: the reference from the Austrian Supreme Court in Povse is itself an example. If the 
ECtHR indeed tries to say that it is no problem that the CJEU did not rule on the compatibility 
question because it was not asked to, then this is a dangerous precedent. It would mean that 
referring courts could easily dodge the question of whether they acted in conformity with the 
Convention and still be granted immunity under the Bosphorus test simply by requesting a 
preliminary ruling on the interpretation of the piece of legislation at issue while avoiding the 
question of ECHR compatibility. Because this conclusion is at odds with the holdings of both 
                                                 
 
84 Cuniberti (2014) para. 47. 
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Michaud and Mayenne, it is assumed that this is simply an unfortunate formulation on the 
ECtHR’s part. 
Povse thus leaves us with uncertainty as to the circumstances in which a national court is 
required to ask preliminary questions in order to satisfy the requirements of the Bosphorus test. 
In general, the rules enumerated above appear to apply, with one of two possible exceptions: 
(1) the national court does not need to make a reference if it is not directly responsible, or (2) 
it does not need to make a reference if the issue has been dealt with in previous CJEU case law. 
Both exceptions, however, are only implicit in the Povse decision. It could even be derived 
from Povse that national courts have a duty to refer, but that it does not matter whether their 
questions concerned the alleged violations. All in all, Povse has done little to clarify the 
obligations imposed on national courts. It seems that a request for a preliminary ruling is still 
an attractive option, even if it is not technically required.85 
If none of the conclusions offered above appear very satisfying, a simpler one is available: the 
ECtHR was simply reluctant to find fault with the system of the Brussels II bis Regulation and 
the free movement of judgments. If it had been very stringent in its assessment of the 
preliminary ruling requested by Austria, it would have had to conclude that the presumption of 
Convention compliance did not apply, and that Austria could, theoretically, be held accountable 
if a violation was found. To avoid this, the ECtHR was forced to conclude, even in a manner 
inconsistent with its own earlier case law, that the Austrian courts satisfied the preliminary 
ruling requirement. Once again, the conclusion drawn in Section 5.4.2 that the ECtHR clearly 
wanted to sanction the free movement of judgments as achieved under Brussels II bis is 
reaffirmed. 
 
5.4.5 The matter of discretion and the applicability of Povse to Regulations 
which contain grounds for refusal  
 
It has been shown extensively that the presumption of Convention compliance that allows a 
state to avoid accountability under the ECHR only applies when that State had no discretion in 
the implementation of the relevant piece of EU legislation. Former President of the ECtHR 
Luzius Wildhaber clarified this in a speech given shortly after Bosphorus was delivered. 
According to him the ‘equivalent protection’ doctrine only applies if the State “does no more 
than implement legal obligations flowing from its membership of the organisation. [The State] 
would be fully responsible under the Convention for all acts falling outside its strict 
international legal obligations.”86 
                                                 
 
85 Costello (2006) p. 120. 
86 Wildhaber, “The Coordination of the Protection of Fundamental Rights in Europe”, Address by the President 
of the European Court of Human Rights, Geneva, 8 September 2005; cited by Costello (2006) p. 100. 
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That the presumption of Convention compliance only applies in cases where the state in 
question had no choice in the way it fulfilled its obligations is clear from the case law. In 
Bosphorus, the ECtHR thoroughly investigated the relevant legislation87 to reach the 
conclusion that the Irish authorities had not exercised discretion.88 The subsequent case law 
presents a mixed picture on this point: sometimes the Court looks at the relevant legislation to 
reach its conclusion,89 sometimes it does not mention the question of discretion at all.90  
In Povse, the ECtHR needed few words to conclude that Article 42 of the Brussels II bis 
Regulation left no discretion to the Member State where enforcement is sought (para. 79). It 
also referred to the CJEU’s preliminary ruling which affirmed that the courts of the requested 
state could not review the merits of the return order, nor refuse enforcement on the ground that 
the return would entail a grave risk for the child (para. 81). This does not seem controversial: 
the CJEU had indeed already affirmed that Brussels II bis left no room for refusal of 
enforcement on any grounds, as the recognition and enforcement of return orders under this 
Regulation is based on the principle of mutual trust, which means that refusal grounds should 
be kept “to a minimum”.91 This is also the central argument of the CJEU’s ruling in Zarraga.92 
The ECtHR’s conclusion that Austria had no discretion is therefore correct. 
The lesson for the larger context of the abolition of exequatur and refusal grounds is therefore 
that Member States that are required to enforce a judgment under an EU Regulation which 
allows complete free movement will not be held accountable by the ECtHR for the 
consequences of that enforcement, provided that they indeed had no discretion in this regard. 
This is an important conclusion, because it means that instruments such as the Brussels I bis 
Regulation, which still contains grounds for refusal, will not benefit from this exception. To 
illustrate this point, it is worth looking at the ECtHR’s judgment in M.S.S. v. Belgium and 
Greece, in which the Court found that the presumption of Convention compliance did not apply 
because the state in question, Belgium, would have been able to refuse to carry out its obligation 
on the basis of the so-called “sovereignty clause”. 
M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece is a case about the Common European Asylum System, which 
like the free movement of civil judgments is an outcome of the 1999 European Council meeting 
in Tampere.93 As such, it is also based on the principles of mutual trust and the presumption of 
compliance of all Member States with fundamental rights. The asylum system is based on the 
rule that asylum seekers can submit an asylum application in only one of the European Member 
States; which Member State is responsible for examining their request is determined according 
                                                 
 
87 ECtHR Bosphorus, para. 143-148. 
88 Ibid., para. 148. 
89 ECtHR Mayenne. 
90 ECtHR Biret; Lock (2010a) p. 544. 
91 CJEU Povse para. 40. 
92 CJEU Zarraga, para. 46. 
93 ECtHR MSS v Belgium and Greece, appl. no. 30696/09 ECHR 2011-I; see Bossuyt (2011) Clayton (2011).  
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to criteria laid down in the Dublin II Regulation (Arts. 5-14).94 The Regulation also states that 
when an asylum seeker lodges an application in a Member State that is not responsible for 
examining it under the Regulation, this Member State is required to transfer the person back to 
the Member State that is responsible (Art. 17). The latter State would then be required to take 
the asylum seeker back. There is however one exception, the so-called “sovereignty clause” of 
Article 3(2), which gives Member States the possibility of accepting responsibility for 
applications for which they are not responsible under the Regulation. 
Mr M.S.S., the applicant in this case, had fled Afghanistan, and finally arrived in Belgium, 
where he applied for asylum. However, it transpired that he had first entered the EU in Greece 
and had been registered there. Belgium was therefore obliged under the Dublin II Regulation 
to transfer him back to Greece. M.S.S. appealed against the decision that ordered his transfer 
on the grounds that in Greece he would likely be detained under terrible conditions, facing ill 
treatment. This appeal was denied, and M.S.S. brought an application against Belgium, alleging 
that with his expulsion Belgium had violated Articles 2 and 3 ECHR. 
The M.S.S. case concerns the same problem as Povse: the accountability of Contracting Parties 
for “indirect” violations; violations that took place in another state (also a Contracting Party), 
but for which they are indirectly responsible because they exposed the victim to those 
violations. The difference is, of course, that in Povse the indirect violation consists of importing 
a foreign judgment that somehow violates Convention rights, while in cases such as M.S.S. the 
indirect violation consists of transferring the victim to a state where he is likely to suffer ill 
treatment. The Court had already developed a body of case law on the latter situation in the 
context of extradition of criminal suspects to (non-Contracting party/third) states where they 
would likely suffer inhumane treatment.95 It had also extended this reasoning to situations 
where a person was extradited from one Contracting Party to another, with the purpose of 
eventually extraditing him to a third state where he would suffer ill treatment.96 
The question in M.S.S. was then whether the same also applied in intra-EU situations, where 
the state responsible for ill-treatment was also an EU Member State. The ECtHR first applied 
the Bosphorus test. Having found that the EU system in principle offered equivalent protection 
to that of the Convention, the Court next examined the matter of discretion. It found that 
[…] Article 3 § 2 of the Dublin Regulation provides that, by derogation from the general 
rule set forth in article 3 § 1, each Member State may examine an application for asylum 
lodged with it by a third-country national, even if such examination is not its 
responsibility under the criteria laid down in the Regulation. This is the so-called 
                                                 
 
94 Council Regulation (EC) No 343/2003 of 18 February 2003 establishing the criteria and mechanisms for 
determining the Member State responsible for examining an asylum application lodged in one of the Member 
States by a third-country national, OJ L 50/01 (the ‘Dublin II Regulation’). This Regulation has since been 
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95 ECtHR Drozd and Janousek v France and Spain [GC], no. 12747/87, ECHR 1992. 
96 ECtHR, T.I. v. United Kingdom [dec.], no. 43844/98, ECHR 2000-III.  
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“sovereignty” clause. In such a case the Member State concerned becomes the Member 
State responsible for the purposes of the Regulation and takes on the obligations 
associated with that responsibility. 
The Court concludes that, under the Regulation, the Belgian authorities could have 
refrained from transferring the applicant if they had considered that the receiving 
country, namely Greece, was not fulfilling its obligations under the Convention. 
Consequently, the Court considers that the impugned measure taken by the Belgian 
authorities did not strictly fall within Belgium’s international legal obligations. 
Accordingly, the presumption of equivalent protection does not apply in this case. 
[emphasis added]. 
The Court then went on to apply the principles of the T.I. and subsequent K.R.S. judgment97 to 
the case (paras. 341-359). It found that in light of all the available information about the human 
rights situation in Greece, submitted by, among others, the UNHCR and the Council of Europe 
Commissioner for Human Rights, the Belgian authorities knew or ought to have known about 
the harms to which he at risk of suffering, and should have considered them. The fact that they 
had not, while they had the means to refuse to transfer him, gave rise to a violation of Article 
3 of the ECHR (para. 361). 
The approach adopted by the Court in M.S.S. therefore conforms to the proclamation of former 
President Wildhaber: that the presumption of Convention compliance would only apply if 
states had no discretion. It is not enough if they did not exercise discretion; if they had the 
opportunity to do so, this means that the presumption does not apply, regardless of whether 
discretion was in fact exercised or not. 
It follows from Povse that those Regulations which have abolished exequatur and refusal 
grounds will be covered by the immunity – at least as far as the element of discretion is 
concerned. In Povse, the ECtHR came to the conclusion that the Austrian courts were not 
capable of exercising discretion simply on the basis of the wording of Article 42 of the Brussels 
II bis Regulation: 
the decision ordering the enforcement of the Venice youth Court’s judgment were based 
on Article 42 of the Brussels [II bis] Regulation, which provides that a certified 
judgment ordering a child’s return under Article 11(8) of the Regulation “shall be 
recognised and enforceable in another Member State without the need for a declaration 
of enforceability and without any possibility of opposing its recognition.” That 
provision leaves no discretion to the courts of the State of enforcement. (para. 79) 
The other regulations for which exequatur and refusal grounds have been abolished all contain 
the same phrasing: “shall be recognised and enforceable in another Member State without the 
                                                 
 
97 ECtHR K.R.S. v. United Kingdom appl. no. 32733/08 02/12/2008. 
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need for a declaration of enforceability and without any possibility of opposing its 
recognition”.98 It is therefore to be expected that these regulations shall be treated in the same 
way by the ECtHR.99 
The matter becomes a little more complicated when it comes to regulations that still contain a 
complete exequatur procedure including refusal grounds, such as the Brussels II bis Regulation 
as concerns judgments on parental responsibility, or those that require no declaration of 
enforceability but do contain grounds for refusal, such as Brussels I bis.  
Under the Brussels I Regulation, courts had no discretion to refuse enforcement at the first 
(judgment import) stage;100 this was clear from the wording of Article 41. It is also obvious 
that courts do not have any discretion at this stage under Brussels I bis, since the requirement 
of a declaration of enforceability has been abolished.101 A state could therefore not be held 
accountable under the Convention for violating Convention rights by granting a declaration of 
enforceability at this first stage, because it had no powers to refuse the declaration. However, 
it is difficult to imagine such a situation arising. If a person lodges an application with the 
ECtHR against a state for a violation resulting from wrongfully granted permission for 
enforcement, then he or she will need to have exhausted the available local remedies lest their 
application be declared inadmissible. Such an applicant will therefore have to make use of the 
procedure provided for in these regulations by which he or she can apply for refusal of 
enforcement on the basis of the grounds for refusal. Therefore, while the national court indeed 
enjoys no discretion at the first stage of the procedure for cross-border enforcement (and could 
therefore not be held accountable under the ECtHR for doing so), what really matters is what 
happens at the second (contradictory) stage of the procedure. As the Brussels II bis Regulation 
does allow the requested court to refuse a declaration of enforceability at the first stage (Art. 
31(2)), the following also applies to that Regulation. 
It is submitted that at this contradictory stage the court clearly is capable of exercising 
discretion in the sense of the M.S.S. judgment. In the words of the ECtHR, discretion is absent 
when the national authority does “no more than implement legal obligations flowing from its 
Membership of the organisation”. Seen in the context of the judgments in which the state was 
considered to have no discretion, this means that the state may not have enjoyed any freedom 
                                                 
 
98 Article 20(1) of Regulation 861/2007 establishing a European Small Claims Procedure; Article 19 of 
Regulation 1896/2006 establishing a European Order for Payment Procedure; Article 5 of Regulation 805/2004 
creating a European Enforcement Order for uncontested claims; Article 17 of Regulation 4/2009 on 
Maintenance obligations. 
99 The EEO, EOP and ESCP Regulations do allow enforcement to be refused in case of irreconcilability. Though 
this refusal ground has little to do with fundamental rights but rather with the impossibility of enforcing 
mutually exclusive judgments, it is of course possible that a case involving its application reaches the ECtHR. In 
such a case, the Member State concerned would not benefit from the presumption of Convention compliance, 
given the fact that it clearly enjoyed discretion. See Article 22, EOP Regulation; Article 21, EEO Regulation; 
Article 22, ESCP Regulation.  
100 Franq (2012) p. 651; see the discussion in Chapter 2.3.1.2. 
101 Article 39, Brussels Ibis Regulation. 
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to make a decision as to how to implement their obligations. Freedom in this sense does of 
course not mean that there are no boundaries within which the national authorities must act, 
but that the relevant legal obligation leaves room for interpretation. That this is true follows 
from the ECtHR’s judgment in Cantoni.102 This judgment shows that if EU law affords 
discretion – in this case the interpretation of a medical term in a directive – then the ECtHR 
will review how this discretion was exercised. In Bosphorus the ECtHR explicitly distinguished 
this judgment, stating: 
It remains the case that a state would be fully responsible under the Convention for all 
acts falling outside its strict legal obligations. The numerous Convention cases cited by 
the applicant […] confirm this. Each case (in particular, Cantoni, p. 1626, § 26) 
concerned a review by this Court of the exercise of State discretion for which 
Community law provided.103  
It is concluded, both on the basis of Cantoni itself, and on the basis of the fact that the ECtHR 
explicitly distinguished this judgment in Bosphorus, that the relevant factor in determining 
whether a state was capable of exercising discretion is whether the relevant legislation left any 
room for interpretation. This conclusion is reinforced by the Court’s finding in Povse: Article 
42 simply imposes an obligation on the requested court to enforce the return order which has 
been certified by the court of origin, which does not leave any room for interpretation.  
The wording of the grounds for refusal contained in the various regulations however do clearly 
leave room for interpretation by the judge who is requested to rule on their application. The 
notions of “public policy”,104 “in sufficient time and in such a way for him to arrange for his 
defence”,105 and irreconcilability,106 are all capable of being interpreted differently according 
to the circumstances of the case, whereas the notion of public policy may also vary according 
to the Member State where it is invoked. If a case reaches the ECtHR in which the applicant 
complains that a court has wrongly granted a declaration of enforceability under, for example, 
Article 28 of the Brussels II bis Regulation, then the ECtHR will consider that the court in that 
case will have made an examination of the facts of the case and will have interpreted the 
relevant ground for refusal to see whether the facts can support its invocation. It is submitted 
that this interpretation will be seen as an exercise of discretion by the State that causes the 
presumption of Convention compliance to be inapplicable. This is confirmed by the ECtHR’s 
                                                 
 
102 ECtHR, Cantoni v. France [GC], no. 17862/91, ECHR 1996-V. 
103 ECtHR Bosphorus, para. 157. 
104 Art. 34(1) Brussels I, art. 45(1)(a) Brussels Ibis; art. 22(a) and 23(a) Brussels IIbis Regulation; art. 26 of the 
Insolvency Regulation.  
105 Article 34(2) of the Brussels I Regulation; article 45(1)(b) of Brussels Ibis; articles 22(b) and 23(c) of 
Regulation Brussels IIbis. 
106 Articles 34(3) and (4) of Brussels I; articles 45(1)(c) and (d) of Brussels Ibis: articles 22 (c) and (d) and 23 
(e) and (f) of Brussels IIbis. 
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judgment in Avotins, where it reviewed whether Latvia’s application of Article 34(2) of the 
Brussels I Regulation had been in conformity with Article 6(1) ECHR.107 
It is important to emphasize however that this conclusion only establishes accountability for 
national courts under the Convention. It does not have any bearing on the question whether 
they will be found guilty of a violation. It follows from Cantoni that if a national authority has 
any discretion, the Court will review their conduct as it would in any other case before it: by 
applying the relevant Convention article to it, while keeping in mind that states enjoy a margin 
of discretion. The forthcoming Grand Chamber judgment in Avotins will likely provide more 
clarity on this matter.108 
In this regard, it is interesting to ask whether a state could be found to have violated Article 
6(1) of the Convention by wrongly granting permission for enforcement. Especially interesting 
is the question whether it could be seen as contrary to this article if the court in question failed 
to raise any of the grounds for refusal of its own motion. There is no agreement on this point 
in the literature.109 The Proposal for the Brussels I Regulation however clearly excludes any 
obligation for the court to do so. In this context it should also be noted that under the Brussels 
I bis Regulation the freedom of courts to raise grounds for refusal of their own motion seems 
to have been curtailed by the legislature.110 The question whether the ECtHR would find a 
violation in a court’s failure to raise grounds of its own motion remains to be answered, though 
it is submitted that in the absence of any clear indications on this point, the ECtHR would be 
unlikely to do so.  
To come back to the general question, it can be concluded that from the perspective of the 
Convention, national judges are certainly capable of exercising discretion when it comes to 
refusing recognition or enforcement under the Brussels I and Brussels I bis Regulations, and 
also under the other Regulations that contain grounds for refusal. It must therefore be concluded 
                                                 
 
107 ECtHR Avotins v. Latvia, appl. no. 17502/07, 25 February 2014. This case has been referred to the Grand 
Chamber. See Requejo Isidro (2015). 
108 ECtHR Avotins v. Latvia; see especially the dissenting opinion by judges Ziemele, Bianku and De Gaetano, 
wh are of the opinion that the way the Latvian court had applied the provision may not have been compatible with 
EU law. According to the judges in their dissenting opinion, ‘[w]hile the Court is not competent to interpret EU 
law, we submit that it should not implicitly approve of domestic practices that may go against EU law. This is a 
new situation for the Court which merits very serious further reflection.’ The Grand Chamber judgment is 
therefore eagerly awaited. 
109 Francq (2012) p. 650 considers it possible to derive from art. 34 Brussels I that a court may of its own motion 
take grounds for refusal into consideration. Layton and Mercer are of the opinion that the court is obliged to do 
so (Layton and Mercer (2004) para. 24.011) while Rauscher provides a very strict reading of the article and 
submits that grounds for refusal may only be examined on application (Leible, Mankowski and Staudinger 
(2006) p. 553). It is interesting to note that in a recent judgment the German Bundesgerichtshof considered itself 
obliged to raise grounds for refusal under the Brussels I Regulation; BGH 12 December 2007, XII ZB 240/05, 
paras. 23-25. 
110 In this regard, it appears that the legislature intended to decrease the possibility for national courts to raise 
refusal grounds of their own motion, by changing the wording of article 34(1) Brussels I, “A judgment shall not 
be recognised [if one of the grounds for refusal is found to apply]”, to “On the application of the person 
against whom enforcement is sought, the enforcement shall be refused if one of the grounds referred to in 
Article 45 is found to apply” in article 46 of Brussels Ibis (emphasis added). 
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that the immunity granted by Bosphorus, and by extension Povse, does not cover these 
Regulations. 
What is important to emphasize here is that the simple abolition of the declaration of 
enforceability that was achieved under Brussels I bis does not appear sufficient to bring the 
enforcement of judgments under this Regulation within the remit of the immunity provided by 
Bosphorus. As explained above, the abolition of the exequatur has not changed the discretion 
enjoyed by courts with regard to the application of refusal grounds at the second stage. The 
fact that the first stage has been abolished also makes no difference from the perspective of 
accountability before the ECtHR, because courts did not have any discretion at this stage 
anyway under the previously existing procedure. Moreover, the situation where a Member 
State would be held accountable for failing to refuse enforcement of a judgment at the first 
stage would not arise, because it would mean that the applicant had not exhausted local 
remedies. The lack of discretion at the first stage is therefore of little practical importance. 
 
5.4.6 A manifest deficiency? 
 
The final element of the Bosphorus case law that remains to be discussed is the question of 
what, if anything, a manifest deficiency would look like in the context of cross-border 
enforcement of judgments. It was already noted that, to date, the ECtHR has not once found a 
manifest deficiency, so that it is unknown what circumstances will lead to such a finding. It 
was discussed under Section 5.3.3 that the concept as well as the standard to be applied were 
already subject to debate. Some have considered it “most unlikely” that the ECtHR would ever 
find a manifest deficiency, considering the marginal review the ECtHR conducts on this 
exception,111 though others consider it remarkable that it has not been found.112  
The ECtHR’s case law on this point provides a mixed picture, especially when it comes to the 
analysis of the substantive protection offered by the EU system, as opposed to the procedural 
protection.113 In Mayenne v. France – which was already discussed above in the context of the 
importance of the preliminary ruling mechanism – the ECtHR was satisfied that there had not 
been a manifest deficiency.114 It came to this conclusion after an analysis that, though short, 
considers the substantive compatibility of the contested measures (the milk quota system) with 
the ECHR. It refers to the European Commission on Human Rights’ decision in Procola v. 
Others,115 in which it had already been found that the milk quota system was in the public 
                                                 
 
111 Besselink (2008) p. 300. 
112 Lock (2010a) p. 545. 
113 Lock (2010a) p. 542. 
114 ECtHR Mayenne v. France. 
115 European Commission on Human Rights Procola v. Luxembourg. 
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interest, and that its interference with Article 1 of the First Protocol to the ECHR was therefore 
justified: 
[T]he Court reiterates that the Convention institutions have already had occasion to stress 
the public interest of curbing milk production, describing the policy to that effect as “in the 
public interest, given that it is aimed at stabilizing the market”.116 
The Mayenne – and underlying Procola – decisions can be seen as the exceptions to the rule 
that in the context of the Bosphorus test the Court generally does not review whether the EU 
legislation at issue substantively conforms to Convention standards. Bosphorus itself is the best 
example (see Section 5.3.2, above). Another example is the ECtHR’s decision in Biret,117 in 
which the Court reiterated its finding in Bosphorus as to the equivalence of the EU’s protection 
mechanism in general. As for any manifest deficiency in the case at hand, the Court satisfied 
itself with the sentence that: 
It considers that the present case does not reveal any “manifest deficiency” in the 
protection of fundamental rights which could rebut this presumption. 
It did not offer any further explanation, aside from citing “mutatis mutandis” its decision in 
Mayenne. 
In a more recent case, Andreasen v. the United Kingdom and 26 other Member States of the 
European Union,118 the applicant aimed to hold the EU Member States accountable for her 
(allegedly) unjustified dismissal from a position at the European Commission. She challenged 
the decision on her dismissal before the EU Civil Service Tribunal119 (then the Court of First 
Instance) and, on appeal, before the General Court.120 Both courts rejected her complaints. 
Before the ECtHR, the applicant relied on Article 6(1) in combination with Article 13 to claim 
that she had been denied an effective remedy because the disciplinary proceedings were not 
considered by an independent tribunal that was either objectively or subjectively impartial. She 
also complained that the disciplinary hearings were not public, and that the jurisdiction of the 
Civil Service Tribunal and the General Court had been limited to the question of whether her 
dismissal was obviously disproportionate (para. 55). The ECtHR considered these complaints 
in light of the Bosphorus doctrine and its earlier decision in Perez, where it ruled that a state 
(Germany) could be held accountable for shortcomings in the internal appeal proceedings of 
the United Nations because ‘manifest deficiencies’ in those proceedings had been shown to 
exist.121 In Andreasen, it held that the 27 Member States could not be held accountable for any 
                                                 
 
116 ECtHR Mayenne v. France, para. 13. 
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118 ECtHR Andreasen v. the United Kingdom and 26 other Member States of the European Union (dec)., appl. no. 
28827/11, 31 March 2015. 
119 Case F-40/05, Marta Andreasen v Commission of the European Communities, ECLI:EU:F:2007:189. 
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deficiencies in the EU’s internal appeal proceedings, because the applicant had, unlike Mrs 
Perez, “not complained in a substantiated manner either that there were manifest deficiencies 
in the internal appeal proceedings”.122 Though in Andreasen a manifest deficiency in the EU’s 
review mechanism was not found to exist, the ECtHR’s judgment in Perez provides useful 
insight in what kind of circumstances could indicate that a manifest deficiency exists. In Perez, 
the ECtHR considered the following circumstances relevant:123 
a) the fact that she did not have an oral hearing at any stage of the proceedings regarding 
her dismissal, despite the fact that in her case there were issues of both credibility and 
contested facts; 
b) she claimed that she had not had access to all documents submitted by the United 
Nations Development Programme (her employer) to the United Nations Administrative 
Tribunal (which has exclusive jurisdiction to employment-related disputes between the 
United Nations (UN) and its staff), and relied upon by the latter, in breach of her right 
to equality of arms; 
c) that the United Nations Administrative Tribunal only had limited jurisdiction in cases 
concerning wrongful terminations of contracts as the Secretary-General could choose 
to pay compensation instead of reinstating the person who had been unlawfully 
dismissed; 
d) that a number of the shortcomings complained of by the applicant were indeed 
confirmed in the report of the Redesign Panel on the United Nations system of 
administration of justice of July 2006, a panel of independent external experts set up by 
the UN Secretary-General himself. 
 
The ECtHR however concluded that Mrs Perez had failed to exhaust all domestic (German) 
remedies, rendering the application inadmissible, and did not therefore go on to examine 
whether these circumstances indeed constituted a manifest deficiency in the internal appeal 
proceedings at the UN.124 Still, it stands to reason that if factors such as those enumerated here 
had been alleged in a substantiated manner in Andreasen, the presumption of equivalent 
protection could have been rebutted in that case. Because Mrs Andreasen did not allege such 
circumstances, the ECtHR clearly did not feel compelled to examine whether a manifest 
deficiency existed in casu. 
The Court has on occasion offered a more thorough review of the procedural safeguards 
available. In Kokkelvisserij, the applicant claimed that he had suffered a violation of his right 
to a fair trial because he had not been allowed to respond to the Opinion of the Advocate-
General during the preliminary ruling proceedings before the CJEU. The ECtHR stressed that 
the nature of the preliminary ruling is a consultation of the CJEU by a national court, not (it 
seems to imply) a contradictory procedure. However, since the preliminary ruling mechanism 
is an essential component of the EU’s procedural mechanism for safeguarding fundamental 
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rights, and as such is necessary to consider that mechanism as ‘equivalent’ to that of the 
Convention, the ECtHR considers itself bound to examine whether the preliminary ruling 
procedure ensured equivalent protection of the applicant’s rights. It then examined the 
circumstances of the case as well as the Rules of Procedure of the CJEU, finally coming to the 
conclusion that the protection afforded to the applicant was not ‘manifestly deficient’ because 
he had not had the opportunity to respond to the Advocate General.125 
The intensity of the Court’s review in Povse has already been discussed in detail above, so it 
suffices to reiterate here that the Court considered that no manifest deficiency existed in that 
case, because, firstly, the Austrian Supreme Court had “duly made use” of the preliminary 
ruling mechanism, and secondly, the applicants could have invoked their Convention rights 
before the Italian courts. The latter argument seems to imply that an inadequacy in Italy’s 
procedural mechanisms could also have constituted a “manifest deficiency”. 
The following conclusions can be drawn. Firstly, that the Court’s review of the question of 
whether a manifest deficiency existed is as a rule relatively marginal; and secondly, that in the 
majority of cases the Court’s review concerned only the procedural mechanism, not the degree 
of substantive protection afforded by the relevant legislation or by the CJEU – even though 
Judge Ress opined that “an obvious misinterpretation or misapplication by the ECJ of the 
guarantees of the Convention right” could also be considered a manifest deficiency. Moreover, 
it has been concluded – and is supported by Povse – that the burden of providing proof that a 
manifest deficiency occurred rests in principle with the applicant.126 The Court will not 
examine this question of its own motion, and its analysis of factors that may contribute to a 
manifest deficiency is therefore limited to the evidence submitted by the applicants. 
For these reasons it is not possible to say with certainty, on the basis of the case law previously 
cited, exactly what a manifest deficiency would entail in the context of free movement of civil 
judgments. However, some clues can be deduced from the case law on this point. 
Firstly, it appears that the concept of “manifest deficiency” refers primarily to a deficiency in 
the procedural protection of fundamental rights. This is clear from the ECtHR’s case law – 
with the notable exception of Mayenne – as well as from the concurring opinion by Judge Ress. 
Another argument that the substantive standards of the relevant secondary legislation have no 
bearing on the question whether the protection is considered equivalent or manifestly deficient 
comes from Povse: though the ECtHR approvingly cites the minimum requirements of Article 
42 of Brussels II bis, it does so at the ‘discretion’ stage, not at the ‘equivalence’ or ‘rebuttal’ 
stage. The standard of protection provided by the regulations that allow for complete free 
movement is therefore unlikely to be considered by the ECtHR as contributing to a ‘manifest 
deficiency’; neither does it have any bearing on the ‘equivalence’ test. 
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Secondly, if it follows that the alleged manifest deficiency is found in the procedural protection 
offered by the EU system, the question arises which procedural deficiencies would qualify as 
a manifest deficiency. It must be reiterated that according to the ECtHR, the EU system for 
protection consists of two elements: the national courts, complemented (if necessary, see 
Mayenne) by the CJEU. The following discusses under what circumstances deficiencies in 
national courts or the EU courts, respectively, could amount to a manifest deficiency. 
In the context of the free movement of judgments, the problem is that the protection of 
fundamental rights under the regulations at the national level has been relegated exclusively to 
the courts of the Member State of origin. The courts of the member state of enforcement have 
no discretion and can therefore not provide protection to the individual concerned, which 
means that the model presented by the ECtHR in Bosphorus does not fit these situations. 
Strictly speaking, under the Bosphorus test, a dysfunction in the procedural framework of the 
member state of origin could lead to the member state of enforcement being held accountable, 
because one of the elements of the Bosphorus test would not have been fulfilled. Yet in Povse, 
the Court also pointed to the availability of redress for the applicants in Italy as an argument 
why no manifest deficiency existed in this case. Interpreted a contrario, this seems to mean 
that the unavailability or insufficiency of procedural remedies in Italy could have resulted in 
the finding of a manifest deficiency. On the other hand, as has been argued under Chapter 4.4.2, 
such a conclusion would be entirely at odds with the general message of the Court’s decision 
in Povse. It has been demonstrated repeatedly that the ECtHR avoided giving the impression 
that it would ever consider an enforcing state liable for merely enforcing a judgment in the 
absence of any discretion. It is therefore submitted that a defect in the procedural protection 
offered in the state of origin would not be seen by the ECtHR as a manifest deficiency in the 
sense of the Bosphorus doctrine – a conclusion which is strengthened by the fact that the 
persons concerned could lodge an application against that state with the ECtHR if such a 
serious deficiency occurred. While it has been questioned whether lodging an application with 
the ECtHR against the state of origin would really provide an effective remedy to replace the 
cross-border control of refusal grounds,127 this does seem to be the approach favoured by the 
ECtHR. Once again, this is logical when seen in the light of the “home remedy rule” that 
underlies the Convention, and that the Court has previously applied.128 More importantly, it is 
in keeping with the deference shown by the ECtHR to the importance of cooperation within 
the EU and the manner in which this is achieved, which it has repeatedly shown in the 
judgments discussed in this Chapter. Finally, the ECtHR has shown in Šneersone and 
Kampanella v. Italy that it will indeed hold the state of origin accountable for a violation 
resulting from a wrongfully granted return order.129 
This leaves us with the final element that could be found to be manifestly deficient: the 
procedural protection granted by the CJEU itself. Looking at the situations proposed by Judge 
Ress (see under Section 5.3.3, above) the only one that seems applicable is the possibility of 
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an obvious misinterpretation or misapplication by the CJEU of the guarantees of the 
Convention right. So, if the court in the Member State of enforcement had requested a 
preliminary ruling, which had resulted in an obvious misinterpretation or misapplication by the 
CJEU of the Convention right at issue, then that could result in a finding of a manifest 
deficiency. However, it was shown that the ECtHR is not clear on whether the courts of the 
Member State of enforcement would in fact be required to request a preliminary ruling; in fact, 
it was suggested under Section 5.4.4 that this inconsistency exists precisely because the ECtHR 
wanted to avoid the impression that the enforcing court could lose its immunity by not 
requesting a ruling. To rebut the presumption of Convention compliance would therefore entail 
a request for a preliminary ruling by the enforcing court – which it is not clearly obliged to 
request, and whose contents do not even need to consider the possible infringement of a 
Convention right, according to Povse – which would then nevertheless result in an obvious 
misinterpretation by the CJEU of the Convention right at issue. Such a situation is difficult to 
envisage, but theoretically it could lead to the enforcing court being held accountable. 
However, while it is difficult to predict exactly how the ECtHR would resolve this particular 
legal puzzle, this research suggests that its insistence on avoiding responsibility of Austria in 
Povse, seen in the light of all its earlier case law as cited in this Chapter, makes it very unlikely 
that it would decide otherwise in a future case. Once again, this shows the difficulty with 
applying the Bosphorus approach to the cross-border context. 
The conclusion of the foregoing must be as follows. The message from Povse is that the ECtHR 
would be very reluctant to find fault with the system for fundamental rights protection as it is 
devised by the Brussels II bis Regulation. It has shown that it finds the division of tasks, 
whereby procedural protection is concentrated with the court of origin, while the court of 
enforcement has a purely executive function, is in conformity with the Convention. The court 
of enforcement is exempted from responsibility under the CJEU because it is implementing 
EU law, and because it has no discretion. The only thing which could upset this balance is if 
there would be a manifest deficiency in the sense of an obvious misinterpretation of a 
Convention right by the CJEU in a preliminary ruling requested by the court of enforcement. 
This is a theoretical possibility, made even more unlikely by the fact that it is questionable 
whether the court of enforcement has a duty to request a preliminary ruling at all. It is difficult 
to imagine the ECtHR holding the court of enforcement accountable as a result of a deficiency 
in a preliminary ruling which it was not even required to request. This is reinforced by the 
general impression that the ECtHR performs a very marginal review of the circumstances that 
could give rise to a manifest deficiency in each particular case, as well as the fact that the 
burden of proof lies with the applicant. This research finds that Besselink’s conclusion that the 
ECtHR would be very unlikely to find a manifest deficiency seems convincing.130 The concept 
of ‘manifest deficiency’ should perhaps be seen as an insurance against a theoretical dramatic 
future decrease in the EU’s adherence to fundamental rights, the proverbial ‘emergency brake’ 
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without which there would be a blanket presumption that the EU will always protect 
fundamental rights adequately; rather than a realistic, legally testable concept. 
 
5.5 The Bosphorus doctrine after European Union accession to the 
European Convention on Human Rights 
 
As explained, the Bosphorus doctrine arose from the ECtHR’s limited ability to review state 
actions flowing from their membership in the EU. As discussed in the context of Matthews, the 
ECtHR recognised that it would be difficult for states to reconcile their membership of 
international organisations such as the EU with their obligations under the ECHR. The 
Bosphorus doctrine is the ECtHR’s way of reconciling these two interests. Essentially, 
however, the Bosphorus doctrine stemmed from the ECtHR’s inability to review the 
compatibility of EU legislation with the ECHR. The ECtHR acknowledged that, because the 
EU was not a party to the ECHR, individuals had no recourse to the ECtHR if their fundamental 
rights had been violated as a result of the application of EU law. It therefore invented the 
‘equivalence test’ to establish whether fundamental rights were adequately protected within the 
EU legal system, which in turn is a precondition for the presumption of Convention compliance 
conferred on Member States when they apply EU law. 
This compromise would have been resolved by the accession of the EU to the ECHR, which 
has been on the agenda since 1994.131 At that time, an opinion from the CJEU on the legality 
of such accession (Opinion 2/94) found that the EU lacked the legal capacity to accede. With 
the Treaty of Lisbon, the TEU was amended to include Article 6(2): 
The Union shall accede to the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights 
and Fundamental Freedoms. Such accession shall not affect the Union’s competences as 
defined in the Treaties. 
The EU and the Council of Europe reached a Draft Accession Agreement,132 which again was 
scrutinised by the CJEU. In Opinion 2/13,133 the CJEU declared the Draft Accession 
Agreement incompatible with the EU’s constitutional framework. Extensive discussion of the 
Opinion can be found elsewhere.134 For the context of civil justice cooperation, it is noteworthy 
                                                 
 
131 See for a discussion Jacqué (2011).  
132 Draft revised agreement on the accession of the European Union to the Convention for the Protection of 
Fundamental Rights and Freedoms, 47+1(2013)008rev2, available at 
http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/standardsetting/hrpolicy/Accession/Working_documents_en.asp. See Gragl (2014); 
Lock (2012); Lock (2010b); Raba (2013). 
133 Opinion 2/13 of the Court (Full Court) of 18 December 2014, ECLI:EU:C:2014:2454. 
134 Barnard, C., Opinion 2/13 on EU accession to the ECHR: looking for the silver lining?, 16-02-2015, at 
http://www.eulawanalysis.blogspot.nl (last accessed 29/01/2016); Krommendijk, Beijer and Van Rossem 
(2015); Buyse, CJEU Rules: Draft Agreement on EU Accession to ECHR Incompatible with EU Law, 20-12-
2014, at http://www.echrblog.blogspot.com (last accessed 29-01-2016).  
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that one of the reasons for the incompatibility was the perceived risk that accession would 
undermine the functioning of mutual recognition. 
The CJEU observed that the functioning of many instruments of EU law (including those on 
civil justice cooperation) rely on the existence and application of common fundamental rights 
standards, which Member States may not override on the basis of their own constitutional 
fundamental rights standards. This means that when fundamental rights standards are 
exclusively governed by EU law, Member States may not apply their own higher standards 
instead, as that would negatively affect the effectiveness of those instruments. The CJEU 
observed that Article 53 of the ECHR allows its Contracting Parties to apply higher standards 
than provided for in the ECHR; the ECHR contains only minimum standards. This, according 
to the CJEU, could potentially jeopardize the primacy of EU fundamental rights standards and 
thereby diminish EU legislation’s effectiveness (para. 189).  
The Court also observed that the principle of mutual trust prohibits EU Member States from 
checking, when implementing EU legislation, whether other EU Member States in fact 
protected fundamental rights. The CJEU expressed concern that mutual trust would be 
undermined if the EU was to be treated as every other Contracting Party after accession: it 
would disregard that in cases of mutual recognition, states’ relations between each other are 
governed by EU law, to the exclusion of every other law. According to the CJEU, the ECHR 
could potentially require EU Member States to check each other’s observance of fundamental 
rights, thereby undermining cooperation on the basis of mutual trust (para. 194). 
It is interesting to observe that the balance between mutual recognition and Member States’ 
fundamental rights obligations is such a sensitive issue that the risk of it being upset by the 
EU’s accession was found to be a reason to advise against accession. It is doubtful whether the 
CJEU’s objections are valid.135 For one, Article 53 ECHR only allows Contracting Parties to 
apply higher standards than those proscribed by the ECHR; it never obliges them to apply such 
standards. The CJEU’s first argument seems therefore to be based on a misinterpretation of 
Article 53. Secondly, if indeed the ECtHR were to find certain instances of the operation of 
mutual recognition incompatible with provisions of the ECHR, then this is simply inherent to 
the external control that accession is intended to achieve. If the EU accedes, it is with the 
purpose of opening itself up to external scrutiny as to EU actions’ compatibility with 
fundamental rights. It is incompatible with that purpose to require that the risk that certain 
instruments may be found incompatible with the ECHR is excluded from the outset. It is clear 
from this element of Opinion 2/13 that the CJEU is not prepared to jeopardise the functioning 
of mutual recognition in any way. In fact, it has been questioned whether after Opinion 2/13, 
and the case law on which it relies, the ECtHR can still hold that the EU offers ‘equivalent 
protection’ to the ECHR, given its near-absolute application of mutual recognition.136 
 
                                                 
 
135 See also Krommendijk, Beijer and Van Rossem (2015) paras. 7-11. 
136 Mole (2016).  
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5.6 Conclusion 
 
The conclusions of the ECtHR’s application of the Bosphorus test in Povse should be drawn 
separately for two different actors. First, it is considered what conditions Povse imposes on EU 
regulations that seek to facilitate free movement of civil judgments. Secondly, Povse also 
imposes obligations on national courts or authorities asked to enforce a judgment on the basis 
on one of these regulations. 
 
5.6.1 Conclusions for legislation 
 
For any future legislative initiatives that seek to facilitate free movement of judgments, the 
message seems simple: the abolition of exequatur and of refusal grounds, whereby the 
enforcing Member State loses all discretion to evaluate the enforcement with regard to the 
protection of Convention rights, is allowed by the ECHR. This conclusion is based on two 
arguments: firstly, the abolition of exequatur and refusal grounds in the view of the ECtHR 
merely means that the responsibility to observe fundamental rights is concentrated with the 
court of origin of the judgment, remedied if necessary by recourse to the ECtHR; this means 
that the absence of cross-border control is unproblematic. Secondly, the abolition of exequatur 
is allowed because it is achieved within the framework of the EU, which as an organisation 
adequately protects fundamental rights; and also because the enforcing state has absolutely no 
discretion where exequatur and refusal grounds are completely abolished. Additionally, it can 
be inferred from the decision that the existence of minimum requirements is an additional 
guarantee, in the view of the ECtHR, that fundamental rights are adequately protected. 
The conclusions for legislation are the following. First, while the enforcing state may be 
exempt from scrutiny, the responsibility lies with the court of origin. This means that the 
procedures in the state of origin, up to and including the certification for enforcement, are 
subject to scrutiny by the ECtHR. That the ECtHR will indeed carry out such scrutiny is 
exemplified by the Šneersone and Kampanella judgment. Essentially, the state of origin will 
be held accountable by the ECtHR for any violations committed in the context of the 
application of an EU Regulation where it applies any discretion. While Šneersone and 
Kampanella shows the consequences of this conclusion for the Brussels II bis Regulation, it 
also needs to be considered what this means for the ‘second-generation’ instruments of the 
European Small Claims Procedure (ESCP), European Order for Payment (EOP), and European 
Enforcement Order for uncontested claims (EEO) Regulations.  
Essentially, the ESCP and EOP Regulations are intended to function in the same way as 
equivalent national procedures. The authorities in the Member State which has jurisdiction are 
therefore responsible for safeguarding the procedural rights of the parties in the same way as 
they would be if the procedure were entirely governed by national law; as the ECtHR decided 
in Cantoni, where there is discretion the ECtHR will review the state’s conduct in accordance 
with the ECHR. Aside from the ECtHR’s case law, this conclusion is also supported by the 
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Recitals to the ESCP Regulation, which affirm that the “court or tribunal should respect the 
right to a fair trial and the principle of an adversarial process”.137 Moreover, these Regulations 
quite clearly require the relevant court or tribunal to make a great number of discretionary 
decisions, the most obvious of which is the decision to issue a EOP or to deliver a judgment as 
the result of a ESCP. 
For the EEO, the conclusion is essentially the same: responsibility before the ECtHR lies with 
the courts of the Member State which has jurisdiction, because the Regulation requires the 
court or tribunal to decide on such things as whether the claim for which an EEO is requested 
is indeed uncontested (Art. 6 of the EEO Regulation), or whether the minimum requirements 
of Chapter III of that Regulation have been complied with. 
The consequence of these conclusions is that when Regulations abolish exequatur and refusal 
grounds, and therefore in essence concentrate the responsibility with the state of origin of the 
decision or judgment, the procedures on the basis of which this state reaches its decision or 
judgment should themselves conform to the ECHR. This is not an especially surprising 
conclusion, and the European legislature was clearly aware of it: the three Regulations each 
pledge adherence to fundamental rights in their Recitals, and they contain procedural 
guarantees in their operative clauses. Whether these guarantees are indeed sufficient to satisfy 
the ECtHR can only really be proven if they become the subject of an application before the 
ECtHR against the Member State who applied them. In any case, it is clear that this Member 
State will be responsible under the ECHR. 
Conversely, if it is the intention of the European legislature to concentrate responsibility with 
the state of origin, while shielding the state of enforcement from having to answer to the 
ECtHR, then it is necessary that no discretion be left to the enforcing state. As was explained 
in Section 5.4.5, the existing Regulations appear to fulfil this requirement. The legislature is 
therefore well advised to apply the same formula to future Regulations that seek to facilitate 
free movement. 
As to the Court’s review of the specific guarantees offered in the Regulations at issue, the 
picture is unclear. On one hand, case law shows that the ECtHR generally has trust in the 
guarantees offered in the EU system as such, without looking specifically at the legislation in 
question. Strictly speaking, for the presumption of compliance of Bosphorus to apply, it is not 
necessary that the Regulation in question contains adequate safeguards (though of course this 
does matter with regard to the responsibilities of the court of origin, see above). However, in 
Povse the ECtHR does point to the minimum requirements of Article 42 of Brussels II bis, 
presumably to substantiate its finding that the abolition of exequatur and refusal grounds is not 
problematic with regard to the ECHR. While it only referred to this at the “discretion” stage of 
its examination (see Section 5.4.3, above), this could nevertheless be seen as a sign that the 
ECtHR considers the existence of minimum requirements if not a precondition for the abolition 
of exequatur and refusal grounds, then at least a sign that fundamental rights are properly 
                                                 
 
137 ESCP Recital 9; such an affirmation of absent from the EOP Regulation. 
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protected. The legislature could therefore be well-advised to include in any future Regulations 
minimum standards which need to be examined prior to certification, such as Article 42 of the 
Brussels II bis Regulation or those contained in Chapter III of the EEO Regulation. It should 
be noted, however, that these minimum standards perform a different function to those 
incorporated into the ESCP and EOP Regulations. While under the Brussels II bis Regulation 
and the EEO Regulation, the minimum standards need to be checked after the delivery of the 
judgment but prior to certification of the judgment as enforceable, under the ESCP and EOP 
Regulations they do not circumscribe the permission for enforcement, but the procedure as a 
whole. However, if the ECtHR applies the same approach when it is faced with a question 
concerning the responsibility of the enforcing Member State under the ESCP or EOP as it did 
for the Brussels II bis Regulation, it stands to reason that it would also look favourably on the 
inclusion of procedural safeguards. To sum up, while the Povse decision does not give rise to 
a requirement that minimum standards be incorporated into the Regulations, the inclusion of 
minimum standards is nevertheless advisable. 
What is also important to emphasize here is that the ECtHR did not consider it a problem that 
the guarantees of Article 42 of Brussels II bis could not be invoked by the parties concerned. 
It is merely the existence of the requirements that is of importance for the finding that the 
enforcing state enjoys immunity. From the perspective of the state of enforcement, the 
justiciability of the minimum standards is therefore of no concern – though it is for the state of 
origin. 
In essence, what the ECtHR said in Povse is the mirror image of what it said in Šneersone and 
Kampanella. Where a regulation allows complete free movement, it is the state of origin which 
is held accountable (Šneersone and Kampanella); the enforcing state is exempted from 
accountability (Povse). This means that the European legislature should be very careful to 
abolish exequatur and refusal grounds completely, with no discretion for the state of 
enforcement, while at the same time making sure that the regulation at issue provide the state 
of origin with sufficient means to ensure that a fair trial is conducted. 
5.6.2 Conclusions for enforcing courts or authorities 
 
For the court or authority responsible for enforcement in the absence of exequatur or refusal 
grounds, the most troublesome element of the Court’s conclusions in Povse is surely whether, 
and if so how, it should refer preliminary questions to the CJEU. Up until Povse, the ECtHR 
was quite clear on this point:138 where a CJEU ruling was considered necessary, a state whose 
courts nevertheless failed to request such a ruling would be held responsible under the ECHR, 
because it would have acted “without the full potential of the relevant international machinery 
for supervising fundamental rights – in principle equivalent to that of the Convention – having 
                                                 
 
138 See under 5.4.3. 
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been deployed”.139 Povse however muddled the waters. It seemed to imply that the Austrian 
court was indeed required to refer preliminary questions,140 yet did not consider it a problem 
that those questions did not concern the fundamental rights questions. With Povse, the ECtHR 
has therefore left national enforcing authorities with a great deal of uncertainty as to their 
obligations. However, the message of Povse is also clearly that the ECtHR approves of the 
abolition of exequatur and refusal grounds, and it clearly avoided giving any indication that the 
enforcing state could be held liable. Perhaps the ECtHR’s insistence that the Austrian Supreme 
Court “duly” made use of the preliminary ruling mechanism should therefore not so much be 
seen as an affirmation of Austria’s obligation, but as a compliment for the trouble the Austrian 
Supreme Court took in referring preliminary questions despite not being obliged to. 
It should also be emphasised that, whatever the legal basis for it, recognition or enforcement 
of a judgment that violates ECHR rights in principle constitutes a separate violation under the 
ECHR. This follows from Pellegrini and from Avotins (for intra-EU situations). This 
conclusion however also follows from the principles underlying the ECHR, which is that each 
Contracting State bears responsibility to protect fundamental rights ‘to everyone within their 
jurisdiction’ (Art. 1). Even in situations where the obligation to recognise or enforce a foreign 
judgment flows from EU legislation, the state where recognition or enforcement is sought is 
not passive; a decision is always necessary to import a foreign judgment into the legal order. 
The State addressed is not a passive ‘accessory’ to the violation that already occurred.141 Povse-
type cases, where any discretion to decide on the recognition or enforcement of foreign 
judgments has been removed from the Member State addressed, are the exception. 
5.6.3 Final remarks 
 
Without repeating what has already been said, the Povse decision is an example of the 
remarkable degree of deference with which the ECtHR treats the application of the law of the 
EU by its Member States. This is exemplified by the very general and abstract test it deploys 
for declaring the EU’s system of fundamental rights protection equivalent to that of the 
Convention. In fact, Povse shows how this assessment has become nearly automatic: the 
ECtHR merely cited previous case law, pointing to its finding in those previous cases that the 
EU system was previously considered equivalent, and left it at that. Furthermore, the ECtHR’s 
deference is also shown in its efforts to avoid the impression that the immunity of the enforcing 
state could ever be rebutted: especially the inconsistent application of the preliminary ruling 
requirement and the illogical discussion of the minimum requirements should be mentioned 
here. Both elements of the Court’s reasoning only really make sense when seen as an attempt 
to avoid criticizing the abolition of exequatur and refusal grounds and implying the 
accountability of the enforcing state in that context. 
                                                 
 
139 ECtHR Michaud. 
140 See under 5.4.4. 
141 See Vonken (1993) p. 172; Oster (2015) p. 564. 
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The only real mystery remains when, if ever, a manifest deficiency would be considered to 
have occurred. The ECtHR has so far never found a manifest deficiency to exist, and that it has 
never positively defined the concept in its case law. We are therefore left with the authoritative, 
but non-binding, concurring opinion of Judge Ress on this point, as well as with a number of 
rulings in which the ECtHR gave some indications as to what is not considered a manifest 
deficiency. Even more complicated is the question of what a manifest deficiency would entail 
in the cross-border context. It seems very unlikely that a manifest deficiency will be found in 
the cross-border context, because that would lead to the enforcing state being held accountable, 
which is a conclusion the ECtHR clearly wanted to avoid. Unfortunately, therefore, we are not 
closer to discovering what a manifest deficiency would entail; though perhaps this should read 
“fortunately”, since the finding of a manifest deficiency would mean a grave defect in the 
system of protection of fundamental rights within the EU had occurred. 
Finally, it is as of yet unclear what precisely the consequences of the EU’s accession to the 
ECHR will be, if ever it accedes. There are two elements to this question which are of particular 
importance: the division of responsibilities between the Member States and the Union, 
particularly when those Member States act under the principle of mutual recognition; and 
secondly, the level of scrutiny that the EU’s legislation will be subject to. 
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6 Free movement of civil judgments and European Union 
fundamental rights law 
 
6.1 Introduction 
 
The previous Chapter analysed to what extent the European Convention on Human Rights 
(ECHR) places limitations on the application of European Union (EU) law and on mutual 
recognition in particular. It showed that EU Member States are required to respect the ECHR 
when they apply EU law, and that they are presumed to have acted in compliance with the 
ECHR if they have no discretion in this regard, which is often the case in the context of mutual 
recognition. 
This Chapter analyses the different ways in which EU fundamental rights law circumscribes 
the free movement of judgments. Where Chapter 4 focused on the Court of Justice of the 
European Union’s (CJEU) interpretation of the right to a fair trial as it applies to civil cases, 
this Chapter looks at the bigger picture of the EU’s constitutional and procedural fundamental 
rights framework. Its scope is therefore wider than the specific context of civil justice 
cooperation. 
First, this Chapter discusses how EU fundamental rights law may constrain the powers of the 
European legislature and the application of EU legislation (Section 6.2). It looks at the function 
of fundamental rights in the EU legal order, including the application of the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights of the European Union (EU CFR)1 by the CJEU. It is shown that the EU 
has expressed a clear commitment to the protection of fundamental rights, and that the CJEU 
has repeatedly held the institutions accountable for this commitment by reviewing the 
conformity of EU legislation with fundamental rights. This has happened in the context of 
mutual recognition, such as in the NS and ME and Others judgment where the CJEU held that 
concerns as to the fundamental rights situation in one Member State could limit the application 
of mutual recognition. Section 6.3 discusses this case and its implications for civil justice 
cooperation. It shows that while the EU has expressed a clear commitment to fundamental 
rights, it can be questioned whether fundamental rights have in fact so far acted as a constraint 
on EU legislative and executive action, especially in the context of mutual recognition.  
At the same time, EU fundamental rights are not merely capable of constraining the application 
of EU legislation: fundamental rights standards are also used as a way of ensuring EU 
legislation’s effectiveness and as a tool to further implement mutual recognition. The CJEU’s 
judgment in Melloni shows that where fundamental rights standards have been harmonised in 
secondary legislation, Member States may not impose higher national fundamental rights 
                                                 
 
1 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, OJ C 326/391, 2012. 
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standards to the detriment of the legislation’s effectiveness. Since EU civil justice regulations 
often contain harmonised fundamental rights standards, the Melloni judgment is highly 
relevant. Section 6.4 discusses the implications of this judgment for mutual recognition in the 
field of civil justice. It is concluded that, where fundamental rights standards in EU legislation 
are intended to be maximum standards, the EU legislature has a responsibility to ensure that 
these standards are sufficient to safeguard EU citizens’ fundamental rights. 
 
6.2 Protection of fundamental rights in the European Union legal 
order 
 
This section discusses how fundamental rights gradually became part of the EU legal order, a 
process that culminated in the adoption of the EU CFR. With the elevation of the EU CFR to 
the level of the Treaties in 2009, fundamental rights gained a central role in the EU legal order, 
and conformity with fundamental rights is now a clear condition for the legality of EU 
measures. The following sections further explain how fundamental rights play a role in the 
application of EU law. Section 6.2.1 discusses the substantive aspect of this question. Sections 
6.2.2 and 6.2.3, respectively, discuss how fundamental rights should be protected by the EU’s 
multi-level judicial system, which comprises the Member States’ courts as well as the EU 
judicial institutions. 
 
6.2.1 The position of fundamental rights in EU law 
 
Originally, the constitutional treaties of the EU contained no provisions for the protection of 
fundamental rights. However, the CJEU developed an unwritten catalogue of fundamental 
rights in its case law.2 As such, fundamental rights became part of what are called the general 
principles of EU law.3 
The CJEU laid the foundation for this development with its judgment in Internationale 
Handelsgesellschaft, in which the CJEU accepted that while national fundamental rights could 
not override Community law, fundamental rights nevertheless formed an integral part of the 
general principles of law protected by the Court of Justice.4 In later case law, the CJEU 
emphasized that it would draw inspiration from the national constitutional traditions of the 
                                                 
 
2 Craig and de Bùrca (2015) 384-390; Lawson (2005) p. 232-234; Douglas-Scott (2006b). 
3 Apart from fundamental rights, these encompass such principles as proportionality, subsidiarity, effectiveness 
(and/or loyal cooperation) and national procedural autonomy. See among others Tridimas (2006); Bernitz, 
Nergelius and Cardner (2008) ; Ehlers (2007). 
4 Case 11-70 Internationale Handelsgesellschaft mbH v Einfuhr- und Vorratsstelle für Getreide und Futtermittel 
ECLI:EU:C:1970:114.  
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Member States, international human rights treaties,5 and the ECHR.6 In Stauder, it confirmed 
that these rights could be binding on the Member States if they acted in the implementation of 
EU law.7 Initially, fundamental rights, and the right to a fair trial in particular, can be said to 
have played an instrumental role to the effective implementation of EU law and to have 
facilitated integration. For example, in Johnston, the CJEU developed the idea of an EU right 
to effective judicial protection, but did so as an aspect of the effective application of EU law.8 
The CJEU did, however, affirm that the right to effective judicial review constituted a general 
principle of law recognized in the constitutional traditions common to the Member States and 
in the ECHR that must therefore be taken into consideration in Community law.9 Building on 
that ruling, in Heylens, the CJEU proclaimed that such judicial control encompassed a duty for 
institutions applying EU law to give reasons for their decisions, to allow the person concerned 
to defend himself.10  
Early on, the CJEU began to refer to the ECHR as an additional basis for its fundamental rights 
pronouncements. In Nold, it affirmed its “special status” as a source of inspiration for its 
fundamental rights jurisprudence.11 It first directly cited the ECHR in Rutili,12 and it has 
continued to do so ever since. However, it treated the ECHR as a source of inspiration, rather 
than as a binding source of law, giving its own autonomous interpretation to certain 
fundamental rights in order to safeguard the goals and values of the EU. This resulted in 
divergent interpretations of certain rights, for example on the right to remain silent,13 and the 
right to privacy of business premises,14 both in competition cases. 
The special status of the ECHR in EU law was affirmed by the inclusion of Article 6(3) in the 
Treaty on European Union (TEU) by the Treaty of Lisbon. This Article provides that 
“fundamental rights, as guaranteed by the European Convention of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms […] shall constitute general principles of the Union’s law.” This 
                                                 
 
5 CJEU Case 43-75 Defrenne, ECLI:EU:C:1976:56.  
6 See, eg, Case 4/73 Nold v Commission, ECLI:EU:C:1974:51; Case 44/79 Hauer v Land Rheinland-Pfalz, 
ECLI:EU:C:1979:290; Case C-235/99 The Queen v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex p Kondova 
ECLI:EU:C:2001:489; Case C-25/02 Rinke v Arztekammer Hamburg ECLI:EU:C:2003:435; Cases C-465/00, 
138 and 139/01 Rechsnungshof v Österreichischer Rundfunk and others, ECLI:EU:C:2003:294. 
7 CJEU Case 29-69 Stauder ECLI:EU:C:1969:57. 
8 CJEU Case 222-84 Johnston ECLI:EU:C:1986:206, para. 19. 
9 CJEU Johnston para. 18. 
10 CJEU Case 222/86 Heylens, ECLI:EU:C:1987:442 para. 15 
11 CJEU Case 4/73 Nold v Commission, ECLI:EU:C:1974:51. 
12 CJEU Case 36-75 Rutili, ECLI:EU:C:1975:137. 
13 Compare the CJEU’s judgment in Case C-374/87 Orkem, ECLI:EU:C:1989:387, with the ECtHR’s ruling in 
Saunders v. United Kingdom, 19187/91 ECHR 1996-VI. See Callewaert (2009) p. 775. 
14 Compare the CJEU’s judgment in Joined Cases 46/87 and 227/88 Hoechst, ECLI:EU:C:1989:337, with that of 
the ECtHR in Niemietz v. Germany, appl. no. 13710/88; however, the CJEU has now revised its provision (see 
CJEU Case C-94/00 Roquette Frères, ECLI:EU:C:2002:603).  
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provision has clarified the position of the ECHR in the EU legal order. The influence of the 
ECHR and the case law from the ECtHR has however been radically altered by the EU CFR.  
The EU CFR changed the system of fundamental rights protection within the EU by codifying 
all these developments. It entered into force in 2001, but was only elevated to the same legal 
status as the Treaties with the ratification of the Treaty of Lisbon in 2009.15 The implications 
of the EU CFR have inspired a wealth of literature.16  
With their inclusion in the EU CFR, and by virtue of Article 6(1) TEU, fundamental rights 
became part of EU primary law. The EU CFR is intended to codify – though not replace – those 
fundamental rights that were already developed as general principles of EU law.17 With the EU 
CFR, the EU has a clear canon of fundamental rights that apply within its legal order. Equally 
importantly, Article 52(3) of the EU CFR essentially incorporated the ECHR into the EU legal 
order by providing that those CFR rights that correspond to ECHR rights shall be interpreted 
in the same way as those ECHR rights (though EU law may provide more extensive protection). 
It therefore also clarified the scope and interpretation of fundamental rights in the EU. 
The EU CFR is now the primary source of reference for fundamental rights for EU 
institutions.18 In Otis, the CJEU ruled that since Article 47 of the EU CFR secures protection 
of the right to a fair trial within the EU, it needed to refer only to that Article.19 In such cases, 
the CJEU will however refer to ECtHR case law in order to ensure that the level of protection 
it provides is commensurate to that provided by the ECHR. 
As to the scope of the protection provided by the EU CFR, Article 51 provides that the EU 
CFR is binding both on the Union’s institutions and on its Member States when they implement 
EU law. The term “implementing” in that Article is to be understood as “acting within the 
scope of Union law”,20 and is intended as a codification of the CJEU’s judgments in Wachauf,21 
ERT,22 and Annibaldi.23 Though the limits of the scope of EU law are debated, there is no doubt 
that it includes all situations in which a Member State applies EU legislation, in which it 
                                                 
 
15 See for a discussion of the consequences of the Lisbon Treaty for the application and interpretation of the EU 
CFR Iglesias Sanchez (2012); Leczykiewicz (2010). 
16 Among many others De Vries, Bernitz, Weatherill (2013); Di Federico (2011); Trybus and Rubini (eds.) 
(2012); O’Brien and Koltermann (2013); Peers, Hervey et al. (2016). 
17 EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, Recital 5. 
18 Borowski speaks of a “pragmatic preference”, Borowski (2012) 217; De Visser (2014) p. 42; European 
Commission, Report on the application of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, 2012, COM/2013/0271 final, 
para. 2.3. 
19 CJEU Case C-199/11 Otis, ECLI:EU:C:2012:684, para. 47. 
20 Explanations relating to the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, OJ C 303/17, 2007, p. 32. 
21 Case C-5/88 Hubert Wachauf v Bundesamt für Ernährung und Forstwirtschaft, ECLI:EU:C:1989:321. 
22 C-260/89 Elliniki Radiophonia Tiléorassi AE and Panellinia Omospondia Syllogon Prossopikou v Dimotiki 
Etairia Pliroforissis and Sotirios Kouvelas and Nicolaos Avdellas and others (ERT v DEP) 
ECLI:EU:C:1991:254. 
23 C-309/96 Daniele Annibaldi v Sindaco del Comune di Guidonia and Presidente Regione Lazio, 
ECLI:EU:C:1997:631 
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effectively acts as an agent of the Union.24 The foregoing leads to the conclusion that when 
Member States apply one of the regulations in the field of civil procedure, they are bound to 
respect the EU CFR. Situations cannot exist which are covered by EU law without the 
fundamental rights of the EU CFR being applicable, as the CJEU affirmed in Åkerberg 
Fransson.25 
 
6.2.2 The Member States courts’ task in the protection of EU CFR rights 
 
It is clear that fundamental rights have achieved constitutional status in the EU. This means 
that Member States are required to respect EU fundamental rights, including the EU CFR, when 
they apply EU legislation.26 How Member State courts should do this in practice depends on 
the degree of discretion that the provision of secondary EU law leaves to the Member State. 
When there is no discretion, the only way for a national court to avoid having to apply the 
provision in such a way as to harm EU fundamental rights would be to declare it inapplicable 
or invalid. When there is discretion, CJEU case law shows that it is for the national court to 
interpret the provision in such a way as to avoid results that are incompatible with fundamental 
rights.27 The CJEU has ruled that when Member States have discretion under EU law, they 
should respect the EU CFR, but it is their responsibility to interpret and if necessary set aside 
national norms in such a way as to ensure effective application of EU law, including the EU 
CFR. As the Court ruled in Åkerberg Fransson:28  
45 As regards, next, the conclusions to be drawn by a national court from a conflict 
between provisions of domestic law and rights guaranteed by the EU CFR, it is settled 
case-law that a national court which is called upon, within the exercise of its 
jurisdiction, to apply provisions of European Union law is under a duty to give full 
effect to those provisions, if necessary refusing of its own motion to apply any 
conflicting provision of national legislation, even if adopted subsequently, and it is not 
necessary for the court to request or await the prior setting aside of such a provision by 
legislative or other constitutional means. 
The Court added that a Member State court may in such cases, if necessary, request clarification 
from the CJEU as to the interpretation of the provision of EU law at issue.29 
As for the first situation, the following must be considered. It is a well-established doctrine of 
EU law that only the CJEU may declare Union law invalid for reasons of incompatibility with 
some other legal principle; national courts may not do so.30 It was already discussed that many 
                                                 
 
24 Besselink (2001) p. 77. 
25 CJEU Case C-617/10 Åklagaren v. Hans Åkerberg Fransson, ECLI:EU:C:2013:280, para. 21.  
26 CJEU Åkerberg Fransson.  
27 CJEU Case C-101/01 Criminal proceedings against Bodil Lindqvist, ECLI:EU:C:2003:596. 
28 See for comments Fierstra (2014); Fontanelli (2013); Hancox (2013); Veenbrink and De Waele (2013); Swarcz 
(2014). 
29 CJEU Åkerberg Fransson, para. 47. 
30 Craig and De Bùrca (2015) p 475-6; CJEU Case 314/85 Foto-Frost, ECLI:EU:C:1987:452, para. 15. 
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instruments of EU legislation in the field of civil procedure leave no discretion to the national 
authorities; the enforcement of return orders under Articles 41 and 42 of Brussels II bis or of 
judgments rendered under the European Small Claims Procedure (ESCP) or European Order 
for Payment (EOP) Regulations are good examples. In such cases, if a national court believed 
that enforcement would be contrary to a fundamental right (whatever its source), the only way 
for that court to refuse enforcement would be to find EU law inapplicable or invalid, because 
there would be no room to interpret the rules in accordance with fundamental rights. This, 
however, is an exclusive competence of the CJEU. In its Foto-Frost judgment, the CJEU held 
that, “where the validity of a Community act is challenged before a national court the power to 
declare the act invalid must also be reserved to the Court of Justice.”31 
While it is therefore possible that EU legislation on the enforcement of judgments could be 
contrary to EU fundamental rights, national courts would not have the power to declare such 
legislation invalid.32 Again, if there is no discretion and therefore no room for the court to 
interpret the obligations arising out of this legislation in accordance with fundamental rights,33 
this means that courts must make a preliminary reference to the CJEU to receive a ruling on 
the validity of EU legislation. This is especially important when it comes to the automatic 
enforcement (without refusal grounds) provided for in the ESCP, EOP, European Enforcement 
Order for uncontested claims (EEO), Maintenance, and Brussels II bis Regulations. A national 
court may not by itself decide not to invalidate such legislation for reasons of nonconformity 
with the EU CFR.34  
In practice it may be difficult for courts to distinguish where EU legislation requires them to 
take measures to protect fundamental rights. It is not always obvious where EU legislation 
allows Member States discretion and where it does not. For the context of free movement of 
civil judgments, this is shown by the eco cosmetics/Raiffeisenbank case.35 This case deals with 
the consequences that should be attached to a failure to serve an EOP on the debtor. The EOP 
Regulation is an instrument that relies heavily on the uniform application of harmonised 
procedural standards in order to safeguard its effectiveness. It contains very few remedies, one 
of which is review where an EOP was served in the correct manner, but too late for the 
                                                 
 
31 CJEU Foto-Frost para. 17. 
32 It has nevertheless been questioned whether Member State courts should be given this power: Leczykiewicz 
(2010); Sarmiento, R., (2013). 
33 Where there is room for interpretation, it is for the authorities and courts of the Member States not only to 
interpret their national law in a manner consistent with Directive 95/46 but also to make sure they do not rely on 
an interpretation of it which would be in conflict with the fundamental rights protected by the Community legal 
order; CJEU Lindqvist, para. 87. 
34 The only exception to this rule is that the CJEU has allowed national courts to temporarily suspend the 
application of EU legislation during the preliminary ruling procedure, but only under certain conditions: CJEU 
Joined Cases C-134/88 and C-92/89 Zuckerfabrik, ECLI:EU:C:1991:65, para. 33. 
35 CJEU Joined cases C-119/13 and C-120/13 eco cosmetics GmbH & Co. KG v Virginie Laetitia Barbara 
Dupuy and Raiffeisenbank St. Georgen reg. Gen. mbH v Tetyana Bonchyk, ECLI:EU:C:2014:2144. See also 
8.5.1. 
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defendant to object to it.36 In eco cosmetics/Raiffeisenbank, the EOP had not been served on 
the debtor at all. The referring court asked whether it could apply the remedy of review by 
analogy. The CJEU however ruled that review would be an inappropriate remedy, since an 
EOP that was never served on the defendant should not have become enforceable at all; it could 
not therefore be reviewed but should be seen as invalid.37 According to the CJEU it would be 
incompatible with the rights of the defence (it did not refer to the EU CFR). In such a case, the 
Member State must provide a remedy under national law. 
What is difficult here is that the EOP Regulation, like the ECSP Regulation, is intended to 
provide a complete procedure for cross-border debt recovery, which is applied uniformly across 
the Member States. It contained no remedies for cases where an EOP was not served on the 
defendant, which was a clear legal vacuum created by the European legislature.38 With its 
judgment in eco cosmetics/Raiffeisenbank, the CJEU places on Member States the 
responsibility to fill these kinds of gaps in EU legislation where necessary for the protection of 
the right to a fair trial. It is not surprising however that the referring court did not foresee this 
and instead asked whether it could apply a remedy already present in the Regulation by 
analogy. Because the effectiveness of the EOP relies largely on its uniform application, this 
suggests that the Regulation contains a closed system of legal remedies, which clearly it does 
not. Even a uniform Regulation such as the EOP, which relies heavily on harmonised norms 
and appears to leave little discretion to the Member States, may thus at times require Member 
State courts to supplement its fundamental rights protection. The distinction between situations 
where Member States enjoy discretion, and in which they are responsible for application of EU 
law in conformity with fundamental rights, and situations in which they are not, is therefore 
not as clear-cut as it may seem. 
 
6.2.3 The role of the CJEU in the protection of EU fundamental rights  
 
The obligation for national courts and authorities to respect the EU CFR rights means that, 
when they are faced with a choice between applying provisions of secondary EU law and 
thereby infringing EU CFR rights, or disregard EU law, they must first seek a preliminary 
ruling from the CJEU, which will then review the provision’s compatibility with the EU CFR. 
This is illustrated by the case of Volker and Schecke.39 In this case the Court ruled that Member 
States’ obligations to publish information about the beneficiaries of agricultural subsidies were 
                                                 
 
36 Article 20(1) EOP Regulation.  
37 CJEU eco cosmetics/Raiffeisenbank, para. 48. 
38 View of Advocate General Bot, delivered on 9 April 2014, Joined Cases C 119/13 to C 121/13 eco cosmetics 
GmbH & Co. KG (C 119/13) v Virginie Laetitia Barbara Dupuy, Raiffeisenbank St. Georgen reg. Gen. mbH (C 
120/13) v Tetyana Bonchyk and Rechtsanwaltskanzlei CMS Hasche Sigle, Partnerschaftsgesellschaft (C 121/13) 
v Xceed Holding Ltd, ECLI:EU:C:2014:248, para. 45. 
39 CJEU Case C-172/91 Volker Sonntag v Hans Waidmann, ECLI:EU:C:1993:144. 
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incompatible with the right to privacy of those beneficiaries, as protected by Article 8 of the 
EU CFR. The case is illustrative of the framework for fundamental rights protection that the 
EU CFR created. The rules in question very specifically prescribed the information that needed 
to be published by the Member States, and therefore left no discretion. The referring national 
court, being of the opinion that the rules regarding publication breached the right to privacy, 
had no room for interpretation, and therefore requested a preliminary ruling from the CJEU to 
confirm this view. The CJEU decided that the rules indeed interfered with the right to privacy 
in a disproportional way, and declared the rules invalid.40 
The CJEU has therefore clearly shown itself to be prepared to review secondary EU legislation 
as to its compatibility with the EU CFR.41 This is encouraging, because European citizens will 
need to rely on the protection provided by the CJEU when they challenge EU legislation that 
leaves no discretion to the Member State that applied it. 
The roles of the CJEU and the Member State courts as regards the protection of EU CFR rights 
are therefore complementary.42 It has always been an important feature of the judicial system 
of the EU that national courts essentially become EU courts when they apply EU law, a task in 
which they are supervised and supported by the CJEU. National courts are bound, by virtue of 
the obligation of loyalty laid down in Article 4(3) TEU, to give full effect to EU law, which 
includes the EU CFR. 
It was discussed before that a large number of the instruments of EU civil procedure law are 
designed to limit the discretion of the Member States, relying on mutual recognition, in order 
to achieve greater efficiency in cross-border litigation. It can therefore be concluded that, for 
this category of legislation, the CJEU is the primary protector of fundamental rights, as national 
courts have little discretion. The case of Volker and Schecke shows that the CJEU is certainly 
prepared to review secondary EU legislation and declare it incompatible with the EU CFR. In 
principle, therefore, it is possible that the CJEU will stand in the way of the application of EU 
legislation in the field of civil procedure and the cross-border enforcement of judgments as 
well. 
There are two caveats to this conclusion. The first is that while the CJEU has certainly proved 
itself to be critical as to the compatibility of EU law with fundamental rights (as illustrated by 
                                                 
 
40 CJEU Joined Cases C-92/09 and C-93/09 Volker und Schecke, ECLI:EU:C:2010:662, paras. 86-88. 
41 See also Case C-236/09 Association Belge de Consommateurs Test-Achats ECLI:EU:C:2011:100; De Visser, 
(2014) p. 42. More recently, the CJEU also declared invalid a Commission decision (Case C-362/14 
Maximillian Schrems v Data Protection Commissioner, ECLI:EU:C:2015:650) as well as the Data Retention 
Directive (Joined Cases C-293/12 and C-594/12 Digital Rights Ireland and Seitlinger and Others, 
ECLI:EU:C:2014:238). See, critically, Chalmers and Trotter (2016) p. 9. 
42 Barents (2010) p. 715. 
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Volker and Schecke and the case law discussed in Chapter 4.3) it has not always been critical 
enough, at least not in the view of certain commentators.43 
The second caveat is that while the CJEU has reviewed secondary EU law, it has so far only 
once allowed Member States to refrain from applying EU law and to refuse mutual recognition 
on the basis of concerns about the actual fundamental rights situation in a certain Member 
State. This happened in the case of N.S. and M.E. and others, which is discussed in the next 
section. Mutual recognition, and the mutual trust in each other’s legal systems Member States 
are required to have, are therefore almost absolute in the view of the CJEU. In other words, if 
fundamental rights concerns are not caused by the EU legislation itself, but by the actual 
fundamental rights situation in the Member State of origin, then the CJEU has proved itself to 
be very strict: only in exceptional circumstances are Member States allowed to disregard the 
obligations imposed on them by EU law. This position has become more nuanced with the 
recent judgment in Aranyosi and Căldăraru,44 which concerns the European Arrest Warrant 
(EAW). 
 
These points can be illustrated by Zarraga, discussed in Chapter 3. Though the CJEU was 
asked in Zarraga to rule on the compatibility of the rules for enforcement of return orders with 
Article 24 of the EU CFR (regarding the child’s right to be heard), the Court showed restraint 
in its assessment, essentially ruling in favour of mutual trust and automatic enforcement. As 
discussed in Chapter 3.5, the CJEU applied a very formal logic. It found that since Article 42(2) 
of the Brussels II bis Regulation required the court in the Member State of origin of a judgment 
ordering the return of a child to ascertain whether the child had been given an opportunity to 
be heard, the protection granted by the secondary EU law in question was sufficient. The CJEU 
did not consider the question whether the protection granted by this provision was in fact 
effective, and did not grant the court in the Member State of enforcement any leeway to refuse 
enforcement for that reason.45 
 
The conclusion is that the review conducted by the CJEU of the fundamental rights protection 
granted by secondary EU legislation was very formal in this case. More importantly however, 
this case shows that the compatibility of EU legislation with fundamental rights is not the only 
issue. Sometimes the legislation will in principle conform to fundamental rights standards, but 
it will be the actual application in the Member State of that legislation which is the issue. In 
such cases nothing can be achieved by the Member State of enforcement, as Zarraga shows. 
Peers was therefore right to conclude that the rule of mutual recognition is “near-absolute”.46 
                                                 
 
43 See e.g. the reactions to the CJEU’s judgment in Advocaten voor de Wereld, which was about the European 
Arrest Warrant. The CJEU quite quickly dispensed with the argument that this was contrary to the principle of 
legality of criminal offences and penalties, in a reasoning which has been called “disappointing in its brevity” 
(Raulus (2012) p. 194) “very laconic” (Albi (2010) p. 42) and as making “little effort to engage with its national 
counterparts” (Sarmiento, D. (2008)). CJEU Case C-303/05 Advocaten voor de WereldVZW v Leden van de 
Ministerraad, ECLI:EU:C:2007:261. 
44 Joined Cases C-404/15 and C-659/15 PPU Pál Aranyosi and Robert Căldăraru ECLI:EU:C:2016:198. 
45 See under 3.5. 
46 Peers (2011) p. 693. 
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The N.S. and M.E. and others and Aranyosi and Căldăraru cases discussed in Section 6.3, 
below, show that exceptions to mutual recognition are only possible in very serious 
circumstances. 
 
6.2.4 Conclusion: the system of fundamental rights protection in the EU 
 
The previous sections considered whether fundamental rights in some way limit the free 
movement of judgments within the EU. It was concluded that the EU CFR certainly allows the 
CJEU to exercise control over the compatibility of EU legislation with fundamental rights, but 
that the CJEU has done so only to an extent. While it has acted as a fundamental rights court 
in the cases of Volker und Schecke and Test-Achats, the Zarraga case presents a different 
picture, perhaps because it concerned the compatibility of mutual recognition with fundamental 
rights. The following sections show that the compatibility of mutual recognition with 
fundamental rights has been problematic for the CJEU, and that it has been reticent in its 
examination of this issue. It is not at this point entirely clear what the reason is for this reticence. 
A possible explanation is that the instruments in these fields tend to be the result of complicated 
and intense negotiations, which is certainly true for the EAW and the Brussels II bis 
Regulations, and the CJEU might not consider itself to be in a position to harshly criticize a 
complicated political compromise. This explanation is certainly supported by the CJEU’s 
judgment in Melloni, discussed in Section 6.4, in which the CJEU considered the existence of 
a “European consensus” as a reason not to allow national courts to apply national constitutional 
principles that diverge from this consensus. In this judgment, it also only briefly discussed the 
conformity of the legislation at issue with the ECHR, and did not even address the question 
whether it would be opportune for the EU to provide more extensive protection. It can be 
argued that the CJEU was prepared to find fault with the system of remedies of the EOP 
Regulation in eco cosmetics/Raiffeisenbank, but this case concerned a clear gap in fundamental 
rights protection and may therefore be an anomaly.  
6.3 ‘Systemic deficiencies’ in fundamental rights protection: N.S. 
and M.E. and others 
 
6.3.1 The rule: mutual recognition entails a presumption that fundamental rights 
are protected 
 
It has been repeatedly shown that secondary EU legislation based on the principle of mutual 
recognition requires and supposes mutual trust between the Member States. This mutual trust 
obliges Member States to work on the presumption that their fellow Member States adequately 
uphold fundamental rights or other standards. In many legal instruments, this trust is not blind 
but is based on common (minimum) standards incorporated into the legislative instrument 
concerned. 
 235 
 
This phenomenon and its implications for fundamental rights have been much debated, 
especially in the areas of criminal law, asylum law, and migration law.47 Many have doubted 
whether it is wise to expect Member States to rely on such a presumption and to abolish checks 
at the national level, especially when this is done in the name of creating a European Area of 
Freedom, Security and Justice.48 It is not surprising that the implementation of mutual 
recognition has been especially controversial in the areas mentioned, since in these areas the 
risk of interference with individual fundamental rights is considerable: criminal law essentailly 
regulates the exercise of State power against an individual, and the rights and freedoms enjoyed 
by that individual against State intervention.49 In the fields of criminal, migration and asylum 
law, the introduction of the principle of mutual recognition and underlying assumption of trust 
has raised cause for concern, and the question of how to reconcile mutual recognition with 
fundamental rights has been the subject of much research and debate.50 
The trust Member States should have that fundamental rights are adequately protected 
throughout the EU is an essential prerequisite of mutual recognition. From policy documents 
such as the 2010 Stockholm Programme it is clear that the purpose of mutual trust is efficiency 
in the cooperation between Member States.51 The idea is that if Member States are able to trust 
that judicial systems and other fundamental rights safeguards are of equal and adequate quality 
throughout the Union, this reduces the need for intermediate checks, increasing efficiency. It 
is also stressed in the policy documents that mutual trust needs to be built by increasing 
exchange of information and cooperation between legal systems and judicial authorities,52 but 
also by creating common norms, such as the rules on strengthening the procedural rights of 
suspected or accused persons in criminal proceedings which were being developed at the 
time.53 
The regulations resulting from the implementation of mutual recognition in the various fields 
all work on the principle that mutual trust between the Member States is justified and respected. 
The discussion of the Zarraga, CJEU Povse, and Rinau cases54 all show that the enforcing 
Member States in those situations were expected by the regulations to rely on mutual trust and 
not substitute their own assessment of the fundamental rights situation for that of the State of 
origin. The CJEU’s ruling in Melloni, discussed in detail below, shows that the same is true for 
                                                 
 
47 E.g. Thunberg Schunke (2013); Battjes et al. (2011). 
48 Peers (2011). 
49 Mitsilegas (2006) p. 1280. 
50 Battjes et al. (2011) p. 6; Thunberg Schunke (2013); Ouwerkerk (2011). 
51 Stockholm Programme, para. 1.2.1. 
52 Stockholm Programme, p. 13-14; The Hague Programme para. 3.2. 
53 Stockholm Programme para. 2.4; in 2009 the European Council adopted a “Roadmap” on procedural rights in 
criminal proceedings (11457/09, DROIPEN 53, COPEN 120) which in turn formed the basis for Directives on 
translation (2010/64/EU) and the right to information (2012/13/EU).  
54 See Chapter 5.4.1.2. 
 236 
 
the EAW in the field of criminal law. In the field of asylum law, the Dublin II Regulation55 and 
the recast Dublin III Regulation56 operate on the same principle. These Regulations create a 
Common European Asylum System (CEAS) by laying down rules that determine which 
Member State is responsible for examining an asylum application. The principle of mutual 
recognition as implemented by that Regulation entailed that when asylum seekers make their 
way to another Member State, this state should send them back to the Member State that is 
responsible for examining the asylum application on the basis of the Regulation. Mutual trust 
in the context of the Dublin system entails that all Member States are expected to treat asylum 
seekers and examine their applications in conformity with the relevant rules of national, EU 
and international law.57 
In the context of the CEAS, however, it has been decided that this mutual trust cannot be 
absolute. According to the CJEU, there should be a possibility to rebut the presumption that 
fundamental rights are respected in the Member State to which the asylum seeker is to be 
returned, when there is evidence that this is clearly not the case. This exception is the result of 
the CJEU’s ruling in N.S. and M.E. and others, and is the consequence of the ECtHR’s 
judgment in M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece, which was discussed in the preceding Chapter. The 
following section analyses the CJEU judgment.58 It is considered what implications N.S. and 
M.E. and others has for the functioning of mutual recognition in the field of civil justice. 
  
6.3.2 The exception: presumption can be rebutted in case of systemic deficiencies 
 
In M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece, the ECtHR had found that Belgium violated Article 3 of the 
ECHR, the prohibition on torture. The ECtHR decided that Belgium could be held accountable 
because even though it had acted in the application of EU law, it had nevertheless enjoyed 
discretion under the “humanitarian clause” (Art. 3(2) of the Dublin II Regulation). It then 
decided that Belgium had violated Article 3 ECHR because it had not used this clause to 
prevent the forced return of M.S.S. to Greece (the Member State responsible for examining his 
asylum application) because it was well known at the time that the conditions to which asylum 
seekers were subjected in Greece were incompatible with that Article.59 
                                                 
 
55 Council Regulation (EC) No. 343/2003 of 18 February 2003 establishing the criteria and mechanisms for 
determining the Member State responsible for examining an asylum application lodged in one of the Member 
States by a third-country national, OJ L 50/01, the “Dublin II Regulation”. 
56 Regulation (EU) No 604/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 establishing the 
criteria and mechanisms for determining the Member State responsible for examining an application for 
international protection lodged in one of the Member States by a third-country national or a stateless person, OJ 
L 180/31 (the “Dublin III Regulation’). 
57 See Battjes et al. (2011) p. 9. 
58 For more information on the preceding ECtHR judgment in M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece, see Chapter 5.4.5. 
59 See for a comprehensive discussion of the M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece judgment Chapter 5.4.5. 
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With this judgment, the ECtHR clearly puts the principle of mutual trust underlying the CEAS 
under pressure. As a result of this judgment, there are situations in which a Member State may 
not rely on mutual trust, but should make an assessment of the risks the asylum seeker will be 
subjected to in the Member State to which he should be returned. This judgment was expected 
to have major repercussions for the CEAS and other fields of law in which mutual trust plays 
an important role, and the CJEU’s interpretation of the judgment was eagerly awaited.60 
The CJEU was able to give its interpretation in N.S. and M.E. and Others.61 The judgment 
concerns two joined cases. In the first, N.S., an Afghan national, challenged the decision of the 
Secretary of State of the United Kingdom (UK) to return him to Greece, which was responsible 
under the Dublin II Regulation for examining his asylum applications. The case of M.E. and 
others concerned five persons who challenged a similar decision of the Irish authorities to 
return them to Greece. All the persons involved argued that the UK and Ireland, as transferring 
Member States, should refrain from transferring them to Greece because of the risks they would 
be subjected to in that country. The UK and Irish courts asked the CJEU whether they were 
obliged to make an assessment of the compliance of Greece with the fundamental rights and 
provisions of EU asylum law, and what the consequences of a finding of non-conformity should 
be. 
The CJEU started its answer of these questions by stressing that the CEAS was based on the 
full and inclusive application of international and European rules62 that guarantee that no 
person should be sent back to a place where they would be persecuted. It also cited its own 
judgment in Lindqvist, mentioned above, to emphasize that Member States must, when they 
apply secondary EU legislation, make sure that they do not rely on an interpretation of that 
legislation which is contrary to fundamental rights.63  
Next, the CJEU discussed the issue of mutual trust. It started by stating that the CEAS was 
“conceived in a context making it possible to assume that all participating States […] observe 
fundamental rights, and that Member States can have confidence in each other in that regard.” 
The EU legislature, according to the Court, was therefore able to use this principle of “mutual 
confidence” in legislation, in such a way as to speed up and simplify the handling of asylum 
applications within the EU. Nevertheless, the CJEU stated: 
[I]t is not inconceivable that that system may, in practice, experience major operational 
problems in a given Member State, meaning that there is a substantial risk that asylum 
seekers may, when transferred to that Member State, be treated in a manner incompatible 
with their fundamental rights. (para. 81) 
The CJEU then stated that not every minor infringement of the Regulations by the responsible 
Member State should have as a consequence that the asylum seeker could not be transferred to 
                                                 
 
60 Den Heijer (2012) p. 1736. 
61 CJEU Joined Cases C-411/10 and C-493/10, N.S. and M.E. and others, ECLI:EU:C:2011:865. 
62 Along with the Dublin II Regulation, Directives 2003/9, 2004/83 and 2005/85 contained minimum standards 
intended to protect the rights of asylum seekers. 
63CJEU Lindqvist; see Chapter 5.2. 
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that State, as that would deprive the Regulation of its substance and endanger the realisation of 
its goal. However, the CJEU stated: 
By contrast, if there are substantial grounds for believing that there are systemic flaws in 
the asylum system and reception conditions for asylum applicants in the Member State 
responsible, resulting in inhuman or degrading treatment, within the meaning of article 4 
of the EU CFR, of asylum seekers transferred to the territory of that Member State, the 
transfer would be incompatible with that provision.  (para. 86) (emphasis added) 
The CJEU thus ruled that only “systemic flaws in the asylum system and reception conditions”, 
as opposed to “the slightest infringement” of the Directives, could result in mutual trust not 
being justified and in an obligation for the transferring Member State not to transfer the asylum 
seeker to the State experiencing those systemic flaws. The CJEU considered it proven that 
Greece experienced such systemic deficiencies, and that the information available about those 
deficiencies, as cited by the ECtHR in M.S.S., enabled the transferring States to evaluate the 
risks to which the asylum seekers would be exposed. According to the Court, Member States 
may not transfer asylum seekers to another Member State when they 
cannot be unaware that systemic deficiencies in the asylum procedure and in the reception 
conditions of asylum seekers in that Member State amount to substantial grounds for 
believing that the asylum seeker would face a real risk of being subjected to inhuman or 
degrading treatment within the meaning of Article 4 of the EU CFR. (para. 94) (emphasis 
added) 
The CJEU concluded by stating that the CEAS could not be applied on the basis of a conclusive 
presumption that the asylum seeker’s fundamental rights will be observed in the Member State 
to which he is to be transferred. Such a conclusive presumption “could itself be regarded as 
undermining the safeguards which are intended to ensure compliance with fundamental rights 
by the European Union and its Member States” (para. 100).  
The conclusion of the Court is clear: while mutual trust is required for the effective functioning 
of the regulation establishing the CEAS, it cannot result in a conclusive and non-rebuttable 
presumption that fundamental rights are protected everywhere. However, the threshold for 
rebuttal is very high: it is only justified when “systemic deficiencies” give rise to “substantial 
grounds” for believing that the asylum seeker would be exposed to a “real risk”.  
The N.S. judgment is remarkable for acknowledging that mutual trust cannot be assumed in all 
circumstances: it must be based on real information as to the actual situation in the Member 
States. The CJEU acknowledges this by stating that the CEAS was “conceived in a context 
making it possible to assume that all Member States observe fundamental rights” (para. 78). It 
also clearly recognises that this context may change, and that circumstances in the Member 
States may in practice make it impossible to rely on mutual trust. The repercussions of this 
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finding for the CEAS, and for other areas of EU law where mutual recognition may conflict 
with fundamental rights, has been acknowledged.64 
In its recent judgment in Aranyosi and Căldăraru,65 the CJEU ruled that exceptions to mutual 
recognition should also be made in the context of the EAW. In the two cases leading to the 
judgment, the referring courts asked whether the execution of a EAW can be refused when the 
detention conditions in the Member State that requested the execution are incompatible with 
fundamental rights, in particular the prohibition on inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment (Art. 3 ECHR/Art. 4 CFR). The Framework Decision on the EAW (FD EAW) 
contains a strict and closed system of grounds for refusal, which does not include a possibility 
to refuse enforcement on the basis of concerns as to the fundamental rights situation in the 
requesting Member State.66 Citing its Opinion 2/13,67 which in turn referred to N.S. and M.E. 
and others, the CJEU ruled that “limitations of the principles of mutual recognition and mutual 
trust between Member States can be made ‘in exceptional circumstances’” (para. 82). The 
CJEU then acknowledged that the prohibition on inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment is absolute and cannot be derogated from (para. 85). According to the CJEU, 
It follows that, where the judicial authority of the executing Member State is in 
possession of evidence of a real risk of inhuman or degrading treatment of individuals 
detained in the issuing Member State, having regard to the standard of protection of 
fundamental rights guaranteed by EU law and, in particular, by Article 4 of the Charter 
[…], that judicial authority is bound to assess the existence of that risk when it is called 
upon to decide on the surrender to the authorities of the issuing Member State of the 
individual sought by a European arrest warrant. The consequence of the execution of 
such a warrant must not be that that individual suffers inhuman or degrading treatment. 
(emphasis added) (para. 88). 
The CJEU then gave a number of quite specific guidelines regarding how the court should 
proceed in such cases. Initially the court should determine, on the basis of “objective, reliable, 
specific and properly updated” information, that there is a “real risk” of the individual 
concerned being subjected to unacceptable detention conditions (para. 92). The court must then 
“assess whether there are substantial grounds to believe that the individual concerned will be 
exposed to that risk” (para. 92). Interestingly, the CJEU added that: 
the mere existence of evidence that there are deficiencies, which may be systemic or 
generalised, or which may affect certain groups of people, or which may affect certain 
places of detention, with respect to detention conditions in the issuing Member State 
does not necessarily imply that, in a specific case, the individual concerned will be 
                                                 
 
64 Den Heijer (2012) p. 1736; Billing (2012); Brouwer (2013). The “systemic flaws” exception was incorporated 
into the recast Dublin Regulation: Dublin III Regulation, Article 3(2). 
65 Joined Cases C-404/15 and C-659/15 PPU Pál Aranyosi and Robert Căldăraru ECLI:EU:C:2016:198. 
66 See the discussion on CJEU Melloni under 6.4. 
67 Opinion 2/13 of the Court (Full Court) of 18 December 2014, ECLI:EU:C:2014:2454. 
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subject to inhuman or degrading treatment in the event that he is surrendered to the 
authorities of that Member State (para. 93). 
It seems that, unlike in N.S. and M.E. and others, the CJEU does not require that deficiencies 
be “systemic”. What matters is the real risk to the individual concerned. 
The CJEU’s finding of an exception to mutual recognition in the field of criminal justice is 
remarkable, especially considering its earlier strict stance in Melloni, discussed below. It is 
commendable that the CJEU recognised that deficiencies in fundamental rights protection 
should be able to justify an exception to mutual recognition where one does not already exist 
in legislation. The question now is whether the approach developed by the CJEU in N.S. and 
M.E. and others and Aranyosi and Căldăraru can be applied to civil cases. 
6.3.3 Can this exception be applied in the field of civil procedure? 
 
The question now is what, if any, repercussions the judgments discussed have for the field of 
civil procedure. This requires an appraisal of the function of mutual trust in the different areas 
and the consequences if that mutual trust were considered to be rebuttable. In this regard, it is 
helpful that such an appraisal has already been made for the field of EU criminal law, in which 
some important aspects have already been identified. 
6.3.3.1 Goal and function of mutual trust and the conditions for rebuttal 
 
It was discussed above that the goal of mutual trust in the context of the CEAS is to promote 
efficiency”,68 facilitating cooperation between Member States, and by doing so, discouraging 
asylum seekers from submitting applications in multiple states. It allows Member States to 
transfer asylum seekers to the Member State responsible under the Regulation, on the basis of 
a presumption that they will be treated in accordance with all relevant rules. If such a 
presumption were not possible, the Member State could be compelled to make, in each case, 
make an assessment of the risks the asylum seeker may be exposed to in the future,69 which 
would reduce efficiency. Various studies into the function of mutual trust in the field of 
criminal law conclude that this is similar: mutual trust allows Member States to extradite 
persons for whom a EAW has been issued without on the basis of mutual recognition, though 
there are a number of refusal grounds.70 It is clear that in both situations mutual trust primarily 
concerns the risks that the person concerned (the asylum seeker, or accused or convicted person 
in criminal cases) will be exposed to in the future. The EAW intends to achieve “the arrest and 
surrender by another Member State of a requested person, for the purposes of conducting a 
criminal prosecution or executing a custodial sentence or detention order” (Art. 1(1)). The 
                                                 
 
68 Stockholm Programme (2010) p. 5. 
69 As discussed, the ECtHR has ruled that in cases where asylum seekers are transferred to third (non-ECHR) 
states, the ECHR imposes an obligation on Contracting States not to expel a person to a country where 
substantial grounds have been shown for believing that he would face a real risk of being subjected to treatment 
contrary to Article 3; see among others ECtHR T.I. v. United Kingdom [dec.] 43844/98 ECHR 2000-III. 
70 Art. 1(2) EAW FD; Refusal grounds art. 3 and 4. 
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execution of an EAW therefore exposes the requested person to a future criminal prosecution 
or a detention, during which he may be subject to fundamental rights risks. Likewise, the 
obligation to transfer an asylum seeker back to the Member State responsible for his asylum 
application exposes the asylum seeker to the circumstances that exist in that Member State with 
regard to the reception and treatment of asylum seekers. 
The assessment of the conditions that persons will be subjected to in future is a difficult task, 
which is why it is more efficient for judicial authorities to rely on a presumption that these will 
be in accordance with fundamental rights. It is presumably for this reason that the CJEU has in 
N.S. set a high standard for the presumption to be rebutted: this is only the case where a judicial 
authority “cannot be unaware” of “systemic deficiencies” which amount to “substantial 
grounds for believing that there is a real risk”. It has been argued that the “cannot be unaware” 
notion reflects the permissibility of a presumption that fundamental rights are complied with, 
which can only be rebutted when there is clear and publicly available evidence to the contrary.71 
The presumption is kept intact, because a national judicial authority does not need to conduct 
its own investigation into the situation in the other Member State; the deficiencies in that 
Member State must be sufficiently widespread and well-documented that such information is 
already available. In Aranyosi and Căldăraru, the CJEU did not use the phrase “cannot be 
unaware”. It is not entirely clear from that judgment whether executing authorities are obligated 
to carry out research as to the detention conditions in a Member State prior to transferring an 
individual there. The judgment implies that only “where the judicial authority of the executing 
Member State is in possession of evidence or a real risk”, the authority should research whether 
it is likely that the individual will be exposed to the risk (para. 88). However, the CJEU also 
states that “to that end, the executing judicial authority must rely on information that is 
objective, reliable, specific, and properly updated” (para. 89), and names a number of sources 
that can be used, such as judgments of the ECtHR. This implies an obligation for the executing 
authority to keep itself informed on the detention situations in fellow EU Member States, at 
least to a level sufficient to allow it to identify a potential risk. 
It does appear from both judgments that the problems with detention conditions should be 
widespread and well reported. This will likely not be the case where only individual and 
isolated incidents have occurred. This high standard is also encompassed in the notion of 
“systemic deficiencies”, which points towards deficiencies that are widespread and serious.72 
Moreover, these circumstances must amount to a “substantial grounds for believing that there 
is a real risk” for the person concerned, which should be interpreted as a foreseeable and serious 
risk.73 
The question now is what the function of mutual trust is in the field of civil procedure and how 
it is applied. As was discussed at length in Chapters 2 and 3, the implementation of mutual 
recognition in this field has taken the shape of the progressive abolition of intermediate checks 
                                                 
 
71 Costello (2012) p. 89. 
72 Costello (2012) p. 89. 
73 Costello (2012) p. 90. 
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on the enforcement of judgments from other Member States. Mutual trust in this context means 
that judicial authorities in the Member States must assume that judgments from other Member 
States conform to the relevant law, including fundamental rights, and that they may not refuse 
to enforce them or otherwise exercise control if they feel that this is not the case. The goal here, 
again, is efficiency: it is more efficient for the judgment creditor (or other beneficiary) if they 
can have their judgment enforced throughout the Union without having to go through further 
procedural hurdles.  
While the goal of mutual trust is therefore the same, there is an important difference between 
the function of mutual trust between the different fields. As discussed above, in the fields of 
criminal and asylum law mutual trust exempts the judicial authority from having to make a 
prospective analysis of the future risks to which the person concerned will likely be subjected. 
This requires not only detailed knowledge of the situation in the Member State where he is to 
be sent to, but also an assessment of the risks that these will pose to the person concerned. The 
lesson from the N.S. and Aranyosi and Căldăraru judgments is therefore, that a national judicial 
authority cannot be expected to make such an assessment unless the evidence is publicly 
available and there are substantial grounds for believing that the person will be subjected to 
serious risks. 
In the field of civil procedure, the task of the national judge is different. If they were not able 
to rely on mutual trust, they would have to examine in a particular case whether fundamental 
rights were complied with in the Member State of origin of the judgment. While this would 
certainly reduce efficiency if it needed to be done in each case, the burden placed on the judge 
need not be as heavy in an individual case. This is because, when a judgment is presented to 
him for enforcement, he is dealing with an isolated case, in which the individual risk to the 
parties does not need to be proven, and in which the fundamental rights infringement, if it 
happened, should be relatively easy to identify. More importantly however, in cases where the 
enforcement of a judgment is requested, the judgment has already been delivered and the 
fundamental rights infringement therefore has already occurred.74 We are therefore not dealing 
with a prospective assessment of a future risk that a person may encounter, but with an 
infringement that has already occurred and which should be obvious from the judgment itself 
or the case file. 
6.3.3.2 Evidentiary standard: “cannot be unaware” 
 
It is therefore submitted that the exception to mutual trust that the CJEU has made in the N.S. 
case should also be applicable in the area of civil procedure and to the cross-border enforcement 
of judgments, but that the evidentiary standard can potentially be lower. The efficiency loss 
that is caused by requiring a judge to assess, retrospectively, whether an infringement occurred 
in a particular case is not as great as that which would be caused by requiring a judge to 
prospectively assess the potential risks to which an asylum seeker would be subjected. This is 
                                                 
 
74 See on this point also Corthaut (2012) p. 186. 
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because evidence will be already available to the judge, because an individual risk does not 
need to be proven, and because the assessment concerns an infringement that has already 
occurred, not a future risk. 
6.3.3.3 Threshold: “systemic deficiencies” giving rise to a “real risk”  
 
The next question is what the threshold would be for considering mutual trust to be rebutted. 
In the N.S. judgment the CJEU required “systemic deficiencies” or “major operational 
problems” to exist, though it appears to nuance this somewhat in Aranyosi and Căldăraru. 
Firstly, as has been argued elsewhere, this notion does not appear in the ECtHR’s M.S.S. 
judgment, and would therefore, if it were seen as an additional threshold, not be incompatible 
with the interpretation of Article 3 ECHR in that case. Since the EU CFR binds the EU to the 
ECtHR’s interpretation of this right, such an additional threshold would not be allowed. It has 
therefore been argued that the “systemic” element should not be seen as an additional hurdle. 
This seems justified, since, apart from the fact that the ECtHR judgment does not allow it, for 
the individual it does not matter whether he is the victim of a systemic or an isolated deficiency. 
It is therefore submitted that the threshold cannot lie at systemic failures, but at such a level 
that allows for isolated incidents to refute mutual trust, yet does not encompass every minor 
transgression. It in fact appears that the ‘systemic’ threshold may be incompatible with the 
ECtHR’s recent judgment in Tarakhel v. Switzerland.75 In this important case, it decided that 
Switzerland could not under the Dublin system send back asylum seekers to Italy, where they 
were first registered. In this case the ECtHR found that the fact that Italy could not give 
assurances that accommodation would be available for all members of the family concerned 
together in itself constituted a violation of Article 3 EHCR.76 It also explicitly stated, “the 
current situation in Italy can in no way be compared to the situation in Greece at the time of 
the M.S.S. judgment”.77 On the face of it, this constitutes a lowering of the threshold of 
‘systemic deficiencies’.78 
Finally, the question should be asked if it matters that N.S. concerned the prohibition on torture 
(Arts. 3 ECHR/4 CFR), a right that is considered notstandsfest, in the sense that it may under 
no circumstances be interfered with (Art. 15 ECHR). It is also absolute – Article 3 ECHR 
contains no limitation clauses.79 It is possible that infringements of the right to a fair trial, which 
is considered to leave a greater margin of appreciation to the parties to the ECHR,80 might not 
be considered as serious and capable of precluding mutual trust as (possible) infringements of 
                                                 
 
75 ECtHR Tarakhel v. Switzerland [GC], appl. no. 29217/12, ECHR 2014. 
76 ECtHR Tarakhel v. Switzerland, para. 22. 
77 ECtHR Tarakhel v. Switzerland, para. 114. 
78 See for an analysis Peers, S., Tarakhel v Switzerland: Another nail in the coffin of the Dublin system?, 
http://www.eulawanalysis.blogspot.com, 5 November 2014 (last accesed 4 May 2016). 
79 Gerards (2011) p. 103. 
80 Legg (2012) p. 210. 
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the prohibition on torture. Here, there are two counterarguments. The first is that the ECHR 
does not establish a hierarchy of rights, and that therefore not one right can be considered more 
“important” than the other. The second is that, as articulated by the CJEU itself in N.S., it cannot 
be accepted that mutual trust, which is intended to facilitate the respect for fundamental rights 
within a European Area of Freedom, Security and Justice, could itself undermine those 
fundamental rights.81 It should not, in that context, matter which fundamental rights are at issue; 
if the EU is founded on a respect for fundamental rights, this should encompass all fundamental 
rights. It is submitted that this is especially unacceptable when, as is the case in the context of 
enforcement of judgments, the infringement will already have occurred and should be clearly 
identifiable. 
 
6.3.3.4 Conclusion 
 
The cases of M.S. and N.E. and others and Aranyosi and Căldăraru show that mutual trust is 
not always justified. Fundamental rights violations simply occur, even in an EU where all 
Member States have ratified the ECHR. This is a reality that cannot be ignored. It is correct 
that in N.S. and M.E. and others, the CJEU created an exception to the rule that mutual 
recognition is absolute. This thesis has repeatedly argued that deficiencies in fundamental 
rights protection may occur in the field of civil justice just as they may in the field of asylum 
law. For that reason, the preceding sections have argued that the exception created in N.S. and 
M.E. and others and Aranyosi and Căldăraru should also be available for civil justice cases.  
The preceding sections however argued that the yardstick the CJEU developed, that the 
deficiencies should be systemic, is understandable for fields of law where mutual trust applies 
prospectively, such as asylum law. In civil justice however mutual trust applies retrospectively, 
to proceedings that have already taken place. This means that an exception to the rule of mutual 
trust is all the more necessary and acceptable from the viewpoint of efficiency, since the judge 
in a civil case is not required to prospectively assess possible risks and in so doing make a 
statement about the fundamental rights situation in another Member State. Rather, they can 
decide, in an individual case and on the basis of the evidence already available in the judgment 
and the case file, whether an infringement has occurred. This means that the requirement of 
“systemic” deficiencies does not need to apply. Chapter 7.3 further develops the threshold that 
should be applied and the way in which this should be operationalised. 
 
6.4 The Court of Justice of the European Union’s Melloni decision: 
Member State fundamental rights and mutual recognition 
 
                                                 
 
81 CJEU N.S. and M.E.and others, para. 100. 
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The previous section showed that concerns about the practice of fundamental rights protection 
in a Member State can, in exceptional circumstances, act as an obstacle to mutual recognition 
and may therefore restrict the free movement of judgments. This section looks at a final 
category of fundamental rights norms that exist within the EU: the rights guaranteed by the 
Member States’ constitutions.82 
Member States’ constitutions have an important role in the multi-layered legal order that is the 
EU. The CJEU has ensured this by citing “the constitutional traditions common to the Member 
States” as a source of inspiration for the general principles of EU law.83 The EU CFR 
acknowledges the importance of the Member States’ constitutions in Article 53. This Article 
provides that 
Nothing in this EU CFR shall be interpreted as restricting or adversely affecting human 
rights and fundamental freedoms as recognised […] by the Member States’ 
constitutions. 
When the EU CFR entered into force in 2001, the meaning of this provision was already subject 
to discussion. It was considered that a literal interpretation of this provision would entail that 
if a Member States’ constitution provided a higher standard than the EU CFR, this higher 
standard should prevail, meaning essentially that Member States’ constitutions could stand in 
the way of an EU decision or policy. Such a literal interpretation was considered a threat to the 
primacy of EU law.84 The Explanations provide little clarity, merely stating that the provision 
is intended to maintain the level of protection afforded “within their respective scope” by EU 
law, national law, and international law.  
 
Since then, the CJEU has been given the opportunity to rule on the matter in the Melloni case, 
and expanded on its reasoning in Åkerberg Fransson. Together, the judgments provide an 
interpretation of Article 53 that is guided by the principle of effectiveness of EU law.  
6.4.1 The CJEU’s judgment in Melloni  
 
6.4.1.1 The questions posed to the CJEU 
The Melloni case85 concerned the execution of an EAW issued by an Italian court for the 
execution of a sentence imposed on Mr Melloni, an Italian national, for bankruptcy fraud. Mr 
Melloni was arrested in Spain, and the court authorised his surrender to the Italian authorities. 
                                                 
 
82 See Craig and de Bùrca (2015) p. 388-390, who explain that the CJEU has proved itself reluctant to ascribe 
too much importance to Member States’ conceptions of fundamental rights.  
83 Case 11-70 Internationale Handelsgesellschaft mbH v Einfuhr- und Vorratsstelle für Getreide und 
Futtermittel, ECLI:EU:C:1970:114, para. 4. 
84 Heringa and Verhey (2001) p. 18. 
85 See for a discussion N. de Boer (2013); De Visser (2013); Veldt-Foglia (2013).  
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Mr Melloni sought to challenge the surrender by filing a recurso de amparo (petition for 
constitutional protection) against the order before the Tribunal Constitucional (Constitutional 
Court). His argument was essentially that he had been convicted without him being present (in 
absentia), though he had been represented by two lawyers. Mr Melloni contended that Italian 
law prevented him from appealing the sentence imposed in absentia, which amounted to a 
violation of his right to a fair trial. He submitted therefore that the execution of the EAW should 
be made subject to the condition that an appeal against the findings of guilt in the original 
judgment would be available.86 The Spanish Constitutional Court requested a preliminary 
ruling from the CJEU, asking whether it could refuse to execute the EAW requesting the 
surrender of Mr Melloni. 
It identified three possible grounds for such a refusal: firstly, it asked whether the FD EAW (as 
amended)87 allowed a refusal of execution on these grounds, or whether it should be seen as 
exhaustively governing the conditions in which execution may be refused. Secondly, it asked 
whether the Framework Decision could be considered compatible with the right to a fair trial 
and the rights of the defence as laid down in Articles 47 and 48(2) of the EU CFR. Finally, it 
asked whether, if the Framework Decision was indeed found to be in breach of the right to a 
fair trial, the national court would be allowed on the basis of Article 53 of the EU CFR to make 
the execution of an EAW dependent on the conviction being open to review in the requesting 
State, “thus affording those rights a greater level of protection than that deriving from European 
Union law, in order to avoid an interpretation which restricts or adversely affects a fundamental 
right recognised by the constitution of the first-mentioned Member State.”88 
As already discussed under Section 6.3.2, the EAW is based on the principle of mutual 
recognition. This is expressed in, among other things, the limited number of grounds for refusal 
to execute the EAW contained in the FD EAW. Moreover, the Article of that Framework 
Decision that dealt with convictions in absentia had been replaced with new rules contained in 
Framework Decision 2009/299, which sought to clarify the circumstances in which the 
execution of an EAW rendered for the purpose of executing a sentence imposed in absentia 
could legitimately be refused. These circumstances were laid down in Article 4a(1) of 
Framework Decision 2009/299, which states that an executing judicial authority “may also 
                                                 
 
86 This argument had already been examined by the Spanish Constitutional Court in a case from 2009, whose 
facts were virtually the same. In that case the Constitutional Court ruled the execution of the EAW to be 
unconstitutional, an outcome which was at the time criticized as being in conflict with EU law. Spanish 
Constitutional Court, judgment of 28 September 2009, STC 199/2009, para. 3. Apart from its significance for 
EU law, the Melloni case is therefore also remarkable for the fact that this time around the Spanish 
Constitutional Court recognized the potential conflict and, for the first time in its existence, requested a 
preliminary ruling; see Torres Pérez (2012) p. 108-109. 
87 Council Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA on the European arrest warrant and the surrender procedures 
between Member States, OJ L 190/001, as amended by Council Framework Decision 2009/299/JHA of 26 
February 2009 amending Framework Decisions 2002/584/JHA, 2005/214/JHA, 2006/783/JHA, 2008/909/JHA 
and 2008/947/JHA, thereby enhancing the procedural rights of persons and fostering the application of the 
principle of mutual recognition to decisions rendered in the absence of the person concerned at the trial, OJ L 
81/24. 
88 CJEU Melloni para. 26. 
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refuse to execute the European Arrest Warrant issued for the purpose of executing a custodial 
sentence or a detention order if the person concerned did not appear in person at the trial 
resulting in the decision […]” (emphasis added) unless one of the circumstances enumerated 
in the rest of the provision applies, which pertain to the provision of information to the person 
concerned. Essentially, the provision lists a number of situations in which the person concerned 
can be assumed to have known about the trial, and his being absent can therefore be seen as a 
choice. Only when these circumstances do not apply may the execution of the EAW be refused. 
In this way, the provision limits the circumstances in which the execution of an EAW may be 
refused. 
 
6.4.1.2 The CJEU’s reasoning: does the secondary legislation express a European 
consensus? 
 
The CJEU concluded that the FD EAW portrayed a European consensus as to the appropriate 
level of fundamental rights protection. It analysed the FD EAW and the amending acts to 
establish that these indeed reflected such a consensus. It reiterated that the FD EAW is based 
on the principle of mutual recognition and that this entails that the grounds for non-execution 
are limited and exhaustively governed by the FD EAW and its amending acts (paras. 35-46). It 
looked at the wording of the provisions and the objectives of the Framework Decision, as 
expressed in its recitals. On the basis of these elements, it came to the conclusion, answering 
the Spanish Constitutional Court’s first question, that the FD EAW intended to exhaustively 
govern the conditions in which the execution of an EAW could be refused where a sentence 
had been imposed in absentia.  
The CJEU then examined the Spanish Court’s second question, coming to the conclusion that 
the FD EAW were in conformity with the ECtHR’s case law on this point. With regard to the 
third question, the CJEU came to the conclusion that an interpretation of Article 53 of the EU 
CFR that allowed a national court to refuse execution on the basis of national constitutional 
rights would be unacceptable, as it would undermine the principle of primacy of EU law. It 
stated that the legislature had clearly intended to exhaustively harmonise the grounds for non-
execution in the FD EAW and its amending acts (as already concluded with regard to the first 
question), and that the those conditions reflected “the consensus reached by all the Member 
States regarding the scope to be given under EU law to the procedural rights enjoyed by persons 
convicted in absentia.” Allowing a Member State to apply Article 53 of the EU CFR in such a 
way as to allow it to apply national norms over and above those laid down in the FD EAW 
would “undermine the principles of mutual trust and recognition […] by casting doubt on the 
uniformity of the standard of protection of fundamental rights as defined in that framework 
decision”(para. 63). 
Whether or not Member States are allowed to apply national constitutional standards when they 
interpret EU secondary legislation is therefore dependent on the degree of harmonisation of 
fundamental rights standards that the legislation has sought to achieve: the European 
consensus. That this is so is confirmed by the CJEU itself in Åkerberg Fransson. In that 
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judgment, the CJEU was asked to rule on the conformity of national legislation (which 
implemented EU law, but had not been designed for that purpose) with the EU CFR. The CJEU 
ruled as follows: 
[…] where a court of a Member State is called upon to review whether fundamental 
rights are complied with by a national provision or measure which, in a situation where 
action of the Member States is not entirely determined by European Union law, 
implements the latter for the purposes of Article 51(1) of the EU CFR, national 
authorities and courts remain free to apply national standards of protection of 
fundamental rights, provided that the level of protection provided for by the EU CFR, 
as interpreted by the Court, and the primacy, unity and effectiveness of European Union 
law are not thereby compromised. (para. 29) (emphasis added)  
The primary requirement seems to be the presence of a consensus reached at the European level 
regarding the level of fundamental rights protection to be provided, which in this case was 
obvious from the provision’s legislative history. On this point the Court accepted the approach 
proposed by Advocate-General (A-G) Bot in his Opinion in Melloni. Paragraphs 124 to 128 of 
this Opinion further clarify the distinction. 
According to A-G Bot in his Opinion in Melloni, it is necessary to differentiate between 
situations where “there is a definition at the European level of the degree of protection which 
must be afforded to a fundamental right”, and situations in which there is no such European 
definition. A-G Bot links this to the objectives of the EU action concerned. According to him, 
the definition of a European level of protection 
reflects a balance between the need to ensure the effectiveness of European Union 
action and the need to provide adequate protection for fundamental rights. In that 
situation, it is clear that, if a Member State were to invoke, a posteriori, the retention of 
its higher level of protection, the effect would be to upset the balance achieved by the 
European Union legislature and therefore to jeopardise the application of European 
Union law. (para. 125). 
What is necessary is therefore that the level of fundamental rights protection has been 
determined at the European level with the purpose of ensuring the effective application of EU 
law. The qualification of “a posteriori” makes clear that the time for Member States to oppose 
such a European determination on the basis of national principles is during the legislative 
process, when the European consensus is being reached; not at the stage of application. 
6.4.1.3 Effectiveness as the decisive factor 
 
The lesson to be drawn from the CJEU’s Melloni judgment is that Member States’ national 
fundamental rights standards cannot be applied to the detriment of the effectiveness of EU 
legislation. When EU secondary legislation contains a European consensus as to the 
appropriate level of fundamental rights protection, Member States are not allowed to apply 
higher national standards. To do so would diminish the effectiveness of that legislation. 
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Whether application of national fundamental rights standards would diminish the legislation’s 
effectiveness depends in part on the level of discretion that Member States enjoy in the 
application of that legislation. Where standards are exhaustively harmonised, application of 
national standards is more likely to render implementation of the legislation less effective. 
Regulations in the field of judicial cooperation, both in criminal and civil justice, often rely on 
a high degree of harmonisation of standards in order to facilitate mutual recognition. The FD 
EAW had been amended with the purpose of avoiding any uncertainty as to the conditions that 
could be attached to non-execution of an EAW. It is understandable from the perspective of 
effectiveness that Member States should not be allowed to apply higher national standards. 
This would be different in cases where EU legislation leaves a lot of room for implementation 
or interpretation, such as in the case of Directives. This is clear from the CJEU’s 
pronouncement in Åkerberg Fransson cited above: where action of the Member States is not 
entirely determined by EU law, national authorities and courts remain free to apply national 
standards of protection of fundamental rights. 
6.4.1.4 Conclusions 
 
Melloni is an important judgment because it shows that fundamental rights standards in EU 
legislation are, unless explicitly stated otherwise, maximum standards. This is highly relevant 
to the field of EU civil procedure law, because the Regulations in this field often rely on 
harmonised standards in order to facilitate mutual trust. Melloni shows that Member State 
courts’ room for applying national, even constitutional, standards is very much limited by the 
principle of effectiveness.  
Another equally important lesson is that, if fundamental rights standards in EU secondary 
legislation are to be maximum standards, they must be sufficient to protect those fundamental 
rights effectively. This places a great deal of trust in the legislature – perhaps too much.89 
 
 
6.4.2 Application of the Melloni doctrine to EU civil procedure law 
 
The following sections seek to ascertain what the repercussions are of the Melloni judgment 
for the application of EU civil procedure law. The preceding analysis showed that whether the 
wording, scheme and purpose of the Regulations in that field can be said to express a European 
consensus is vital, and it is therefore necessary to analyse the Regulations discussed in this 
book against background. However, since the text of the Regulations was already discussed in 
detail in Chapters 2 and 3, the following sections refer back to those Chapters where 
appropriate. 
                                                 
 
89 See Besselink (2014). 
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It has been discussed that most EU Regulations in the field of civil justice rely on mutual 
recognition combined with common minimum standards. Some Regulations leave 
considerably more leeway to the Member States in their application and implementation than 
others. As the previous analysis of Melloni showed, the level of discretion left to the Member 
States largely determines whether they have any room to apply national fundamental rights 
standards. As Chapter 2 made clear, the Regulations that have abolished exequatur and refusal 
grounds rely heavily on harmonized standards of fundamental rights protection, whereas others 
do not. For the former category, application of national fundamental rights standards would 
probably sooner impart their effectiveness than for the latter category. The following discusses 
these two categories separately.  
 
6.4.2.1 Application to Regulations which contain grounds for refusal 
 
There is no doubt that the principle of effectiveness governs the application of the refusal 
grounds contained in the European regulations. The CJEU consistently rules that refusal 
grounds must be applied restrictively so as not to render the objective of those regulations, 
effective cross-border enforcement, completely unattainable.90 In Prism Investments it also 
clarified that the refusal grounds are limitative.91 
At the same time, both the public policy exception (Art. 45(1)(a) of Brussels I bis) and the 
protection for the defaulting debtor (Art. 45(1)(b)) explicitly leave room for interpretation. 
While the CJEU has restricted the application of the public policy exception to “manifest” 
breaches of “fundamental” principles,92 and linked the principle of public policy to the rights 
laid down in the ECHR,93 it remains up to the Member States court to determine whether 
enforcement or recognition would in a given case be contrary to public policy. As for the 
protection of the defaulting defendant, it should be interpreted strictly,94 but it is still up to the 
Member State court whether the defendant was left with ‘sufficient time to enable him to 
arrange for his defence’.  
It is clear that together, these grounds for refusal are intended to be limitative: the CJEU has 
confirmed that they do not overlap and that the public policy exception has a residual 
function.95 Applying the Melloni test, this means that no higher national grounds of 
fundamental rights protection can be applied. Article 41(2) of Brussels I bis should be 
interpreted correspondingly; its prohibition on the application of “incompatible” grounds 
should be seen as prohibiting the application of national fundamental rights standards that are 
                                                 
 
90 See e.g. CJEU CJEU Case C-420/07 Apostolides v. Orams, ECLI:EU:C:2009:271, para. 55. With regard to 
Article 45(1)(b) which protects the defaulting debtor, see CJEU Volker Sonntag v Hans Waidmann. 
91 CJEU Case C-139/10 Prism Investments vs. Jaap-Anne van der Meer, ECLI:EU:C:2011:653. 
92 Corthaut (2012) p.15; Kessedjian (2007) p. 28. 
93 CJEU Krombach v. Bamberski, discussed in Chapter 2.2.5. 
94 CJEU Volker Sonntag v Hans Waidmann. 
95 Franq (2012) p. 567; CJEU Case 145/86 Hoffman v Krieg, ECLI:EU:C:1988:61; CJEU Case C -78/95 
Hendrikman and Feyen / Magenta Druck & Verlag, ECLI:EU:C:1996:380. 
 251 
 
higher than those allowed by the grounds incorporated in the Regulations. Article 41(2) must 
therefore be seen as primarily aimed at refusal grounds of a practical nature, such as those 
prohibiting seizure of certain (primary) goods or assets, the use of disproportionate 
enforcement measures, or set-off (as in the Prism Investments case). 
 
6.4.2.2 Regulations that abolished exequatur 
 
It may be recalled that complete abolition of both stages of exequatur was achieved for 
judgments falling within the scope of the Maintenance Regulation, some of the judgments 
falling within the scope of the Brussels II bis Regulation, and those resulting from the 
autonomous European procedures of the ESCP and the EOP.96 
For all these instruments, the abolition of all possibilities of cross-border control was a 
conscious choice, motivated by the objective of achieving free circulation of judgments. This 
objective, however, has underlying motivations that pertain in turn to the protection of 
fundamental rights. The 1999 Tampere Conclusions already stated that “[e]nhanced mutual 
recognition of judicial decisions and judgments […] would facilitate […] and the judicial 
protection of individual rights”, while pinpointing mutual recognition as an instrument to 
achieve this aim. The subsequent Stockholm Programme97 and Programme for the 
implementation of mutual recognition in civil matters98 subsequently pursued the abolition of 
the exequatur as a means of implementing mutual recognition.  
The abolition of exequatur and refusal grounds in these instruments – or, in most cases, the 
decision not to include an exequatur procedure with grounds for refusal from the outset – 
therefore reflects a decision on the part of the European legislature that fundamental rights 
would be best respected by concentrating the responsibility for their protection in the Member 
State of origin of the judgments. To this end, the Brussels II bis Regulation requires the court 
that delivered a judgment ordering the return of a child to the state where (s)he is habitually 
resident (in cases of child abduction) to check whether the child was given an opportunity to 
make his or her views known before certifying the initial judgment as enforceable. This 
replacement of the exequatur procedure, which gives authority to the Member State where 
enforcement is sought to apply grounds for refusal, with a certification procedure in the 
Member State of origin, can therefore be said to reflect a European consensus as to the 
fundamental rights standards to be applied. The same can be said of instruments where the 
exequatur has been abolished altogether. The European consensus required by the CJEU in 
                                                 
 
96 See 2.3. 
97 European Council, The Stockholm Programme - an open and secure Europe serving and protecting citizens, 
OJ C/115/10, 2010, p. 13. 
98 Council Programme of measures to implement the principle of mutual recognition of decisions in civil and 
commercial matters, OJ 2001, C 12/1. 
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Melloni therefore certainly exists for these instruments. For a Member State of enforcement to 
try to refuse enforcement would clearly limit the free circulation of judgments that these 
instruments are intended to achieve and therefore diminish the effective application of EU law. 
That the abolition of exequatur and the shifting of protective functions away from the Member 
State of enforcement are absolute was confirmed by the CJEU in its Zarraga99 judgment, and 
subsequently sanctioned by the ECtHR in Povse.100 
6.4.2.3 Consequences of Melloni for the uniform instruments 
 
The Melloni judgment is also likely to have repercussions for the application of the ESCP and 
EOP. In a way, these two instruments reflect in their entirety a European consensus on the 
fundamental rights standards to be applied, since they are two autonomous procedures intended 
to provide an alternative to the existing national procedures. However, both Regulations 
explicitly leave a number of issues to national law.101 The following analysis explains this 
conclusion. 
6.4.2.4 The European Small Claims Procedure 
 
It is clear that the rules governing the ECSP are aimed at simplifying, speeding up and reducing 
the costs of obtaining an enforceable title, which is the stated purpose of the procedure 
according to its Recital 8.102 On the other hand, the ESCP Regulation does provide that the 
procedural law of the Member State where the procedure is conducted shall apply ‘subject to 
the provisions of this Regulation’. In other words, where the Regulation does not explicitly 
provide otherwise, the procedural law of the Member State shall apply. This means that some 
of the provisions of the Regulation may not actually leave as much discretion to the Member 
States as they appear. 
An example is the right to an oral hearing. The ESCP is intended to be primarily a written 
procedure, with an oral hearing only possible if the court considers it necessary for a fair 
conduct of the procedure. Clearly this leaves discretion to the national court, and as such does 
not completely proscribe the standards to be applied. However, if a Member State were to 
implement the rules of the Regulation in such a way as to require an oral hearing in every 
instance, this would clearly diminish the effectiveness of the procedure. It would therefore not 
be allowed to do so, even if the right to an oral hearing was protected by its constitution.103 
This might be problematic for a Member State such as the UK, where part 27.10 of the English 
Civil Procedure Rules only allows for a procedure in the Small Claims Track to be concluded 
without a hearing “if all parties agree.” 
                                                 
 
99 CJEU Joseba Andoni Aguirre Zarraga v. Simone Pelz, discussed under 3.5. 
100 Discussed in detail in Chapter 5. 
101 Article 26, EOP Regulation; Article 19, ESCP Regulation. 
102 See also the Proposal, section 2.1 (“Overall objective”). 
103 Kramer (2008a) 358. 
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6.4.2.5 The European Order for Payment Procedure 
 
It can be assumed that, analogously to the rules of the ESCP, the expression of the effectiveness 
principle of Melloni would also apply to the rules of conduct of the procedure contained in 
Article 7 of the EOP Regulation, as well as the corresponding time limits, as these could also 
be seen as a European standard concerning the procedural standards that should be upheld. The 
same is true for Article 8 of the Regulation, which authorises the court to issue an EOP when 
“the claim appears to be founded”. Combined with Article 7(2) of the Regulation, which 
provides that the claimant only needs to provide “the cause of the action, including a description 
of the circumstances invoked as the basis of the claim and, where applicable, of the interest 
demanded”, as well as “a description of the evidence”, this means that the examination to be 
conducted by the court can only be very limited indeed.104 This is confirmed by the fact that 
Article 8 allows this examination to take the form of an automated procedure. It can be 
questioned whether this could prove problematic to courts in a Member State such as France, 
where even when claims are uncontested courts are still in principle required to examine the 
merits of the case. Another potential problem has been raised by the CJEU’s case law itself. In 
Banco Espanol105 and Cofidis,106 the CJEU ruled that Member State courts must, of their own 
accord, apply EU rules on unfair terms on consumer contracts in national procedures. If this 
applies in national payment procedures, it arguably also applies in procedures for an EOP. 
Standards of EU consumer law may therefore require Member State courts to conduct a more 
thorough investigation of the merits than the EOP Regulation appears to allow.107 
6.4.2.6 Application of Melloni to Regulations which contain minimum standards for 
certification 
 
A final area where the application of norms could be limited by Melloni is the procedure by 
which judgments are checked against certain minimum standards by the court of origin before 
being certified as enforceable throughout the Union without any need for exequatur.108 This 
                                                 
 
104 Kramer (2010) para. 3.2.2. 
105 Case C-618/10 Banco Español de Crédito SA v Joaquín Calderón Camino, ECLI:EU:C:2012:349. 
106 Case C-473/00 Cofidis SA v Jean-Louis Fredout, ECLI:EU:C:2002:705. 
107 Though the European Commission, in its 2015 Report, suggests that in such cases Member State courts may 
choose to conduct the procedure under national law; it is questionable whether this solves the problem. Report 
from the European Commission to the European Parliament, the Council and the European Economic and Social 
Committee on the Application of Regulation (EC) 1896/2006 of the European Parliament and the Council 
creating a European Order for Payment Procedure, COM(2015) 495 final, p. 10-11.  
108 Some have doubted whether minimum requirements could provide an adequate compensation for the 
abolition of exequatur. Cuniberti and Rueda consider it an “alibi” for the removal of cross-border checks: 
Cuniberti and Rueda (2011) p. 297 et seq. More generally, it has been pointed out that it is the cross-border 
nature of the exequatur procedure which has a protective value and can therefore not be replaced with a check in 
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model is to be found in the Brussels II bis Regulation, pertaining to judgments ordering the 
return of a child or access to a child by its parents, where the court of origin can issue such a 
certificate, provided that the child and the parents (in case of access) were given a chance to be 
heard. Its most pertinent example however is the EEO,109 an instrument which was introduced 
in 2005 and which allows the court in the Member State of origin of the judgment to declare 
any judgment falling within its scope enforceable throughout the EU, provided that the claim 
was uncontested110 and that the minimum requirements laid down in the Regulation are 
fulfilled. 
The minimum requirements laid down in the EEO Regulation concern the service and provision 
of information to the defendant. Like the EOP Regulation, the EEO contains a large number 
(no fewer than 10) permissible ways in which the documents instituting the proceedings may 
have been served on the defendant. The wording of these articles (“one of the following 
methods”) certainly suggests that they should be seen as exhaustive. Articles 16 and 17 
governing the provision of information to the defendant are similarly prescriptive: they contain 
a list of facts that must have been conveyed to the debtor. There appears to be little room for a 
court requested to issue an EEO to diverge from these criteria. The Recitals to the Regulation 
serve to affirm this: Recital 13 explicitly states that “due to differences between the Member 
States as regards the rules of civil procedure and especially those governing the service of 
documents, it is necessary to lay down a specific and detailed definition of those minimum 
standards.” The rules on service and information therefore intend to reflect a European 
consensus on the methods of service that are deemed acceptable. 
Interestingly, as opposed to the ESCP and EOP Regulations, the EEO Regulation contains 
relatively generous grounds for review. Article 19(1) contains the same grounds for review as 
Articles 18 of the ESCP Regulation and 20 of the EOP Regulation, namely in cases where the 
debtor was not adequately informed and could therefore not defend himself through no fault of 
his own. Article 19(2) then leaves open the possibility for courts to “grant access to a review 
of the judgment under more generous conditions than those mentioned in paragraph 1.” The 
Proposal makes clear that this should not be interpreted as giving the national court discretion 
to review an EEO on the basis of any ground whatsoever; it explicitly refers to the conditions 
laid down in paragraph 1, which leads to the conclusion that courts may be more generous in 
allowing a review of an EEO, but only for reasons that have to do with a lack of provision of 
information to the debtor.111 
                                                 
 
the country of origin: De Cristofaro (2011) p. 452; Kramer (2011a) p. 640; Cuniberti and Rueda (2011) p. 301; 
Muir Watt (2001) p. 551. 
109 EEO Regulation; Krans (2005); Zilinsky (2005); See for a critical appraisal of the lack of cross-border 
control in this instrument Stein (2004); Zilinsky (2011). 
110 Article 3(1) of the Regulation clarifies when a claim can be seen as uncontested. 
111 See the explanation of Article 20 in the Proposal, COM/2002/0159 final. 
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It is more difficult to interpret Articles 41(2)(c) and 42(2)(a) of the Brussels II bis Regulation 
in this respect. These articles require that a court satisfies itself, before declaring enforceable a 
judgment concerning the right of access of parents to their child, or the return of a child, that 
the child “was given an opportunity to be heard, unless a hearing was considered inappropriate 
having regard to his or her age or degree of maturity”. These provisions are based on Article 
24 of the EU CFR, which in turn is based on appears to be in line with Article 12 of the UN 
Convention on the Rights of the Child.112 Article 12(2) of this Convention provides that “the 
child shall in particular be provided the opportunity to be heard in any judicial and 
administrative proceedings affecting the child”, which according to the Implementation 
Handbook “implies an active obligation on the State to offer the child the opportunity to be 
heard, although, […] it is important to emphasize that there is no requirement that the child 
express views.”113 
There is therefore no obligation to hear the child, only to actively provide it with the 
opportunity to be heard. However, the right of the child to be heard in procedures such as these, 
which greatly affect him or her, is protected by the UN Convention and – accordingly – the EU 
CFR for a very important reason:114 to allow the child to participate in procedures which 
concern him or her, to respect his or her autonomy, and to prevent the child being pressured or 
influenced by other parties.115 These minimum standards therefore require interpretation by the 
court requested to certify a judgment: it must ascertain that the child had an opportunity to be 
heard, unless such a hearing was considered inappropriate because of the child’s age or 
maturity. It seems strange that a court is expected to ascertain that a child was given an 
opportunity to be heard commensurate with his or her age and maturity, while only the court 
originally seized of the dispute could have made such an assessment.  
Moreover, the Zarraga case discussed in Chapter 3 makes clear that what constitutes “an 
opportunity to be heard” is not at all easy to define: in that case the child had been summoned 
to appear before the Spanish court, but due to her age would have to be accompanied by her 
mother, who was herself at risk of being arrested for child abduction if she entered Spain. The 
mother’s requests for a guarantee that she and her daughter would be allowed to leave together 
was ignored, as were her requests that her daughter be heard via videoconferencing. 
Nonetheless, the Spanish court ruled that the child had been given an opportunity to give her 
views, and declared the judgment enforceable. To conclude, there is a great deal of uncertainty 
as to what is needed to satisfy the requirements of Articles 41(2)(c) and 42(2)(a). Even though 
                                                 
 
112 Explanations relating to the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, OJ C 303/17, p. 25 (relating to Article 24 of 
the EU CFR). 
113 Hodgkin and Newell (2007) p. 155-156. 
114 The UN Committee has even recognized the right of the child to be heard as one of four “general principles” 
of the Convention, which according to the General Comments of the Committee on that article “highlights the 
fact that this article establishes not only a right in itself, but should also be considered in the interpretation and 
implementation of all other rights.” The right of the child to be heard is therefore clearly of central importance 
to protecting the child’s autonomy. United Nations Committee on the Rights of the Child, Convention on the 
Rights of the Child. General Comment No. 12: the right of the child to be heard, 2009, p. 3. 
115 United Nations Committee on the Rights of the Child, Convention on the Rights of the Child. General 
Comment No. 12: the right of the child to be heard, 2009. 
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they both implement a fundamental rights norm that is common to all EU Member States due 
to being enshrined in the EU CFR, they can therefore hardly be said to reflect a European 
consensus. 
To conclude, the model by which a court in the Member State of origin certifies a judgment as 
enforceable after checking certain minimum standards can be seen as a way to provide some 
protection of fundamental rights, if very limited and closely circumscribed, in the absence of 
exequatur. Whether this model provides an adequate substitute for the cross-border control 
provided by the exequatur has been doubted. For one, cross-border control provides a “fresh 
look” which an internal control can by definition not provide. It is therefore questionable what, 
if anything, this mechanism provides in terms of actual protection. This is all the more true in 
the case of the Articles 41 and 42 of the Brussels II bis Regulation as the grounds for 
certification are not grounds for review; they cannot be invoked by those they are intended to 
protect. 
6.4.2.7 Final remarks 
 
The conclusion of the foregoing must be that the Melloni judgment closely circumscribes the 
way in which EU instruments of civil procedure are to be interpreted and applied. It is 
submitted that this could prove to be problematic for national courts and potentially creates 
risks for individual litigants. Melloni’s message seems simple, but practice shows that it may 
not always be so easy to determine what consequences effectiveness has for the application of 
instruments that involve mutual recognition. The ESCP and EOP Regulations explicitly leave 
room for interpretation to Member State courts, but the preceding analysis showed that this 
room for interpretation is in practice limited by the effectiveness requirement. This creates 
potential problems where important principles of national or European law are at stake, for 
example the protection of consumer rights by way of ex officio application of EU directives in 
the context of EOP procedures.  
Apart from complicating the situation for national courts, the CJEU in Melloni also gives a 
signal that cannot be misunderstood: primacy and effectiveness of EU legislation supersede 
national fundamental rights. The CJEU’s more recent judgment in Aranyosi and Căldăraru116 
does not change this conclusion; though in that judgment, the Court allowed an exception to 
the automatic enforcement of the European Arrest Warrant, it only allowed an exception on 
the basis of the prohibition on inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment (laid down in 
the ECHR and the EU CFR), not on the basis of Member States’ constitutions. The CJEU in 
that judgment also closely circumscribed the circumstances in which this exception could be 
applied. 
The CJEU’s strict stance on mutual recognition in the context of judicial cooperation, 
combined with the lack of willingness of the CJEU to test the conformity of that legislation 
                                                 
 
116 Joined Cases C-404/15 and C-659/15 PPU Pál Aranyosi and Robert Căldăraru ECLI:EU:C:2016:198; see 
the discussion under 6.3.3. 
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with fundamental rights itself, does little to allay the concerns and confusion which, empirical 
research shows, national courts experience with regard to the implementation of these 
provisions. This places all the more responsibility on the EU legislature to provide for effective 
and robust fundamental rights provisions in secondary legislation.  
 
6.5 Conclusion 
 
This Chapter asked whether EU fundamental rights law imposes restrictions on the free 
movement of judgments. It discussed a number of different sources of fundamental rights 
norms as to their impact on this process.  
First, this Chapter showed that the EU has long considered itself bound by fundamental rights, 
first through their inclusion in the canon of general principles of EU law, and now through the 
EU CFR. The adoption of the EU CFR is a clear signal that the EU as an organisation is 
committed to protecting fundamental rights; conformity with fundamental rights norms is 
clearly a prerequisite for the legality of EU legislation. The CJEU has proved itself to be 
prepared to review EU legislation’s conformity with fundamental rights, though unfortunately, 
this has not yet led to a revision of the near-absolute application of mutual recognition. 
Secondly, this Chapter discussed the compatibility of mutual trust with fundamental rights. It 
explored whether defects in the actual fundamental rights protection in an EU Member State 
can, in a concrete case, justify an exception to the application of mutual trust. It was shown in 
N.S. and M.E. and others and in Aranyosi and Căldăraru that the CJEU allowed such an 
exception, but only in cases where widespread or systemic violations have been shown to 
occur. It was proposed that this threshold is not appropriate for the civil justice context, because 
in civil cases mutual trust functions retrospectively. Unlike in criminal or asylum cases, 
Member States are not required to prospectively assess the potential risk a person may be 
exposed to, but rather to retrospectively assess whether a violation has already occurred. In 
civil cases it is therefore even less defensible for EU Member States to be required to disregard 
violations in other EU Member States than it is in criminal or asylum cases (though the 
ECtHR’s Tarakhel judgment casts doubt on the acceptability of the ‘systemic’ threshold in the 
latter categories of cases as well). The next Chapter proposes a new ‘emergency brake’ for civil 
cases. 
Finally, this Chapter discussed the role of national constitutional fundamental rights standards 
in the application of EU legislation. It was shown in Melloni that the CJEU gave off a clear 
signal that when fundamental rights standards have been harmonised in EU secondary 
legislation, national standards can no longer be applied if that affects the EU legislation’s 
effectiveness. Melloni shows that fundamental rights, in the EU, are not only a constraint on 
legislative or executive power: they also facilitate integration by reducing Member States’ 
scope to apply national norms, increasing legal certainty. The Melloni judgment leads to the 
conclusion that the CJEU attaches great importance to the intentions of the legislature, as 
expressed in the wording, scheme and purpose of any legislative instrument. This is valuable 
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knowledge: it means that provisions that are intended to protect procedural rights must be 
formulated very carefully, as they will be taken literally. A precise and clear formulation of 
legislative provisions of course also improves legal certainty for individual litigants and 
provides clarity to national courts who are charged with applying these norms. Chapter 8 
discusses how the civil justice Regulations that rely on highly harmonised fundamental rights 
standards should be improved, in light of the fact that they are to be regarded as maximum 
standards. 
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Conclusion to part II 
 
The preceding Chapters analysed how the fundamental rights framework that applies in the 
European Union (EU) constrains the free movement of judgments in civil cases. Chapter 4 
discussed the requirements flowing from the right to a fair trial as protected by Article 6(1) 
European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), and EU fundamental rights law, in particular 
Article 47 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights (CFR). Chapters 5 and 6 then took a 
broader perspective and analysed how free movement of judgments fits into the constitutional 
framework of fundamental rights protection. Chapter 4 analysed the compatibility of free 
movement of judgments with accountability of EU Member States under the ECHR; Chapter 
6 discussed the role of EU Member States in the protection of fundamental rights within the 
EU’s own framework. The conclusions from the analysis conducted in these three Chapters are 
as follows. 
 
A. The right to a fair trial requires effective protection, also within 
the European Union context 
 
Chapter 4 showed that the right to a fair trial holds a prominent place within the ECHR, because 
of its importance in a democratic society and as a central element of the rule of law.1 The Court 
of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) has long acknowledged the existence of the right to 
a fair trial within the EU legal order. The EU CFR has explicitly linked the interpretation of 
the right to a fair trial in the EU context to that provided in the European Court of Human 
Rights’s (ECtHR) case law. The CJEU’s interpretation of the right to a fair trial is in some 
respects more specific and extensive than that provided by the ECtHR. It was also shown that 
the right to a fair trial applies to the enforcement stage of civil proceedings,2 and guarantees a 
right to enforcement. The Chapter also discussed whether some kind of hierarchy could be 
discerned within the right to a fair trial. While in principle all aspects of the fair trial are equally 
deserving of protection, it was shown that they can be distinguished according to their function 
in achieving a fair trial3 and according to how a failure to observe them could be remedied.4 
The next Chapter explores how these factors could play a role in the decision whether or not 
the creditor’s right to enforcement should take precedence over the violation suffered by the 
judgment debtor in the context of an application for refusal of recognition or enforcement. 
                                                 
 
1 Chapter 4.2.  
2 Chapter 4.3.6.  
3 Chapter 4.4. 
4 Chapter 4.3.7. 
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B. The ECtHR has limited jurisdiction to review the application of 
EU legislation 
 
Chapter 5 showed that the ECtHR developed the Bosphorus doctrine for addressing potential 
fundamental rights violations that occurred due to the application of EU law. The Bosphorus 
line of case law is based on the premise that the EU provides ‘equivalent protection’ to that 
provided by the ECHR. In Povse, the ECtHR applied this reasoning to the free movement of 
civil judgments. Chapter 5 argued that Povse suffers from twisted logic due to the ECtHR not 
being well placed to deal with a violation involving several states.5 The ECtHR’s jurisdiction 
is based on individual responsibility of states for violations occurring within their jurisdiction. 
This mechanism is not designed for addressing situations that are not only the result of 
obligations placed on those states by virtue of their Membership of the EU. The ECtHR’s 
Bosphorus doctrine is difficult to apply to the cross-border context.6 The limitations of the 
ECtHR’s jurisdiction over the application of EU law are especially problematic in the context 
of mutual recognition, since the ECtHR has essentially sanctioned the concentration of 
decision-making power in the Member State of origin, which, it is submitted, may at times be 
unacceptable. 
C. The European Union has committed itself to protecting 
fundamental rights 
It was extensively discussed that the EU has committed itself to protecting fundamental rights.7 
Article 2 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) states that the EU is ‘founded on […] respect 
for human rights’. Article 6 TEU affirms that the EU recognises the rights and freedoms set 
out in the EU CFR and that these shall have the same value as the Treaties: they are therefore 
primary EU law. As discussed in Chapter 4, through their incorporation into the EU CFR, the 
EU is indirectly bound by the rights laid down in the ECHR, and their interpretation by the 
ECtHR. Moreover, the EU professes itself to be, among other things, an ‘area of freedom, 
security and justice’. In the 1999 Tampere Conclusions, the purpose of the creation of such an 
area is shown to be firmly rooted in the Union’s commitment to fundamental rights.8 The 
principle of mutual recognition, whose adoption the Tampere Conclusions endorse, was 
therefore clearly intended to improve European citizens’ access to justice and to ensure that 
they could exercise their rights everywhere in Europe without being hindered by borders. This 
commitment to the effective enjoyment of rights is reaffirmed by the later policy programmes 
discussed in earlier Chapters. It is submitted that it would be incongruous if the implementation 
of the principle of mutual recognition, which is intended to improve the legal position of 
European citizens, would have the side effect of allowing judgments that are the result of an 
unfair procedure to be enforced, especially is previously there had been a perfectly effective 
                                                 
 
5 Chapter 5.4. 
6 Chapter 5.4.2. 
7 Chapter 6.2. 
8 Tampere Conclusions, no.1.  
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remedy. If the EU is committed to ensuring its citizens can effectively exercise their rights, 
what rights can be more important than those guaranteed by the ECHR and the EU CFR? 
D. Absolute mutual trust is incompatible with effective fundamental 
rights protection 
 
Furthermore, the degree of mutual trust between the Member States that is necessary for mutual 
recognition to function effectively arguably does not in fact exist, and neither can those 
Member States be expected to rely on it. The European legislature appears to be working on 
the assumption that mutual trust is at a sufficient level to allow measures such as the exequatur 
to be abolished, but this has been doubted.9 Moreover, even the EU legislature has 
acknowledged that there are differences between the Member States’ legal systems, both in 
theory and in practice, which may prove detrimental to mutual trust.10 
The necessity of exceptions to mutual recognition was acknowledged in the field of asylum 
law by the judgments in M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece (ECtHR) and N.S. and M.E. and others 
(CJEU). As discussed in Chapter 5, in N.S., the CJEU ruled that if there are ‘systemic flaws’ 
in the conditions the asylum seeker in question would be subjected to in the Member State that 
he would be returned to, an exception to the principle of mutual recognition would be allowed. 
Chapter 5 argued that a similar emergency brake is necessary in the field of civil justice 
cooperation, but that the ‘systemic’ threshold developed by the CJEU is inappropriate.11 
In Melloni, the CJEU underlined the important role of harmonised standards of fundamental 
rights protection in EU legislation in the application of mutual recognition. It is submitted that, 
provided they are of sufficient quality, such harmonised standards may of course contribute 
greatly to the protection of fundamental rights in the context of mutual recognition. The 
important question however is, according to this research, what happens when these standards 
have proved to be insufficient, or they have been disregarded. It is submitted that the existence 
of harmonised standards in secondary legislation cannot be an adequate substitute for cross-
border control at the enforcement stage. Cases such as Maronier v. Larmer and Zarraga show 
that the existence of legislative safeguards does not prevent problems occurring: rules can be 
disregarded, or wrongly applied. The real, and difficult, question is what happens when the 
                                                 
 
9 Chapter 2.2.3. 
10 This is shown by the fact that Brussels Ibis includes an attempt to preclude parties from using so-called 
‘torpedo actions’, whereby they bring a claim in a Member State where civil procedures are known to take very 
long (see Franzosi (1997)). Even if this Member State has no jurisdiction, the lis pendens rules of the Brussels I 
Regulation required that no other court could consider the matter before the court first seised declines 
jurisdiction. Article 31(2) of Brussels Ibis attempts to prevent this by allowing the court specified in an 
exclusive choice-of-court agreement to examine the case without having to wait for the court first seised to 
decline jurisdiction. According to Recital 22 of the Regulation, this rule has the purpose of preventing ‘abusive 
litigation tactics’. The European legislature is therefore clearly aware that differences in the efficiency of 
Member States’ justice systems exist and may be exploited. 
11 Chapter 5.3.3. 
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existing standards have proved insufficient. In such cases, it is submitted, absolute mutual trust 
of Member States in each other’s legal systems cannot be demanded. 
To sum up, there are both practical and fundamental legal arguments to be made against 
requiring Member States to rely fully on mutual trust and expecting absolute mutual 
recognition. This has been acknowledged in the fields of EU criminal law and asylum law. It 
is submitted that EU civil procedure should do likewise, since, as has been discussed at length 
in this research, fundamental rights violations occur also in this field. The next Chapter 
proposes that an exception to mutual trust should be possible for extreme cases. 
E. The European legislature is uniquely placed to address cross-
border fundamental rights concerns 
 
It can also be argued that the Povse decision, which applied the Bosphorus doctrine to the cross-
border enforcement of judgments, does not in any way absolve the EU and its Member States 
from the obligation to adequately protect fundamental rights. It was shown that the Bosphorus 
doctrine emanates from the ECtHR’s lack of jurisdiction to review Member State’s actions 
when they apply EU law. By contrast, the EU, whose legislative authority is based precisely 
on the existence of the cross-border element, is perfectly placed to design a solution that 
adequately protects the rights of the individual litigant. It has the capability of designing 
instruments such as regulations which apply in each Member State in the same way and whose 
application can be supervised, both by the CJEU and through monitoring activities by the 
European political institutions. It is not hindered, as the ECtHR is, by the fact that it can only 
deal with one specific situation, involving one state, at a time. To conclude, Povse should be 
seen as a sign of encouragement, a signal that the EU must take its obligations as an 
organisation which respects fundamental rights seriously. In Povse, but also in the judgments 
preceding it, the ECtHR gave the European legislature the perfect basis for assuming a role as 
a fundamental rights protector in its own right, which does not interfere with the ECtHR’s 
jurisdiction.  
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7 Towards an ‘emergency brake’ in instruments of EU civil 
procedure 
 
7.1 Introduction: the need for an emergency brake 
 
This Chapter proposes that European Union (EU) regulations on recognition and enforcement 
should retain an ‘emergency brake’ of the kind provided by the public policy exception: a 
ground for refusal of recognition or enforcement that is capable of remedying fundamental 
rights violations, that can be applied by the Member State where recognition or enforcement is 
sought (the Member State addressed). Chapters 2 and 3 showed that the refusal grounds have 
proven to act as a mechanism for detection and remediation of violations of the right to a fair 
trial and other fundamental rights.1 It was argued that in the cases where the public policy 
exception was applied, the violation could only have been detected through cross-border 
review. This is not only because in these cases the parties affected by the violations were unable 
to invoke a remedy in the Member State of origin, but also because Member States may not be 
able to critically assess and disqualify their own legal system and judicial culture.2 For this 
reason, many authors have previously argued in favour of such an emergency brake for 
exceptional cases.3 In addition to the preceding arguments, the following three reasons are 
offered as to why an emergency brake is indispensable, especially in the current legal and 
political situation.  
This research proposes that, from the viewpoint of fundamental rights protection, it is unwise 
to abolish a safeguard that has been proven to act as an effective mechanism for highlighting 
fundamental rights violations and limiting their effects.4 It could be argued that the possibility 
of refusing enforcement is a remedy which is only available to debtors lucky enough to have 
assets located in a Member State other than that where the judgment was rendered. From this 
perspective, abolishing refusal grounds only serves to achieve equality between cross-border 
cases and domestic cases, in which such a remedy would not be available. Correct though this 
                                                 
 
1 Chapter 3.2.7. 
2 Chapter 3.4.1.  
3 De Cristofaro concludes that the “goal of enhancing free movement on the basis of absolute mutual recognition 
cannot be attained to the detriment of fundamental rights”; De Cristofaro (2011) p. 451 ; Frąckowiak-Adamska 
(2015); Lopez de Tejada (2013); Schlosser (2010) p. 103; Oberhammer (2010) p. 202; Kramer (2011b) p. 640; 
Dickinson (2011) p. 8-10; Schack (2011); Vlas (2013) p. 624; Layton (2011) p 7. Contra: Hess (2001) p. 394; 
Stein (2004) p. 182. 
4 Cuniberti and Rueda (2011) p. 302. 
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observation may be, there are two counterarguments. The first is that if one takes the view, as 
this research does, that the purpose of fundamental rights law is to prevent or remedy all 
violations, it cannot be argued that removing an effective mechanism for doing so is acceptable 
as ‘collateral damage’ of the implementation of free movement of judgments.5 Whether this is 
acceptable is a political decision, requiring debate as to how the balance should be struck 
between efficiency and fundamental rights protection.  
Secondly, it can be argued that cross-border disputes, which are often conducted over a great 
geographical distance and where differences in language and procedural culture exist, carry a 
higher risk of miscommunication and misinformation, which may impact on the fairness of the 
trial. Partly this increased risk is acknowledged by the existence of a special refusal ground 
intended to protect the defaulting defendant, under Article 45(1)(b) of Brussels I bis and its 
equivalents.6 It was discussed that even the second-generation instruments (the European 
Enforcement Order for uncontested claims (EEO), European Order for Payment (EOP), and 
European Small Claims Procedure (ESCP) Regulations) acknowledge that cross-border service 
of documents may provide minimum standards for service,7 but recent case law shows that 
these may not prevent mistakes.8 The difficulties associated with service in cross-border cases 
are also demonstrated by the existence of a specific Regulation concerning the service of 
documents in civil and commercial matters within the EU.9  
A final and important argument for keeping some kind of emergency brake is that it may be 
the only way of remedying judgments that are the result of corruption in the Member State of 
origin. Corruption within the judiciary can never be ruled out. The EU, the Council of Europe,10 
and other international organisations such as the World Justice Project,11 produce regular 
reports concerning the independence of the judiciary in European countries. For example, the 
2014 Anti-Corruption Report of the European Commission to the Parliament and the Council, 
which reports on corruption and the ways this is addressed in the Member States, found that, 
at least where corruption is concerned, judicial independence is under pressure in some 
Member States. Some of the country reports also highlight concerns with regard to specific 
Member States.12 The EU Justice Scoreboard, produced by the European Commission, in 2013 
                                                 
 
5 Kramer (2011b) p. 221; De Cristofaro (2011) p. 451; Muir Watt (2001) p. 554. 
6 Chapter 2.3.2.2. 
7 See Chapters 2.3.6 and 2.3.7; Kramer (2011b) p. 226-228. 
8 In a recent judgment, eco cosmetics/Raiffeisenbank, the CJEU ruled that a European order for payment that was 
not served in accordance with those standards could not benefit from the enforcement regime of the EOP 
Regulation: CJEU Case C-119/13 and 120/13 eco cosmetics and Raiffeisenbank para. 483. See 8.5.1 
9 Regulation (EC) No 1393/2007 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 November 2007 on the 
service in the Member States of judicial and extrajudicial documents in civil or commercial matters (service of 
documents) and repealing Council Regulation (EC) No 1348/2000, OJ L 324/79 (‘Service Regulation’). 
10 See for example the reports of the European Commission for the Efficiency of Justice (CEPEJ) whose reports 
are available at http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/cooperation/cepej/evaluation/default_en.asp. 
11 See for example their ‘Rule of Law Project’, available at http://data.worldjusticeproject.org/#.  
12 For example, the country report concerning Bulgaria pointed towards ‘integrity challenges’ concerning the 
nomination and selection of Constitutional Justices and ‘flaws’ in the Parliaments involvement in judicial 
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showed a “rather low level of perception of judicial independence by business-end users in 
certain Member States”.13 Given these conclusions, it cannot be assumed that judgments 
delivered in Europe are never the result of a procedure in which corruption was present, for 
instance because a judge was bribed. 
As has been argued by Stadler and Kramer, enforcing a judgment that is the result of corruption 
may be at odds with the right to a fair trial.14 In such cases a cross-border remedy such as 
refusal of enforcement may be especially necessary because an available remedy in the 
Member State of origin is hardly satisfactory in such cases. As Stadler puts it, “it goes very far 
to expect a debtor in such cases to once again put his trust in the justice system of the state 
where the judgment was rendered and to invoke a remedy there”.15 The necessity of a cross-
border check in cases of corruption is illustrated by the Yukos Oil vs. Rosneft case, discussed 
below.16 
To conclude, this research considers that there are sufficient arguments for maintaining an 
emergency brake in EU instruments that facilitate cross-border recognition and enforcement. 
This Chapter discusses what such an emergency brake should look like. It is considered 
whether it is preferable, with a view to protecting the right to a fair trial, to retain a public 
policy exception, or to replace this with an explicit reference to fair trial (Section 7.2). Section 
7.3 provides guidelines for the application of such an emergency brake. Section 7.4 discusses 
the need for other more specific refusal grounds, such as the protection for the defaulting 
defendant provided by Article 45(1)(b) of the Brussels I bis Regulation. Section 7.5 discusses 
the specific context of judgments ordering the return of the child or access to a child. 
 
7.2 The nature of the emergency brake: procedural public policy or 
fair trial 
 
7.2.1 Introduction 
 
                                                 
 
appointments (p. 9) while the report on Hungary highlights some serious concerns regarding such matters as the 
premature termination of the mandate of the former president of the Supreme Court, extensive powers attributed 
to the President of the National Judicial council (an administrative body) to transfer cases (p. 4-5). European 
Commission, EU Anti-Corruption Report 2014, country reports of Bulgaria and Hungary, available at  
13 European Commission, The EU Justice Scoreboard, COM(2013) 160 final, p. 21. 
14 Kramer (2012) p. 129; Stadler (2004b) p. 8. 
15 Stadler (2004b) p. 8. 
16 See under 7.3.7.6. 
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The previous section made a case for the retention of some kind of refusal ground in EU 
legislation on recognition and enforcement that should be capable of remedying fundamental 
rights violations. This section addresses what that refusal ground should look like. 
As described in Chapter 2, in 2010 the European Commission in 2010 proposed to replace the 
public policy exception of the Brussels I Regulation with a much narrower refusal ground.17 It 
was proposed that a defendant would be able to contest a judgment’s recognition or 
enforcement in the Member State where it was sought when such recognition or enforcement 
“would not be permitted by the fundamental principles underlying the right to a fair trial.”18 
The 2010 Proposal did not explain in detail the reasons for replacing the public policy exception 
with this much narrower refusal ground.  
As discussed, this proposed limitation prompted much criticism from the European Parliament 
and individual commentators.19 The criticism focused mostly on the political implications of 
replacing public policy with a narrow reference to a fair trial. The European Parliament’s 
Report stated that the public policy exception was necessary for Member States to safeguard 
their fundamental values.20 It was also stated that the European Commission had not made a 
convincing case for including only the procedural aspect of public policy, thereby abolishing 
substantive public policy.21 Eventually, the public policy exception in Brussels I bis remained 
substantively as it was in Brussels I. 
What was not explicitly addressed during the discussions was the fundamental question of the 
difference between a public policy exception and a more narrow reference to fundamental 
principles underlying the right to a fair trial. Chapter 3 discussed that public policy certainly 
encompasses fundamental rights, as confirmed by the Court of Justice of the European Union 
(CJEU) in Krombach v. Bamberski.22 Yet, as a concept it is wider, and it should therefore be 
carefully considered whether there is a benefit from the viewpoint of fundamental rights to 
having this open-ended concept incorporated into legislation. The goal here is to ascertain 
whether the public policy exception provides advantages over a reference to fair trial. The value 
of public policy is traditionally seen as mainly political, allowing States an opportunity to 
protect national values; it is assumed that public policy could be done away with if it is accepted 
that Member States share common values.23 This Chapter questions that assumption. 
                                                 
 
17 Chapter 2.2.2. 
18 Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on jurisdiction and the recognition 
and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters (Recast) COM(2010) 748 final (2010 Proposal). 
19 Layton (2011) p. 7; Dickinson (2011) p. 8-9; Nielsen (2012) p. 592-593; Kramer (2011a) p. 640; Cuniberti and 
Rueda (2011) p. 312-315. 
20 European Parliament, Draft Report on the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the 
Council on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters (recast) 
(COM(2010)0748 – C7-0433/2010 – 2010/0383(COD)) 28 June 2011, p. 26-27. 
21 Layton (2011) p. 7; Dickinson (2011) p. 8-9. 
22 Chapter 3.2.5.  
23 E.g. Frąckowiak-Adamska (2015) p. 25. 
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As this book concerns the role of the right to a fair trial in the context of recognition and 
enforcement, this chapter focuses primarily on the right to a fair trial as protected by Article 
6(1) European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR) and 47 EU Convention on Fundamental 
Rights (EU CFR). The question that is asked is whether, for the purposes of protecting the right 
to a fair trial in the cross-border context, the public policy exception could be adequately 
replaced with a reference to the right to a fair trial. The chapter therefore compares the current 
situation, in which some regulations allow recognition or enforcement to be refused where it 
would be incompatible with public policy, with a hypothetical situation in which recognition 
or enforcement could be refused where it would be incompatible with Article 6(1) ECHR or 
47 EU CFR. This means that the discussion primarily concerns the procedural aspect of public 
policy, though the substantive aspect of public policy is not forgotten.24 
The reason that the current public policy exception is compared to a situation in which the right 
to a fair trial would serve as a criterion for recognition and enforcement is not that these are the 
only two legislative options available. It would be possible, for example, to include a reference 
to “fundamental principles underlying the right to a fair trial” in the regulations, as the 2010 
Proposal for the recast Brussels I Regulation proposed, or some other variation.25 It would 
however be difficult to assess what the consequences would be of replacing the public policy 
exception with such a refusal ground without knowing more about what would constitute such 
fundamental principles. The analysis would become highly theoretical and would likely not 
yield very useful conclusions. The right to a fair trial of Article 6(1) ECHR/ 47 EU CFR 
however, provides a clear reference point, and a comparison between these Articles and the 
public policy exception serves to clarify the particularities of the public policy exception as 
opposed to a fair trial. The conclusion then returns to the question whether, if the public policy 
exception can be replaced as a refusal ground, its replacement should be a reference to Article 
6(1) specifically or a more general concept of fair trial, due process, or another criterion. 
This chapter proceeds as follows. It seeks to ascertain whether a reference to the right to a fair 
trial can adequately replace the public policy exception by analysing its scope, character and 
manner of interpretation. It is shown that the fair trial is clearly a fundamental principle 
underlying the legal order of the EU and its Member States (Section 7.2.2). It is considered 
whether the nature of the right to a fair trial and its interpretation render it suitable to be used 
as a yardstick for the review of foreign judgments (Section 7.2.3). 
Next, it is discussed what replacing public policy with the right to a fair trial would mean for 
the scope of this refusal ground. The next section then discusses a number of iterations of 
procedural public policy which would not be covered by the right to a fair trial, and which 
would therefore fall outside the scope of the refusal ground (Section 7.2.4). It is shown that 
                                                 
 
24 Section 7.2.5. 
25 For instance, Article 33 of the recently adopted Insolvency Regulation refers to the Member State’s “public 
policy, in particular its fundamental principles or the constitutional rights and liberties of the individual’. 
Regulation (EU) 2015/… of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 May 2015 on insolvency 
proceedings (recast) 2012/0360 (COD) LEX 1607, PE-CONS 31/15 (not yet published in the Official Journal). 
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though the right to a fair trial to a large extent defines procedural public policy, the two concepts 
are not identical. 
It must be emphasised that the discussion only concerns the relationship between fair trial and 
procedural public policy. The need for a substantive public policy exception is discussed 
separately in Section 7.2.5. Finally, a conclusion is drawn on the suitability of fair trial as a 
yardstick in Section 7.2.6. 
7.2.2 The right to a fair trial as a fundamental principle 
 
In order to assess whether there is an added value to having a public policy clause as opposed 
to only a reference to a fair trial, it is necessary to analyse to what extent the two concepts 
overlap and what the differences between them are. An immediate caveat is that, as Chapter 
3.2.1 explained, public policy can be defined as “the complex of norms at the very heart of a 
political entity”, and as such its content may vary across time and place.26 It is therefore not 
possible to provide a complete overview of what principles constitute public policy at a given 
time. It is very difficult to say a priori what the consequences would be of replacing procedural 
public policy with a reference to the right to a fair trial. It is shown below that the current 
interpretation of procedural public policy to a large extent corresponds with, or is even derived 
from, Article 6(1) ECHR/47 EU CFR. But this is not to say that the concepts are identical. 
Even the commonly accepted fundamental right to a fair trial is subject to varying 
interpretations that are closely related to national ideas about what constitutes a fair civil 
procedure, but which are all in principle compatible with Article 6(1) and the European Court 
of Human Rights’ (ECtHR) case law on this point. An example is the right to a reasoned 
judgment.27 Apart from these existing discrepancies, it is well understood that public policy 
may evolve over time. A conclusion that currently, procedural public policy in the EU Member 
States to a large extent coincides with Articles 6(1) ECHR/47 EU CFR28 may not necessarily 
hold true in future. 
There is no doubt however that in the current legal-political constellation, the right to a fair 
trial does constitute a fundamental principle of the legal orders of the Member States of the 
EU, as well as the EU as such. The inclusion of the principle of fair trial in the ECHR and in 
the EU CFR – which binds the EU as well as its Member States – in itself testifies to that, 
though fair trial has been a feature of European constitutional culture for far longer.29 There is 
                                                 
 
26 Chapter 3.2.  
27 See 7.2.6. 
28 Hess and Pfeiffer (2011) p. 155. 
29 The right to a fair trial can be found in the Magna Carta, the charter of rights agreed between King John of 
England and a number of rival barons in 1215, a document which influenced the constitutional development of 
England, the United States and the entire modern world: Van Caenegem (1995) p. 80. It is also apparent in the 
maxim of audiatur et alteram pars (or audite et alteram partem), loosely translated as the principle of an 
adversarial trial, which was found in Roman law. See Smits (2008) p. 97. 
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however no doubt that Article 6(1) ECHR has been adopted by national courts and that it has 
had a profound influence on national case law, on legislation and on legal procedural culture.30 
The right to a fair trial clearly also constitutes part of the EU’s public policy. For example, in 
Kadi the CJEU applied fundamental rights as constitutional principles of the EU, which cannot 
be set aside for the purposes of international cooperation: 
285 It follows from all those considerations that the obligations imposed by an 
international agreement cannot have the effect of prejudicing the constitutional 
principles of the EC Treaty, which include the principle that all Community acts must 
respect fundamental rights, that respect constituting a condition of their lawfulness 
which it is for the Court to review in the framework of the complete system of legal 
remedies established by the Treaty.31 
There can therefore be no doubt that fundamental rights, as enshrined by the ECtHR and in the 
Charter, are part of the public policy of the EU and (therefore) its Member States. As Chapter 
3 discussed in detail, this conclusion was confirmed both by the CJEU32 and Member State 
courts. The 2011 Report on the Interpretation of the Public Policy Exception by Hess and 
Pfeiffer shows that the majority of cases where public policy was applied by courts concerned 
procedural public policy.33 Moreover, it was shown that in most of these cases, national courts 
derive the content of public policy from international fundamental rights treaties such as the 
ECHR, primarily Article 6 ECHR.34 Chapter 3 discussed a number of examples.35 It seems 
clear that procedural issues are the primary reason for invoking and applying the public policy 
exception, and that the content of public policy is in those cases derived from Article 6(1) 
ECHR36.37 
7.2.3 The suitability of the right to a fair trial as a yardstick for refusing 
enforcement 
 
                                                 
 
30 See for the Netherlands Smits (2008) p. 19-20. 
31 CJEU Joined Cases C-402/05 P and C-415/05 P Kadi and Al Barakaat International Foundation v Council and 
Commission ECLI:EU:C:2008:461, para. 285. 
32 CJEU Krombach v. Bamberski para. 38-39; Case C-394/07 Marco Gambazzi v. DaimlerChrysler Canada Inc. 
and CIBC Mellon Trust Company ECLI:EU:C:2009:219, para. 28.  
33 Hess and Pfeiffer (2011) p. 57-59. 
34 Hess and Pfeiffer (2011) p. 155.  
35 Chapter 3.2.6. 
36 Beaumont and Johnston (2010b) p. 261.  
37 Though the remit of substantive public policy is very limited, as shown by a case such as Diageo v. Simiramida, 
it may nevertheless play a role in the protection of fundamental rights (CJEU Case C 681/13 Diageo Brands v 
Simiramida-04 EOOD ECLI:EU:C:2015:471, discussed in Chapter 3.2.4; see Hazelhorst (2016). See section 
7.2.5.  
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If the content of procedural public policy is largely derived from the right to a fair trial, does 
this mean that fair trial could replace procedural public policy? This section considers the 
nature of the right to a fair trial in order to show what the consequences of such a replacement 
would be. It is shown that the right to a fair trial cannot be legitimately restricted, though it is 
subject to inherent limitations. It is also shown that though the ECtHR applies the right to a fair 
trial extensively and accords Contracting States little margin of appreciation, Contracting 
States nevertheless enjoy discretion as to how they conduct a fair trial. It is considered whether 
these characteristics mean that fair trial is suitable as a criterion to apply in the context of cross-
border recognition and enforcement, and what potential problems this may cause. 
Chapter 3 already extensively discussed the various elements of the right to a fair trial, so this 
is not required here. It should be remembered that Article 6(1) includes a right to a fair and 
public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established 
by law. The right to access to a court is inherent to the right to a fair trial.38 The element of a 
“fair hearing” can be further divided into such requirements as the right to an adversarial trial, 
the right to equality of arms, and the right to a reasoned judgment. Article 6(1) does not suggest 
a hierarchical relationship between the elements.  
7.2.3.1 Absolute character of Article 6(1) and interpretation 
It is generally accepted that the right contained in the ECHR can be divided into categories 
according to whether, and in what way, their exercise can be limited. There are different ways 
of making such distinctions;39 for the purposes of this research, it is useful to distinguish 
between absolute rights, qualified rights, and limited rights, in which Article 6(1) belongs to 
the latter category. Absolute rights are non-derogable: they contain no grounds on which they 
can be restricted (for instance Arts. 4(2) and (3)(c) (the prohibition on forced labour) and Art. 
5 (habeas corpus)). Some of them are also ‘notstandsfest’, which means they cannot be 
derogated from even in times of war or another public emergency (Art. 15(1) and (2) ECHR). 
This category includes Articles 3 (the prohibition on torture), Article 4(1) (the prohibition of 
slavery) and Article 7 (the principle of “no punishment without law”).  
Qualified rights are rights that Contracting States may interfere with in order to secure certain 
interests, which are expressly stated in the Article. Such interests are either the needs of society 
as a whole (such as public health or public safety), or the rights of others. Qualified rights 
include the right to respect for private and family life, home and correspondence in Article 8 
ECHR; freedom of thought, conscience and religion in Article 9; and freedom of expression in 
                                                 
 
38 ECtHR Golder v. UK appl. no. 4451/70 ECHR A18. 
39 Kiestra (2014) p. 38.  
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Article 10. In the balancing of these fundamental rights against the interests that the 
interference is intended to secure, Contracting Parties enjoy a margin of appreciation.40 
Article 6(1) ECHR contains no limitation clauses that apply to the Article in its entirety, which 
means Contracting Parties may not restrict its application. The only element of Article 6(1) that 
can be restricted is the requirement of publicity.41 However, Article 6(1) contains inherent 
limitations;42 for example, the ECtHR has accepted that the right to access to a court may be 
limited, because this right is not expressly defined in Article 6(1).43 Article 6(1) can therefore 
be seen as a limited right. The difference with qualified rights such as Article 8 ECHR is that 
Article 6(1) does not expressly provide for these limitations and that Contracting Parties enjoy 
less discretion.44 It can be concluded that Article 6(1) cannot be restricted, apart from the 
requirement of publicity (as provided for in the Article) and the limitation inherent to the right 
to access to a court. 
That said, the concept of fairness is always subject to interpretation. It can be derived from the 
foregoing that when a trial cannot be considered fair, Article 6(1) will have been violated. But 
what is considered fair differs depending on the circumstances of the case. When the ECtHR 
is called upon to review whether a procedure was fair, it will look at the trial in its entirety.45 
There are few procedural defects that will conflict with fair trial to such an extent that an 
opinion can be given about the fairness of the trial irrespective of the further course of the 
proceedings. One example may be national legislation that completely prevents a person from 
effectively defending himself, such as the French law that prevented Mr Krombach from 
entering an appearance. Alternatively, it is possible that procedural defects are repaired at a 
later stage of the trial, for example during appeal, so that the procedure as a whole can be 
considered fair.46 This approach means that there is no one correct way of conducting a fair 
civil trial. The ECtHR has avoided giving an enumeration of criteria in the abstract by which 
the fairness of a procedure can be assessed.47 This means that Contracting States are free to 
shape the civil trial in such a way as they consider appropriate, but that the ECtHR will assess 
on a case-by-case basis whether the requirements of a fair trial have been met.  
7.2.3.2 Margin of appreciation and possibilities for restriction 
 
                                                 
 
40 See below.  
41 See 4.3.3.  
42 Gerards (2011) p. 108; Kiestra (2014) p. 41. 
43 Chapter 4.3.2.1; Arai (2001) p. 35; ECtHR Golder, para. 38. 
44 Arai shows that the ECtHR has over time become more stringent in its assessment whether limitations on the 
right to access were proportional: Arai (2001) p. 39-43. 
45 E.g. ECtHR Barberà, Messegué and Jabardo v. Spain, appl. no. 10590/83 ECHR A146; ECtHR Kostovski v. 
The Netherlands (merits) appl. no. 11454/85 A166.  
46 Mole and Harby (2006) p. 6; Chapter 4.2.4. 
47 Van Dijk and Viering (2006) p. 579; Smits (2008) p. 99. 
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While Article 6 ECHR is therefore subject to interpretation, this does not mean that it cannot 
provide a clear and common benchmark for Member State courts to apply. An indication of the 
fundamentality of Article 6(1) is the fact that, as opposed to other rights laid down in the ECHR, 
it is subject to extensive interpretation by the ECtHR. As the previous section explained, the 
ECHR allows Contracting States to limit the exercise of certain provisions in order to secure 
certain interests; in this consideration, they enjoy a margin of appreciation. This doctrine is 
grounded in the ECtHR’s consideration that national authorities may at times be ‘better placed’ 
to decide to what extent limitations on ECHR rights are necessary to protect certain values or 
interests.48 
Such a margin of appreciation does not play a significant role in the application of most 
elements of Article 6(1) ECHR, because it cannot legitimately be restricted.49 However, there 
are elements of Article 6(1) where a certain margin of appreciation applies. Its role is most 
notable with regard to the right to access to a court, which according to the ECtHR may be 
limited provided that the “very essence” of the right is not impaired, the limitation pursues a 
legitimate aim, and there must be a reasonable relationship of proportionality between the aim 
and the means employed.50 The ECtHR also accorded Contracting Parties a margin of 
appreciation with regard to the admissibility of evidence, where it considered that domestic 
courts are better placed to decide on such matters.51 Contracting States also have a margin of 
appreciation with regard to the right to a public hearing and the public pronouncement of the 
judgment, because Contracting Parties may limit this right in the interests of morals, public 
order or national security. They enjoy a margin of discretion in this regard, though how wide 
this margin is depends on the aim the restriction of publicity is intended to achieve.52 Chapter 
4 also discussed that the ECtHR leaves some discretion to Contracting Parties concerning the 
extent to which judgments contain reasoning;53 when deciding whether a judgment was 
adequately motivated, it takes into consideration what the national practice is in that regard. 
This is however only one of the factors the ECtHR takes into account when deciding whether 
the motivation is adequate. The ECtHR in these cases still reviews thoroughly whether the 
judgment was sufficiently motivated.54  
                                                 
 
48 ECtHR Handyside v. UK, appl. no. 5493/72 ECHR A24 para. 48.  
49 Legg (2012) p. 210.  
50 ECtHR Ashingdane v. UK appl. no. 8225/78 ECHR A93; see 4.2.4.  
51 Arai (2001) p. 49. 
52 Arai (2001) p. 50; compare e.g. ECtHR Campbell and Fell v. UK appl. nos. 7819/77 7878/77 ECHR A80, para. 
87 (public security) with the stricter approach in ECtHR Le Compte, Van Leuven and De Meyere v. Belgium 
[merits], appl. nos. 6878/75 7238/75 ECHR A43 (professional secrecy and the right to privacy of doctors and their 
patients).  
53 Chapter 4.3.2.7. 
54 See for example the extensive examination of the parties’ arguments and submissions and whether they needed 
to be discussed in the judgment in ECtHR Ruiz Torija v. Spain, appl. no. 18390/91, ECHR A303-A, para. 30. 
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7.2.3.3 Extensive interpretation and the ‘fourth instance’ doctrine 
 
In Delcourt v. Belgium, the ECtHR ruled that Article 6(1) is subject to extensive interpretation. 
In its assessment whether a certain restriction was necessary for the protection of morals, the 
ECtHR considered the following: 
In a democratic society within the meaning of the Convention, the right to a fair 
administration of justice holds such a prominent place that a restrictive interpretation 
of Article 6 para. 1 would not correspond to the aim and the purpose of that provision 
[…].55 
While there are many ways in which Contracting Parties may organise a fair trial, the ECtHR 
has the final say as to whether that fairness was achieved. In doing so, it will carry out a rigorous 
scrutiny of the trial as a whole. There is, however, a limitation to the review carried out by the 
ECtHR: the so-called “fourth instance” doctrine. This essentially means that the ECtHR does 
not deal with errors of fact and law: it does not get involved with the merits of the case.56 Yet, 
the ECtHR may intervene in respect to “errors of fact and law” in so far as they may have 
infringed the procedural rights guaranteed by Article 6(1).57 Consequently, in recent case law 
the ECtHR found that Article 6(1) had been violated by decisions that were “arbitrary or 
manifestly unreasonable”.58 
There is also a line of case law dealing with inconsistencies in judicial decisions. Though it is 
not for the ECtHR to deal with errors of fact and law, and though it acknowledges that 
irregularities are a necessary element of each justice system, it nevertheless may find a violation 
if “profound and long-standing differences” exist in the case law of the domestic courts. In 
such cases it will review “whether the domestic law provides for machinery for overcoming 
these inconsistencies, whether that machinery has been applied and, if appropriate, to what 
effect”.59 
If Article 6(1) were to become the criterion for deciding on the enforcement or recognition of 
a judgment, a national court could, quite legitimately, apply the ECtHR’s rulings in the 
aforementioned cases to arrive at the conclusion that recognition or enforcement could be 
refused. The prohibition against reviewing a judgment as to its substance applies to findings of 
fact and substantive law and to the exercise of discretion.60 It appears that the ECtHR’s rulings 
where it considered that inconsistencies in case law constituted violations may fall foul of this 
prohibition. 
 
                                                 
 
55 ECtHR Delcourt v. Belgium appl. no. 2689/65 ECHR A11 para. 25. 
56 ECtHR Garcia Ruiz v. Spain, appl. no. 30544/96 ECHR 1999-I, para. 48; Harris et al. (2014) p. 18. 
57 See Harris et al. (2014) p. 371. 
58 ECtHR Andelkovic v. Serbia, appl. no. 1401/08, 9 April 2013, para. 27. See further 3.4.2. 
59 ECtHR Albu and others v. Romania, appl. no. 34796/09 and 63 other cases, 10 May 2012; see 3.3.2.  
60 Jenard (1979) para. A1.198. 
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7.2.3.4 The suitability of fair trial as a criterion for recognition and enforcement 
 
What does all this mean for the suitability of the right to a fair trial as a criterion for the 
recognition or enforcement of foreign civil judgments within the EU? The advantage of the 
right to a fair trial as a criterion would be, firstly, that it embodies a principle that is recognised 
by all EU Member States and by the EU itself as being fundamental. This is also borne out by 
Member State and CJEU practice. An additional advantage is that it may not be restricted (apart 
from the requirement of publicity) and is not subject to a margin of appreciation, which reduces 
confusion and the ability to abuse the provision. Of course, the right to a fair trial is subject to 
interpretation according to the circumstances of the case: whether a trial has been fair must be 
assessed on a case-by-case basis. But this is also true for the public policy exception. In fact, 
the casuistic character of the right to a fair trial may prove to be an advantage. Practice has 
shown that the judgments whose enforcement is refused under the public policy requirement 
are extremely diverse. The public policy exception has functioned as a ‘catch-all’ provision,61 
which is capable of addressing a diversity of situations. In this sense, it would be undesirable 
to create – if this were even possible – a ‘hard and fast’ rule according to which the acceptability 
of foreign judgments could be assessed. The room for interpretation which the right to a fair 
trial allows in this regard fulfils the same function as a public policy criterion: it is deliberately 
open to interpretation, so that cases can be assessed in their entirety, and it remains possible to 
do justice to the specific circumstances of the case.  
It was shown above that what constitutes a fair trial differs according to the circumstances of 
the case; the elements of the right to a fair trial are subject to interpretation in the light of those 
circumstances. What must be emphasised however is that the fact that these elements are 
subject to interpretation in a specific case does not mean that Contracting States can form 
different opinions on what is a ‘fair’ trial. It is the circumstances of the case that determine 
whether a fair trial has been conducted or not, not the Contracting States’ interpretation of the 
notion of fair trial or one of its components. In that sense, the right to a fair trial provides a 
common standard that is not subject to a margin of appreciation on the part of the Contracting 
States. This is not diminished by the fact that the right to a fair trial does not prescribe exactly 
what a fair trial should look like. It seems obvious that, if fair trial became the yardstick, this 
would considerably reduce Member State’s freedom to apply a national definition of fair trial 
comparable to the public policy exception. Currently, public policy, at least in theory, allows 
Member States to refuse recognition or enforcement of foreign judgments on the basis of 
domestic conceptions of a fair trial. It is however doubtful whether this reduction would have 
considerable practical impact, since the content of procedural public policy is already largely 
derived from Article 6(1) ECHR and because the CJEU monitors its application. Moreover, 
this reduction in scope may be beneficial with a view to protecting the right to a fair trial, since 
it reduces the possibility for EU Member States to apply an overly broad or conclusive 
                                                 
 
61 It was discussed that public policy performs a residual function with regard to the other, more specific grounds 
for refusal; see 2.23; CJEU Case 145/86 Hoffman v Krieg ECLI:EU:C:1988:61, para. 21. 
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conception of public policy. This improves legal certainty for the judgment creditor and 
therefore potentially helps to protect his right to enforcement. 
Using the fair trial as a yardstick to decide whether a foreign judgment should be recognised 
or enforced may create problems. There are ECtHR judgments where a violation of Article 
6(1) ECHR was found, but where application of the public policy exception would have been 
highly problematic. As Chapter 4 discussed, there is a line of case law dealing with 
inconsistencies in judicial decisions. Though it is not for the ECtHR to deal with errors of fact 
and law, and though it acknowledges that irregularities are a necessary element of each justice 
system, it nevertheless may find a violation if “profound and long-standing differences” exist 
in the case law of the domestic courts. In such cases it will review “whether the domestic law 
provides for machinery for overcoming these inconsistencies, whether that machinery has been 
applied and, if appropriate, to what effect”.62 If a fair trial were to become the criterion for 
deciding on the enforcement or recognition of a judgment, a national court could, quite 
legitimately, apply the ECtHR’s rulings in the aforementioned cases to arrive at the conclusion 
that recognition or enforcement could be refused. 
Although the ECtHR may consider itself well placed to carry out such a review, to allow a 
national court, asked to enforce a judgment from another EU Member State, to perform such a 
review, would be fundamentally at odds with the prohibition on review as to the substance 
which is one of the guiding principles of EU law on recognition and enforcement and private 
international law more generally. The national court would certainly not be allowed to apply 
the public policy exception of one of the existing instruments in such a way as to allow a review 
of the merits of the kind conducted in the aforementioned cases.63 This is therefore an example 
of a situation which would fall within the remit of Article 6(1) ECHR, but that should arguably 
not lead to refusal of recognition or enforcement. This highlights a risk of incorporating Article 
6(1) ECHR as a ground for refusal into the Regulations: Article 6, like all articles of the ECHR, 
is not static, but subject to evolving interpretation by the ECHR (the so-called ‘living 
instrument’ doctrine). If judgments can be refused enforcement because of their incompatibility 
with Article 6(1) ECHR, it is possible that an evolving interpretation of that article by the 
ECHR may widen the scope of that refusal ground in ways that cannot be foreseen at the time 
of adoption of the relevant regulation. It can however be asked if this is not preferable to the 
many potential and unpredictable interpretations that national courts may give to the public 
policy exception.64 More generally, the ECHR is a living instrument whose interpretation will 
evolve. While this is a good thing in the context of the ECtHR’s monitoring mechanism, where 
changes in society need to be taken into consideration, it potentially creates risks in the context 
of cross-border recognition and enforcement, where legal certainty is essential. 
From the perspective of the creditor, replacing procedural public policy with fair trial may have 
a considerable advantage. The next section shows that, though rare, there are examples of cases 
where EU Member States employed a conception of public policy that goes beyond the remit 
                                                 
 
62 ECtHR Albu and others v. Romania, para. 21. 
63 Article 52, Brussels I Regulation; Article 26 Brussels IIbis Regulation; Article 41 Succession Regulation. 
64 Some examples are discussed under 7.2.4.  
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of fair trial. For a creditor, this creates a risk of being confronted with overly inclusive national 
conceptions of public policy. Replacing procedural public policy with fair trial grounds may 
increase foreseeability and reduce this risk, contributing to better protection of the creditor’s 
right to enforcement by restricting the scope of public policy. 
Another potential benefit of replacing procedural public policy with fair trial grounds is that it 
would guarantee that violations of the fair trial would be remedied through the application of 
this refusal ground. Currently, recognition or enforcement may only be refused if such 
recognition or enforcement would be contrary to the public policy of the Member State 
addressed. In principle, therefore, refusal is only possible where the violation of procedural 
rights that occurred in the Member State of origin could not occur under the law of the Member 
State addressed. If that Member State’s law would also allow the violation, there would be no 
ground to refuse enforcement to the foreign judgment on the basis of public policy, because 
the judgment would not be contrary to the public policy of the Member State addressed.65 Since 
the CJEU held that the right to a fair trial is part of Member State’s public policy,66 and Member 
States in practice derive the content of public policy from the right to a fair trial,67 the problem 
should not occur. Enforcement or recognition should, as a matter of EU law, be refused to 
judgments from other Member States if those judgments result from procedures that are 
incompatible with a fair trial, even if the procedure in question would be compatible with the 
addressed Member State’s own law. Still, replacing procedural public policy with fair trial 
grounds would have the advantage of clarifying the status of a fair trial as a precondition for 
recognition and enforcement and removing the condition of incompatibility of the judgment 
with the national law and practice of the Member State addressed. 
 
7.2.4 Are procedural public policy and fair trial identical in scope?  
 
Replacing procedural public policy with fair trial grounds may have advantages from the 
perspective of foreseeability. Compared to the national concept of public policy, the fair trial 
is a common norm defined at the European level. Replacing public policy with fair trial grounds 
would also create benefits from the perspective of fundamental rights protection. The question 
remains as to what consequences such a replacement would have for the scope of the 
emergency brake; the types of cases that would come within its remit. It is discussed in this 
section that some cases that fall within the scope of public policy would fall outside the scope 
of a fair trial refusal ground, and vice versa. The question is whether this difference in 
respective coverage would be problematic.  
The previous paragraphs showed that fundamental rights are often used to shape the public 
policy exception. Of course there are also cases where public policy is applied to protect 
                                                 
 
65 Corthaut (2012) p. 186-187. 
66 CJEU Krombach v. Bamberski, para. 37. 
67 Hess and Pfeiffer (2011) p. 57-59; see the discussion under 7.2.3. 
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national values which, though certainly fundamental within their own legal order, are arguably 
not commensurate with the right to a fair trial. There are also elements of public policy which, 
though they are not covered by fair trial, nevertheless do touch on the fairness of the trial. An 
example is procedural fraud committed by one of the parties, rather than by the judge. These 
elements are discussed in turn. 
7.2.4.1 The inherent threshold of the public policy exception 
 
The preceding sections showed that the right to a fair trial largely overlaps with procedural 
public policy. This observation may justify the conclusion that fair trial grounds may 
adequately replace procedural public policy. Even so, do all violations of the right to a fair trial 
justify the application of the public policy exception, or should a distinction be made between 
violations, for instance on the basis of their seriousness, or according to the element of fair trial 
that was harmed? 
Case law shows that not all procedural irregularities are sufficient grounds for a refusal of 
recognition or enforcement. This is for two different reasons: firstly, because public policy may 
not be applied to refuse recognition or enforcement simply because the outcome of the case 
would have been different under national law of the Member State addressed. Secondly, the 
public policy exception may only be applied in the most serious of cases, where a manifest 
infringement of a fundamental principle has occurred. Practice shows that courts often reject 
an appeal to public policy where irregularities occurred in the original proceedings but were 
insufficiently serious, or where remedies were still available in the state of origin. This is 
reasonable, because application of a refusal ground has serious consequences: it completely 
prevents the judgment creditor from exercising his right to enforcement. 
In the literature on public policy, it is accepted that not all norms that are deemed part of public 
policy in a certain legal order are also sufficiently fundamental to be considered part of external 
public policy.68 External public policy (ordre public externe) only consists of those norms that 
are deemed fundamental to that legal order to the extent that they prevent foreign judgments or 
foreign law from taking effect.69 The requirements that the legal order imposes on domestic 
procedures therefore only have a reduced effect to foreign law or foreign judgments:70 foreign 
judgments cannot be required to comply with each specific rule that would apply in a domestic 
procedure. This does not mean, however, that all rules that apply in the state addressed are to 
be given a ‘reduced effect’. As Schilling argues, the right to a fair trial is itself already a more 
general and more fundamental version of domestic procedural norms.71 Such a fundamental 
norm should therefore not be accorded only a reduced effect in the context of cross-border 
                                                 
 
68 Corthaut (2012) p. 23. 
69 Chapter 3.2.1.  
70 Schilling (2012) p. 569.  
71 Schilling (2012) p. 569.  
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recognition and enforcement. In principle, therefore, all violations of the right to a fair trial 
should be considered grounds for refusing recognition or enforcement. 
The CJEU’s case law does not provide an indication that only qualified, i.e., sufficiently 
serious, violations of fundamental principles should lead to refusal or recognition of 
enforcement. The CJEU has consistently ruled that only ‘manifest’ breaches of fundamental 
rights should lead to the application of the public policy exception.72 However, as Chapter 3 
discussed, the qualification ‘manifest’ relates to the visibility or obviousness of the violation, 
as it is connected to the prohibition of review on the substance of the judgment.73 ‘Manifest’ 
does not refer to the seriousness of a violation (though it seems reasonable to expect that a very 
serious violation is also obvious and therefore manifest). According to the CJEU, what is 
required for the application of the public policy exception is a “manifest breach of a rule of law 
regarded as essential in the legal order of the State in which enforcement is sought or of a right 
recognised as being fundamental within that legal order”.74 Since the right to a fair trial is 
regarded as a fundamental right, any manifest (i.e., obvious) violation should in principle lead 
to application of procedural public policy. 
Practice shows that EU Member State courts are indeed restrained in the application of public 
policy, and cases can be found where there were certainly concerns as to the fairness of the 
proceedings, but an appeal to public policy was nevertheless refused. However, court practice 
does not appear to support a reduced application of the right to a fair trial; the restrictiveness is 
rather found in a high evidentiary standard or in the availability of remedies in the state of 
origin. It does not seem to be the case that an appeal to public policy is refused in cases where 
there is an obvious violation of the right to a fair trial on the basis that that violation is not 
sufficiently serious. Rather, the violation had not been demonstrated, or remedies were 
available in the Member State of origin. 
Layton and Mercer, for instance, cite a French judgment which ruled that it was not contrary 
to French public policy to enforce a German judgment ordering maintenance on the basis of a 
finding of paternity, even though that finding had not been based on procedural safeguards 
which would have been available in France.75 They also cite a case where it was not considered 
contrary to French public policy to enforce an Italian judgment where the defendant had been 
precluded by Italian procedural law from raising a ground of defence on appeal which he had 
failed, by reason of his non-appearance, to raise in first instance.76 More examples can be found 
in the Hess/Pfeiffer Report. For example, a Dutch court considered an appeal to public policy 
unfounded, as the fact that the defendant was not adequately informed of the proceedings, as 
                                                 
 
72 CJEU Krombach v. Bamberski, para. 37. 
73 Chapter 3.2.5.  
74 CJEU Krombach v. Bamberski, para. 37.  
75 Layton and Mercer (2004) no. 26.021; Theillol v Office de la Jeunesse de Fribourg, Journal de Droit 
International 1979, p. 383. 
76 Layton and Mercer (2004) no. 26.021; Cozzi v Dame Capurro et autres, Bull. Cass. 1979, Part I, no. 286. 
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she claimed, not necessarily meant that the procedure had been unfair.77 Similarly, the Dutch 
Supreme Court rejected an appeal to public policy by a defendant who claimed that he had not 
been heard in the proceedings resulting in a default judgment, because he had – albeit 
unsuccessfully – been able to invoke a remedy against this default judgment.78 In an earlier 
judgment, the Dutch Supreme Court had already made clear that recourse to public policy is 
only possible when no remedies were available against procedural defects in the country of 
origin.79 There are also three cases in which the Dutch Supreme Court overturned decisions 
from the lower courts in which public policy had been applied to refuse enforcement of 
judgments that did not contain any reasoning. The Supreme Court ruled in all three cases that 
the judgments indeed contained no reasoning, but that this could not be considered contrary to 
public policy, because the claims had been acknowledged by the defendant as correct.80 
Another interesting example is a Lithuanian case, where a defendant argued that he had not 
received a fair trial, because he had not been provided with legal aid; the Lithuanian court 
however ruled that free legal aid is not awarded to everyone and that it cannot therefore 
constitute part of public policy.81 
The question remains however whether all elements of the right to a fair trial should come 
within the scope of public policy, i.e., their violation should lead to refusal of recognition or 
enforcement. Neither the right to a fair trial itself nor the ECtHR’s case law provides a basis 
for concluding that certain elements are less important than others, or that certain procedural 
irregularities are in every case more likely to lead to a finding of a violation than others. All 
elements of the right to a fair trial, whether explicit or implicit, contribute towards the fairness 
of the trial. Against this background, the reference in the Commission’s 2010 Proposal for the 
recast Brussels I Regulation to “fundamental principles underlying the right to a fair trial”82 is 
somewhat puzzling, because Article 6(1), the most commonly accepted incarnation of the right 
to a fair trial in Europe, does not make a distinction between fundamental and non-fundamental 
principles. In fact, it could be argued that “the right to a fair trial” itself is the fundamental 
principle underlying the elements of Article 6(1). It was shown that when applying such 
elements as the right to a reasoned judgment, the principle of an adversarial trial, or one of the 
other elements, the guiding principle is always what is fair or just in a specific case. In that 
sense, the ‘fair trial’ is the fundamental principle underlying its separate elements. Those 
elements can be seen as specific requirements that serve to operationalise the notion of a fair 
trial, but in whose interpretation the fair trial still serves as a guiding principle. In principle, 
therefore, there seems to be no reason to distinguish between more and less fundamental 
elements of the right to a fair trial. If a fair trial became the yardstick for review of foreign 
judgments, in principle all violations of that right could be grounds for refusal of recognition 
or enforcement. It can however be debated whether refusal of enforcement is indeed an 
                                                 
 
77 Rb Middelburg 23 September 2009, ECLI:NL:RBMID:2009:BK9209 
78 HR 27-6-2008, ECLI:NL:PHR:2008:BD2007  
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80 Hoge Raad 18 March 2011, ECLI:NL:HR:2011:BP0003. 
81 Hess and Pfeiffer (2011) p. 55. 
82 2010 Proposal, Article 46(1) p. 42. 
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appropriate remedy for all violations. For example, if the proceedings took an unreasonable 
length of time within the meaning of Articles 6(1) ECHR/47 EU CFR, will refusing 
enforcement adequately remedy that violation? This question is considered for each element of 
fair trial in Section 7.3, below. 
7.2.4.2 Antisuit- or Mareva-injunctions  
 
Conversely, there are examples83 of the application of public policy that would fall outside the 
scope of fair trial were this to become a ground for enforcement. An example that was recently 
discussed in the literature84 is the application of public policy against so-called ‘Mareva’ or 
antisuit-injunctions. Such injunctions, which were developed and are predominantly used in 
England,85 may be requested by one of the parties to a conflict in order to prevent the other 
party from commencing or continuing the proceedings in another forum. The CJEU in Turner 
v. Grovit86 settled the debate by declaring such injunctions incompatible with the Brussels 
Convention/Regulation, because injunctions prohibiting one party from bringing an action 
before the courts of a Member State interfere with the jurisdiction allocated to that Member 
State by the Regulation. Since such injunctions are contrary to a fundamental principle 
underlying judicial cooperation under the EU Regulations, it can be argued that Member States 
may legitimately refuse to recognise such an injunction on the basis of the public policy 
exception.87 Here, the principle that would be protected by the public policy exception would 
be the allocation of jurisdiction in cross-border cases, which is one of the foundations of the 
Brussels regime. While certainly of fundamental importance to the functioning of that regime, 
this principle appears to be more about the effective functioning of the Brussels regime and 
about legal certainty, rather than the protection of fundamental individual rights. 
7.2.4.3 Procedural fraud 
 
                                                 
 
83 More examples can be found than the ones discussed in these sections. One possible example is a Hungarian 
judgment referred to in the 2011 Report on the application of public policy, where enforcement was refused 
because the judgment contravened the Hungarian principle that one should be able to litigate in one’s native 
language (Hess and Pfeiffer 2011, p. 53-54). Though the right to a fair trial may include a right of the defendant 
to translation of the document instituting the proceedings into a language he understands, it arguably does not 
include a right to litigate in one’s native language before a foreign court. See Ontanu and Pannebakker (2012) p. 
171-172, European Commission of Human Rights X and Y v. Austria 9099/80 DR 27, p. 209. 
84 Ortolani (2015). 
85 Hartley (2014) p. 9; Hess and Pfeiffer (2011) p. 67, shows the UK view on this matter.  
86 CJEU Case C-159/02 Turner v Grovit ECLI:EU:C:2004:228. 
87 See also Ortolani (2015) p. 17. He raises the interesting question whether the principle of mutual trust as such 
has public policy status in the EU.  
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A more problematic issue is the question of procedural fraud committed by one of the parties. 
Fraud may constitute, for example, lying to the court,88 or forging a signature.89 Procedural 
fraud is a separate ground for refusal for recognition under English law,90 but in many EU 
Member States, and in the European context, fraud can be considered to be subsumed by public 
policy, provided that no means for redress were available in the Member State of origin.91 The 
Heidelberg Report (2007) finds a considerable number of judgments where fraud was found to 
have occurred and whose enforcement was refused on the basis of public policy.92 It cannot be 
doubted that where a judgment has been obtained by fraud committed by one of the parties 
(provided that this can be proven by their opponent), the proceedings have not been fair. Yet 
fraud committed by the parties, as opposed to fraud committed by the judge (for example by 
accepting a bribe), does not appear to be covered by Article 6(1). This article is, in principle,93 
not horizontally applicable. It confers an obligation on the state rather than on individuals. It 
cannot therefore be used to remedy instances of procedural fraud by one of the parties. 
This is confirmed by the ECtHR’s McDonald judgment, discussed in Chapter 4. In this 
judgment, the ECtHR accepted that a refusal to enforce a foreign judgment could result in a 
violation, but not where that refusal was based on procedural fraud. According to ECtHR case 
law, no one can complain about a situation to which they themselves had contributed.94 The 
fraudulent party cannot invoke his right to enforcement of a judgment if that judgment was 
fraudulently achieved. McDonald concerned a case in which the applicant, the party who 
sought enforcement, had himself committed fraud. Whether Article 6(1) is of any help where 
the person against whom enforcement is sought was the victim of fraud, and whether it confers 
on Contracting States a positive obligation to identify fraud or remedy it if the fraud only 
becomes apparent after the delivery of a judgment, is unclear. So far, there appears to be no 
                                                 
 
88 Hartley (2015) p. 410. 
89 For example, in a Dutch case under The Hague Child Abduction Convention, the child’s habitual residence was 
said to be Portugal on the basis of an agreement between the parents on which the mother’s signature was allegedly 
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(2004) p. 249. 
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94 ECtHR McDonald v. France [dec.], appl. no. 18648/04, 29 April 2008. See also ECtHR Avotins v. Latvia, appl. 
no. 17502/07, 25 February 2014. 
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indication of a positive obligation for Contracting States to prevent or remedy fraud, unless it 
was alleged during the proceedings. 
A ground for refusal that refers only to Article 6(1) ECHR therefore runs the risk of excluding 
judgments obtained by fraud. This is an undesirable outcome that runs counter to the idea of a 
European area of justice. In contrast to abuse of procedural rights, which results in a delay, 
procedural fraud may in fact influence the outcome of the case. Procedural fraud may lead to 
judgements that are simply wrong as they are based on an incorrect presentation of the facts. 
Such judgemtns should not be allowed to circulate freely. 
7.2.4.4 Excessive procedural costs 
 
Another example of a use of procedural public policy that would probably not overlap with 
Article 6(1) ECtHR is the practice of Greek courts refusing the enforcement of orders for costs 
deemed to be ‘excessive’ according to national standards. This practice appears to follow from 
a 2006 judgment from the Greek Areios Pagos, in which it ruled that ‘excessive’ procedural 
costs should be considered against public policy.95 The Areios Pagos based this conclusion on 
the Greek constitution and on Article 6(1) ECHR. This judgment appears to have been followed 
by lower courts: in 2013 it was reported96 that a Greek Court of Appeal refused enforcement a 
cost order granted in the United Kingdom. In that case, costs of more than £80,000 had been 
awarded for a claim not exceeding £17,000. The Court of Appeal of Corfu in Greece deemed 
these costs excessive in proportion to the amount of the original claim by domestic standards. 
Accordingly, the cost order contravened Greek public policy standards and enforcement was 
refused for part of the cost order. 
It is questionable whether such an application of procedural public policy is indeed supported 
by Article 6(1). Though the ECtHR has ruled that high costs of civil litigation may be 
incompatible with Article 6(1) as they restrict the right to access to a court that Article 6(1) 
contains,97 it has also ruled that the right to access to a court may be subject to (financial) 
limitations and that states enjoy a margin of appreciation in this regard.98 Where the ECtHR 
has found violations of Article 6(1) in relation to excessively high costs, it has consistently 
ruled that costs can only be excessive if they would effectively prevent the litigants from 
pursuing their case based on their individual circumstances.99 The ECtHR’s case law does not 
appear to support a general rule that a certain proportion of costs to the amount claimed results 
in an unacceptable restriction of the right to access. Such an assessment can only be made in 
an individual case on the basis of evidence regarding the litigant’s financial situation. 
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Moreover, the enforcing court would need to take into account the margin of appreciation of 
the state of origin in this instance. For this reason, the Greek practice of applying the public 
policy exception to costs orders in the way the Areios Pagos has advocated does not seem to 
be supported by Article 6(1). Such an application of procedural public policy would therefore 
likely fall outside the scope of Article 6(1) and would no longer be possible if the right to a fair 
trial were to be made the framework for refusing enforcement or recognition. 
7.2.4.5 Varying interpretations of elements of Article 6(1) 
 
Apart from the right to access to a court, there are more elements of Article 6(1) that may 
legitimately be applied differently by the Contracting States. An example is the right to a 
reasoned judgment. It has been discussed in literature that states have varying practices 
concerning the degree to which judgments must be motivated and that they have applied their 
national standards to foreign judgments as part of procedural public policy. Most commentators 
refer to France, where it was the practice of the Cour de Cassation to refuse enforcement of 
judgments that were, by French standards, insufficiently motivated, or to request additional 
documents to make up for this lack of motivation.100 It should be asked whether replacing 
procedural public policy with a reference to “the right to a fair trial” would curtail such 
differences in standards. Perhaps it would not, because the ECtHR itself has accorded 
Contracting States a degree of margin of appreciation in this regard. The ECtHR has taken into 
account that various practices exist between the Contracting States regarding the degree to 
which judgments are motivated. This means that a judgment that contains little motivation may 
be compatible with Article 6(1) if it is consistent with the usual practice of courts in the state 
concerned, provided that the objectives served by providing reasons have been met.101 This is 
relevant to the present discussion, because procedural public policy has been used to apply 
national standards concerning the motivation of judgments to foreign decisions. 
The problem of differing interpretations of common principles is therefore unlikely to be solved 
by incorporating a common norm into EU legislation instead of a public policy exception. It is 
submitted that such differences should not be applied excessively in order to safeguard 
creditor’s rights to enforcement, but that this limitation on their application should lie in a 
proportionality test rather than in a restriction of the scope of the refusal ground. 
 
7.2.5 Substantive public policy and fundamental rights other than fair trial 
 
This research explicitly does not concern substantive public policy, but since procedural and 
substantive issues can in practice be closely interwoven,102 it is necessary to briefly review the 
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relationship between fundamental rights and substantive public policy and to consider whether 
the observations about suitability of fundamental rights as a yardstick also apply in this context. 
It is certain that if the right to a fair trial were to become a refusal ground, this would prevent 
judges from refusing enforcement or recognition because of substantive elements. In the field 
of civil justice, a likely casualty of such a curtailment would be the issue of punitive damages, 
where a court awards damages to a claimant over and above the amount of damage he suffered, 
as a kind of penalty for the party who caused the damage. This type of penalty is generally not 
recognised in civil law systems, where the starting point is the reparation of damage that was 
actually suffered.103 Punitive damages are in some jurisdictions therefore considered to be 
contrary to public policy. Here also, the public policy exception is used to bridge the gap 
between two legal systems that are based on incompatible principles, rather than on a concern 
for individual rights. The problem of punitive damages however primarily arises in the context 
of judgments from the United States, since not only do very few EU Member States allow for 
their imposition, punitive damages are also most excessive in the United States.104 
In the examples cited, the public policy exception is clearly very valuable as a tool for ensuring 
the smooth interaction of legal systems that may be based on very different principles. Whether 
this function is still necessary within the EU may be debated; some authors posit that situations 
of incompatibility between legal systems within the EU will become ever scarcer.105 For the 
purposes of the protection of fundamental rights however it may be concluded that the 
“bridging” function of public policy is not the most important. For the purposes of fundamental 
rights protection, it would be possible to replace the public policy exception with a fundamental 
rights reference. 
During the negotiations on the recast Brussels I Regulation, two fields of civil justice were 
singled out as requiring a substantive public policy exception: defamation and collective 
redress procedures.106 Especially with regard to defamation cases, the link with various 
fundamental rights is apparent. As the European Commission wrote in its 2010 Proposal, 
The proposal retains the exequatur procedure with regard to defamation cases in which 
an individual claims that rights relating to his personality or privacy have been violated 
by the media. These cases are particularly sensitive and Member States have adopted 
diverging approaches on how to ensure compliance with the various fundamental rights 
affected, such as human dignity, respect for private and family life, protection of 
personal data, freedom of expression and information.107 
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According to the Commission, the lack of consensus among the Member States on how to 
balance fundamental principles such as privacy and freedom of expression is sufficient to 
justify a restricted application of mutual recognition in these matters. In the subsequent 
discussion, commentators argued that this divergence required the retention of a substantive 
public policy exception in the Brussels I bis Regulation.108 There seems to be a consensus that 
a substantive public policy exception remains necessary. 
Could substantive public policy be replaced with a reference to ‘fundamental rights’, in the 
same way that procedural public policy might be replaced by the right to a fair trial? The 
potential consequences of such a choice are impossible to oversee within the limits of this 
research. It should however be observed that the variation amongst Member States’ principles 
is likely to be far larger with regard to substantive issues, for example with regard to the balance 
between free speech and privacy as illustrated above, than it is with regard to fair trial. As 
explained, the right to a fair trial’s fundamental status is not contested, and it has been 
interpreted extensively by the ECtHR. This means that, though there are many ways of 
conducting a fair trial, EU Member States at least agree that a trial should be fair, and the same 
standard applies in all Member States. For these reasons, and considering that the content of 
procedural public policy is already largely derived from the right to a fair trial, replacing the 
former with the latter would have the advantage of increasing clarity and legal certainty. 
By contrast, the matters covered by substantive public policy are far more varied, as illustrated 
by Dickinson: as examples of matters on which Member States disagree, he mentions questions 
of medical ethics, the use of gene technology, or the operation of nuclear installations.109 Many 
of these matters are arguably not covered by fundamental rights, or only tangentially. 
Even where fundamental rights overlap with the principles encompassed by substantive public 
policy, there would still be considerable differences between Member States. The field of 
family law reveals a considerable divergence of views among Member States on such matters 
as same-sex marriage and adoption. With regard to same-sex marriage, the ECtHR itself has 
ruled that the lack of consensus among the Contracting States on this issue meant that the 
decision whether to allow same-sex couples to marry is part of the States’ margin of 
appreciation.110 Here, as well, replacing public policy with fundamental rights is unlikely to 
reduce uncertainty for litigants or, conversely, improve fundamental rights protection; both 
options leave a considerable margin of appreciation to the states. 
7.2.6 Interim conclusion 
 
This Chapter set out to answer the question whether, with a view to remedying fundamental 
rights violations in the context of cross-border enforcement of judgments, the procedural public 
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policy exception could be replaced with a reference to fair trial, as was proposed by the 
European Commission in its 2010 Proposal. 
Section 7.2.2 showed that the fundamental status of a fair trial is uncontested. Currently, but 
also historically, states consider a fair trial a fundamental principle underlying their legal order. 
CJEU and Member State case law also bears out that procedural public policy and fair trial are 
more or less synonymous. 
There are some advantages to replacing procedural public policy with fair trial grounds from 
the perspective of fundamental rights protection. For the judgment creditor, applying a 
common norm such as fair trial reduces the possibility of enforcement being refused on the 
basis of national conceptions of public policy that are outside the scope of fair trial (such as in 
the Greek case discussed above). For the judgment debtor, a replacement would increase legal 
certainty because it would be clear that recognition or enforcement should be refused if a 
violation of fair trial had occurred; currently, application of the public policy exception at least 
in theory still requires that the procedural irregularity would be considered contrary to the law 
of the Member State addressed. 
Another considerable advantage from a legal-political point of view is that the refusal grounds 
would become truly ‘Europeanised’. Replacing (national) public policy with a common 
fundamental principle would reinforce this refusal ground’s role in the protection of 
fundamental rights; the argument against public policy that it was an example of ‘obsolete 
nationalism’ could no longer be made.111 Refusal of recognition or enforcement to a foreign 
judgment would cease to be a conflict of national principles with European ones (mutual trust), 
but rather an application of a common European fundamental rights norm, which would be in 
line with the EU’s commitment to fundamental rights as discussed in Chapter 6. 
There are however also disadvantages. One is that certain situations that would currently fall 
within the scope of public policy would fall outside the scope of fair trial, such as procedural 
fraud. This problem could be resolved by adding a separate refusal ground for dealing with 
cases of fraud (committed by one of the parties). 
A more fundamental problem is the question whether all violations of fair trial should be 
capable of triggering refusal of recognition or enforcement. Currently, in order to trigger the 
application of the public policy exception cases must show a ‘manifest breach’ of a ‘right 
considered as fundamental’. It cannot be said on the basis of Article 6(1) itself that there is a 
hierarchy between its elements and that one can consequently be seen as more fundamental 
than the other. One could also ask whether all violations of Article 6(1) would constitute a 
manifest breach of one of those fundamental principles: is the threshold for finding a violation 
that the ECtHR applies more stringent, or more lenient, than the one applied by courts when 
they consider the application of the public policy exception? This question is very difficult to 
answer in abstracto. The examination of cases in which public policy was applied in Section 
7.2.4 did not yield evidence to suggest that national courts are more lenient in their application 
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of public policy than they would be if they applied Article 6(1); practice suggests that they 
consider these provisions to be one and the same for the purposes of denying enforcement. This 
also follows from the Krombach judgment in which the CJEU applied the ECtHR’s case law 
to deduce that public policy should be considered applicable.112 This gives a clear signal that 
when Article 6(1) is not observed, public policy may be applied. However, some violations of 
fair trial should arguably not lead to refusal of recognition or enforcement, such as violations 
of the right to a trial within a reasonable time. It is questionable whether this problem could be 
solved by incorporating a requirement that only ‘flagrant’ or ‘manifest’ violations should lead 
to refusal of enforcement, since the problem is not so much the seriousness of the violation, 
but the appropriateness of refusal of enforcement as a remedy for these types of situations. 
Finally, a fundamental problem is that, as Section 7.2.5 showed, there is clearly still a need for 
a substantive public policy exception. Theoretically, replacement of procedural public policy 
with fair trial could be combined with a separate substantive public policy exception. However, 
it has been observed that the distinction between substantive and procedural public policy is 
primarily an academic one and potentially difficult to make in practice;113 substantive and 
procedural issues are often intertwined. Though they are difficult to oversee, an artificial 
distinction between substantive and procedural issues may create considerable problems of 
interpretation. 
Considering these potential problems that may be caused by ‘the right to a fair trial’ as a ground 
for refusal of recognition or enforcement, perhaps the wiser option would be to maintain a 
public policy exception. Public policy has been a standard feature of EU legislation on civil 
justice matters for a long time, and remains included in a number of important Regulations.114 
Practice shows that its application is rare and that its interpretation does not seem to cause 
national courts any problems. It is universally accepted that public policy must only be applied 
in very serious cases; the Reports on its application (the 2007 and 2011 Reports) did not point 
into the direction of an excessive or unacceptable use of this provision by the national courts. 
Furthermore, the application of the concept is closely supervised by the CJEU. In its Krombach 
judgment, it gave a highly authoritative and universally accepted (it appears from the 2011 
Report) definition of the outer limits of the principle, in which it also affirmed the concept’s 
link with the rights protected by the ECHR and their interpretation by the ECtHR. Arguably 
the CJEU’s influence provides a guarantee that the rights of the ECHR will be protected within 
the context of the public policy exception; it would be very difficult to argue against the 
background of Krombach that a situation which would clearly amount to a violation of Article 
6(1) or one of the other more absolute provisions could not result in the application of public 
policy. 
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On the basis of these considerations, this research proposes that the public policy exception 
still provides an effective and workable means of remedying violations of the right to a fair 
trial in the cross-border context. It is therefore submitted that the public policy exception of 
(currently) Article 45(1)(a) of the Brussels I bis Regulation be (re)adopted for all Regulations 
that cover recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil matters.  
7.3 The conflict between debtor’s and creditor’s rights 
 
Having concluded that the European Regulations on recognition and enforcement should retain 
a public policy exception, this section now considers in what cases this refusal ground should 
be applied. The aim of this exploration is to provide guidance to courts tasked with interpreting 
the provision; it may also serve to clarify, from a fundamental rights perspective, the essential 
conflict that refusal of recognition or enforcement entails, and how it should be resolved. This 
section explores the conflict that is created by the possibility of refusing recognition and 
enforcement between the creditor’s right to enforcement, and the debtor’s right to a fair trial. 
It is shown that this conflict is essentially one of proportionality: neither of these rights can in 
all cases override the other, but when they inevitably clash, a solution must be found that does 
not disproportionally disadvantage the ‘losing’ party. 
It was discussed above that the public policy exception as it currently exists does not explicitly 
allow for a proportionality assessment. On the basis of the CJEU’s guideline as provided in 
Krombach v. Bamberski, all violations of an “essential principle” or a “fundamental right” 
should, in principle, be grounds for application of the public policy exception. However, it is 
clear that the CJEU requires Member State courts to examine whether the violation suffered by 
the defendant or judgment debtor is sufficiently serious to justify refusal of enforcement. In 
Gambazzi, it ruled that, 
It should […] be borne in mind that fundamental rights, such as respect for the rights 
of the defence, do not constitute unfettered prerogatives and may be subject to 
restrictions. However, such restrictions must in fact correspond to the objectives of 
public interest pursued by the measure in question and must not constitute, with regard 
to the aim pursued, a manifest or disproportionate breach of the rights thus 
guaranteed.115 
According to the CJEU in Gambazzi, the court of the Member State where enforcement is 
sought should, inter alia, take into account the reasons for the (perceived) infringement of the 
right to a fair trial.116 This interpretation of public policy leaves a certain margin of appreciation 
to the Member State addressed to assess the degree of infringement of the right to be heard that 
was in fact suffered.117 
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Application of the public policy exception therefore always involves an examination of the 
proportionality of that application vis-à-vis the infringement that occurred. Consequently, the 
application of an ‘emergency brake’ must primarily be seen as a conflict between two equal 
interests: the rights of the creditor and of the debtor, which, both being derived from the right 
to a fair trial, are in principle equal in weight. Perhaps therefore the answer can be found by 
applying the theories surrounding the conflict between fundamental rights as it has been 
developed in legal theory and case law. 
7.3.1 Guidance of the ECtHR for solving conflicts 
 
Could an infringement of the right to enforcement be justified by the fact that to grant 
enforcement would result in the violation of another person’s rights to fair trial? Kiestra, in his 
study of the impact of the ECHR on private international law, shows that the right to 
enforcement can be restricted and what matters is the proportionality of that restriction.118 
While the ECtHR has not yet ruled on a case where refusal of enforcement was allowed on 
fundamental rights grounds, it has certainly provided an opening for such considerations to be 
taken into account. In Négrépontis-Giannisis the ECtHR ruled that the right to enforcement of 
a foreign judgment could be restricted on the basis of a public policy exception, though it found 
a violation because the application of that exception had in fact failed to respect the applicant’s 
right to family life.119 In Avotins v. Latvia, the ECtHR ruled that the disadvantage suffered by 
the judgment debtor was of his own doing and could therefore not constitute a reason to request 
refusal of enforcement.120 
The ECtHR does therefore acknowledge that a refusal of enforcement or recognition can be 
justified, but it has not had the chance to set out the conditions in which that might happen. An 
exploration of the possible factors that could be taken into account is therefore still necessary. 
7.3.2 Methods for resolving conflicts between fundamental rights 
 
A great deal has been written on the appropriate method for resolving conflicts between 
fundamental rights.121 The ECtHR itself has employed various techniques. It is said to generally 
favour a solution in which a balance is found between the two rights at issue by applying the 
principle of proportionality (also referred to as ‘practical concordance’).122 The benefit of this 
approach is that it avoids having to find a hierarchy between the rights at issue; hierarchy as a 
technique for resolving conflicts between fundamental rights is said to have become a 
‘taboo’.123 Yet for a judge asked to rule on an appeal to refuse enforcement of a foreign 
judgment, it is impossible to balance the rights of both debtor and creditor, since he is faced 
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with a binary choice. He can either allow enforcement, thus giving precedence to the creditor’s 
right to enforcement over the debtor’s right to a fair trial; or refuse enforcement, thereby doing 
the opposite. It is impossible in this situation to achieve a solution that ‘balances’ both interests, 
as one must necessarily prevail over the other, and both outcomes are mutually exclusive. The 
judge in this situation cannot therefore avoid having to choose between two rights, implicitly 
creating a hierarchy: the creditor’s right to enforcement and whatever aspect of the debtor’s 
right to a fair trial appears to have been violated.  
It should therefore be examined how the ECtHR has resolved conflicts between elements of 
the right to a fair trial in its case law. It is of course impossible to provide a definitive guidance 
that is capable of solving all possible future conflicts, but this analysis may at least provide 
national judges with useful viewpoints to apply in such cases. 
Conflicts between fundamental rights are often conflicts between two different fundamental 
rights, for example the right to privacy versus the right to freedom of expression,124 or the right 
to equal treatment with the right to freely practice one’s religion.125 For these types of problems, 
a solution can sometimes be found in the (implicit) hierarchy that exists in the ECHR between 
rights that are absolute and notstandsfest, rights that are absolute but not notstandsfest, rights 
that have specific grounds for limitation, rights that have general grounds for limitation and are 
subject to a margin of appreciation, and so on.126 This approach does not usually provide a 
solution for cases where both parties invoke the same Convention right – unless certain 
elements of that right are subject to limitation clauses where others are not. In the case of Article 
6(1), the element of publicity is the only element that may be limited, though such limitations 
must comply with the conditions laid down in this Article.127 Chapter 3 and Chapter 6.2.3 in 
particular also discussed that some elements of fair trial, including the right to access to a court, 
are subject to inherent limitations.  
Some useful guidance is provided by Brems in a 2005 article on how to resolve conflicts in the 
context of the right to a fair trial. In this article, she references criteria that have been developed 
by Sullivan in her work on gender equality and religious freedom.128 The criteria to be applied 
in order to resolve conflicts are as follows. Firstly, one has to examine each of the rights 
involved and how important the aspect of the right that is at issue in the concrete case is for the 
protection of the human right as such.129 As Chapter 4 already discussed, this comes down to 
distinguishing a ‘core’ and a ‘periphery’ within the right in question.130 The question of 
conflicts between fundamental rights therefore becomes, in essence, a test of proportionality, 
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which is only limited by the assertion that the enjoyment of a right may not be made absolutely 
impossible: the ‘core’ of the right in question may not be harmed.131 Chapter 4 already 
concluded that it is difficult to distinguish in abstracto a core and a periphery within the right 
to a fair trial, because different elements may be a ‘core’ with regard to certain objectives of 
the fair trial, but ‘peripheral’ to others.132 This Chapter proposes that it may be possible to 
distinguish between the various elements according to different criteria, including the margin 
of appreciation that is accorded to the state, and the remedy that the ECtHR has found to be 
appropriate. The next section discusses this further. 
The second criteria developed by Sullivan is the severity of the interference. If the exercise of 
one right is rendered utterly impossible, this will carry more weight than if it is merely made 
more difficult.133 This is especially important in the context of cross-border enforcement: a 
refusal of recognition or enforcement will make the exercise of the creditor’s right to 
enforcement completely impossible. This means that the interference with the debtor’s right 
must have been very serious to justify this interference with the creditor’s right. It should be 
stated here that it is difficult to speak, in the context of the fair trial, of ‘exercising’ this right. 
The right to a fair trial is not one that litigants can exercise without active interference of the 
state: in fact it provides a positive obligation for the state to facilitate a fair trial for the litigant. 
This in contrast to, for example, the right to family life (Art. 8 ECHR), which is something that 
people can indeed exercise and where the state has a negative obligation not to interfere.134 
Perhaps it is therefore not appropriate to ask whether the violation has made the ‘exercise’ of 
the right to a fair trial utterly impossible. One should rather ask whether the violation has made 
it completely impossible for the objectives of the fair trial to be achieved. What objective that 
is depends on the element at issue: Chapter 4 explained that some elements of Article 6(1) 
mostly serve the objective of a fair outcome, while others mostly serve to ensure fair 
proceedings.135 
Thirdly, it needs to be examined whether, apart from the two rights that are in direct conflict, 
other rights are also implicated. The restriction of a human right carries more weight if it results 
in practice in the additional restriction of another right. Because the right to a fair trial provides 
auxiliary protection to other fundamental rights, this will nearly always be the case.136 In the 
context of this research, one might think in particular about family cases in which procedures 
are started to enforce one of the parties’ right to family life under Article 8 ECHR. Many 
commercial and consumer cases can however be seen as enforcing, for example, the right to 
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property (Art. 1 of the First Protocol to the ECHR),137 or the right to privacy (Art. 8 ECHR). It 
is questionable whether this criterion is of much use when dealing with conflicts between 
elements of a fair trial, given its auxiliary nature; but it is certainly something than can be taken 
into account if the exercise of the other implicated rights would be made excessively difficult.  
The final criterion developed by Sullivan is the cumulative effect of the restrictions of the 
human right in question. Restrictive measures should not be viewed in isolation but should also 
be seen in their larger context. For the right to a fair trial this means that a judge should take 
into account not only the impact of a refusal to enforce on the parties, but also the impact on 
the rule of law and the interests of justice.138 
This section considers to what extent the criteria proposed by Sullivan, and developed by 
Brems, could be applied to the conflict between a creditor’s right to enforcement and another 
element of fair trial. The preceding section already pointed out some difficulties with applying 
the method to this type of conflict. For that reason, the following proposes how the framework 
could be amended or interpreted in the context of the fair trial. 
7.3.2.1 Distinguishing a ‘core’ and a ‘periphery’ in the elements of Article 6(1) 
 
Chapter 2 already concluded that it is very difficult to distinguish, in abstracto, a ‘core’ and a 
‘periphery’ within the elements of fair trial. All elements of that article contribute equally to 
the trial’s fairness, at least in principle. It was however suggested that there are other factors 
that may, in a concrete case, allow a judge to distinguish between the elements of Article 6(1) 
and to decide whether non-enforcement or non-recognition is an appropriate remedy for their 
violation. It must be stressed that this is not to suggest that some elements are more ‘important’ 
or ‘essential’ than others. The following merely suggests that, in the specific context of a 
conflict with the right to enforcement, and considering that the only option would be to make 
the exercise of that right by the creditor utterly impossible (see below), certain factors could be 
taken into account. 
7.3.2.2 The objective of the fair trial the element intends to protect 
 
The first of these factors is the goal that the element that was violated was intended to protect. 
Chapter 4 concluded that the fair trial serves, essentially, two objectives: to facilitate a fair 
outcome, and to provide a fair process.139 Some elements of fair trial primarily serve the 
outcome, while others serve the process; though some of course contribute to both. In the 
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ECtHR’s case law, both objectives normally weigh equally heavily, in the sense that all 
elements of fair trial are equally important, and all elements may trigger a finding of a violation 
if they are not observed. 
It could be argued however that in the specific context of conflicts with the right to 
enforcement, outcome-related violations should outweigh process-related violations. As 
Chapter 3 explained, the reason why refusal of enforcement or recognition is allowed, and the 
reason why it is effective, is because it prevents the consequences of an unfair trial from taking 
place. Is it appropriate if enforcement is refused, so that the outcome of the judgment is 
prevented from taking effect, even if that outcome would have been the same either way? It 
should be emphasized that this should not be seen as permission for a judge to review the 
fairness of the outcome (which would be incompatible with the prohibition on review on the 
substance).140 Rather it allows the judge to take into account whether the violation that occurred 
completely removed the prerequisites for achieving a fair outcome, so that the outcome cannot 
have been fair. It is submitted that refusal of recognition or enforcement is more likely to be an 
appropriate sanction when the outcome of the trial is likely to be unfair than when it is only the 
procedure that was unfair. Arguably, in the latter situation, a remedy such as the finding of a 
violation by the ECtHR may address the violation; see further the discussion on whether the 
exercise of the right is made utterly impossible, below.  
This consideration would be important primarily in those cases in which the principle of 
equality of arms was not observed, but where the object of the inequality was not of 
consequence for the outcome of the trial. Likewise, procedural irregularities such as a failure 
to communicate certain information of evidence to one of the parties, which may in themselves 
constitute a violation of Articles 6(1) or 47, should for not trigger the application of the public 
policy exception if a fair outcome could still have been achieved. Section 7.3.7 (below) 
elaborates further on the consequences of this conclusion for a concrete case.  
7.3.2.3 Margin of appreciation 
 
A second factor that could be taken into consideration is whether the element at issue is subject 
to a margin of appreciation.141 This is appropriate for two separate reasons. The first is that, 
where a margin of appreciation exists, it is simply less obvious whether the observed 
irregularity in the procedure would also amount to a violation before the ECtHR. If the element 
at issue were subject to a margin of appreciation, it cannot be obvious whether such interference 
would immediately amount to a violation. Since the public policy exception should only be 
applied to ‘manifest’, which means obvious and serious, violations, this would exclude 
situations where it is doubtful whether a violation would in fact be found. The second reason 
lies in the principle that the public policy exception should not be used where the problem is 
                                                 
 
140 Chapter 2.3.1.1; see for a discussion of its implications in specific situations 7.3.7, particularly in the context 
of the right to an oral hearing. 
141 Section 7.3.2, showed that certain elements of the right to a fair trial are subject to a margin of appreciation: 
notably the admissibility of evidence and the right to a public trial and public pronouncement of the judgment.  
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simply a difference between the legal system of the state of origin and that of the state of 
enforcement. It cannot be a valid reason for refusal of enforcement that, for example, under the 
law of the state of enforcement, a judgment would have had to be more extensively motivated. 
The question the judge should ask himself is whether the judgment constitutes a clear violation 
of fair trial as interpreted by the ECtHR, not whether it constitutes a violation of the 
interpretation of that provision in his state. 
7.3.2.4 The remedies that are considered appropriate for addressing violations  
 
Finally, a factor that could be weighed is what remedies are generally considered appropriate 
for a violation of the element at issue. Chapter 4 extensively discussed what remedies the 
ECtHR and CJEU have considered appropriate for specific violations.142 It was shown that 
violations of the reasonable time requirement are generally treated differently than violations 
of other elements of Article 6(1). Contrary to, for example, a violation of the right to a fair 
hearing, an excessively long procedure cannot be adequately remedied with for example a right 
to appeal or other remedies that protract the proceedings even further. Rather, excessively 
lengthy proceedings should be addressed by either a preventative remedy, aimed at acceleration 
of the proceedings, or by compensation.143 The consensus appears to be that remedies for 
excessively long proceedings should not influence the outcome of the proceedings.144 It is 
proposed that this is appropriate because, in most cases,145 the length of the proceedings has no 
impact on the outcome of the proceedings, contrary to, for example, a violation of the right to 
a fair hearing. If one party has not been given a chance to present his or her views during the 
trial at first instance, the outcome of that trial is also questionable, and it is therefore correct 
that it can be subject to an appeal, during which the mistakes made during the first stage of the 
proceedings can be rectified. 
By contrast, a violation of the reasonable time requirement does not in itself invalidate the 
outcome of the trial. What has been harmed is not so much the correctness of the outcome or 
the procedural justice of the parties, but their interest in an efficient and effective trial. Of 
course, a trial that lasts overly long is not effective; but this is not a problem that a retrial or 
appeal can solve; and neither can a refusal of enforcement. What purpose does it serve when, 
after having waited for a judgment for an excessively long period, the judgment creditor is then 
denied enforcement of that judgment because the debtor suffered a violation of his right to a 
reasonable time? This would be especially inappropriate because the two parties are, from the 
viewpoint of the ECHR, both victims of one and the same violation of fair trial. In accordance 
with the ECtHR’s and CJEU’s stance, in such a case enforcement should not be refused, but 
parties should invoke the remedies available in the state of origin of the judgment. This might 
only be different in cases where a failure to conclude the proceedings within a reasonable time 
                                                 
 
142 See 4.3.7. 
143 See 4.3.7.2. 
144 Chapter 4.3.7.2; Smits (2008) p. 253. 
145 See further under 7.3.7.  
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can impact the decision; though as Section 7.3.7 (below) argues, it is questionable whether 
refusal of recognition or enforcement is an adequate sanction even where that is the case. 
 
7.3.3 Whether the exercise of the right is made utterly impossible 
 
This section considers the second element of Sullivan’s method for solving conflicts: whether 
the exercise of the right is made utterly impossible. This means that when one of the parties to 
the conflict is prevented completely from exercising his or her right, than the violation suffered 
by the other party should be very severe to justify this interference. As Brems states,  
The hardest cases are obviously those in which the exercise or protection of each of the 
rights involved excludes the exercise or protection of the other.146  
It can be questioned whether this is always the case in situations where refusal of enforcement 
is considered. Of course, it is clear that refusal of enforcement – thereby giving precedence to 
the debtor’s right to a fair trial – excludes the exercise of the creditor’s right to enforcement, at 
least in the Member State where enforcement is refused. But in the opposite situation, where 
enforcement is allowed, one could question whether it has become entirely impossible to 
protect the debtor’s right to a fair trial. One could argue that it is still possible for a debtor who 
has suffered an unfair trial to appeal to the ECtHR and obtain compensation that way, so that 
the protection of their rights has not become entirely impossible. The counterargument is that 
an application to the ECtHR cannot be considered a sufficient remedy for certain very serious 
violations.147 It was argued that it seems hardly sufficient when a judgment has been handed 
down in clear violation of fair trial, whose outcome is very questionable, for the creditor to 
profit from its enforcement while the judgment debtor has no choice but to undertake a lengthy 
and costly procedure before the ECtHR. More importantly, an application to the ECtHR can 
only result in a violation being found: it will not prevent the effects of the judgment from taking 
place.  
A judge asked to rule on the judgment’s enforceability should therefore ask himself whether 
the violation suffered by the debtor can be adequately remedied by an application to the ECtHR, 
or whether the only effective sanction is to prohibit the judgment’s enforcement. In assessing 
this, the outcome/process dichotomy becomes relevant again. It could, for instance, be 
considered which of these two objectives the element concerned contributes to, and whether 
its violation has made achieving that goal utterly impossible. For example, one could argue that 
refusal of enforcement of the judgment ordering Mr Krombach to pay compensation was 
appropriate, because Mr Krombach’s right to a fair hearing had been violated to such an extent 
that both objectives, obtaining a fair outcome and conducting a fair procedure, had become 
entirely impossible. Arguably, the only way of preventing an entirely unfair outcome from 
taking effect is to prohibit enforcement. For violations which concern only the procedure but 
                                                 
 
146 Brems (2005) p. 304. 
147 Cuniberti and Rueda (2011) p. 295. 
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which would not have influenced the outcome, it is perhaps still possible to restore the litigant’s 
trust through compensation or a finding of a violation by the ECtHR, thereby making the 
achievement of this goal not entirely impossible. In any case, refusing enforcement would not 
repair a violation of this kind. 
To ascertain whether attainment of the objectives of the fair trial has become utterly impossible, 
judges should ask what objective each of the elements of fair trial serves and whether it has 
been rendered utterly impossible. Section 7.3.7 provides concrete examples, but some idea 
should be given here of the implications of this factor for the judges’ consideration. 
7.3.4 Whether other rights are also implicated 
 
The third element of Sullivan’s proposed method is the question whether other rights are also 
implicated in the conflict. This is a difficult criterion to apply to cases involving the right to a 
fair trial, since they arguably by definition involve other rights; a fair trial is an auxiliary right 
necessary to protect or acquire subjective rights. However it may be possible to distinguish 
between cases in which the link with other rights is particularly strong. Within the context of 
this research, cases involving the right to family life (Art. 8) immediately come to mind, though 
in cases involving access to or the return of a child, this will likely not help solve the conflict 
because both parties will have equal claims under that right. Another example might be a case 
such as K.H. and others v. Slovakia,148 in which the ECtHR found a violation of Article 6(1) 
because a group of Roma women were denied access to their medical files. They needed these 
files to substantiate a claim against a hospital where, it was suspected, a sterilisation procedure 
had been performed on them without their consent, leading to their infertility. Being denied 
access to this information concerning their health also amounted to a violation of their right to 
private and family life, protected under Article 8.  
 
7.3.5 Cumulative effect 
 
As the final factor in Sullivan’s approach, the question of ‘cumulative effect’ pertains to the 
wider repercussions of the restrictions imposed on the rights in question. It means that judges 
should consider the general interest that many fundamental rights embody. In the context of 
the right to a fair trial, this could perhaps lead judges to attach more weight to a violation of 
the requirement of independence of the judge which is shown to be systemic and widespread, 
since allowing such violations to go unchecked does not only have repercussions for the 
individual litigant. One could think of situations where a widely reported and serious problem 
exists concerning a lack of independence or the prevalence of corruption within the judiciary. 
It can, however, be questioned whether judges are really in a position to take such factors into 
account within the context of one particular case.  
                                                 
 
148 ECtHR K.H. and others v. Slovakia, appl. no. 32881/04 ECHR 2009-II. 
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7.3.6 Other factors to consider 
 
In addition to the criteria developed by Sullivan, judges should take into account the principles 
underlying the recognition and enforcement regime of the European Regulations. One such 
principle, which was discussed in Chapter 2, is the prohibition of review on the merits. This 
principle, laid down in Article 52 of the Brussels I bis Regulation, requires judges to assume 
that the court in the Member State of origin lawfully reached a legally correct decision149. The 
finding of facts and legal qualification of those facts by the court of origin must be regarded as 
correct. What constitutes the ‘substance’ of the judgment should be interpreted broadly.150 
According to the CJEU, this prohibition justifies a narrow interpretation of the grounds of 
refusal.  
What implications does this have for the judge’s consideration whether the judgment debtor’s 
violation outweighs the refusal of enforcement to the creditor? Arguably, the prohibition of 
review on the substance prohibits a judge from refusing enforcement where the assessment 
whether a violation has taken place requires him to delve too deeply into the substantive 
assessment of the foreign court (it may be remembered that only ‘manifest’ or obvious 
violations should lead to refusal of enforcement). This problem could arise for example where 
the complaint of the judgment debtor pertains to him having been denied an oral hearing in the 
state of origin (see Section 7.3.7, below). The same might apply to a complaint that the 
judgment was not sufficiently motivated, since this also depends on such factors as the nature 
of the decision and the submissions that were made by the parties and whether those were or 
could have been decisive.151 The prohibition would most likely prevent a court from refusing 
enforcement on the basis of inconsistencies or irregularities in the Member State of origin’s 
case law, even though such inconsistencies may lead to a finding of a violation according to 
the ECtHR.152 At the same time, any appeal to one of the refusal grounds may require a 
thorough review of the procedure before the court of origin, which may make it necessary to 
gain an overview of the arguments and evidence that were put forward. The scope of the 
prohibition on review on the substance is not entirely clear. 
It must be clarified that the suggestion made above, that violations which affect the outcome 
of the trial should weigh heavier than violations that only affected the fairness of the process, 
should not be interpreted as permitting the judge in the relevant Member State to rule on the 
fairness of the outcome. Rather, it means that the complete absence of the prerequisites for 
achieving a fair outcome, among which a fair hearing, should weigh heavily towards a finding 
that refusal of enforcement is justified. The judge’s consideration should therefore not concern 
the fairness of the outcome in the particular case, but the existence of violations of the elements 
of Article 6(1), which mean that the outcome cannot possibly have been fair. 
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Arguably, judges may therefore only refuse recognition or enforcement if the violation in the 
underlying procedure is not only sufficiently serious but also obvious. This coincides with the 
qualification of Article 45(1)(a) of the Brussels I bis Regulation that the enforcement should 
be ‘manifestly’ incompatible with public policy for refusal to be justified. It is of course 
difficult to provide a criterion that allows a judge do distinguish between manifest and non-
manifest violations in every case. The next section aims to illustrate the difference with a 
number of examples. 
Another factor to consider is the burden of proof, which lies with the party who appeals for a 
refusal of recognition or enforcement. Contrary to the ECtHR, a judge asked to rule on an 
application for refusal of enforcement should rely on the evidence provided by the applicant. 
Though Article 47 of the Brussels I bis Regulation is silent on the matter of the burden of proof, 
it is clear that the refusal grounds must be actively invoked by an interested party. As discussed 
in Chapter 2, the requirement that refusal of enforcement or recognition may only be done on 
application by one of the interested parties is aimed at preventing courts from applying the 
refusal grounds ex officio. According to Article 47, which governs the procedure for requesting 
refusal of enforcement, requires the applicant to submit a copy of the judgment as well as a 
translation or transliteration where necessary. It does not refer to the possibility of submitting 
additional documentation to support the application for refusal. The article therefore does not 
exclude this possibility. Most likely the law of the Member State where enforcement is sought 
governs the matter of evidence according to as Article 47(2). This is important, because not all 
violations of the right to a fair trial may be obvious from the judgment on its own.  
Yet even if the law of that Member State allows the submission of evidence in addition to the 
judgment, the system of the Regulation is clearly intended to avoid an extensive investigation 
at the enforcement stage of everything that may have gone wrong in an earlier phase of the 
proceedings. This is shown by the requirement that only ‘manifest’ violations of public policy 
may lead to refusal, and by the prohibition of review on the substance. Moreover, contrary to 
the ECtHR, a judge deciding on an application for refusal of enforcement does not have the 
authority to request documentation from the responsible government. For that reason, it seems 
clear that while a party who applies for refusal of enforcement is in principle free to submit 
evidence supporting that application, the judge deciding on that application should only take it 
into consideration in so far as it shows that an obvious violation has taken place. 
A further factor that should be taken into account is whether the judgment debtor was capable 
of invoking remedies in the Member State of origin. This is not to say that enforcement should 
only be refused if no remedy remains in the Member State of origin, because as Layton states, 
it is precisely in cases where such remedies proved to be inadequate that refusal grounds are 
needed;153 however, as the CJEU has consistently held, most recently in Diageo/Simiramida, 
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they should only be applied “where specific circumstances make it too difficult or impossible 
to make use of the legal remedies in the Member State of origin”.154 It is not sufficient for the 
debtor to merely state that the available remedies were likely to be ineffective. 
Finally, and quite obviously, it should be considered whether the judgment debtor indeed 
suffered a disadvantage as a result of the violation. In this regard it should be observed that the 
rights that fair trial guarantees can be voluntarily waived, explicitly or implicitly.155 
7.3.7 Application to conflicts between specific elements of fair trial 
 
This section applies the factors identified in the preceding section to concrete cases. Examples 
are taken from the existing case law of the ECtHR and the CJEU to show how the rather abstract 
approach developed above could be applied to a concrete situation. In each of the following 
examples, the right to enforcement of the creditor is contrasted with one of the elements of fair 
trial, and it is considered how serious a violation of that element should be to outweigh the 
disadvantage suffered by the creditor. To this end, it is first examined to what extent a refusal 
of enforcement constitutes a violation of the creditor’s right to enforcement, and how heavy 
such a violation should weigh in a conflict with another element of fair trial. 
7.3.7.1 Right to enforcement 
 
As Chapter 4.3.6 explained, the right to a fair trial encompasses a right to enforcement. 
According to the ECtHR, the right to enforcement requires states to take all necessary measures 
required to effect enforcement, though there may be limitations such as limitation periods,156 
and states cannot be held accountable for circumstances beyond their control.157 In McDonald 
v. France, the ECtHR acknowledged that a denial of permission for enforcement of a foreign 
judgment could potentially constitute a violation of Article 6(1).158 At the same time, in 
Négrépontis-Giannisis the ECtHR acknowledged that states could apply a public policy 
condition to foreign judgments, provided it was not applied disproportionately and 
arbitrarily.159 
Applying the principles developed above, it is clear that a refusal of enforcement would 
certainly preclude the objectives of a fair trial from being obtained, given that the ECtHR itself 
ruled that “that right would be illusory if a Contracting State’s domestic legal system allowed 
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a final, binding judicial decision to remain inoperative to the detriment of one party”.160 A 
refusal of enforcement would likely also mean that the exercise of this right would be rendered 
utterly impossible, since a refusal completely prohibits a judgment creditor from taking 
enforcement measures (at least in the Member State that refuses enforcement), or where 
recognition is concerned from invoking the judgment in any way. It is also possible, and in fact 
likely, that this has consequences for his ability to exercise other fundamental rights: the 
obvious example is a parent being prevented from having access to his or her children, as would 
follow from Article 8.161  
A refusal to recognise or enforce a foreign judgment would therefore certainly amount to an 
interference with the creditor’s rights under Article 6(1), though as Chapter 4.3.6 explained, 
the ECtHR has ruled that such an interference may be justified and therefore does not have to 
amount to a violation. A restriction does have to be proportional, according to the ECtHR. The 
following therefore essentially explores when a restriction of the creditor’s right to enforcement 
would be disproportional to the violation suffered by the debtor.  
7.3.7.2 Right to a fair hearing versus the right to enforcement 
 
Under what circumstances can a violation of the right to a fair hearing outweigh the right to 
enforcement? Applying the principles developed above, the violation of the right to a fair 
hearing would first need to be such as to violate the ‘core’ of fair trial. It was proposed that 
what is the ‘core’ of fair trial depends on the objective that the element is intended to achieve, 
and that the objective of obtaining a fair outcome outweighs the objective of achieving a fair 
process. The right to a fair hearing does not appear to be subject to a margin of appreciation to 
any considerable degree. Furthermore, the violation would need to have been sufficiently 
serious to make the fulfilment of the objectives of the fair trial utterly impossible.  
It seems to be quite clear that a case such as Krombach v. Bamberski162 would fulfil these 
criteria. In this case the defendant was entirely excluded from the trial and prevented from 
commenting on the claims and evidence presented by the claimant. Under such circumstances 
it seems clear that both the outcome and the process cannot have been fair. As Chapter 4 
explained, the fair trial relies on an exchange of views between the parties in order to provide 
an accurate depiction of the facts of the case; if the facts have not been accurately established, 
it is impossible to apply the law to the facts and achieve a fair outcome. It seems clear that 
excluding a defendant from the trial entirely casts doubt on the veracity and fairness of the 
outcome. Furthermore, it seems clear that a rule of national law, which entirely precludes a 
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Kiestra (2014), p. 216-241. 
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person from taking part in the trial, renders the exercise of his right to be heard utterly 
impossible. Moreover, the existence of such a rule makes it very simple for a judge to ascertain 
that a violation occurred. The prohibition of reviewing a judgment on its substance should not 
pose an obstacle in this context, and neither should the burden of proof.163 Along the same 
lines, a case in which no service took place or the defendant was otherwise not informed for 
reasons outside his control, such as Beer v. Austria or Maronier v. Larmer, could also justify 
refusal of enforcement.164 
The application of the criteria is more difficult when it comes to violations that do not affect 
the outcome of the proceedings, or where their impact is difficult to ascertain. In a case such 
as Nideröst-Huber, a violation of the right to adversarial proceedings was found because the 
defendant had not been allowed to comment on observations submitted by a lower court to the 
court that was to decide on the case.165 This amounted to a violation, even though the 
observations had not influenced the decision, because according to the ECtHR it is for the 
parties to decide whether they wish to comment on any observations submitted, and because 
the observations were clearly aimed at influencing the decision. Though these circumstances 
may lead to a finding of a violation by the ECtHR, it is questionable whether refusal of 
enforcement would be proportional in such a case. Firstly, given that the lack of an adversarial 
trial did not have any consequences for the outcome of the trial, refusal of enforcement would 
not seem to be able to remedy such a violation. Arguably, what has been harmed is, as the 
ECtHR puts it, “the litigant’s trust in the workings of justice”, which may be remedied by a 
finding of the ECtHR that a violation has been committed.166 This reasoning would also apply 
to violations of the right to equality of arms that did not influence the outcome of the trial. 
By contrast, a case such as Feldbrugge,167 where the defendant was prevented from 
commenting on evidence which was decisive for the outcome of the proceedings, could trigger 
the refusal of enforcement provided it can be shown, without the judge having to review the 
entire procedure, that such evidence was indeed decisive for the outcome. The trouble here 
would most likely lie in the prohibition to review the judgment as to its substance: it would be 
very difficult for a judge to make an assessment of what evidence was presented during the 
trial and whether or not it was decisive for the outcome. Perhaps for this reason the application 
of the remedy of refusing recognition or enforcement should be restricted to cases in which the 
defendant was entirely and unfairly excluded from the trial or prevented from commenting on 
any submissions. A possible example would be the case of A.B. v. Slovakia, in which a litigant 
was prevented from effectively taking part in the trial due to the court’s failure to respond to 
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her request that a lawyer be appointed.168 In such cases, it would be almost impossible for the 
right to an adversarial trial to be respected; and such an exclusion from the trial would be 
immediately obvious to the judge who decides on the appeal for refusal of enforcement. 
It can therefore be concluded that violations of the right to an adversarial trial and the principle 
of equality of arms are likely to fall foul of the prohibition on reviewing a judgment as to its 
substance. The ECtHR’s case law offers many examples of violations that would not justify a 
refusal of enforcement for this reason. One example is Cepek v. Czech Republic,169 in which 
the court failed to inform the litigant that it would apply a very specific derogation of a rule of 
civil procedure concerning procedural costs. Another is Zagrebacka banka v. Croatia,170 in 
which a litigant did not have sufficient time to react to an estimate of the legal interest to be 
paid over the principal sum, which also amounted to a violation. In such cases, a refusal to 
enforce only those parts of the judgment affected by the violation may offer a solution. 
Finally, a clear reason for refusal would be if the courts in the Member State of origin failed to 
request a preliminary ruling from the CJEU if they were under an obligation to do so; the 
CJEU’s ruling in, for instance, Diageo/Simiramida makes quite clear that preliminary ruling is 
an essential part of safeguarding a fair trial.171 The ECtHR also considers it a violation of 
Article 6(1) if a domestic court failed to request a preliminary ruling if it was under an 
obligation to do so.172 
 
7.3.7.3 Right to a reasoned judgment versus the right to enforcement 
 
The right to a reasoned judgment is one of the more complex elements of Article 6(1) to which 
to apply the criteria developed above. It is true that an adequate reasoning is essential for the 
parties to understand the reasons why a decision was taken and to enable them to decide 
whether or not to appeal against it. It ensures that the judge is accountable to both the parties 
and to the wider society for his decisions; it allows the fairness and veracity of his decisions to 
be scrutinised. A complete absence of any kind of reasoning therefore certainly casts legitimate 
doubt on the fairness of the outcome of the proceedings and therefore arguably affects the very 
core of the right to a fair trial.173 
At the same time, it was repeatedly mentioned that the right to a reasoned judgment is not only 
subject to a certain discretion, but that it also entirely depends on the circumstances of the case. 
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On the subject of the discretion, the ECtHR has consistently paid attention to “the differences 
existing in the Contracting States with regard to statutory provisions, customary rules, legal 
opinion and the drafting and presentation of judgments.”174 This seems to imply that alongside 
the objective circumstances of the case, consideration may also be given to what is customary 
under national law when it comes to the motivation of judgments. Contracting States therefore 
enjoy a certain margin of discretion in this regard.175 From this it can be inferred that 
differences in national practices with regard to the motivation of judgments are in principle 
acceptable in light of the right to a fair trial, as long as the manner of reasoning meets the other 
criteria developed in the Court’s case law.176 As was explained above, the existence of such a 
margin of appreciation renders the assessment whether or not the judgment was sufficiently 
reasoned more difficult. The judge would need to take into account the standard of reasoning 
that is generally required in the state where the judgment was rendered, and not apply the 
standard that would be expected for domestic judgments. 
Even more problematic is, again, the prohibition on reviewing the judgment on the substance. 
As was explained in Chapter 4, assessing whether a judgment was sufficiently motivated 
involves an examination of the arguments and evidence that were at issue during the 
proceedings. The ECtHR has found violations of this element where the applicant was awarded 
only a partial disability pension, even though he had earlier received a full pension; according 
to the Court the ‘confusion’ this caused for the defendant required the judgment to be more 
extensively motivated.177 To arrive at this conclusion the ECtHR therefore had to establish 
what was at stake in the case, what questions were raised, and what factors would influence the 
outcome of the proceedings. Another example is Tatishvili v. Russia, in which the ECtHR 
found a violation in the failure of the courts to take into account evidence produced at the trial, 
and to verify whether the treaty on which they based their conclusions in fact existed.178 Though 
such omissions undoubtedly amount to a violation of the right to a fair trial, it is submitted that 
for a judge deciding on a refusal of enforcement such a conclusion would veer too closely to a 
review of the evidence submitted and of the legal basis for the foreign court’s decision. This 
seems hardly compatible with the prohibition on review as to the judgment’s substance. 
                                                 
 
174 ECtHR Ruiz Torija v. Spain, appl. no. 18390/91 ECHR A303-A, para. 27; ECtHR Hiro Balani v. Spain, appl. 
no. 18064/91 A303-B, para. 29.  
175 Smits (2008) p. 148. It would not be correct to call this a margin of appreciation, because the ECtHR still 
reviews fully whether the right to a reasoned judgment has been respected in each case: see under 3.3.2. 
176 Cuniberti has questioned in this regard whether English default judgments, in which a claim is simply awarded 
without further examination if the defendant fails to file a defence or an acknowledgement of service, are 
compatible with Article 6(1). A definitive answer cannot be given, because such a case has never come before the 
ECtHR; possibly, as Cuniberti points out, because the ECtHR only has jurisdiction when all remedies at the 
national level have been exhausted, while default judgments are usually rendered at the first instance level. 
Cuniberti (2008) p. 29. 
177 ECtHR Hirvisaari v. Finland, appl. no. 49684/99 27 September 2001, para. 31. 
178 ECtHR Tatishvili v. Russia appl. no. 1509/02 ECHR 2007-I, para. 60-61. 
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It is concluded that a lack of reasoning should only lead to refusal of enforcement if it is 
obvious, for example when a judgment has not been motivated at all. In this assessment, the 
judge must keep in mind whether the objective of providing clarity and accountability have 
indeed been rendered entirely impossible to achieve by the lack of reasoning. Arguably, a 
default judgment which contains no reasons but which is based on a rule of law which says that 
a claim shall be awarded if it is not opposed, is not incompatible with these objectives.179 
7.3.7.4 Right to an oral hearing versus the right to enforcement 
 
The right to an oral hearing may be essential to both objectives of the fair trial depending on 
the circumstances of the case; yet a right to an oral hearing does not exist in each case. As the 
ECtHR clarified in Jussila v. Finland, whether an oral hearing is required comes down to the 
nature of the issues to be decided;180 it also ruled that regard may be had to considerations of 
“efficiency and economy”181 in the decision whether to allow an oral hearing. This margin of 
discretion means that it would be difficult to review at the enforcement stage whether an oral 
hearing should have been held. It may be remembered that in Jussila the ECtHR explicitly 
renounced the idea that there is a right to an oral hearing in at least one instance unless 
‘exceptional circumstances’ allow the court to dispense with it,182 and that it is not the case that 
an oral hearing should be refused only in rare cases. It is submitted that considering this leeway 
that is accorded to the national judge of the state where the procedure took place, it would be 
difficult for a judge in the state of enforcement to review whether the oral hearing was rightfully 
refused. 
This is compounded by the fact that the decision to hold an oral hearing is highly influenced 
by the facts of the case. The prohibition on review as to the substance likely forms an obstacle 
here as well. Whether a refusal to hold an oral hearing constitutes a violation comes down, 
according to the ECtHR, to whether it is possible to resolve the case only on the basis of written 
observations or whether there were circumstances that could only be verified at an oral hearing. 
An oral hearing may be necessary where the “personal character and manner of life” of the 
party concerned are relevant for the decision,183 or where the case involves an assessment of 
the applicant’s conduct.184 Again, deciding whether an oral hearing was necessary therefore 
requires the judge to review whether the judge that delivered the judgment adequately assessed 
                                                 
 
179 Cuniberti (2008). 
180 ECtHR Jussila v. Finland (merits) appl. no. 73053/01 ECHR 2006-XIV. 
181 ECtHR Schuler-Zgraggen v. Austria, appl. no. 14518/89, 31 January 1995. 
182 As was the ECtHR’s approach in ECtHR Fischer v Austria, appl. no. 33382/96, 17 January 2002; ECtHR 
Salomonsson v Sweden, appl. no. 38978/97, 12 November 2002; ECtHR Martinie v France [GC], 58675/00, 
ECHR 2006-VI , ECtHR Miller v Sweden appl. no. 55853/00 para. 29; see 3.3.2. 
183 ECtHR X. v. Sweden. The presence of the litigant has also been required in child access cases (X v. Sweden) 
and in some commercial cases (X. v. Germany). European Commission for Human Rights X. v. Germany (dec.) 
appl. no. 1169/61 24 September 1963; and X. v. Sweden (dec.) appl. no. 434/58 30 June 1959. 
184 ECtHR Muyldermans v. Belgium, appl. no., 12217/86 ECHR A214-A. 
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the facts and arguments presented and what was needed to either prove or disprove them. 
Arguably, such a review would be incompatible with the prohibition on review as to the 
substance. As an example, refusal of enforcement or recognition would likely not be justified 
in a case such as Helmers. In that case, the ECtHR concluded that an oral hearing should have 
been held due to the nature of the case (defamation), what was at stake for the applicant (his 
professional reputation and career). It also considered what questions were at issue: the points 
raised “went to the merits of the case and, […] raised serious questions as to which facts were 
relevant [and] which facts had been proved.” According to the ECtHR, such matters could only 
be settled by means of an oral hearing.185 It is submitted that if a court, asked to decide on an 
application for refusal of enforcement, were to carry out such a thorough review, this would 
come close to substituting its own discretion for that of the court of origin, which the EU regime 
for recognition and enforcement does not allow.186 
Given the degree of discretion attached to the decision to hold an oral hearing, a decision not 
to do so is unlikely to be able to justify refusal of recognition or enforcement. This may be 
different where the oral hearing was refused because of a rule of law that completely prohibits 
oral hearings from being held for an entire category of cases, where it was impossible to plead 
that exceptional circumstances nevertheless justified a hearing, and where there was no 
possibility of remedying this during an appeal. 
7.3.7.5 Right to a public trial versus the right to enforcement 
 
As explained in Chapter 4, publicity is important to a fair trial. As the ECtHR put it, given the 
possible detrimental effects that the lack of a public hearing could have on the fairness of the 
proceedings, the absence of publicity could not in any event be remedied by anything other 
than a complete re-hearing before the appellate court.187 Article 6(1) exhaustively lists a 
number of grounds for limitation of the right to a public hearing. 
On one hand, the right to a public hearing is therefore in most cases ‘essential’ to the fairness 
of the trial. This is borne out by the fact that it can only be limited under very specific 
circumstances, which Article 6(1) lists exhaustively. At the same time, the application of these 
limitation grounds leaves a degree of discretion to the national court. Establishing whether or 
not, for example, the young age of those involved, or the sensitivity of the issues discussed, 
could justify a restriction of the right to a hearing held in public, is a consideration which really 
only the judge deciding on the dispute could have made. 
On the other hand, if there was a rule that required that all hearings should be held in private, 
without the litigant being able to request a public hearing on the ground that his case presents 
                                                 
 
185 ECtHR Helmers v. Sweden, appl. no. 1826/85 ECHR A212-A para 38-39. 
186 Mankowski (2016) p. 964. 
187 ECtHR Riepan v. Austria, appl. no. 35115/97, ECHR 2000-XII, para. 40.  
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special features, this could perhaps be considered ground for refusing enforcement or 
recognition. As the ECtHR ruled in Martinie v. France, such rules “cannot in principle be 
regarded as compatible with Article 6 § 1 of the Convention”.188 In that case it ruled that “other 
than in wholly exceptional circumstances, litigants must at least have the opportunity of 
requesting a public hearing, though the court may refuse the request and hold the hearing in 
private on account of the circumstances of the case and for pertinent reasons”.189 If, therefore, 
the hearing was held in private, without any possibility of requesting that it be held in public, 
this might justify a refusal of enforcement or recognition. The existence of such a rule would 
be immediately obvious, so the prohibition of review on the substance would not be an issue; 
also, it might be considered what wider repercussions for the credibility of the justice system 
it would have if all hearings were held in private. Such a rule would affect the transparency 
and accountability of the justice system and therefore cast doubt on the fairness of both the 
outcome and the proceedings. 
 
7.3.7.6 The right to adjudication by an impartial and independent tribunal versus the right 
to enforcement 
 
The absence of independence or impartiality of the judge imparts the fairness of the outcome 
and destroys both the parties’ and the public’s confidence in the judiciary. This is exemplified 
by the ECtHR’s judgment in Micallef v. Malta, where the Court held that even when deciding 
on a request for interim measures (such as injunctions), where speed is of the essence, the right 
to an impartial and independent tribunal must always be respected, even if other elements of 
Article 6(1) may only apply in so far as compatible with the nature and purpose of interim 
proceedings.190 In such cases, the right to an impartial and independent tribunal remains an 
indispensable and inalienable safeguard, according to the Court.191 A clear case of corruption, 
for example, should therefore probably lead to refusal of enforcement. In such cases, the 
deciding judge may take into account the ‘cumulative effect’ of the violation, and the effects it 
has on society.  
The problem with this assessment will most likely lie in the burden of proof. It was previously 
concluded that while a party who applies for refusal of enforcement is in principle free to 
submit evidence supporting that application, the judge deciding on that application should only 
consider it as far as it shows that an obvious violation has taken place. An application for refusal 
of enforcement should not result in a complete review of the procedure in the Member State of 
origin. Yet with regard to the problem of independence or impartiality, additional evidence 
may be necessary, considering that a lack of impartiality is most likely not immediately obvious 
from the judgment alone. 
                                                 
 
188 ECtHR Martinie v France [GC], paras. 41-42. 
189 ECtHR Martinie v France [GC], para. 42. 
190 ECtHR Micallef v. Malta [GC], appl. no. 17056/06 ECHR 2009-V, para. 86. 
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In particular, it may be difficult to prove personal bias on the part of the judge. For this reason, 
the ECtHR has also allowed objective factors that give rise to legitimate doubt as to the judge’s 
impartiality as evidence of a violation. A case such as Micallef v. Malta provides a clear 
indication of a personal bias of the judge: in that case the judge was a family member of the 
opponent of an applicant. Such a personal connection is likely to lead to personal bias, and is 
often simple to prove. A case such as Aslaner v. Turkey is more difficult, because in that case 
a violation was found in the fact that three judges out of thirty-one had been previously involved 
with the case. Though such factors are in principle objectively verifiable, the ECtHR has ruled 
that the ‘degree of the involvement’ should be taken into account; the fact that a judge was 
previously involved at all does not necessarily amount to a lack of impartiality. To establish 
whether a violation took place, a judge should look very closely at the decisions previously 
taken by the judges suspected of bias and to what extent those decisions concerned the 
substance of the judgment whose enforcement is requested. In Aslaner, that assessment 
included reviewing the exact questions on which the judges suspected of bias had been asked 
to rule in a previous stage of the proceedings. Though such factors are still relatively easy to 
discern objectively, and might therefore amount to an ‘obvious’ violation, such an assessment 
comes close to a review on the substance and requires detailed information about the 
proceedings. More problematic are cases that require a review of the internal rules of the 
judiciary in the Member State of origin. According to the ECtHR, the absence of procedures 
for requesting the withdrawal of judges suspected of bias may amount to an objective factor 
giving rise to legitimate doubt about the judges’ impartiality.192 Likewise, an absence of 
independence may be derived from deficiencies in the judicial organisation, such as guarantees 
for a random assignment of cases193 and to prevent interference from the executive powers.194 
It is questionable to what extent such factors can really be assessed adequately in an 
enforcement dispute, as they would require thorough knowledge of the procedural law and 
judicial organisation of the state of origin. For example, the ECtHR found a violation in DMD 
Group v Slovakia because there was no system in place to guarantee the random assignment of 
cases to a judge, but it only came to this conclusion after an extensive discussion of the 
mechanism for awarding cases and the criteria used in that regard.195 Such information is most 
likely not publicly available; in its judgment, the ECtHR referred to administrative rules on the 
assignment of cases,196 but also to the work schedules made pursuant to those rules197 and the 
number of modifications made to those schedules.198 It is submitted that such an assessment 
could not be expected from a judge ruling on refusal of enforcement. 
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195 ECtHR DMD Group v. Slovakia.  
196 ECtHR DMD Group v. Slovakia, paras. 34-39. 
197 ECtHR DMD Group v. Slovakia, para. 16. 
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By contrast, in some cases, it is comparatively easy to assess the degree of independence of the 
judge without having to go into details. As an example, in the case of Brudnicka v. Poland,199 
a violation was found in a maritime dispute, because of the fact that the judges who decided 
were immediately accountable to the executive, and that their appointment and removal was 
also decided on by the executive. This hierarchy was immediately obvious from the legislation 
governing the procedure. In such a case, the deciding judge should only have to look at 
legislation, which is usually publicly available, to establish a lack of independence. Another 
clear indication may be the presence of submissions by members of the executive in the case 
file.200 In Agrokompleks v. Ukraine, there were letters in the case file from the applicant’s 
opponent to members of the Parliament, letters with ‘instructions’ from those members of 
parliament to the court, and letters of thanks from that party to the members of parliament for 
their intervention.201 The ECtHR therefore concluded that the authorities “blatantly interfered 
in the court proceedings, which is unacceptable”.202 It is submitted that such cases, where there 
is evidence in the case file of an interference that by its nature is incompatible with the principle 
of independence, should lead to refusal of enforcement or recognition. Most likely such cases 
where evidence of blatant interference is available are rare; presumably, in most cases the 
interference of the executive or other actors happens more covertly. It is submitted that in such 
cases courts should be able to take into account generally available and objective information 
as to, for example, the presence of corruption in the judiciary. This was the approach of the 
Dutch Court of Appeal on the recognition of arbitral awards in the Yukos Oil v. Rosneft case. 
These arbitral awards were annulled by a Russian court. Despite this annulment, the Yukos Oil 
shareholders sought enforcement of the arbitral awards, stating that the trial in which they had 
been annulled was tainted by corruption.203 The Dutch Court of Appeal, relying on diversity 
sources, ruled that it was sufficiently likely that the courts who decided on the annulment had 
been partial and dependent, and that therefore this decision should be ignored in the 
proceedings on recognition.204 It is submitted that, extreme though this example is, this 
approach is correct given that it is impossible to require the parties affected by corruption or 
partiality to provide evidence thereof. In this context, one may also think of reorganisations of 
the judiciary that give rise to severe doubt as to the independence of the judiciary from the 
executive. For example, in 2011, Hungary undertook a reform of its judicial system which 
involved such measures as an abrupt lowering of the retirement age for judges and the dismissal 
of the President of the Supreme Court. The former was found by the CJEU to be incompatible 
with EU legislation on equal treatment,205 while the latter led to a finding of a violation of 
                                                 
 
199 ECtHR Brudnicka and others v. Poland, appl. no. 54723/00, ECHR 2005-II, para. 17. 
200 ECtHR Agrokompleks v. Ukraine (merits). 
201 ECtHR Agrokompleks v. Ukraine (merits) para. 130.  
202 ECtHR Agrokompleks v. Ukraine (merits) para. 135. 
203 Kramer (2012) p. 136. 
204 Gerechtshof Amsterdam 28 April 2009, ECLI:NL:GHAMS:2009:BI2451, Yukos Capital v. Rosneft, para, 3.10. 
205 CJEU Case C-286/12 European Commission v. Hungary, ECLI:EU:C:2012:687.  
 311 
 
Articles 6(1) and 10 ECHR by the ECtHR.206 The reforms were also widely condemned 
politically.207 Such widespread, well-documented and profound concerns about the 
independence of the judiciary in a Member State may arguably provide a basis for applying the 
public policy exception. 
7.3.7.7 The right to a decision within a reasonable time versus the right to enforcement  
 
The right to a decision within a reasonable time is certainly essential to the fairness of the trial, 
given that excessive delays undermine the credibility and effectiveness of the trial. However, 
it is questionable whether a failure to observe this requirement should result in non-
enforcement. Firstly, the argument made in the preceding sections was that it is arguably fair 
for the creditor to be denied enforcement of a judgment if it is doubtful that the judgment itself 
is fair or based on a correct understanding of the facts. If the reasonable time has been exceeded, 
the fairness of the outcome is however in principle not affected (though this may be different 
for cases where speed is of the essence: see below). Moreover, if a court has failed to deliver 
its judgment within a reasonable time, this constitutes a violation of Article 6(1) vis-à-vis both 
parties, not just the judgment debtor. It does not seem proportionate if a court were to refuse 
enforcement in order to remedy a violation of the reasonable time requirement suffered by the 
debtor, if the creditor is also a victim of that violation. 
Secondly, the ECtHR’s own case law offers up examples of cases where the reasonable time 
requirement was found not to outweigh violations of other elements of the fair trial. In Wynen 
v. Belgium,208 a criminal case, the ECtHR found a violation of the principle of equality of arms 
because the applicant was limited in the number of memorandums or documents he could 
submit, while the defendant in the same case was not subjected to such a time limit. According 
to the respondent government, this limitation had been imposed in order to expedite the 
proceedings and make them more efficient by limiting the number of exchanges that parties 
could have between themselves, thus reducing the burden on the deciding court. Though the 
ECtHR acknowledged the importance of guaranteeing a trial within a reasonable time, it ruled 
that the applicant’s right to equality of arms should not have been sacrificed to achieve that 
goal. It stated that other ways could have been found to ensure expeditious proceedings which 
                                                 
 
206 ECtHR Baka v. Hungary (merits) appl. no. 20261/12 27 May 2014 (referred to the Grand Chamber on 15 
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did not put one of the parties at a disadvantage vis-à-vis the other, for example by limiting the 
time during which submissions could be made for both parties equally.209 
Another important case is Goç v. Turkey,210 in which the applicant had claimed compensation 
from the state for his wrongful arrest and deprivation of liberty. During the proceedings the 
applicant had not been allowed to present his views during an oral hearing. The ECtHR ruled 
that this constituted a violation of Article 6(1), because the applicant had been wrongly 
imprisoned, and an oral hearing was necessary to allow the applicant to communicate 
effectively the extent of his suffering and how this had influenced him and his family.211 The 
respondent government argued that holding an oral hearing was not necessary in this case and 
would have impaired the procedure’s speed and efficiency. The ECtHR however considered 
that the applicant’s “right to explain his personal situation in a hearing before the domestic 
court subject to public scrutiny […] outweighs the considerations of speed and efficiency”212.  
In both these judgments, the ECtHR therefore prioritised other elements of the fair trial over 
the right to a decision within a reasonable time. The underlying idea appears to be that there 
are many ways of ensuring a speedy and efficient procedure, which do not impact on the 
litigant’s other rights under Article 6(1). Along the same lines, and in addition to the argument 
presented above, it can be argued that it would also be disproportionate to prioritise the 
reasonable time requirement over the right to enforcement. It is important to all parties involved 
that procedures are conducted within a reasonable time, but according to the ECtHR, this can 
never be a reason to disregard other elements of the fair trial. 
Finally, as has been discussed, there appears to be a consensus that excessively long 
proceedings should not be addressed by a remedy that affects the outcome of the proceedings. 
Chapter 4 referred to the ECtHR’s judgment in Kudla v. Poland, and the CJEU’s judgment in 
Der Grüne Punkt, both of which proscribed either remedies aimed at acceleration of the 
proceedings, or pecuniary compensation, for violations of the reasonable time requirement. 
Contrary to violations of other elements of Articles 6(1) and 47, appeals or other procedural 
remedies appear not to be seen as effective for addressing violations of the reasonable time 
requirement, since additional procedures only extend the proceedings even further. Apart from 
that practical consideration, there may also be an argument of principle behind this rule. 
Contrary to such elements as the right to a fair hearing, the reasonable time requirement 
arguably does not contribute to the fairness of the outcome of the proceedings. It would perhaps 
be inappropriate if, as a sanction for exceeding the reasonable time, the decision that was taken 
would again be made subject to discussion, even though there are no reasons to doubt its 
fairness. In line with the ECtHR’s judgment in Kudla v. Poland, it would be too burdensome 
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to expect the litigants to endure additional procedural steps if the decision was not unfair in the 
first place. A refusal of enforcement or recognition, or another remedy which influences the 
outcome of the proceedings, therefore cannot adequately address the damage suffered by the 
litigants as a result of an exceedance of the reasonable time.  
This could be different in cases where the lack of speed either disproportionally disadvantaged 
one of the parties, or where it had a demonstrable impact on the outcome of the proceedings. 
Both may be an issue in family law matters, especially in cases concerning child custody, where 
the passage of time may have irreversible consequences for the parent-child relationship.213 It 
has also been accepted that, even when a child has been wrongfully removed, the passage of 
time may eventually render a return of the child to the country where he or she originally 
resided contrary to his or her best interests.214 It would thus be possible for litigants to apply 
delaying tactics to such an extent that it affects the outcome of the proceedings. Such delays, 
especially where they are partly caused by the courts that delivered the judgment, should 
arguably be considered contrary to public policy. The inherent risk of this approach is that the 
abducting or removing parent could argue that a return order handed down after an excessively 
long period should not be enforced, thereby profiting from both the abduction and the inactivity 
of the courts in the country of habitual residence. This risk is well documented in literature on 
international child abduction, which is why speed is one of the concepts underlying both 
Regulation 2201/2003 and the Hague Child Abduction Convention,215 so that excessively long 
proceedings are avoided. The other inherent risk is that refusal of enforcement of, for example, 
a return order, may only exacerbate the damage done to the relationship between the child and 
its parent. It is therefore very unlikely that refusal of recognition or enforcement on the basis 
of a violation of the reasonable time requirement is an adequate remedy for that violation and 
in the interests of the parties involved.216 
 
7.3.7.8 The right to consistency and legal certainty versus the right to enforcement 
 
Finally, it was previously discussed that a violation of fair trial may also occur where there are 
considerable inconsistencies in court decisions.217 In such cases, the violation is found in the 
outcome of the proceedings and the application of the law by the court of origin, not in the 
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procedure itself. It is submitted that such an application of fair trial does not sit well with the 
general prohibition on reviewing judgments on the merits. 
This may be different in cases where the decision of the court is ‘arbitrary or manifestly 
unreasonable’, as it was in the cases of Khamidov and Andelkovic.218 Even though in those 
cases the violation also concerns the outcome of the proceedings, it is submitted that the 
prohibition on review as to the substance should not be an obstacle. These judgments emanate 
from cases in which the unfairness of the trial was apparent from the outcome of the case: he 
or she may have been given an opportunity to be heard, but clearly their submissions or any 
evidence in favour of their claim was nevertheless disregarded. This points to extreme 
carelessness, or perhaps a lack of impartiality, on the part of the court. The problem is that this 
procedural unfairness is only apparent in the outcome of the case, and that a review of the 
substance, including the available evidence and how it was appreciated, needs to be carried out 
in order to arrive at this conclusion. However, these are extreme examples of cases where only 
a superficial reading of the judgment would show that the trial cannot have been fair. In 
Khamidov v. Russia, it was apparent from the judgment that the courts had completely and 
without justification ignored all evidence submitted by the applicant, while in Andelkovic the 
court failed to refer to the applicable law and the facts of the case, rendering the judgment 
wholly arbitrary. Such defects should be immediately obvious from looking at the judgment 
and the case file. 
Along the same lines, it would be possible for a court to refuse enforcement on the basis that 
legal certainty was not respected, for example in a case such as Brumarescu. In this case a 
violation was found in the fact that a final judicial decision was overturned without a 
justification. Provided that there no possible justification could be found, such violations could 
be considered contrary to public policy. The ECtHR’s line of case law pertaining to consistency 
however is more problematic. While the ECtHR may find that inconsistencies are incompatible 
with the right to a fair trial, for a judge to refuse enforcement on this basis would most likely 
clash with the prohibition on review as to the substance of the judgment. A case such as 
Borovska and Ferrai v. Slovakia should therefore probably not lead to refusal of recognition 
or enforcement.219 
7.3.8 Conclusion: the threshold for refusing recognition or enforcement 
 
Refusal of recognition or enforcement is only justified when the violation suffered by the 
judgment debtor outweighs the violation suffered by the creditor of his right to enforcement. 
The following factors should be taken into consideration in such an assessment.  
a. Refusal of recognition or enforcement is more likely to be justified where the debtor 
suffered a violation of an element of Article 6(1) that serves the objective of 
achieving a fair outcome; if this is so, the violation has given rise to severe doubts 
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as to the fairness and veracity of the outcome, and refusal of enforcement if that 
outcome may be an appropriate sanction. Refusal of enforcement or recognition is 
likely not an appropriate sanction for violations of elements that only inform the 
procedure and have no impact on the outcome, or for which specific sanctions have 
been proscribed. 
b. Refusal of recognition or enforcement is less likely to be appropriate if the element 
that was violated leaves a degree of appreciation to the Contracting States. 
c. Refusal of recognition or enforcement is more likely to be justified where the 
violation suffered by the debtor must made the exercise of the element of Article 
6(1) utterly impossible. The deciding judge must consider whether a remedy in the 
state of origin or before the ECtHR may offer an adequate solution. If so, refusal of 
enforcement or recognition is not appropriate. 
d. When fundamental rights other than Article 6(1) are also violated or interfered with 
by the violation of Article 6(1), this provides an additional reason for refusing 
enforcement or recognition. The judge should have regard to the immediacy and 
severity of the interference. 
e. The judge may consider the wider repercussions of the violation suffered by the 
debtor on underlying principles such as the rule of law or the credibility of the 
justice system. 
f. Refusal of recognition or enforcement is inappropriate if the assessment whether a 
violation took place requires a review of the procedure in the state of origin, to such 
an extent that it essentially amounts to a review of the judgment on its substance. 
g. Judges should, when necessary, take into account the difficulties the applicant may 
encounter in providing evidence, and correct for them.  
h. Refusal is unlikely to be appropriate if a remedy was available in the Member State 
of origin, unless the specific circumstances made it too difficult or impossible to 
make use of the legal remedies in the Member State of origin. 
i. Refusal is only appropriate if the person who requests refusal has in fact suffered a 
disadvantage as a result of the violation. It should be considered whether he himself 
contributed to the violation and whether he (implicitly) waived his right to fair trial. 
j. A judge must consider whether partial refusal of enforcement is possible and 
adequate as a sanction, if the violation suffered by the debtor affects only one 
distinct aspect of the procedure. 
 
7.4 Protection of the defaulting defendant and the special jurisdiction 
grounds 
 
The previous sections discussed in detail the need for a public policy exception in the European 
Regulations on recognition and enforcement. This Chapter does not discuss in detail the need 
for a specific refusal ground to protect defendants, such as Article 45(1)(b) of Brussels I bis. 
The reason for this is that the arguments in favour of retaining a refusal ground capable of 
addressing violations of fair trial apply equally to this refusal ground as they do to the public 
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policy exception. As Chapter 3 discussed, this refusal ground has proved practically important 
in remedying fundamental rights violations; for that reason, it should be retained.220 If public 
policy were replaced with a reference to fair trial, there would arguably be little use for the 
refusal ground of Article 45(1)(b), since it was considered a lex specialis compared to public 
policy.221 However, since this research concludes that such a replacement is likely to create 
problems, and therefore advises the retention of public policy, there would be clear added value 
to retaining the refusal ground of Article 45(1)(b) alongside public policy. It has been shown 
that this refusal ground has proved practically important.222 As Chapter 3 showed, some of the 
most important CJEU judgments that concern the rights of defendants, such as Trade Agency 
and ASML, relate to the application of this refusal ground.223 
In the 2010 Proposal for a recast of the Brussels I Regulation, a proposal was made to replace 
the refusal ground with a review procedure in the Member State of origin of the judgment. A 
similar arrangement was included in the Maintenance Regulation (Art. 19), the ESCP 
Regulation (Art. 18), the EOP Regulation (Art. 20) and the EEO Regulation (Art. 19). As is 
discussed in more detail in Chapter 8, such an arrangement increases the burden on the 
defendant, since he not only has to actively invoke the protection of the review mechanism, but 
to do so in a Member State where he is not domiciled. Considering that the application of this 
refusal ground was already strictly circumscribed by the CJEU, it is submitted that this further 
restriction places a disproportionate burden on the defendant. Furthermore, it is submitted that, 
as shown with regard to the public policy exception, it is difficult to expect Member States to 
be sufficiently critical of their own law and practice within such a review mechanism.224 An 
example is a case like Hendrikman, where the German court of origin was of the opinion that 
the defendants had technically ‘appeared’ because the court had appointed lawyers on their 
behalf, even though they were unable to instruct these lawyers. Though this standpoint was 
defended by the German government during the preliminary reference procedure, the CJEU 
robustly dismissed this argument.225 The Hendrikman case shows that, as with the public policy 
exception, it is unwise to rely on self-examination by the Member State of origin when it comes 
to reviewing whether the rights of the defaulting defendant were respected. This may be 
different where the rules on service are harmonised.226 
                                                 
 
220 Chapter 3.3.1. 
221 Cuniberti and Rueda (2011) p. 298; Franq (2015) p. 882; CJEU Case 145/86 Hoffman v Krieg, 
ECLI:EU:C:1988:61, para. 21; Case C -78/95 Hendrikman and Feyen / Magenta Druck & Verlag, 
ECLI:EU:C:1996:380, para. 23.  
222 Chapter 3.3.1. 
223 CJEU Case C-283/05 ASML Netherlands BV v Semiconductor Industry Services GmbH (SEMIS) 
ECLI:EU:C:2006:787; Case C-619/10 Trade Agency Ltd v Seramico Investments Ltd ECLI:EU:C:2012:531. 
Chapter 3.3.2. 
224 Chapter 3.4.  
225 Case C -78/95 Hendrikman and Feyen / Magenta Druck & Verlag ECLI:EU:C:1996:380, para. 18. See also 
Case C-112/13 A v B and Others ECLI:EU:C:2014:2195, para. 60. 
226 See Chapter 8.5.3, on the EOP and ESCP Regulations. 
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The same applies to the jurisdiction defences of Article 45(1)(e) Brussels I bis. The correct 
application of the special and exclusive jurisdiction grounds protected by this Article is 
essential to a proper functioning of the Regulation as such. The protection afforded by these 
special jurisdiction grounds, especially that afforded to consumers, would be illusory if it could 
only be invoked by challenging jurisdiction in the Member State where the opposing party 
commenced proceedings.227 
 
7.5 The need for an ‘emergency brake’ for return and access orders 
 
7.5.1 Refusal of enforcement of return orders 
 
This Chapter proposes that EU Regulations that facilitate the cross-border enforcement of civil 
judgments should contain an emergency brake mechanism, in the form of a ground for refusal 
of recognition or enforcement that should be applied restrictively and in only the most serious 
of cases. The question considered here is whether such a mechanism is appropriate for child 
abduction cases. The main argument in favour of an emergency brake put forward in this 
Chapter was that refusal of enforcement was proven to be the only way, in some cases, of 
addressing fundamental rights violations that had been committed in the Member State of 
origin of the judgment. It is certainly possible that a return order from one Member State 
constitutes a violation, either because one of the parties’ rights to be heard under Article 6(1) 
ECHR was violated in achieving it, or because its enforcement will violate one of the parties’ 
rights under Article 8 ECHR. The question remains as to whether there are instances in which 
a refusal of enforcement is the only way of remedying such a violation, and whether the 
potential impact on the other parties’ fundamental rights and interests can ever be justified.  
When it comes to the parties’ rights to a fair trial, it first needs to be pointed out that it is only 
the parents or guardians that derive any rights from Articles 6(1)/47 in the context of return 
proceedings, because they are the parties to the proceedings. The child is not a party, but rather 
the object of the proceedings; his or her rights are protected by the system of the Brussels II 
bis Regulation as such, and by specific rules such as the requirement that the child is given an 
opportunity to be heard as a prerequisite for enforcement (Art. 42(1)). The child’s right to be 
heard is however not derived from the right to a fair trial, but from the child’s right to participate 
in proceedings that affect him or her, introduced by the Convention on the Rights of the 
Child.228 Any violations of the right to a fair trial in the context of return proceedings can 
therefore only directly concern one of the parties to the proceedings, though they may of course 
adversely affect the child’s right to participate and his or her interests more generally. 
                                                 
 
227 Chapter 3.3.2; Dickinson (2011) p. 10. 
228 United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, Article 9. 
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Essentially, the question is therefore whether a violation of a party’s right to a fair trial should 
lead to a refusal of enforcement. Clearly, a refusal of enforcement may adversely affect the 
child’s best interest. It is submitted that allowing courts to refuse enforcement of return orders 
as a remedy for a violation of a party’s right to a fair trial is almost by definition 
disproportionate if any harm to the child’s health and development occurs as a result of that 
refusal. In Sahin v. Germany, the ECtHR ruled that in matters such as rights of access, parents 
have independent rights to respect for their family life, but that particular importance should 
be attached to the best interests of the child, which, depending on their nature and seriousness, 
may override those of the parents. According to the ECtHR, a parent cannot be entitled under 
Article 8 to have measures taken that would harm the child’s health and development.229 It 
seems improbable that the ECtHR would come to a different conclusion with regard to Article 
6 ECHR. Refusal of enforcement of a return order cannot be an appropriate remedy for a 
violation of a guardian’s rights under Article 6(1) if it adversely affects the child’s interests. 
Even if there is no, or no considerable, risk of harm to the child as a result of the refusal to 
enforce, it is questionable whether a violation of Article 6(1) can ever in itself be a sufficient 
reason for such a refusal. While of course parents, as parties to those proceedings, have a right 
to be heard in return proceedings, the main purpose of those proceedings is the protection of 
the parents’ and the child’s rights under Article 8 ECHR. The parents’ right to be heard is one 
of the ways to achieve effective protection of those rights, as this right enables him or her to 
voice any views or concerns as to where the child should live. Under the Brussels II bis 
Regulation, the parties’ right to be heard is expressly protected by Article 42(2). If one of the 
parents suffers a violation of this right, or another element of Article 6(1), this therefore also 
affects the extent to which he can effectively invoke his rights under Article 8. A violation of 
Article 6(1) is therefore clearly of consequence for the fairness of the return proceedings and 
its outcome. 
However, the right to a fair trial is also of independent importance in child abduction cases. It 
is possible that one of the parties to the proceedings is an organisation such as a child protection 
agency, which may have custody or act as an agent for the left-behind parent or guardian.230 In 
such a case, the organisation does not have a right to family life, but does enjoy a right to be 
heard; in this case, the right to be heard should be seen as conducive to protecting the child’s 
best interests. Again, the right to be heard is therefore essential to guarantee a fair outcome to 
the proceedings. 
The question is now whether refusal of enforcement can be an appropriate sanction, if it does 
not adversely affect the child’s interests, or in fact aligns with those interests. It was proposed 
                                                 
 
229 ECtHR Sahin v. Germany appl. no. 30943/96 2003-VIII, para. 66.  
230 It should be noted that perhaps not all guardians enjoy an independent right to a relationship with the child 
under Article 8; for example, while the relationship between children and foster/adoptive parents has been found 
to fall within the scope of Article 8, the relationship between a child and a protective agency or organisation has 
not; see European Commission for Human Rights X. v. Switzerland, appl. no. 8257/78, DR 13, p. 248. 
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that refusal of enforcement may be a proportionate remedy for a violation that makes the 
exercise of the right utterly impossible.231 In this context, it is important to consider that a 
judgment ordering return may not be the final decision in a child abduction case. The purpose 
of a return order is to ensure the swift return of a child to his or her state of habitual residence, 
in order to allow the courts of that state to subsequently make an informed decision on where 
the child should live. Enforcement of a return order is not necessarily the last step in a child 
abduction case: any views the abducting parent may have as to where the child should live he 
or he may voice during later custody proceedings, which are better suited to consider such 
arguments. However, the automatic enforcement regime of Brussels II bis applies to all 
judgments requiring return; such a judgment may well be a final judgment on custody from the 
Member State of the child’s habitual residence.232 Unless a right to appeal is available against 
that judgment, the abducting parent who was not heard may have no recourse other than to 
oppose its enforcement. Again, such a remedy can only be appropriate if the child’s interests 
are not at risk. 
It is possible to conclude on the basis of the factors identified in this Chapter that refusal of 
enforcement of a judgment requiring return may sometimes be the only way to remedy a 
violation of one of the parties’ right to a fair trial, especially it that violation also affects the 
parent’s right to family life. However it is only appropriate if it does not endanger the child’s 
health or safety or otherwise affect his or her interests; according to the ECtHR, a parent should 
not be able to request measures that would harm the child’s health or development. Rightfully, 
under the 1980 Convention refusal of enforcement is only possible if the child is at a “grave 
risk” of physical or psychological harm.233 Article 11(4) of the Brussels II bis Regulation 
provides that this refusal ground cannot be used if ‘adequate arrangements’ have been made to 
ensure the child’s safety, but the 2015 Study shows that courts are often unclear on what this 
entails and whether any measures will be sufficient, resulting in a higher number of refusals.234 
It is also accepted that providing a possibility to oppose the enforcement of a return order may 
have wider repercussions: it may encourage abductions,235 and remove the left-behind parent’s 
advantage of being able to conduct proceedings in his or her own Member State. Again, it goes 
beyond the remit of this research to conclude whether or not this is a sufficient reason to have 
enforcement of return orders be completely automatic within the EU. The matter of returning 
abducted children involves primarily a balancing act between all the parties’ rights under 
Article 8 ECHR and the child’s best interests as an independent factor. To determine how these 
factors should influence the availability and application of a refusal mechanism is beyond the 
scope of this research. 
7.5.2 Automatic enforcement of judgments granting rights of access 
 
                                                 
 
231 Chapter 7.3.  
232 Article 11(8) Brussels IIbis Regulation. 
233 Chapter 8.6.1.  
234 Study on the assessment of the Brussels IIbis Regulation (2015) p. 47. 
235 McEleavy (2005); Pérez-Vera (1982) p. 22. 
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Under the Brussels II bis Regulation, judgments granting rights of access also benefit from the 
automatic enforcement regime (Art. 41(1)). Access rights may include the right take a child for 
a limited period of time to a place other than the child’s habitual residence (Art. 5(b) 1980 
Convention). The 1980 Convention only provides with regard to these rights that states should 
have in place Central Authorities, to which parties may present “an application to make 
arrangements for organising or securing the effective exercise of rights of access” (Art. 21). 
The Authorities should then, in conformity with the obligations of co-operation under the 
Convention, “take steps to remove, as far as possible, all obstacles to the exercise of such 
rights.”236 It appears that a legislative initiative to which was intended only to simplify the 
enforcement of access rights in the EU237 in fact triggered the reform of the enforcement of 
return orders as well.238 The introduction of automatic enforcement for access rights however 
proved less controversial, presumably because it did not attempt to extensively reform an 
already existing mechanism. 
It is submitted that, in principle, the same arguments apply to the automatic enforcement of 
access rights as to return orders. It is possible that a judgment that grants a right of access is 
rendered in violation of one of the parties’ rights to be heard, and that it may, as a consequence 
or additionally, violate that parties’ rights under Article 8 ECHR or the child’s interests. The 
enforcement of access rights may require the use of force or the imposition of penalty fees for 
a failure to deliver the child at the agreed time and place. Such enforcement may have 
considerable consequences for the parties involved. 
On the other hand, it is questionable whether this is always the case and whether the effects 
created by enforcement are irreversible. This Chapter proposes that refusal of enforcement 
should only be considered if it is impossible to address violations in another way. It is clear 
that a right of access is essential to realising the parent’s right to a relationship with his child, 
whereas it does not render the exercise of the other parent’s right with his child utterly 
impossible. When it comes to the child’s best interests, the risks mostly appear to lie in the 
manner of enforcement. As with return orders, the best interests of the child may outweigh the 
rights of the parents.239 The enforcement of these rights can be organised in many ways; the 
Regulation does not proscribe the manner of enforcement. Article 48 of the Brussels II bis 
Regulation authorises courts in the Member State of enforcement to “make practical 
arrangements for organising the exercise of rights of access, if the necessary arrangements have 
not or have not sufficiently been made in the judgment delivered by the courts of the Member 
State having jurisdiction as to the substance of the matter and provided the essential elements 
of this judgment are respected.” It may be possible to widen this competence, so that the court 
may not refuse enforcement altogether but may alter the manner in which the access rights are 
                                                 
 
236 Article 21, 1980 Convention. 
237 Initiative of the French Republic with the view to adopting a Council Regulation on the mutual enforcement 
of judgments on rights of access to children, OJ C 234/7. 
238 Proposal for a Council Regulation concerning jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments 
in matrimonial matters an in matters of parental responsibility repealing Regulation (EC) No 1347/2000 and 
amending Regulation (EC) No 44/2001 in matters relating to maintenance, COM (2002) 222 final/2, p. 2. 
239 ECtHR Sahin v. Germany, para. 66. 
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enforced in such a way as to avoid any harm to the child, provided that the essential elements 
of the judgment are respected. In this way, a lack of consideration of the ‘unheard’ parent’s 
and the child’s interests and rights can be compensated, without having to resort to a complete 
refusal of enforcement. A refusal of enforcement would disproportionately affect the rights of 
the parent to whom access was granted, whereas there are alternative ways of protecting the 
other parent’s rights and the best interests of the child. 
7.6 Conclusion 
 
This Chapter proposes that an ‘emergency brake’ should be retained for all categories of civil 
judgments whose cross-border recognition and enforcement is facilitated by EU regulations. 
The purpose of this Chapter is to explore what such a refusal ground should look like. It was 
concluded that it seems more appropriate to retain the public policy exception rather than to 
replace it with a reference to fundamental rights. The primary problem with such a replacement 
is that a somewhat artificial distinction would have to be made between procedural and 
substantive public policy. This distinction is primarily academic and may prove difficult to 
apply in practice. This is because in practice substantive and procedural problems are closely 
interlinked. A distinction in legislation between substantive and procedural public policy may 
create more problems than it solves. Further research would be needed to see whether this issue 
can be resolved. 
Nevertheless, there are advantages to replacing the procedural element of public policy with a 
reference to fair trial. The primary advantage is that it would ensure that defendants could rely 
on violations of their right to a fair trial being remedied at the enforcement stage, whereas 
currently the contested practice would (in theory) be contrary to the practice of the Member 
State addressed as well. Conversely, the claimant would not be confronted with an application 
of public policy that goes outside what is allowed by the right to a fair trial, thus improving the 
protection of his right to enforcement. Combined, these changes would have the advantage of 
solidifying the link between fundamental rights and the cross-border recognition and 
enforcement of judgments and further entrenching fair trial in EU legislation on this matter. 
Finally, this Chapter concludes that in each case, a careful balancing needs to take place 
between the right to enforcement of the creditor and the element of the debtor’s fair trial that 
was violated. In this respect, the judge should always ask himself whether refusal of recognition 
or enforcement is an appropriate remedy to the debtor’s violation and whether it is proportional 
to the disadvantage suffered by the creditor. 
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8 Facilitating enforcement of civil judgments across European 
Union Member States 
 
8.1 Introduction 
 
The previous Chapter argued that European Union (EU) regulations concerning the 
enforcement of civil judgments across borders should contain a mechanism for judgment 
inspection in the Member State of enforcement, allowing that Member State to refuse 
enforcement or recognition on the basis of a limited number of grounds for refusal. This 
Chapter discusses how the second element of cross-border enforcement, judgment import, 
should be organized to protect the parties’ right to a fair trial adequately. Like the previous 
Chapter, it discusses how to balance the judgment creditors’ right to enforcement with 
safeguards that should ensure that judgment debtors’ rights are respected. As the previous 
Chapter concluded, this thesis rejects the idea of complete abolition of cross-border checks on 
enforcement of judgments in civil cases. Instead, it argues that refusal grounds in the State of 
enforcement should be combined with an effective procedure for obtaining, in the Member 
State of origin, permission for cross-border enforcement. This Chapter explores what that 
procedure should look like in order to ensure conformity with the right to a fair trial for all 
parties concerned. 
This Chapter has as its starting point that both the EU fundamental rights framework and the 
European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) require that EU legislation respects 
fundamental rights and that EU legislation should contain effective safeguards to that end. 
Chapter 5 concluded that though the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) in principle 
allows the abolition of cross-border checks on the enforcement of judgments in civil cases, it 
does so on the basis of a premise that the EU is, as an organization, able to effectively protect 
fundamental rights within its legal framework.1 This means that it is for the European 
legislature to formulate effective safeguards in legislation and to provide the machinery capable 
of enforcing those safeguards.2 In conformity with the ECtHR’s judgment in Avotins3 and the 
CJEU’s in Lindqvist,4 Member States are ultimately responsible for applying these safeguards. 
Because the CJEU ruled in Melloni5 that fundamental rights standards in EU secondary law 
are, by dint of the principle of effectiveness, maximum standards, these standards will need to 
be carefully calibrated. They will also need to be clear, so that problems of interpretation are 
kept to a minimum.  
                                                 
 
1 Conclusion to Part II. 
2 Conclusion to Part II. 
3 ECtHR Avotins v. Latvia, appl. no. 17502/07, 25 February 2014. 
4 CJEU Case C-101/01 Criminal proceedings against Bodil Lindqvist ECLI:EU:C:2003:596. 
5 CJEU Case C-399/11 Stefano Melloni v. Ministerio Fiscal ECLI:EU:C:2013:107. 
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The structure of this Chapter is as follows. Section 8.2 discusses the requirements that a 
procedure for obtaining permission for enforcement should fulfil. It looks at this procedure 
from both the perspective of the creditor and that of the debtor. It also considers whether these 
requirements are best fulfilled by a procedure in the Member State of origin of the judgment 
or one in the Member State of enforcement, and whether this aspect makes any difference for 
the design of the procedure. Specifically, it considers whether the instrument of certification, 
as implemented in the Brussels I bis Regulation, can adequately fulfil the identified 
requirements.  
Section 8.3 discusses the Maintenance Regulation, which completely abolished all intermediate 
steps for cross-border enforcement and the refusal grounds. Next, Section 8.4 discusses the 
European Enforcement Order (EEO). This instrument merits a detailed discussion, because it 
introduced a mechanism for enforcing a judgment across borders that combines both judgment 
import (or rather: export) and judgment inspection with the court of origin of the judgment, 
abolishing any role for the Member State of enforcement. It is considered whether this 
mechanism is capable of protecting the right to a fair trial effectively. 
Section 8.5 deals with the uniform European procedures, the European Order for Payment 
Procedure (EOP) and the European Small Claims Procedure (ESCP). These procedures should 
of course conform to the right to a fair trial in their entirety, not just on the matter of cross-
border enforcement. Recent CJEU case law and empirical data are analysed to determine what 
problems there are in the design and implementation of these procedures and how these could 
be resolved. 
Finally, Section 8.6 discusses the specific context of child abduction and access to children. 
This field of European civil justice cooperation merits specific attention, because practice has 
made clear that the protection of the rights of both children and parents in the cross-border 
context is a sensitive issue, which cannot be done justice by merely looking at the enforcement 
stage. Without aiming to be exhaustive on the subject, this section highlights a number of the 
most problematic aspects and explains why these cannot be adequately addressed by merely 
looking at the enforcement stage. 
 
8.2 How to organize judgment import in European Union 
Regulations 
 
The preceding Chapter argued that EU regulations that concern cross-border enforcement of 
judgments within the EU should contain grounds for refusal of recognition and enforcement in 
the Member State where enforcement is sought. This section discusses the other element of 
cross-border enforcement: judgment import, the formal means by which a judgment gains the 
status of an enforceable title in a state other than where it was handed down. It explains how 
judgment import should be organized, taking into account the requirements that the right to a 
fair trial imposes on enforcement proceedings. This section presumes, as the preceding Chapter 
proposed, that judgment inspection consists of a limited number of grounds of refusal for 
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enforcement that the Member State of enforcement may apply. This section therefore only 
considers how judgment import should be organized when the person against whom 
enforcement is sought has the possibility of later invoking grounds for refusal in the Member 
State of enforcement. An effective mechanism for judgment import is essential with a view to 
guaranteeing the creditor’s right to enforcement. 
Currently, the Brussels I bis Regulation contains a mechanism for cross-border enforcement 
that fulfils these characteristics: it combines a simple procedure for obtaining a certificate in 
the Member State of origin, which constitutes an enforceable title, with grounds for refusal in 
the Member State of enforcement. It is therefore appropriate to review this mechanism for its 
expediency and its conformity with the right to a fair trial. The following briefly sketches the 
mechanism. The next sections then discuss what demands the right to a fair trial makes of the 
procedure for achieving enforcement; they relate to both ECHR and Court of Justice of the 
European Union (CJEU) case law (8.2.1) and other recommendations, such as those of CEPEJ 
(8.2.3). These are then applied to the example of Brussels I bis in order to assess whether its 
mechanism meets the demands. Recent literature on the Regulation is also used to assess its 
practical application.  
The current Brussels I bis Regulation requires the party who wishes to enforce a judgment in 
another Member State to request a certificate from the court that rendered the judgment (Art. 
42(1)). In accordance with Article 53, the court shall issue the certificate on application, using 
the form in Annex 1 to the Regulation. This form consists of a number of questions that partly 
concern very formal aspects of the judgment, such as contact details of the court and the parties 
and the date on which it was given, and some more substantive aspects. For the purposes of the 
protection of fair trial rights, the questions under 4.3 and 4.5 of Annex 1 are most relevant. 
Question 4.3 requires the court to check whether the judgment was delivered by default, and if 
so, when the document instituting the proceedings was served on the defendant. Question 4.5 
asks whether the judgment was served on the defendant prior to the certificate being issued. It 
does not specify how service should have been effected, but leaves this to the interpretation of 
the court that issues the certificate. Most likely courts will apply the requirement in conformity 
with the way Article 45(1)(b) and its predecessor have been interpreted by the CJEU.6 
Essentially, the certification procedure can be characterized as a form of judgment export: it 
facilitates the enforcement of a domestic judgment in other EU Member States. The certificate 
of the Brussels I bis Regulation serves to aid communication between the courts and to certify 
that the judgment constitutes an enforceable title.7 In this sense, it has the same function as the 
declaration of enforceability of Brussels I (though contrary to that declaration the certificate 
has no independent function as an enforceable title). It is therefore possible to speak of 
‘judgment export’; this distinguishes the procedure from the judgment inspection stage, and 
makes clear that it fulfils the same function, but is different from, judgment import (exequatur). 
                                                 
 
6 CJEU Case C-283/05 ASML Netherlands BV v Semiconductor Industry Services GmbH (SEMIS) 
ECLI:EU:C:2006:787; Fitchen (2015) p. 459-460. 
7 Chapter 2.3.3.1, in relation to the Brussels Ibis Regulation. 
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Both judgment import and judgment export are mechanisms for obtaining permission for 
enforcement in another Member State from where the judgment was given. The following 
discussion concerns both these mechanisms. 
 
8.2.1 Requirements that can be derived from ECtHR case law 
 
This section discusses what requirements the ECtHR has set out in its case law concerning the 
procedure for obtaining permission for enforcement. It discusses both ECtHR case law on cases 
concerning exequatur, meaning the procedure for obtaining permission in one state for 
enforcement of a judgment obtained in another state, as case law on purely internal situations 
concerning enforcement. Both strands of case law are relevant, because obtaining permission 
for enforcement in another state is only part of the wider issue of achieving effective 
enforcement. 
Chapter 4 showed that ECtHR case law provides a right to enforcement of judgments obtained 
in civil cases, because according to the Court the right to a fair trial would be ‘illusory’ if states 
were to allow judgments to remain inoperative.8 It was also concluded that proceedings 
necessary to obtain enforcement should fulfil the requirements of the right to a fair trial; this 
also applies also to exequatur proceedings in states where enforcement of a foreign judgment 
was sought. 
So which requirements can be derived from ECtHR case law with regard to procedures that 
allow judgment creditors to obtain permission for enforcement? The most relevant ECtHR 
judgment in this regard is Saccoccia9, which concerned the question whether a hearing should 
have been held during exequatur proceedings. The case concerned the enforcement in Austria 
of a judgment obtained in the United States. The applicant before the ECtHR, Mr Saccoccia (a 
United States national), was suspected in the United States of having laundered money. The 
Rhode Island District Court in the United States issued a forfeiture order in respect of assets 
(cash, a bank account and bearer bonds) held in Austrian banks, which were deemed to be the 
proceeds of money laundering. The Vienna Regional Criminal Court allowed the forfeiture 
order to be enforced. Before the ECtHR, the applicant complained that the Austrian exequatur 
proceedings did not comply with Article 6(1) of the ECHR, since the enforcing court had not 
held a public hearing to allow him to explain why the assets had been lawfully acquired. 
The ECtHR established the applicability of Article 6(1) by ruling that the forfeiture order 
involved a determination of the applicant’s civil rights and obligations.10 It then cited its case 
law in Hornsby v. Greece and other cases to establish that exequatur proceedings also come 
                                                 
 
8 ECtHR  Hornsby v. Greece appl. no. 18357/91 ECHR 1997-II. 
9 ECtHR Saccoccia v. Austria, appl. no. 69917/01, 18 December 2008. 
10 ECtHR Hornsby v. Greece, para. 57. 
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within the scope of Article 6(1), given that this “is the moment when the right asserted actually 
becomes effective”.11 It also acknowledged, however, that exequatur proceedings do not 
require the court to decide anew on the merits of the case, but only to “examine whether the 
conditions for granting execution are met”.12 The Court then used this characteristic of 
exequatur proceedings to determine whether the refusal to hold a public hearing constituted a 
violation of Article 6(1). The Court cited its settled case law concerning the right to an oral 
hearing to establish that that right is not absolute, and that the nature of the issues to be decided 
is decisive.13 An oral hearing may not be necessary when there are no “issues of credibility or 
contested facts”14 or where the proceedings concern merely “legal issues of a limited nature” 
or of “no particular complexity”.15 
The Court applied these criteria to the case at hand. According to the relevant treaties between 
the United States and Austria, the questions to be examined were the following: reciprocity; 
whether the acts committed by the applicant were punishable by Austrian law at the time of 
their commission; whether statutory time-limits were complied with; and whether the 
proceedings before the court of origin “had been in conformity with the standards of Article 6 
of the ECHR”16. The Court found that the exequatur procedure conducted before the Austrian 
courts only involved “rather technical issues of inter-State cooperation in combating money-
laundering through the enforcement of a foreign forfeiture order” and that “they raised 
exclusively legal issues of a limited nature”17. The proceedings did not require the hearing of 
witnesses or the taking of evidence, nor did they require a hearing of the applicant in person 
because his credibility or personal conduct were not at issue. The Austrian courts could 
therefore fairly and reasonably decide the case on the basis of written materials, and a hearing 
did not need to be held. 
In Saccoccia, the ECtHR therefore provided an important assessment of the characteristics of 
the exequatur proceedings and what requirements Article 6(1) imposes on them. It appears, as 
is in line with the settled case law on the right to an oral hearing, that the limited review 
conducted at this stage justifies that no oral hearing needs to be held. This finding is also 
relevant to other elements of Article 6(1), such as the right to a reasoned judgment, because 
their applicability is also determined by the extent and complexity of the review conducted 
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14 ECtHR Hornsby v. Greece, para. 76; the Court cites ECtHR Jacobsson v. Sweden (no. 2) appl. no. 16970/90 
ECHR 1998-I and ECtHR Valová and others v. Slovakia, appl. no. 44925/98.  
15 The Court cites ECtHR Varela Assalino v. Portugal (dec.) appl. no. 64336/01 and ECtHR Speil v. Austria 
(dec.) appl. no. 42057/98.  
16 ECtHR Saccoccia v. Austria, para. 77. 
17 ECtHR Saccoccia v. Austria, para. 78. 
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during the proceedings.18 The next section considers how this influences the way other 
elements of the right to a fair trial apply in this context. 
Saccoccia provides guidance on the protection that should be provided to the person against 
whom enforcement is sought during the procedure itself (other than the protection afforded by 
a potential refusal of enforcement). Of course, the ECtHR’s case law on the right to 
enforcement is relevant to the creditor. 
In such cases as Romanczyk,19 and Matrakas and others,20 the ECtHR examined whether 
Contracting States had violated the applicants’ right to enforcement of maintenance orders on 
the basis of the New York Convention.21 The Court is not prescriptive in this regard, but 
reviews whether the authorities acted with sufficient diligence in their assistance of the creditor. 
In Matrakas, the ECtHR found a violation on the part of Greece because it had not acted 
diligently in the enforcement of maintenance orders. The Greek authorities were found to have 
failed to provide the necessary information, to summon the debtor, or otherwise take measures 
to ensure the enforcement of these orders, which led to unacceptable delays in the enforcement. 
In Romanczyk, the violation lay in the failure of authorities in the state where enforcement was 
sought to follow up when they were informed that the debtor had not honoured his obligations. 
In Jovanovski, and Vrbica, the ECtHR also found violations in the authorities’ failures to act 
diligently and within a reasonable time period. 
Though these judgments make clear that a failure to provide assistance in the enforcement of a 
(foreign) judgment may constitute a violation of fair trial, they do not prescribe what an 
effective enforcement procedure should look like. The ECtHR rather reviews what obligations 
the relevant international treaty or domestic law created and whether the authorities carried out 
those obligations in a diligent manner and within a reasonable time. In order to guarantee the 
creditor’s right to enforcement it therefore does not matter what exactly the enforcement 
procedure looks like, as long as it is effective in obtaining enforcement (with the important 
caveat that the state’s authorities are not responsible when enforcement is impossible due to 
the debtor’s lack of funds). Any procedure for obtaining enforcement included in EU 
Regulations must therefore contain clear obligations for both states involved in the 
enforcement, and guarantees for ensuring that they fulfil these obligations diligently and within 
due time. 
8.2.2 Implications for the design of the procedure for obtaining permission for 
enforcement 
 
The preceding section leads to the conclusion that any procedure for obtaining permission for 
enforcement is a balance between the creditor’s right to (and the general public’s interest in) 
speedy and effective enforcement, and the debtor’s right to a fair trial in general. The latter 
                                                 
 
18 Chapter 4.3.2.7. 
19 ECtHR Matrakas and others v. Poland and Greece, appl. no. 47268/06. 
20 ECtHR Romanczyk v. France appl. no. 7618/05. 
21 New York Convention of 20 June 1956 on the Recovery Abroad of Maintenance. 
 329 
 
may manifest itself differently depending to how the procedure is designed: as Saccoccia 
provides, various elements of the right to a fair trial may merit more or less extensive protection 
depending on what actually happens during the procedure. If the questions examined at the 
stage where permission for enforcement is granted are merely ‘legal issues of a technical 
nature’ and of ‘no real complexity’, the procedural safeguards may be less extensive. The 
following discusses the implications of this case law for the design of a procedure for obtaining 
permission for enforcement. 
As Chapter 7 extensively discussed, this thesis proposes that EU regulations should retain a 
possibility for Member States where enforcement is sought to refuse enforcement or 
recognition when the judgment constitutes a sufficiently serious violation of the right to a fair 
trial. This means that another check at the stage where permission for enforcement is granted 
would probably not be justified, because it would add little additional protection in return for 
the added procedural burden of an additional administrative step. A simple and effective 
procedure for obtaining permission for enforcement, during which only the judgment’s 
compliance with relatively formal requirements are checked, would likely be the best option 
for combining effectiveness with protection of the rights of the debtor. This would allow the 
creditor to quickly and effectively obtain permission for enforcement, while the debtor would 
retain the possibility of applying for refusal of enforcement in the Member State where 
enforcement is sought (likely his own domicile) if serious violations were suspected. 
One reservation that should be clearly stated is that specific safeguards may be needed in the 
context of family law, specifically pertaining to child abduction cases. Refusal of enforcement 
may not be an appropriate remedy for miscarriages of justice in this context, due to the 
sensitivity of the issues. Section 8.6 therefore discusses what specific safeguards may be 
needed for these types of cases. 
For judgments outside this category, the question is essentially what requirements the judge (or 
authority) who decides whether a judgment may be enforced should check at that stage, keeping 
in mind that refusal grounds may still be invoked in the Member State of enforcement. In order 
to form a picture of the type of requirements that may be checked, this Chapter looks at the 
requirements that are included in the regulations that are discussed in this thesis. The 
regulations that have abolished exequatur in the Member State of enforcement all contain some 
requirements that the court of origin must check prior to allowing it to be enforced across 
borders.22 
                                                 
 
22 The European Order for Payment (EOP) and judgments resulting from a European Small Claims Procedure 
(ESCP) may only be enforced when all procedural guarantees contained in those Regulations are complied with 
(CJEU Joined cases C-119/13 and C-120/13 eco cosmetics GmbH & Co. KG v Virginie Laetitia Barbara Dupuy 
and Raiffeisenbank St. Georgen reg. Gen. mbH v Tetyana Bonchyk , ECLI:EU:C:2014:2144). Because these 
guarantees apply to the entire procedure, and are not simply prerequisites for enforcement, they are discussed 
separately, in Section 8.5 of this Chapter. 
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8.2.3 Other recommendations for the design of an effective enforcement 
procedure 
 
Further to the ECHR and the ECtHR’s case law, the Committee of Ministers of the Council of 
Europe has adopted a Recommendation on enforcement.23 The Council of Europe’s 
Commission on the Efficiency of Justice (CEPEJ) later adopted Guidelines on the 
implementation of this Recommendation (2009).24 Both documents are not binding, but should 
be seen as authoritative advice on the proper implementation of the right to enforcement of 
judgment that Article 6(1) ECHR encompasses. 
The Recommendation advises that the member states of the Council of Europe implement 
enforcement procedures that are “efficient and cost-effective”. In order to achieve this, 
according to the Recommendation the following conditions should be fulfilled (paraphrased): 
i. Enforcement should be defined and underpinned by a clear legal framework which 
delineates the powers, rights and responsibilities of all actors involved; 
ii. Enforcement should be carried out in accordance with the existing law and judicial 
interpretation thereof, in order to guarantee legal certainty, transparency and 
foreseeability; 
iii. Parties have a duty to cooperate;  
iv. Defendants should provide up-to-date information on their income, assets and other 
relevant matters; 
v. There should be no postponement of the enforcement process unless there are reasons 
prescribed by law; 
vi. A proper balance should be struck between interests of both parties (especially with 
regard to Articles 6 and 8 ECHR); 
vii. Certain essential assets and income of the defendant should be protected. 
Furthermore, the Committee recommends that enforcement procedures provide for the most 
effective and appropriate means for serving documents, provide for measures to deter or 
prevent procedural abuses, proscribe a right for parties to suspend enforcement to ensure 
protection of their rights, and provide for judicial review (where necessary) of decisions made 
during the enforcement process. These recommendations all inform the actual enforcement 
proceedings in the state where enforcement is carried out, and are only to a limited extent 
                                                 
 
23 Council of Europe, Commission of Ministers, Recommendation Rec(2003)17of the Committee of Ministers to 
member states on enforcement (adopted by the Committee of Ministers on 9 September 2003 at the 851st meeting 
of the Ministers’ Deputies) Rec(2003)17.  
24 European Commission on the Efficiency of Justice (CEPEJ) Guidelines for a better implementation of the 
existing Council of Europe’s Recommendation on Enforcement, adopted by the CEPEJ at its 14th plenary 
meeting, (Strasbourg, 9 – 10 December 2009) CEPEJ(2009)11REV2. 
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applicable to the mechanism for cross-border enforcement of the EU regulations. Still, they are 
a relevant source of information as to what constitutes an effective right to enforcement. 
The 2009 CEPEJ Guidelines further contain the following advice (in so far as relevant to the 
cross-border aspect of enforcement) (paraphrased): 
i. There should be sufficient information on the enforcement process and the activities 
of the court and the enforcement agent should be transparent; enforcement 
authorities should bear responsibility for effecting service;25 
ii. Parties should be able to understand and participate effectively in the enforcement 
proceedings: to that end, information should be communicated as clearly and 
comprehensibly as possible;26 
iii. Parties should be notified effectively of the enforcement measures taken against 
them, including any possibilities for challenging enforcement and the consequences 
of failing to comply;27 
iv. Member states should ensure that enforcement is not unnecessarily prolonged; 
defendants should be given the right to challenge enforcement measures within 
reasonable time, but this should not unjustifiably halt or delay the enforcement.28 
 
8.2.4 Assessment: how should judgment import or export be organized? 
 
It was concluded that, where grounds of refusal are available in the Member State of 
enforcement, the procedure for achieving judgment import should be kept as simple as possible. 
This is likely the best way to reconcile the creditor’s right to speedy and effective enforcement 
with the protection of the rights of the debtor. 
The certification procedure of the Brussels I bis Regulation appears to fit these requirements 
reasonably well. During the recast process, it was pointed out that the judgment import phase 
of the enforcement mechanism of Brussels I had only a formal function that could be greatly 
simplified or even abolished without adverse consequences for the protection of fundamental 
rights, as long as grounds for refusal were available.29 This does not however mean that the 
import function is of no importance to the protection of the parties’ rights. An effective 
harmonized mechanism for obtaining an enforceable title that is easily identifiable by 
enforcement authorities throughout the EU can greatly contribute to the realization of the 
                                                 
 
25 No. 9-12. 
26 No. 15. 
27 No. 17-22. 
28 No. 66-71. 
29 Oberhammer (2010) p. 198; Arenas Garcia (2010) p. 359. 
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creditor’s right to enforcement. A uniform certificate, such as that required for enforcement 
under the Brussels I bis Regulation, could be a very effective way of achieving this. 
8.2.4.1 Creditor’s right to enforcement 
 
It has been questioned whether a certificate provided by the court of origin of the judgment 
would be equally effective as an exequatur in the Member State of enforcement. Some 
commentators welcomed the replacement of the exequatur with the certificate as it simplified 
the procedure for the creditor.30 It was however also observed that the exequatur provided a 
link between the judgment and the Member State where enforcement is sought, while the 
current certification procedure places the burden on national enforcement authorities.31 Not 
everyone sees this as a justified concern. According to Hovaguimian, in most Member States 
enforcement agents are highly qualified individuals, and there is little reason “at least for a 
major part of the EU” to fear that they would be confronted with legal questions beyond their 
qualifications.32 
Another issue is the matter of adaptation of enforcement measures that are unknown in the 
Member State of enforcement to measures that are available in that State.33 It has been stated34 
that problems may occur as Brussels I bis allows Member States to leave such decisions to non-
judicial enforcement authorities, who may not accurately assess the need for adaptation or for 
an examination by a court on this matter. The (lack of) adaptation may be challenged by the 
parties (Art. 52(2)), but this may cause delays. Hovaguimian however points out that complex 
questions of adaptation are rare and that, as previously stated, enforcement authorities should 
be sufficiently skilled to address them.35 
Likewise, there is disagreement as to whether the fact that a certificate is issued by the court of 
origin, as opposed to an exequatur by the court of enforcement, constitutes an advantage to the 
creditor in terms of speed, costs and expediency. Potential advantages are that the court of 
origin is better informed of the proceedings, which enables him to quickly and efficiently 
decide on a request for a certificate. Another potential advantage is that nothing precludes the 
creditor from requesting the certificate before the judgment has been handed down, for 
example, in the summons.36 This eliminates the need for a separate exequatur from a court in 
the Member State of enforcement and thus reduces costs and increases speed and efficiency. 
There are doubts, however, as to the actual size of this cost reduction, since according to the 
                                                 
 
30 Hess (2012) p. 1102; Oberhammer (2010) p. 199. 
31 Kramer (2014) p. 368. 
32 Hovaguimian (2015) p. 229. 
33 Art. 51(1) Brussels Ibis. 
34 Kramer (2014) p. 356, Hovaguimian (2015) p. 231. 
35 Hovaguimian (2015) p. 231. 
36 This is indeed what happens in Dutch first instance courts, for example District Court Rotterdam 25 March 
2015, ECLI:NL:RBROT:2015:2487. 
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CSES Report, only a small proportion of the costs associated with cross-border enforcement is 
spent on court fees.37 It is possible that lawyer’s fees may also be reduced by the removal of 
the need for a court-issued exequatur, but it was rightly pointed out that creditors are still 
unlikely to approach enforcement authorities in a Member State they are unfamiliar with 
without the aid of a lawyer.38 
It also needs to be pointed out that the disparity in enforcement costs among Member States, 
which was an important rationale for the reform of the enforcement mechanism of the EU 
Regulations,39 has not been solved with the abolition of exequatur in favour of a certification 
procedure. The court fees Member States may charge for issuing the certificate have not been 
harmonised, nor have the fees charged by the enforcement authorities. 
On the matter of delays, it should be stressed that in so far as they are caused by a lack of 
efficiency of the enforcement authorities in the Member States, Brussels I bis does not provide 
a solution. National enforcement law and practice will always remain the bottleneck of any 
cross-border enforcement mechanism, unless it is harmonised. 
It can be expected that the possibility of requesting the certificate during the proceedings on 
the merits allows enforcement to happen faster. On the other hand, it has been pointed out that 
Brussels I bis allows courts addressed with refusal applications or appeals thereof to 
automatically stay or limit enforcement on the basis of Article 44.40 Such a stay or limitation 
may span three separate proceedings, depending on whether the Member State addressed 
allows a second appeal against a decision on refusal of enforcement (Art. 50). It has been 
suggested that such delays could be prevented by imposing some restriction on the discretion 
to allow a stay of enforcement, and that Brussels I bis constitutes a missed opportunity on this 
matter.41 Such automatic stay or limitation of enforcement could also be considered contrary 
to nos. 66 and 67 of the CEPEJ Guidelines, which provide that states should not unnecessarily 
prolong enforcement proceedings and that any action by the defendant to challenge 
enforcement does not unjustifiably halt or delay these proceedings.42 
Another possible cause for delay is the lack of a time period within which an application for 
refusal of enforcement should be submitted. Whereas Brussels I limited this to one month or 
                                                 
 
37 According to CSES (2010) p. 147, of the EUR 2.208 average costs of cross-border enforcement in simple cases, 
EUR 53 constituted court fees.  
38 Hovaguimian (2015) p. 243; according to the CSES Report, EUR 1205 of the total cost of EUR 2.208 are 
lawyer’s fees; CSES (2010) p. 147.  
39 Hess, Pfeiffer and Schlosser (2007) para. 525; Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the 
Council on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters 
(Recast) COM(2010) 748 final, p. 4; European Commission, Action Plan Implementing the Stockholm 
Programme, COM(2010)171 final, p. 5. 
40 Hovaguimian (2015) p. 238; Cuniberti and Rueda (2011) p. 315. 
41 Cuniberti and Rueda (2011) p. 315. 
42 CEPEJ Guidelines, Nos. 66-67. 
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two months (depending on the debtor’s domicile) after the moment of service of the declaration 
of enforceability (Art. 43(5)), Brussels I bis leaves this to the law of the Member State of 
enforcement (Art. 47(2)). It will therefore depend on the law of the Member State addressed 
whether this constitutes an improvement over Brussels I. 
Without any statistical evidence on the application of Brussels I bis currently available (at the 
time of writing, about one year after entry into force) it is impossible to say whether the 
proposed gains in terms of costs, speed and efficiency have been achieved, and whether they 
will prove to be significant. However, despite some reservations, there do not seem to be any 
reasons to suspect that Brussels I bis’ certification procedure is significantly less efficient than 
its predecessor, the exequatur. Since the exequatur was found by the Heidelberg Report to 
function quite effectively,43 it can be concluded that the Brussels I bis mechanism for cross-
border enforcement is likely to effectively protect the creditor’s right to enforcement, though 
there is certainly room for improvement.  
8.2.4.2 Protection of the debtor 
 
From the debtor’s perspective, it should be noted that the certificate, which in accordance with 
Article 43(1) should be served on the defendant prior to enforcement measures being taken, 
does not contain information on how and where to apply for refusal of enforcement, and on 
what grounds this is possible. Member States are free to provide such additional information 
(Art. 47(2)), but this is not required. Since the CEPEJ Guidelines advise that parties should be 
informed of any possibilities to challenge enforcement, it is recommended that this information 
be included in the certificate or otherwise provided to the debtor. 
It should also be noted, as Kramer points out, that service on the defendant of the certificate 
and the judgment does not suffice to inform him where in the EU and at what point in time the 
creditor will actually seek enforcement.44 It may therefore be necessary for the debtor to apply 
for refusal of enforcement in all EU Member States where targetable assets exist or may exist. 
Moreover, Article 53 does not provide for a time period between the service of the certificate 
and the taking of the first enforcement measure; this is left to the Member States.45 Domestic 
time limits may not however be sufficient to enable a debtor in a cross-border case, who may 
be completely unaware of the case before the certificate is served, to take measures against its 
enforcement. Kramer is correct to conclude that this lack of uniformity does not contribute to 
legal certainty and transparency, and that the protection offered by the service of the certificate 
is incomplete.46 
                                                 
 
43 Hess, Pfeiffer and Schlosser (2007) para. 52; Chapter 2.2.4.1. 
44 Kramer (2015) p. 427. 
45 Ibid., p. 428. 
46 Ibid., p. 428. 
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From the debtor’s perspective, the protection of his right to a translation of the judgment is also 
relevant. Article 43(2) of Brussels I bis allows him to request a translation of the judgment if it 
is not in a language that he understands. This right to translation ensures that the debtor can 
make an informed decision whether or not to oppose enforcement. For that reason, when a 
translation has been requested, no enforcement measures other than provisional measures may 
be taken. This means that enforcement cannot proceed until the translation has been provided 
and a reasonable time has elapsed to allow the debtor to decide whether to challenge the 
enforcement.47 This rule is based on Article 8 of the EU Service Regulation. This article has 
rightly been criticized because it is unclear what it means to understand a language sufficiently 
well to accept the judgment, and who should determine whether that is the case.48 The burden 
of ensuring that the debtor receives the judgment in a language he understands lies with the 
debtor, who must take active measures to ensure that this happens. 
 
8.2.4.3 Effectiveness of a check of service of the documents instituting the proceedings 
 
Considering that the ECtHR does not provide explicit guidelines to establish what requirements 
are to be checked before enforcement is permitted, perhaps practice may provide some insight 
into which requirements are effective.  
 
All regulations discussed require the judge to review, in cases where the judgment was 
delivered by default, whether the defendant was appropriately notified of the proceedings. Does 
this check indeed ensure that no judgments are enforced against defaulting defendants who 
were not properly informed of the proceedings? In this regard it should be observed that though 
the Brussels I bis Regulation requires judges to check whether the defendant was properly 
informed before issuing a certificate, this check is not the only way the Regulation protects the 
rights of the defaulting defendant. Like its predecessor, Brussels I bis contains a double review 
of this matter, in the form of both a pre-enforcement check by the court of origin and a ground 
for refusal of enforcement in the Member State where enforcement is sought. As the CJEU 
ruled in Trade Agency,49 the existence of a certificate that indicates that the defendant was 
adequately served with the document instituting the proceedings can constitute only prima 
facie evidence of service having been effected. The Court gave three reasons for this 
conclusion. Firstly, it pointed out that the Brussels I Regulation did not in any way prohibit 
such a double review. Secondly, the certificate only required the issuing judge to state a date 
of service, but no other information. Thirdly, the judge who issued the certificate was not 
necessarily the same as the one who rendered the judgment. The judge in the state of 
enforcement therefore retains the authority to review whether service was indeed performed. It 
                                                 
 
47 See Recital 32; Kramer (2015) p. 429. 
48 Stadler (2012). 
49 CJEU Case C-619/10 Trade Agency Ltd v Seramico Investments Ltd ECLI:EU:C:2012:531. 
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is likely that this interpretation also applies to Brussels I bis, since the certification procedure 
contained in that Regulation has the same characteristics.50 This means that the check of service 
prior to the issuance of the certificate is not intended to prevent all cases where service was not 
effected properly from being enforced; there is always the additional insurance of the 
possibility of refusal of enforcement on the basis of Article 45(1)(b). 
 
If the preliminary check (in the State of origin) whether service was effected is not the only 
way of safeguarding this essential requirement, then there is also no reason to make it more 
extensive than it already is. A more precise check prior to certification (for example like the 
one included in the EEO Regulation, to be discussed further on) would not be necessary and 
therefore only cause unnecessary delay for the creditor.  
 
8.2.5 Conclusion on judgment export in Brussels I bis 
 
From the creditor’s perspective, judgment export under Brussels I bis appears to function 
relatively well, though it needs to be stressed that no quantitative data on its application are 
available yet. It can however be assumed that the possibility of requesting a certificate from 
the same judge who issues the judgment is easier to achieve than requesting a declaration of 
enforceability in the Member State of enforcement. The practical bottleneck remains the 
accessibility of foreign enforcement authorities and differing enforcement practices, though 
this problem is not unique to the Brussels I bis Regulation. It was discussed that the concerns 
that were envisaged with regard to enforcement authorities becoming responsible for 
adaptation, amongst others, may prove to be unfounded. In terms of costs, certification has 
unfortunately not resulted in a great reduction when compared to Brussels I. 
All in all, it is concluded that thought the efficiency (in particular in terms of cost) gains of the 
certification mechanism of Brussels I bis over Brussels I’s exequatur may be modest, this still 
means that the certification may turn out to be relatively effective, simply because exequatur 
was also found to be relatively effective, and certification is not such a radical change. There 
is some disagreement on the question whether the certificate can adequately replace exequatur 
as a connection between the judgment and the state of enforcement, clarifying its status, but as 
of yet, there appears to be no reason to conclude that the certificate is less well received and 
understood by enforcement authorities. Time will tell; in the meantime, it is concluded that on 
the face of it, Brussels I bis’ combination of a simple and effective certification procedure 
combined with grounds for refusal combines debtor’s and creditor’s rights relatively well. 
Certification allows the creditor to simply and quickly obtain permission for enforcement, 
whereas refusal grounds provide the necessary flexibility to remedy violations of the debtor’s 
rights when appropriate. 
                                                 
 
50 Fitchen (2015) p. 504. 
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8.3 The Maintenance Regulation 
 
As discussed in Chapter 2, the Maintenance Regulation51 is the only Regulation that abolished 
exequatur entirely for Member States that have adopted the 2007 Hague Protocol to the 
Maintenance Convention.52 No procedural steps or checks are necessary to obtain enforcement 
of a maintenance decision falling within the scope of this Regulation. The refusal grounds have 
also been abolished. As the previous Chapter proposed, the abolition of refusal grounds creates 
a risk of fundamental rights violations going unchecked; it is therefore recommended that a 
public policy exception be reintroduced. This seems especially important with regard to 
maintenance decisions since, as Chapter 3 concluded, most cases in which public policy was 
invoked concerned maintenance decisions.53 
The abolition of the exequatur as such can in principle be commended for simplifying cross-
border enforcement. However, it is currently difficult to say whether the abolition of exequatur 
constitutes a real improvement, since the Regulation has not yet been evaluated and no other 
statistics seem yet to be available regarding its functioning. Whether abolition of exequatur 
constitutes a real gain from the perspective of facilitating enforcement therefore remains to be 
seen. From the debtor’s perspective, it may be problematic that the Regulation does not contain 
a mechanism which allows him to be informed of the enforcement before enforcement 
measures are taken (though service of the judgment itself prior to enforcement is required by 
most Member States’ domestic law).54 A lack of service of the EEO however deprives the 
debtor from the possibility to seek review of the decision in the Member State of origin (as 
provided by Article 19 of the Regulation) before enforcement has commenced, and from the 
possibility to invoke domestic remedies against enforcement. As to the (likely) effectiveness 
of this mechanism, see the discussion of the similar mechanism under the EEO Regulation 
(8.5.1, below). 
8.4 The European Enforcement Order 
 
The previous section discussed the ‘judgment export’ mechanism of the Brussels I bis 
Regulation. It concluded that though some improvements are possible, the mechanism is 
capable, in conjunction with refusal grounds to be applied in the Member State of enforcement, 
of balancing effective enforcement with adequate protection of the debtor’s rights. 
                                                 
 
51 Council Regulation (EC) 4/2009 of 18 December 2009 on jurisdiction, applicable law, recognition and 
enforcement of decisions and cooperation in matters relating to maintenance obligations, OJ L7/1. 
52 Chapter 2.3.4. 
53 Chapter 3.2.6.1.  
54 For instance, in the Netherlands Article 430(3) of the Code of Civil Procedure requires that judgments are served 
on the person against whom enforcement is sought prior to enforcement measures being taken, 
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This section now discusses the EEO, which offers a very different mechanism for achieving 
cross-border enforcement.55 It combines judgment export and judgment inspection in one 
procedure, replacing grounds for refusal with a pre-certification check of minimum standards. 
The following discusses whether that mechanism can satisfy the requirements of the right to a 
fair trial. It should be noted that there does not appear to be any great political interest in the 
EEO any longer56 and it is questionable whether the EEO has much added value after Brussels 
I bis abolished exequatur. The point of this discussion is therefore not just to discuss the EEO, 
but to determine whether it is at all possible to organize effective judgment inspection (through 
a check of minimum standards) in the Member State of origin, as opposed to in the Member 
State of enforcement. The discussion is therefore not only about the EEO as such, but about 
the question whether grounds for refusal can be replaced with a check of minimum 
requirements in the Member State of origin at all. It will be shown that the conclusions from 
this section are also highly relevant with regard to the certification of return orders under the 
Brussels II bis Regulation (Section 8.6, below) while the conclusions with regard to the service 
requirements are important with regard to the similar arrangements in the EOP and ESCP 
Regulations (Section 8.5, below). 
8.4.1 Service of the document instituting the proceedings 
 
The question is whether a check of minimum standards of service by the court of origin is as 
effective a protection of the debtor’s right to be heard as the mechanism provided by the 
Brussels I bis Regulation. Whereas Brussels I bis contains a dual review on the matter of service 
to the defendant in default cases, supplementing a check prior to the issuing of the certificate 
with grounds for refusal in the Member State of origin, the EEO relies solely on the check 
performed by the court of origin. If that court is convinced that the minimum requirements 
have been complied with, the judgment may be certified as an EEO. This means that it can be 
enforced throughout the EU without any appeal against enforcement being possible. It is 
therefore important that the minimum requirements on service are sufficient to ensure that the 
debtor was adequately informed of the proceedings, given that he has no recourse in the form 
of an appeal against the issuing of an EEO or against enforcement (though he may apply for 
withdrawal if it was “clearly wrongly granted”).57 This section asks whether the minimum 
                                                 
 
55 See for a discussion of the instrument Bittman (2008); Zilinsky (2005); Zilinsky (2006). 
56 No evaluation of the EEO Regulation has yet been announced, despite this being required, despite it having 
entered into force in 2004. No other legislative developments (such as proposals for amendment) have yet 
occurred.  
57 Additionally, Article 19 provides that debtors should have the right, under national law, to apply for a review 
of the judgment itself in exceptional situations. Such exceptional situations may arise where 1) service was 
effected in accordance with Article 14 (without proof of receipt) but not in sufficient time to enable the debtor to 
arrange for his defence, or b) where the debtor was unable to object to the claim by reason of force majeure or 
due to extraordinary circumstances without any fault on his part. This Article concerns a right to review of the 
judgment, not of the certificate; and it does not in itself create a right to review, but merely requires that national 
law does. The remedies of Articles 10 and 19 are discussed further on in this section. 
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requirements on service are sufficient to ensure that the debtor’s right to be heard was 
respected. Effective service is especially important in the context of uncontested judgments, 
because proof that the defendant knew about the proceedings instituted against him, and was 
in a position to challenge the claims, yet chose not to, justifies the delivery of a default 
judgment against him. For the automatic enforcement of such a judgment to be justified the 
rules on service, and the manner in which they are checked,58 should be watertight.  
 
Chapter III of the EEO Regulation exhaustively lists a number of ways in which service of the 
document instituting the proceedings may have been effected to the debtor. The methods of 
service are alternative: there is no hierarchy between them. The permitted methods of service 
of the document instituting the proceedings are: 
i) Personal service attested by proof of receipt signed by the debtor (Art. 13(1)(a)); 
ii) Personal service attested by a document signed by the competent person who 
effected the service stating that the debtor has received the document or refused to 
receive it ‘without any legal justification’ (Art. 13(1)(b)); 
iii) Postal service attested by an acknowledgement of receipt which is signed and 
returned by the debtor (Art. 13(1)(c)); 
iv) Service by electronic means such as fax or e-mail attested by an acknowledgement 
of receipt which is signed and returned by the debtor (Art. 13(1)(d)); 
v) Personal service at the debtor’s address on persons living or employed there (Art. 
14(1)(a)); 
vi) In the case of a self-employed debtor or a legal person, personal service at the 
debtor’s business premises or on persons employed by him (Art. 14(1)(b)); 
vii) Deposit of the document in the debtor’s mailbox (Art. 14(1)(c)); 
viii) Deposit of the document at a post office or with competent public authorities and 
the placing in the debtor’s mailbox of a notification of that deposit, provided that 
the notification contains certain information (Art. 14(1)(d)): 
ix) Postal service without proof pursuant to the method mentioned under vii “where the 
debtor has his address in the Member State of origin” (Art. 14(1)(e); 
x) Electronic means attested by an automatic confirmation of delivery, provided that 
the debtor has expressly accepted this method of service in advance (Art. 14(1)(f)).  
Article 14(2) further provides that the methods of Article 14 may not be used “if the debtor’s 
address is not known with certainty”. The Regulation also requires that document instituting 
proceedings contained information concerning the amount of the claim, the reasons for it and 
any interest (Art. 16) and with due information about the procedural steps necessary to contest 
the claim (Art. 17). Furthermore, if service was effected in conformity with Article 14 (so 
without proof of receipt by the debtor), but not in sufficient time to enable the debtor to arrange 
                                                 
 
58 The matter of impartiality of the judge who checks the minimum requirements for enforceability is discussed 
further on in this section. 
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for his defence, Article 19 provides additional protection to the debtor. In such cases a judgment 
may only be certified as an EEO if the debtor is allowed, under the law of the Member State of 
origin, to apply for a review of the judgment. Article 19 also applies where the debtor was 
prevented from objecting to the claim “by reason of force majeure or due to extraordinary 
circumstances without any fault on his part.” Finally, if service of documents in another EU 
Member State is required, the EU Service Regulation may be applied.59 
 
Are these methods of service sufficient to guarantee the debtor’s right to be heard? It may be 
recalled that Article 6(1) ECHR does not proscribe one method of service. The question is 
rather whether an individual’s right to access to justice has been denied in a specific case. The 
ECtHR’s case law provides that authorities must show that they acted with diligence in 
ensuring that persons are informed of any court proceedings against them. The Court has 
consistently reviewed whether authorities took all the necessary steps to ensure the documents 
reached the person concerned. This may involve searching for his address,60 or publishing a 
notification in mass media.61 Sending a letter to the debtor without proof of delivery has not 
been considered sufficient.62 
 
In theory, therefore, all methods of service provided in the Regulation are compatible with the 
ECHR. It may however be called questionable that the Regulation provides no hierarchy 
between them.63 While the ECHR does not proscribe one manner of service, it can be inferred 
from the ECtHR’s case law that the authorities must apply the method that appears most likely 
to ensure that the person concerned indeed receives the requisite documents: in this regard the 
Court has observed that only personal service is conclusive.64 The European Court of Justice 
has likewise observed, in a case concerning Article 26(2) of the Brussels I Regulation, that 
courts should satisfy itself that “all necessary steps are have been taken to ensure that the 
defendant can defend his interests. To that end, the court seised of the matter must be satisfied 
that all investigations required by the principles of diligence and good faith have been 
undertaken to trace the defendant.”65 
 
                                                 
 
59 Regulation (EC) No 1393/2007 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 November 2007 on the 
service in the Member States of judicial and extrajudicial documents in civil or commercial matters (service of 
documents) and repealing Council Regulation (EC) No 1348/2000, OJ L 324/79. 
60 ECtHR Dilipak and Karakaya v. Turkey Application nos. 7942/05 24838/05 ECHR 2014, para. 83. 
61 ECtHR Zavodnik v. Slovenia appl. no. 36261/08 ECHR 2013, paras. 79-81. 
62 ECtHR Godorozea v. Moldova appl. no. 17023/05 ECHR 2009, para. 31, and Russu v. Moldova appl. no. 
7413/05 13 November 2008.  
63 It may be noted that an earlier proposal did include a hierarchy between methods of service (Zilinsky (2005) p. 
159); this appears to have been replaced with the implied hierarchy of Article 19. It may be mentioned that 
hierarchy between service methods is common in domestic civil procedure law, such as Dutch law (Articles 45 
and 46 of the Civil Procedure Code, respectively) and Germany (Sections 176-178 ZPO).  
64 ECtHR F.C.B. v. Italy appl, no. 12151/86 ECHR A208-B para. 32. 
65 CJEU Case C-292/10 G v Cornelius de Visser ECLI:EU:C:2012:142, para. 55. Article 26(2) of Brussels I allows 
a court to stay proceedings “so long as it is not shown that the defendant has been able to receive the document 
instituting the proceedings or an equivalent document in sufficient time to enable him to arrange for his defence, 
or that all necessary steps have been taken to this end”.  
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It is reasonable to expect that a defendant is more likely to receive the documents if they are 
served on him personally with proof of receipt (Art. 13(1)(a)) than when they are left in his 
mailbox (Art. 14(1)(c)). Leaving the documents in the debtor’s mailbox may be compatible 
with Article 6(1) ECHR if this was the most effective method for serving the documents, but 
perhaps not if it was also possible to serve them in person or by registered mail. The problem 
with a non-hierarchical list of acceptable methods of service is that it precludes any kind of 
review whether the method of service that was used was also, in light of the circumstances of 
the case, most likely to ensure that the debtor indeed received the information he needed. The 
ECtHR’s approach with regard to service is not to assess whether the method of service is as 
such acceptable, but whether the authorities took the action that could “legitimately and 
reasonably be expected” of them. The EEO Regulation does not afford judges any discretion 
in their appraisal of the methods of service used, even though especially in the context of 
default judgments it is essential that they can safely assume that the debtor was informed. This 
can be contrasted with the approach of the Brussels I bis Regulation, which, as discussed, 
allows judges to assess whether in the circumstances of the case service was effected in such a 
way “as to allow [the defendant] to arrange for his defence”. This lack of flexibility combined 
with the absence of hierarchy in methods of service is what causes tension with the defendant’s 
right to be heard. 
 
Further, it has been pointed out that some elements of the minimum standards for service are 
unclear. The first element is Article 14(2), which provides that the alternative methods for 
service are not permitted “if the debtor’s address is not known with certainty”. Commentators 
have asked, rightly, how ‘certain’ the creditor must be of the debtor’s address for service by 
one of these methods to be allowed.66 To that may be added the question to whom the address 
must be known: is it sufficient that the creditor states that he knows the debtor’s address for 
certain? Or must the court that decides on the claim, or the authorities that served the document, 
satisfy themselves that the address provided indeed belongs to the debtor? It is certainly not 
unknown for creditors to act in bad faith in this regard. The ECtHR does expect authorities to 
make all reasonable efforts to establish a person’s address.67 If this has not happened, and the 
court that rendered the judgment relied only on the creditor’s information, is this sufficient for 
certification as an EEO? 
 
A second element that has been criticised is Article 14(1)(c), which allows the document 
instituting the proceedings to be left “in the debtor’s mailbox”. The original proposal allowed 
service by means of a deposit in a mailbox only if that mailbox was “suitable for the safe 
keeping of mail”. The Regulation omits this qualification. Stadler and Ptak have pointed out 
that this may allow service in a common mailbox that is freely accessible to all inhabitants of 
                                                 
 
66 Zilinsky (2006) p. 483. See for an interpretation Ptak (2014) p. 130-131. 
67 ECtHR Dilipak and Karakaya v. Turkey para. 85. 
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a larger apartment building or business premises, or one that is otherwise insecure, thus 
increasing the possibilities for error.68 
 
Thirdly, Article 13(1)(b) which requires the person who effected the service to attest that the 
debtor “refused to receive [the document] without any legal justification”. The question is on 
what basis this person (who may be a court bailiff, but also a postman or someone else) should 
decide whether the refusal to accept the document was legally justified.69 The proposal did not 
contain this possibility and therefore also does not provide any clarification. The provision 
therefore creates room for error. 
 
A further questionable element is Article 14(1)(e), which allows service without any kind of 
proof (neither an attestation by the person who effected the service or proof of receipt by the 
debtor) if the debtor has his address in the Member State of origin (of the judgment). Stadler 
has pointed out that this section refers to the debtor’s address, not his domicile. It is not required 
that the debtor lives at the address or even spends time there. In the case of a default judgment, 
a court cannot check whether the debtor has indeed himself provided the address or whether 
the creditor has invented it.70 In such cases, according to Stadler, the review mechanism of 
Article 19 would not benefit the debtor. Stadler’s criticism coincides with the point made above 
that it is unclear who should verify the debtor’s address and what degree of certainty they 
should have. 
 
A more general criticism of the EEO’s minimum requirements is that they require courts to 
assess their own methods of service for conformity with these requirements. The EEO 
Regulation does not proscribe how service should be effected, but only provides minimum 
requirements that the method of service applied should fulfil. All Member States have methods 
of service that are incompatible with these minimum requirements.71 Courts will therefore need 
to be vigilant when it comes to the conformity of their own rules on service with the Regulation. 
It has been doubted whether courts can effectively exercise such self-control.72 The matter of 
impartiality is discussed in detail further on in this section. 
 
To conclude, the problem with the minimum requirements on service of the EEO Regulation 
does not lie so much in the minimum requirements themselves (though some criticism is 
certainly possible). It lies in the fact that, unlike the refusal ground of Article 45(1)(b) of 
Brussels I bis, the minimum requirements leave the judge no room for deliberation on the 
                                                 
 
68 Stadler (2004a) p. 806; also Ptak (2014) p. 122. 
69 Stadler (2004a) p. 806 makes the comparison with Article 8 of the Service Regulation, which requires the person 
who affects the service to ascertain whether the person on whom the document is served ‘understands the 
language’ of the document. According to Stadler, both requirements are equally impracticable. 
70 See also Ptak (2014) p. 126-127. 
71 Zilinsky (2006) p. 482. 
72 Stadler (2004a) p. 805. 
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question whether service was effected in the most effective way possible.73 If service was 
effected in one of the ways allowed by the Regulation, then there is no reason to refuse 
certification as an EEO. This is problematic for two reasons. Firstly, because as the CJEU itself 
confirmed in the context of the Service Regulation, it is important that that the addressee of a 
document actually receives the document in question, but also that he is able to know and 
understand effectively and completely the meaning and scope of the action brought against him 
abroad, so as to be able effectively to assert his rights in the Member State of transmission.74 
The simple ‘checklist’ procedure of the EEO Regulation removes any possibility to review 
whether this was the case. Secondly, the problem lies in a potential lack of vigilance and 
impartiality of judges when it comes to the conformity of their national rules on service with 
the Regulation. This is discussed in more detail further on. 
 
It is further questionable if the available remedies of Articles 10 and 19 can really provide the 
debtor with an effective possibility to dispute the manner in which service was effected. These 
remedies are discussed further on in this section.75 
 
Unfortunately, because the EEO Regulation has not been reviewed by the European 
Commission as of yet, there is no empirical evidence which would enable us to conclude 
whether the mechanism it created is sufficient to protect debtors’ rights. A survey of Dutch 
case law on this point suggests that courts appear to apply the minimum requirements on 
service and the protection of consumer debtors strictly.76 That said, the number of instances in 
which an EEO was requested is low,77 and in the majority of cases the request for an EEO was 
rejected because the judgment fell outside the scope of the Regulation or because the claim in 
question was not uncontested.78 Because of these low numbers, it seems too soon to conclude 
that the EEO protects debtor’s rights adequately. 
 
 
8.4.2 Impartiality of the judge who issues the EEO certificate 
 
All European instruments that require a judgment to be certified in the Member State of origin 
specify that the certificate should be issued by the ‘court of origin’ of the judgment.79 This 
                                                 
 
73 See also Ptak (2014) p. 239. 
74 CJEU Case C-519/13 Alpha Bank Cyprus Ltd ECLI:EU:C:2015:603, para. 32; CJEU Case C-325/11 Alder 
ECLI:EU:C:2012:824, paras. 35 and 41.  
75 Section 8.5.2.6. 
76 E.g. Rechtbank Haarlem 15 December 2009, ECLI:NL:RBHAA:2009:BK6667; Rechtbank ’s Hertogenbosch 
9 September 2009, ECLI:NL:RBSHE:2009:BJ7558; Gerechtshof Amsterdam 10 April 2012, 
ECLI:NL:GHAMS:2012:BW1284. 
77 On 31 March 2016, a search in the Dutch case law database http://www.rechtspraak.nl for the European 
Enforcement Order Regulation yielded 60 results. 
78 A survey of judgments concerning the EEO Regulation published in the case law database shows that, since the 
EEO became available 40 out of 57 requests for an EEO were rejected.  
79 Art. 53 Brussels Ibis, Art. 6(1) EEO Regulation. 
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section discusses how this relates to the right to adjudication by an independent judge that 
Articles 6(1) ECHR and Article 47 of the Charter guarantee. 
The literature on the EEO and on the Brussels I bis Regulation shows that the question of 
independence has provoked debate. The fact that the Regulations specify that the certificate 
should be issued by the same court that handed down the judgment, but not necessarily by the 
same judge, was considered potentially problematic from two different perspectives. 
On the one hand, in relation to the Brussels I bis Regulation, it was considered that it is likely 
that it may not always be feasible to have the judge that handed down the judgment also be the 
one to later declare it enforceable. This means that the judge who eventually issues the 
certificate of Annex 1 to the Regulation may not be the judge who decided on the case. It also 
means that the judge who issues the certificate may not be as well informed of the proceedings, 
including the manner of service to the defendant, as the judge who decided the case. It has been 
questioned whether it may not be preferable to specify that these tasks should be performed by 
one and the same judge in order to avoid confusion and disinformation.80 
The opposite argument has also been made that the relative complexity of the minimum 
standards of the EEO Regulation may require greater independence of the judge who decides 
on enforceability in relation to the judge who delivered the judgment. Stadler has argued that 
judges cannot be expected to be sufficiently critical at the certification stage of their own 
conduct in an earlier stage of the proceedings to guarantee that the minimum requirements are 
adequately observed.81 She points out that though the original Commission Proposal required 
the certificate to be issued by the same judge who delivered the judgment, the Regulation only 
requires this to be done by the same court, and therefore allows Member States to organize 
their procedures in such a way as to divide these tasks among different judges.82 According to 
her, in particular the questions of jurisdiction and proper service are too important to rely on 
the self-discipline of the deciding judge. 
These differing views may be explained by the differing purposes that the certification process 
serves in each Regulation. Within the Brussels I bis Regulation, the certificate fulfils a mostly 
formal function and provides only prima facie evidence of service having been effected, with 
Article 45(1)(b) providing complementary protection. However, within the EEO Regulation, 
the checks at the certification stage are the only way of safeguarding the debtor’s rights. The 
need for independence may therefore be greater. This section considers this question in the 
context of the ECtHR’s case law on independence and impartiality. 
                                                 
 
80 Fitchen (2015) p. 504; Zilinsky recommends for these reasons that Member States implement the Regulation in 
such a way as to ensure that these tasks are indeed performed by the same judge; Zilinsky (2005) p. 155.  
81 Stadler (2004a) p. 805. 
82 Ptak reaches the same conclusion based on an analysis of Article 6 ECHR: Ptak (2014) p. 238. 
 345 
 
Chapter 4 explained that the principle of impartiality may prohibit a judge’s involvement in a 
case at multiple stages of the proceedings, depending on the degree of their involvement. 
Impartiality denotes the absence of bias on the part of the judge, and it has been acknowledged 
that involvement of the judge in pre-trial decisions may give rise to a suspicion of such bias. 
The question is therefore whether a judge who issues a certificate of enforceability can be 
considered partial if he is also the judge who delivered the original judgment. 
There is no doubt that the principle of impartiality applies in the enforcement stages of the 
proceedings as well, considering that the ECtHR has ruled that enforcement proceedings fall 
within the scope of Article 6(1).83 So what does the requirement of impartiality imply for the 
certification mechanism, whereby a judge checks whether the decision he himself handed down 
earlier conforms to certain requirements? 
There is a substantial body of case law from the ECtHR on the question of whether a judge can 
be considered impartial if he is involved in several stages of the proceedings. This case law 
mostly concerns criminal cases in which judges often take both pre-trial decisions, for example 
ordering the pre-trial detention of the accused, and the decision on the merits in the same case. 
This may be compatible with the right to an impartial judge, depending on the ‘scope and 
nature’ of the decisions taken at the earlier stage.84 Though the case law on the interpretation 
of this concept is fairly casuistic, some general guidelines have been identified in the Court’s 
case law.85 
Before these can be applied to the mechanism of certification of judgments, a preliminary 
question needs to be addressed: is the certification, in the Member State of origin, a separate 
‘stage’ of the proceedings? As an example, in a civil case the ECtHR found a violation of the 
principle of impartiality where a judge who decided on the applicant’s dismissal from her job 
later also decided, in separate proceedings, whether she should be rehabilitated.86 The principle 
of impartiality also prevents a judge from hearing an appeal to his own decision.87 
It may be recalled that it was shown that in Dutch courts, the decision on the merits and the 
certification of that decision as an EEO are usually given in one and the same judgment; judges 
therefore likely do not regard these procedural stages as separate. It is however very well 
possible that the certification of a judgment as an EEO is a procedural step separate from the 
delivery of the judgment; Article 6 provides that certification can be done “at any time upon 
application”. This allows for the possibility that an EEO may be requested separately some 
time after the judgment has been handed down, so that it is truly a different ‘stage’ of the 
                                                 
 
83 See 4.3.6. 
84ECtHR Morel v. France appl. no. 34130/96 ECHR 2000-VI; ECtHR Nortier v. the Netherlands appl. no. 
13924/88 ECHR A267; ECtHR Saraiva de Carvalho v. Portugal appl. no. 15651/89 ECHR A286-B; ECtHR Fey 
v. Austria appl. no. 14396/88 ECHR A255-A. 
85 Kuijer (2004) p. 347. 
86 ECtHR Indra v. Slovakia appl. no. 46845/99. 
87 ECtHR De Haan v. The Netherlands appl. no. 22839/93 ECHR 1997-IV. 
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proceedings. The conclusion that the certification as an EEO is a separate stage is also 
supported by the fact that the certification is not integral to the civil procedure: it is an 
additional, and optional, step that may be taken if the judgment creditor considers it desirable. 
Certification as an EEO is not an essential part of the civil procedure as such. 
It is also necessary to look at the function of the certification mechanism in relation to the 
decision on the merits. The EEO Regulation is aimed to replace the control mechanism 
previously provided by the application of refusal grounds88 and requires courts to exercise 
‘scrutiny’ to satisfy themselves that the minimum requirements have been complied with. Only 
then may they issue an EEO.89 The delivery of an EEO is therefore not merely a formality, but 
is intended to act as a control mechanism: it requires judges to inspect the judgment and the 
facts of the case in order to verify whether the minimum requirements have been complied 
with. The expectation is that judges will refrain from issuing an EEO if, for example, they 
conclude that service was not effected in accordance with one of the methods proscribed by 
the Regulation, or that the debtor is a consumer and the judgment was not delivered in the 
Member State of his domicile.90 It is submitted that this control function of the EEO provides 
that it should be regarded as, functionally, a separate stage of the proceedings, because it serves 
a different function from the decision on the merits. Its purpose is to allow a judge to ascertain 
whether the judgment fulfils the requirements for enforceability, which is a separate question 
from the merits of the applicant’s claim. 
For both these reasons, it is concluded that certification as an EEO is intended to be a separate 
stage in the proceedings to the decision of the merits. The question is now whether it is 
problematic when the same judge (by which is meant the same person, not a different judge in 
the same court) is involved in both stages. 
The ECtHR appreciates that procedural efficiency may justify the involvement of one and the 
same judge in various stages of the proceedings, and this practice is therefore not necessarily 
incompatible with Article 6(1). What matters is the ‘scope and nature’ of the issues examined. 
From the case law it transpires that a lack of impartiality may occur where the two stages of 
the proceedings concern different legal questions, but there is nevertheless a ‘close link’ 
between the issues examined. Such a close link may be present where the stages both concern 
the same set of facts,91 and where the second stage may to some degree entail reconsideration 
of the decision taken at the first stage.92 
These two factors, the substantive overlap in the issues addressed and the element of 
reconsideration, are both relevant with regard to the mechanism of certification. The issues that 
                                                 
 
88 Recital 10. 
89 Recital 17. 
90 It is not always self-evident when a party acts in his capacity as a consumer or within his trade or profession. 
The CJEU has ruled that the same criteria should be applied under the EEO Regulation as under the Brussels Ibis 
Regulation to ascertain whether a person acts as a consumer: CJEU C-508/12 Walter Vapenik v Josef Thurner 
ECLI:EU:C:2013:790. 
91 ECtHR Indra v. Slovakia, para. 52. 
92 Ibid.  
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are considered before a judgment is certified as an EEO are numerous, but they can be summed 
up as follows: 
i) Whether the judgment falls within the material scope of the Regulation (Art. 2); 
ii) Whether the claim is indeed uncontested (Art. 3); 
iii) Whether the judgment is enforceable in the Member State of origin (Art. 6(1)(a)); 
iv) Whether the jurisdiction rules of sections 3 and 6 of Chapter II the Brussels I 
Regulation, which protect consumers, were complied with (Art. 6(1)(b)); 
v) Whether the minimum standards on service of Chapter III of the EEO Regulation 
were observed (Art. 6(1)(c); 
vi) Whether the judgment was delivered in the Member State where the debtor has his 
domicile, if the debtor is a consumer and he did not expressly agree to the debt in a 
settlement or an authentic instrument (Art. 6(1)(d)).  
It is submitted that there may be a close link between the issues addressed in a decision on the 
merits and some of the issues set out above. This applies for example to the requirement that a 
claim is uncontested, in conjunction with the question whether the standards of service were 
observed. Under Dutch law, for example, a default judgment may only be delivered if the 
defendant has not appeared (which means he did not appear in person or has not at any stage 
been represented by an attorney), provided that the summons was properly served on him.93 
This coincides with Article 3(1)(b) of the Regulation, which provides that a claim shall be 
regarded as uncontested if “the debtor has never objected to it, in compliance with the relevant 
procedural requirements under the law of the Member State of origin, in the course of the court 
proceedings”. The question whether he was adequately served with the summons also overlaps: 
most methods of service proscribed by the Regulation are also allowed under Dutch law. The 
primary method of service under Dutch law is personal service on the defendant or a person 
present at his address who can be expected to ensure that the defendant indeed receives the 
document.94 If neither of these are possible, the document may be left at the defendant’s address 
or sent by mail.95 In all cases, service is attested by a written confirmation signed by the bailiff. 
The question is now whether judges are likely to come to a different conclusion on these matters 
in the certification phase than they are in the decision stage. If a judge has previously decided 
that a default judgment is appropriate, because the defendant did not appear according to 
national procedural law, is he then in a position to effectively scrutinise this decision before 
certifying it as an EEO? The analysis of the Dutch courts’ application of the EEO Regulation 
shows that there is sometimes confusion as to its interpretation and the requirements that it 
imposes. One court concluded that certification as an EEO in all cases requires that the decision 
                                                 
 
93 Art. 139 Wetboek van Burgerlijke Rechtsvordering (Rv). 
94 Article 46 Rv. 
95 Article 47(1) Rv).  
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has been served on the debtor, which it does not.96 Another refused certification on the basis 
that the case did not concern a consumer, even though the EEO is not limited to consumer 
cases.97 These are only a few examples, but they show that the EEO Regulation is a complicated 
piece of legislation, which moreover is little used and may not be familiar to all judges. It does 
not seem unreasonable to assume that judges may not always apply the conditions for 
certification correctly, perhaps especially so if they have already taken a correct, according to 
them, decision on some of those conditions already. It is submitted that the correction 
mechanism of certification is unlikely to function effectively if it is carried out by the same 
judge who issued the decision. 
Would this also amount to a violation of Article 6(1) ECHR, based on the ECtHR’s case law 
on impartiality? Certification and the decision on the merits certainly concern, to an extent, the 
same questions. Certification does not however provide any kind of review of the decision on 
the merits; it merely concerns the conditions in which that decision was delivered. It is no 
appeal or review of the decision itself. The ECtHR’s judgments concerning situations in which 
the same judge was involved in both the first instance and the appeal (or review) procedure can 
therefore not be seen as precedents. The overlap in the issues considered in the certification 
stage and in the decision stage are clearly not as large as the overlap between stages where the 
merits are (at least partly) reconsidered. 
The question is whether it is the extent of the overlap that is decisive, or the nature of the 
reconsideration that the second stage is intended to achieve. It was concluded that the purpose 
of the certification procedure is to prevent decisions that were handed down in violation of one 
of the minimum requirements from being certified as an EEO. Does this specific function have 
any bearing on the matter of impartiality?  
In its judgment in San Leonard Band Club v. Malta,98 the ECtHR does appear to suggest that 
judges can hardly be expected to correct their own errors when it comes to an interpretation or 
application of the law. The facts of the case were as follows. The Maltese Housing Secretary 
had issued a requisition order with respect to a property, which had the effect of protecting the 
occupation of that property by a tenant (The San Leonard Band Club). The owners of the 
property sought to have the order declared null and void and to regain possession of the 
property. The first instance court rejected their claim, but the Court of Appeals subsequently 
reversed that decision and declared the order null and void. San Leonard Band Club then 
applied for a retrial of the case: this was the only remedy available to them, because no third 
level of jurisdiction existed for these types of cases. Under Maltese law, a request for a retrial 
is allowed on limited grounds, which include ‘a wrong application of the law’. According to 
San Leonard Band Club, the law had been applied wrongly, because the requisition order was 
a matter of public interest, and decisions of the Housing Secretary were not subject to judicial 
review. The request for a retrial on this ground was considered, and rejected, by the same three-
                                                 
 
96 Rb Groningen, ECLI:NL:RBGRO:2006:AZ7764. 
97 Rb Middelburg, ECLI:NL:RBMID:2010:BN9802. 
98 ECtHR San Leonard Band Club v. Malta appl. no. 77562/01 ECHR 2004-IX. 
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judge panel that took the original decision to declare the requisition order null and void. San 
Leonard Band Club then applied first to the domestic courts, and then to the ECtHR, with the 
complaint that the panel could not have been impartial in its examination of the request for a 
retrial, because it required them to assess whether their own conclusions in the decision on the 
merits may have been incorrect. 
The ECtHR indeed found that the principle of impartiality had not been respected and found a 
violation of Article 6(1) ECHR. It accepted that the fact that the same panel of judges was 
involved in both phases of the proceedings could give rise to doubts in the applicant’s mind as 
to its impartiality (the objective aspect of impartiality).99 It then ruled that these doubts could 
be objectively justified. The ECtHR considered that the same judges were called upon to decide 
whether or not they themselves had committed an error of legal interpretation or application in 
their previous decision, being in fact requested to judge themselves and their ability to apply 
the law. There was no new information available to them, nor did the evaluation concern a new 
question: they were simply called upon to reassess and evaluate their own earlier decisions as 
to the application of the law. This, according to the ECtHR, provided an objective justification 
for the applicant’s doubts as to the panel’s impartiality.100 
The lack of impartiality was thus found in the fact that judges were required to reassess their 
own earlier decisions on the application of the law. This case clearly did not concern an appeal 
or another kind of reconsideration of the merits of the case (which distinguishes it from the 
cases cited above); it concerned an evaluation of only one aspect of the decision. What was 
important to the Court was that this same matter had already been decided upon by the same 
judges once before. Therefore, even though the overlap between the matters examined at both 
stages was limited to this one issue, the question the judges had to answer on the issue was 
identical. 
This judgment appears to provide that a mechanism that requires a judge to reconsider an issue 
he decided on earlier may give rise to objectively justified doubts as to his impartiality. It does 
not appear to matter that the reconsideration only concerns one aspect of his earlier decision. 
Application of this finding to the EEO mechanism leads to the conclusion that a judge can 
hardly be expected to be impartial with regard to questions such as the uncontested nature of 
the claim and the correct application of minimum standards, in so far as those were part of his 
decision on the merits as well. The consideration of the question whether the claim is 
uncontested or whether the defendant was served with the documents instituting the 
proceedings in the proper manner may require a judge to admit that he was wrong to deliver a 
default judgment. A judge may also be required to conclude that he wrongly assumed 
jurisdiction, in violation of the (exclusive) jurisdiction rules of sections 3 and 6 of Chapter III 
of the Brussels I Regulation. It is submitted that, based on the ECtHR’s case law, legitimate 
doubts may arise as to a judge’s impartiality when he has to reassess his own earlier findings 
in this manner. 
                                                 
 
99 Paras. 61-62. 
100 Paras. 63-65. 
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8.4.3 Right to a fair hearing before a judgment is declared enforceable  
 
The discussion of Saccoccia above yielded the conclusion that it is likely not necessary to hold 
an oral hearing during enforcement proceedings if the questions considered during those 
proceedings are ‘legal issues of a limited nature’. Chapter 4 discussed the European courts’ 
case law on this point, which provides that an oral hearing only needs to be held when there 
are ‘issues of credibility or contested facts’;101 it may not be necessary where the proceedings 
concern merely ‘legal issues of a limited nature’ or of ‘no particular complexity’.102 
If we look at the way the certification procedure of Brussels II bis and the EEO Regulation is 
currently organized, it appears that an oral hearing would likely not be required. The 
examination at this stage concerns only the compatibility of the proceedings with a number of 
narrowly defined requirements which are fairly technical in nature and do not, as they are 
currently formulated, require an examination of the debtor’s credibility. There is also not much 
room for contestation due to the lack of room for interpretation in the minimum requirements. 
This can be contrasted with the examination of grounds for refusal in the Member State of 
enforcement. When the question is whether enforcement should be refused because it would 
be ‘manifestly contrary to public policy’ or because the debtor was not served ‘in sufficient 
time to enable him to arrange for his defence’, these questions cannot be called simple or 
technical and are likely to be subject to contestation. 
 
8.4.4 The right to appeal (non-)certification 
 
What seems most problematic from the perspective of the right to a fair trial is the lack of 
enforceability of the minimum standards on service contained in the Regulation. This problem 
concerns the core of the EEO’s innovation, which is the concentration of all checks on 
enforcement with the courts in the Member State of origin. It was concluded above that the 
minimum requirements on service of the EEO Regulation are in principle compatible with the 
ECHR, though it may be problematic that there is no requirement that the most likely effective 
method was attempted first. 
 
The question is what happens when the minimum requirements have not been observed, yet 
the court of origin nevertheless certifies the judgment as an EEO. Even if a judgment debtor is 
then able to request withdrawal of the certificate on the basis of Article 10 of the Regulation, 
this is no remedy for the lack of effective service in the first place. Presumably, the creditor 
should then seek enforcement through the Brussels I bis Regulation, which then contains the 
double review procedure for lack of effective service as described above. If withdrawal turns 
out not to be the appropriate remedy for a failure to observe the minimum requirements (for 
                                                 
 
101 Judgment, para. 76; the Court cites ECtHR Jacobsson (no. 2) and ECtHR Valová and others v. Slovakia.  
102 The Court cites Varela Assalino v. Portugal and Speil v. Austria.  
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one, when will an EEO be considered to have been ‘clearly’ wrongly issued?), the Regulation 
does not appear to provide a remedy to the debtor at all. In either case, it is questionable whether 
the Regulation provides effective protection to the debtor with regard to his right to be 
effectively informed of the proceedings. Since the presumption that service has been properly 
effected forms the cornerstone of the Regulation as a whole, and because the Regulation 
contains no other way of remedying a failure to observe the debtor’s right to a hearing, this 
casts serious doubt on the Regulation’s conformity with the right to a fair trial. It is also 
questionable whether it provides any real advantage to the creditor, since he may have to return 
to the Brussels I bis Regulation in certain cases. However, since – as previously shown – in 
Dutch procedural practice no additional steps need to be taken to obtain an EEO after the 
judgment is issued, the loss of time and money spent on obtaining an EEO is likely to be 
negligible.103 In Member States where this is not the case, it is to be expected that the EEO will 
fall out of favour in comparison with the Brussels I bis Regulation. 
 
The possibility for review that Article 19 requires may provide relief to a debtor who was not 
adequately served, though Article 19 in itself does not create a remedy, it merely requires that 
one should be available if one of the service methods of Article 14 was used. It is important to 
stress however that this remedy, as well as that of Article 10, requires the judgment debtor to 
take action in the Member State of origin of the judgment. This is clearly less favourable to 
him then a request for refusal of enforcement in his own Member State, where enforcement is 
sought. This may not be such an obstacle for a professional party who has access to legal advice 
and information on the procedural steps to take. But what if the court of origin of the judgment 
certifies a judgment against a consumer as an EEO, even though the court of origin is not in 
the Member State of the debtor’s domicile (as required by Article 6(1)(d) of the Regulation)? 
Then the debtor (the consumer) would need to take action in the Member State where the 
judgment was given, not his own Member State, to have it withdrawn. This is arguably 
precisely the kind of situation the EEO Regulation was intended to avoid by including Article 
6(1)(d) in the first place. 
 
Section 4 of Article 10 of the EEO Regulation provides that “no appeal shall lie against the 
issuing of a European Enforcement Order certificate”. This section does not appear to prohibit 
an appeal against a refusal to issue an EEO certificate. The Dutch and German courts certainly 
interpret it that way. This does not seem to conflict with the aim and purpose of the Regulation. 
Zilinsky argues that “any appeal against the decision to issue or not to issue an EEO conflicts 
with the aim of the EEO Regulation” because it creates delays.104 But surely this is only a 
problem when judgment debtors aim to forestall enforcement by appealing against the issuing 
of a certificate. Where a certificate is refused, the delay created by the creditor’s appeal against 
                                                 
 
103 The Dutch case law repository offers one judgment involving an EEO requested after the entry into force of 
Brussels Ibis, though considering the low numbers of usage of the EEO prior to that development, this is perhaps 
not statistically significant. See the Annex. 
104 Zilinsky (2005) p. 168. 
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that decision affects only himself, and it is up to him to evaluate whether a delay is preferable 
to seeking enforcement through the Brussels I bis Regulation instead. 
 
The matter of remedies against the (wrongful) certification of an EEO is one where a careful 
balance needs to be struck between the creditor’s interest in speed and efficiency and the 
debtor’s right to observance of his right to effective service. On the one hand, an appeal by the 
debtor against the certification as an EEO would probably provide too much scope for abuse 
and therefore adversely affect the creditor. On the other hand, it is problematic that there are 
no effective possibilities for review after enforcement has commenced (or after the certificate 
and the judgment have been served) when the minimum standards have been misapplied. 
 
It should be noted that debtors may have the possibility to contest the enforcement of a 
judgment certified as an EEO in the Member State of enforcement. Under Dutch law, there is 
the possibility of starting an enforcement dispute, on the grounds that enforcement amounts to 
abuse of the right to enforcement. This would occur when, for example, the debtor can show 
that the debt was already paid. The EEO Regulation does not grant the Member State of 
enforcement a possibility to refuse enforcement on such grounds (or on any grounds other than 
irreconcilability, as provided by Article 21(1)). Yet it is possible that the CJEU’s judgment in 
Prism Investments105 may be applicable here. In that judgment, the CJEU ruled that the 
enforceability of a judgment in its Member State of origin is a precondition for its enforceability 
in other Member States. If the judgment has become unenforceable in its Member State of 
origin due to the debt already having been paid, this also means that enforcement in another 
Member State is no longer possible. It is very well possible that this reasoning would also apply 
to a judgment certified as an EEO, since Article 11 of the EEO Regulation provides that the 
certificate “shall take effect only within the limits of the enforceability of the judgment.” The 
French Cour de Cassation recently relied on this Article to declare unlawful the enforcement 
of a judgment certified as an EEO where that judgment had been overturned in its Member 
State of origin.106 It therefore appears that withdrawal in the Member State of origin of the EEO 
is not the only way for the debtor to prevent enforcement of a judgment that is no longer 
enforceable in its country of origin. 
Finally, it seems plausible that a judgment that has been certified as an EEO in violation of one 
of the minimum requirements cannot benefit from the Regulation’s enforcement regime at all. 
In this judgment, which is discussed in detail in the next section, the CJEU ruled that if an 
application for an EOP was not served on the defendant in conformity with the Regulation’s 
minimum requirements, the defendant was not able to make an informed decision whether or 
not to oppose the claim. According to the CJEU, this meant that an EOP granted without the 
minimum requirements having been complied with “cannot benefit from the application of the 
                                                 
 
105 Case C-139/10Prism Investments v. Jaap Anne van der Meer ECLI:EU:C:2011:653. 
106 Cour de cassation, chambre civile 2, Audience publique du vendredi 6 janvier 2012 N° de pourvoi: 10-23518 
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enforcement procedure laid down in Article 18 [of the Regulation]. It follows that the 
declaration of enforceability of such an order for payment must be regarded as invalid.”107 
Since the EEO Regulation contains a similar mechanism of minimum requirements followed 
by automatic enforceability, it could be concluded that an EEO issued in violation of these 
minimum requirements should be regarded as invalid. According to the CJEU, such an invalid 
title should not therefore benefit from the automatic enforcement regime. 
This leads to the conclusion that a certificate issued in violation of the EEO’s minimum 
standards should be considered invalid. It is clear that the CJEU’s reasons for considering an 
EOP invalid (the lack of opportunity for the defendant to defend himself) also apply in the 
context of an EEO: the purpose of the minimum requirements in both Regulations is exactly 
the same. The CJEU’s conclusion regarding the EOP should therefore also be considered 
applicable to the EEO Regulation. Even without the certificate having been withdrawn, it can 
therefore not be enforced if issued in violation of the minimum requirements. The question is 
now what should happen in the Member State of enforcement if invalidity is alleged by the 
debtor. Presumably he would have to apply for a stay of enforcement (Art. 23) while a request 
for withdrawal under Article 10(1)(a) is considered by the court of origin.  
8.4.5 Conclusion on the European Enforcement Order 
 
This section aimed to establish whether the EEO could adequately replace the mechanism of 
Brussels I and I bis, concentrating both judgment export and judgment inspection with one and 
the same court in the Member State of enforcement. The preceding Chapter gave reasons why 
EU Regulations should maintain a possibility for cross-border judgment inspection. Since the 
EEO does not offer such a possibility, it is incapable of addressing some fundamental rights 
violations effectively. As Chapter 7.1 posited, certain types of violations, particularly but not 
only a lack of impartiality on the part of the judge, cannot be adequately addressed by a 
procedure that is confined to the Member State where the judgment was rendered. The EEO, 
which relies on self-control, cannot function as effectively as a cross-border remedy in this 
regard. 
Apart from this argument, which applies to all EU Regulations, the EEO can also be criticised 
on its own terms. Its combination of unclear and potentially ineffective minimum standards on 
service, the impossibility of impartiality of the judge in the certification procedure, and the lack 
of possibilities for review and appeal, means that the Regulation fails to protect the debtor’s 
right to a fair hearing adequately.108 
 
                                                 
 
107 CJEU Joined cases C-119/13 and C-120/13 eco cosmetics GmbH & Co. KG v Virginie Laetitia Barbara Dupuy 
and Raiffeisenbank St. Georgen reg. Gen. mbH v Tetyana Bonchyk, ECLI:EU:C:2014:2144, discussed below. 
108 See also Ptak (2014) p. 241. 
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8.5 The uniform European procedures 
 
This section discusses the uniform European procedures, the ESCP and the EOP Procedure. In 
contrast to the instruments that were previously discussed, the right to a fair trial is relevant to 
these procedures in their entirety, because aside from facilitating cross-border enforcement, 
they aim to provide a complete procedure resulting in an enforceable decision. The following 
therefore discusses the conformity of these procedures with all aspects of the right to a fair trial 
as far as they are relevant. However, the protection these procedures give to the rights of the 
parties involved should be discussed in light of the fact that these procedures allow no refusal 
of recognition or enforcement. Like the EEO, these procedures rely on checks in the Member 
State of origin. An EOP or a judgment resulting from an ESCP can be enforced automatically 
throughout the EU, with no possibilities to oppose enforcement. Possibilities for review of 
these decisions are very limited. It is therefore essential that the procedural guarantees of these 
Regulations are sufficient and effective, because the remedies in cases where something goes 
wrong are very limited. 
The discussion touches, for each of the instruments, on the following aspects of the right to a 
fair trial: access to justice; the creditor’s right to enforcement; the right to a fair hearing; service 
of documents, the right to a trial within a reasonable time, and the effectiveness of procedural 
safeguards and the right to appeal. 
 
8.5.1 The European Order for Payment Procedure 
 
In 2015, the European Commission published a (rather succinct) report on the functioning of 
the EOP Procedure.109 There are some national reports on its functioning which contain some 
empirical data.110 A conclusion that appears to be supported by all national research is that the 
EOP is very rarely used, both in absolute terms as compared to national orders for payment.111 
                                                 
 
109 Report from the European Commission to the European Parliament, the Council and the European Economic 
and Social Committee on the Application of Regulation (EC) 1896/2006 of the European Parliament and the 
Council creating a European Order for Payment Procedure, COM(2015) 495 final. 
110 Rylski (2012) p. 145-190 (“Polish Report”); The Baltic States Report (note 126); for the Netherlands, see 
Kramer, Tuil and Tillema (2012) p. 112 onwards. The 2015 European Commission Report was prepared on the 
basis of a number of Member State reports, but these mostly concern the implementation into legislation of the 
procedure, along with some case law; see http://www.acj.si/en/project-results, last accessed 04/12/2015. 
111 European Commission Report, 2015, p. 3; see references to the Polish report and experiences in Sweden, 
Austria and Denmark in Mánko (2013) (p. 5); this shows that 35 applications for an EOP were made in Sweden, 
and 94 in the UK; see also the Baltic States Report, which reports that Latvian courts had issued 9 EOPs until 
2012 (p. 325) the Estonian courts ‘carried out’ (what this means is unclear) 94 decisions on the basis of the EOP 
Regulation (p. 694) and that Lithuanian figures ranged between 3 EOPs issued (in 2006) to 19 in 2011 (p. 382). 
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On the whole, awareness of the procedure in the Member States appears quite low.112 In terms 
of access to justice, this lack of awareness is a clear problem. 
The number of EOP’s that are contested varies greatly among Member States. In the 2013 
European Parliament Research Briefing, Polish figures were cited, which showed that 93% of 
EOPs remained uncontested.113 The 2015 European Commission Report however shows that 
the number of uncontested EOPs may be as low as 5% (in Greece). Dutch research showed that 
the percentage of cases in which a statement of opposition was lodged lay around 24%.114 
When an EOP is issued, it is therefore likely to be quite an effective means of debt collection, 
but reports also show that it may take a long time before the EOP is issued115 and costs are not 
transparent.116 This forms a problem with regard to the creditor’s right to enforcement, but also 
with regard to the debtor’s right to a fair hearing: the reports show that debtors were sometimes 
hesitant to oppose EOPs served on them for fear that this would incur costs,117 or unsure of the 
status of the document. It is essential, particularly in a one-sided procedure such as the EOP, 
that defendants are aware of the implications of an Order for Payment being issued against 
them and the possibilities of opposition in order to safeguard their right to a fair hearing. 
The 2015 Report states that ‘no major problem concerning the service of documents has been 
reported in the specific context of the European Order for Payment Procedure’.118 At the same 
time, the Report cites the eco cosmetics/Raiffeisenbank case, which resulted from a failure to 
serve an EOP on the defendant, so some problems are clearly experienced. Moreover, this case 
shows that in such cases the EOP Regulation does not provide for a remedy, making the 
potential problems with service especially concerning. This case is discussed below (Section 
8.5.1). 
The experiences with the ESCP have shown that the uniform European procedures are not very 
well known and their complexities not well understood, neither by litigants nor by courts. It 
has been shown that service is not always effected in the way prescribed by the Regulations; it 
has also been pointed out that defendants may be unaware of what is being served on them, or 
afraid that lodging a statement of opposition may incur costs. 
The 2013 European Parliament Research Briefing also stated that 
The analysis revealed that the rules of the Regulation are interpreted and applied in 
divergent ways, often contrary to the purposes of the Regulation. For instance, in 
several cases courts required the claimant to pay in advance for the costs of translation, 
                                                 
 
112 2010 Eurobarometer.  
113 European Commission Report, 2015, p. 8-9. 
114 Kramer, Tuil, Tillema (2012) p. 114. 
115 European Commission Report, 2015, p. 7. 
116 European Commission Report, 2015, p. 8. 
117 Chainais (2010) p. 647. 
118 European Commission Report, 2015, p. 7. 
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without checking first whether it was really necessary. In some cases courts demanded 
that the claimant provide the documents supporting the claim, although the Regulation 
does not require this. Polish courts usually sent the EOP abroad by post, without 
checking if this method is acceptable in a specific MS.119 
While the latter sentence is clearly also worrying in view of the rights of the defence, perhaps 
a greater problem appears to be that, rather than being motivated by a perceived injustice, courts 
are – once again – simply not very familiar with the rules of the EOP Regulation. This 
conclusion seems to be supported by the Baltic experience.120 
Even though the rules contained in the EOP Regulation have themselves been criticized for not 
protecting procedural rights effectively, surely a situation in which they are applied 
inconsistently across the different Member States, and even between courts within one Member 
State, is in any case unsatisfactory. In cross-border litigation especially parties are greatly 
benefited by clarity and consistency of legal rules. Given that uniform European procedures 
like the EOP and ESCP are designed to offer greater simplicity and coherence in cross-border 
litigation, the fact that they are not succeeding is worrisome with a view to protecting 
fundamental rights. Otherwise, there is of yet too little empirical evidence to draw a conclusion 
either way. 
8.5.1.1 Effectiveness of procedural safeguards and right to appeal 
 
Like the ESCP, the EOP procedure affords the defendant a right to apply for a review of the 
Order under limited circumstances (Art. 20(1)). A review may only be granted if: a) service 
was effected in accordance with one of the methods of Article 14 (service without proof of 
receipt by the debtor), but not in sufficient time to enable him to arrange for his defence, 
without any fault on his part, or b) the defendant was prevented from objecting to the claim by 
reason of force majeure or due to extraordinary circumstances without any fault on his part. In 
both cases the defendant should act promptly. The review procedure is therefore not available 
in cases where service was not effected in conformity with any of the methods of the 
Regulation, for instance where it was served on a business address where the defendant is no 
longer located. This happened in the case of eco cosmetics/Raiffeisenbank,121 where the CJEU 
indeed concluded that the review procedure of the EOP did not apply.  
At issue was the question of what happens when an EOP was issued against a defendant, but 
the defendant claims that the EOP was not properly served on them. The EOP Regulation (like 
the ESCP Regulation)122 exhaustively proscribes the ways in which service can be effected.123 
However, the Regulation does not say what happens when an EOP is not served in accordance 
                                                 
 
119 Mankó (2013) p. 5. 
120 Baltic States Report (2012) p. 425 concerning Lithuania especially.  
121 CJEU Joined cases C-119/13 and C-120/13 eco cosmetics GmbH & Co. KG v Virginie Laetitia Barbara Dupuy 
and Raiffeisenbank St. Georgen reg. Gen. mbH v Tetyana Bonchyk , ECLI:EU:C:2014:2144. 
122 Article 13, ESCP Regulation. 
123 See also Kramer (2010) p. 25, citing Hess and Bittman (2008) and Storme (2009). 
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with these rules. A German court asked whether the review procedure could be used in such a 
case. The existing review procedure and the grounds for review could legitimately be seen as 
exhaustively laying down the situations in which a decision could be can be reviewed. The 
referring court asked whether it could nevertheless apply the review procedure in a case where 
service had not been effected at all. 
The CJEU held that it could not, since Article 20(1) exhaustively listed the situations in which 
the review procedure could be applied, and failure to effect service is not one of them. 
However, it then ruled that the national court should find such a remedy under national law. 
EOP’s that were declared enforceable despite not having been served in the appropriate manner 
could not, the CJEU held, “benefit from the application of the enforcement procedure”, and 
should therefore be considered ‘invalid’. 
This outcome is certainly correct, as it would be unacceptable if there was nothing a debtor 
could do against an EOP that was issued against him without it having been served on him 
properly. The manner in which the CJEU reaches it is a little ambiguous: it states that Article 
20 cannot be applied because this is only applicable in the situations that it exhaustively 
enumerates, “a failure to effect service not being one of them”. Article 20 does however allow 
review when service has been performed but in insufficient time, so it is not true that this Article 
does not concern service. It appears however that the CJEU on this point followed Advocate-
General (A-G) Bot, who points out that review would be an inappropriate remedy in cases 
where service was not effected,124 since for review to be possible the EOP should have become 
enforceable in the first place. For an EOP to become enforceable even though the debtor was 
never in a position to contest it is contrary to the rights of the defence. According to the A-G 
and the CJEU the consequence of a failure to serve the EOP effectively should therefore be 
that the EOP is regarded as invalid. 
However, in the words of the A-G, the absence of a remedy for such situations in the EOP 
Regulation means that a legal vacuum exists on this point.125 It is left up to national procedural 
law to provide an adequate remedy, which could result in inequality between the Member 
States on this important point. Instead of simplifying cross-border litigation, it requires parties 
to familiarize themselves with the procedural law of the Member State that has jurisdiction, 
which could be any of 27 (at the time of writing) different legal systems. Such a fragmented 
system of judicial protection against failures to observe the EOP Regulation’s minimum 
standards is contrary to the EOP’s intentions and should be addressed in a future proposal.126 
                                                 
 
124 View of Advocate General Bot, delivered on 9 April 2014, Joined Cases C 119/13 to C 121/13 eco cosmetics 
GmbH & Co. KG (C 119/13) v Virginie Laetitia Barbara Dupuy, Raiffeisenbank St. Georgen reg. Gen. mbH (C 
120/13) v Tetyana Bonchyk and Rechtsanwaltskanzlei CMS Hasche Sigle, Partnerschaftsgesellschaft (C 121/13) 
v Xceed Holding Ltd, ECLI:EU:C:2014:248, para. 45. 
125 Ibid., para. 27. 
126 See also Hess and Raffelsieper (2015) p. 402. 
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The Commission concluded in its 2015 Report on the EOP that the conditions for application 
of Article 20 need ‘clarification’.127 No amendments have yet been proposed.128 
Apart from the review procedure provided for in Article 20(1), Article 20(2) of the EOP 
Regulation allows a defendant to apply for a review in cases where the order was “clearly 
wrongly issued, having regard to the requirements laid down in this Regulation, or due to other 
exceptional circumstances”. The CJEU has ruled that wrong information in the claim form does 
not constitute an exceptional circumstance;129 nor does a failure to observe the time limits.130 
The latter raises the question if there are any, and if so what, consequences attached to a failure 
to observe time limits under the EOP Regulation. If there are none, this is contrary to ECtHR 
case law requiring that effective measures are available against failures to observe the 
reasonable time requirement.131 
 
8.5.2 The European Small Claims Procedure 
 
This section looks at the experiences with the ESCP, which was introduced in 2009 and 
amended in 2015 (taking effect in 2017).132 Chapter 2 explained133 that the ESCP is one of two 
harmonized European procedures that remove the need for exequatur by providing an 
opportunity to obtain a decision that is immediately enforceable throughout the EU. Numerous 
evaluations show that the functioning of this procedure has not been free of problems as far as 
the protection of procedural rights is concerned. Of course, any problems with the ESCP are 
not immediately comparable with a situation in which exequatur previously existed, but has 
been abolished, as under the Brussels II bis Regulation. The objective of the ESCP and EOP is 
more ambitious than a simple abolition of exequatur. Instead of only simplifying cross-border 
recognition and enforcement, they aim to replace the traditional path of obtaining a judgment 
under national procedural rules followed by an exequatur entirely. Any problems concerning 
fundamental rights protection under these instruments can therefore not be blamed entirely on 
the absence of exequatur. However, it is clear that if an ESCP or EOP results in a judgment 
that infringes procedural rights, through a malfunctioning of the procedural guarantees 
                                                 
 
127 Report from the European Commission to the European Parliament, the Council and the European Economic 
and Social Committee on the Application of Regulation (EC) 1896/2006 of the European Parliament and the 
Council creating a European Order for Payment Procedure, COM(2015) 495 final, p. 9. 
128 As section 8.5.2.6, discusses, the 2015 Regulation amending the ESCP and EOP Regulations does address this 
problem for the ESCP Regulation by widening the scope of the review procedure. 
129 Case C-245/14 Thomas Cook Belgium NV v Thurner Hotel GmbH, ECLI:EU:C:2015:715. 
130 Case C-324/12 Novontech-Zala ECLI:EU:C:2013:205. 
131 Chapter 4.3.7.2. 
132 Regulation (EU) 2015/2421 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 2015 amending 
Regulation (EC) No 861/2007 establishing a European Small Claims Procedure and Regulation (EC) No 
1896/2006 creating a European order for payment procedure, OJ L 341/1. 
133 Chapter 2.3.7. 
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contained in either of these Regulations or for other reasons, the added protection of the 
exequatur is lacking, magnifying the potential effects of such a faulty judgment. 
In order to determine what problems have been encountered in the implementation of the 
ESCP, it is worth looking at some of the empirical studies that have been done on the 
functioning of the ESCP. The following also discusses some of the experiences of Dutch courts 
with the ESCP as evidenced by case law. There is as of yet no CJEU case law on the ESCP. 
The most comprehensive study on the functioning of the ESCP to date is the 2013 Assessment 
of the socio-economic impacts of the policy options for the future of the European Small Claims 
Regulation, prepared by Deloitte (the “Deloitte Report”) for the European Commission.134 This 
study evaluated the effectiveness of the ESCP and provided policy recommendations for the 
future. The European Commission also published two Eurobarometer reports that are relevant: 
Eurobarometer 395 on the ESCP from April 2013 (“Eurobarometer 395”)135 and 
Eurobarometer 351 on Civil Justice from October 2010 (“Eurobarometer 351”).136 
There are also the reports prepared by consumer networks: the 2012 European Small Claims 
Procedure Report of the Network of European Consumer Centres (ECC-Net)137 and the 2011 
Report of the French and German European Consumer Centres (CEC-ZEV).138 Empirical 
research into the conduct of Dutch courts has also been carried out.139 The Baltic States 
published a report on the implementation of and experiences with the ESCP as well as the EOP 
and EEO in those three states.140 
Furthermore, a public consultation was launched in early 2013, whose results were published 
on a website; a number of individual responses were also submitted.141 In November 2013 the 
European Commission published a Proposal for amendment of the ESCP and the EOP,142 
                                                 
 
134 Assessment of the socio-economic impacts of the policy options for the future of the European Small Claims 
Regulation. Final Report, European Commission – Directorate-General for Justice, July 2013 (“Deloitte Report 
2013”) available at http://ec.europa.eu/justice/civil/document/index_en.htm (last accessed 29 April 2016). Note 
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135 European Commission – Directorate-General for Justice, Special Eurobarometer 395: The European Small 
Claims Procedure, April 2013, available at http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/ebs/ebs_395_en.pdf (last 
accessed 29 April 2016).  
136 European Commission – Directorate-General for Justice, Special Eurobarometer 351: Civil Justice, October 
2010, available at http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/ebs/ebs_351_en.pdf (last accessed 29 April 2016). 
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140 Baltic States Report (2012). 
141 See http://ec.europa.eu/justice/newsroom/civil/opinion/130318_en.htm (last accessed 29 April 2016).  
142 European Commission, Proposal for a Regulation amending Regulation (EC) No 861/2007 of the European 
Parliament and the Council of 11 July 2007 establishing a European Small Claims Procedure and Regulation (EC) 
No 1896/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2006 creating a European Order 
for Payment Procedure, COM (2013) 794 final. 
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which addressed the problems detected by the various evaluations. An amended ESCP 
Regulation was adopted on 16 December 2015.143 An important feature of this amendment is 
that it raised the ceiling of EUR 2,000 to EUR 5,000. Originally, the Commission proposed 
extending the scope of the ESCP to claims up to EUR 10,000, which was considered too 
high.144 
The original proposal also entailed a substantial widening of the definition of cross-border 
cases be substantially widened: instead of only applying to cases where one of the parties is 
habitually domiciled in another Member State than the one whose courts have jurisdiction, 
application can now also be based on the place of performance of a contract, the place where 
the facts on which the claim is based arose, or the place where the judgment is to be enforced. 
The 2015 Regulation does not include this extension of the definition of cross-border. 
With regard to fundamental rights protection, the following issues were identified as potentially 
problematic. They are discussed for their relevance to certain elements of the right to a fair 
trial. 
8.5.2.1 Access to justice 
 
First of all, the ESCP was evaluated as to its effect in improving access to justice in cross-
border cases, which is one of its main objectives. The Deloitte Report concluded that the total 
number of ESCP applications in 2012 was around 3500, which was “low compared to the 
theoretical scope of the Regulation of 5 million claims”.145 It identified three obstacles to the 
effective use of the procedure. First of all, the costs and time associated with cross-border 
litigation were considered “disproportionate”, because cross-border litigation often includes 
translation costs, court fees, costs for serving documents and the costs associated with oral 
hearings. The ESCP had not resulted in a reduction of these costs as opposed to traditional 
cross-border litigation. A second obstacle was the lack of transparency concerning the costs of 
                                                 
 
143 Regulation (EU) 2015/2421 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 2015 amending 
Regulation (EC) No 861/2007 establishing a European Small Claims Procedure and Regulation (EC) No 
1896/2006 creating a European order for payment procedure, OJ L 341/1. 
144 Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on the ‘Proposal for a Regulation of the European 
Parliament and of the Council amending Regulation (EC) No 861/2007 of the European Parliament and the 
Council of 11 July 2007 establishing a European Small Claims Procedure and Regulation (EC) No 1896/2006 of 
the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2006 creating a European order for payment 
procedure’ COM(2013) 794 final — 2013/0403 (COD) OJ C 226/08, p. 45. 
145 Deloitte Report, Part I: Evaluation, p. v. Data concerning the Dutch experience corroborate these findings: see 
Kramer and Ontanu (2013) p. 324. As does the Baltic States Report (2012): this shows the following numbers: 6 
cases in Latvia (which is “comparatively rarely” according to the researchers; p. 327); 1 case in Estonia (p. 676); 
and none for Lithuania, because no data were collected on the use of the ESCP (though the answers to the 
questionnaires show that 1 judge answered “yes” to the question whether he had experience with the ESCP (p. 
386)). The Lithuanian reports stated that they “intended to receive a lot more statistical information on Lithuanian 
court activities regarding the application of Regulations, yet this was not the case”(p. 383).  
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litigation,146 while a third was simply that relevant actors were not aware of the availability of 
the procedure. The Report concluded therefore, “while there is evidence that the Regulation 
has improved the access to justice since it entered into force, it may be relevant to consider 
making some amendments to the Regulation in order to further contribute to the improvement 
to the access to justice”. One proposed amendment to the Regulation was a cap on court fees 
of 10% of the value of the claim, which would improve transparency but proved 
controversial.147 It was not adopted in the new Regulation. 
Another problem, identified in all reports, is the complexity of forms. Both the Deloitte and 
ECC-Net Reports noted that the main obstacle to the effective application of the ESCP is the 
complexity of the forms.148 The Special Eurobarometer indicated that 16% of the respondents 
found it difficult to fill in the application forms, against 62% who found it easy. The complexity 
of the forms, along with the limited assistance available through the courts or other responsible 
authorities at the Member State level (despite Article 11 ESCP requiring Member States to 
provide assistance), lead consumers to approach lawyers; this greatly adds to the cost of an 
ESCP. In particular, forms are seen as too rigid, applicants have difficulties formulating the 
legal basis of the claim, and the question of international jurisdiction poses a problem.149 It is 
notable that various respondents to the Commission survey observed that legal assistance 
proved necessary for the effective use of the procedure, and recommended that consumers be 
made aware of the risk of attempting a procedure without professional advice or that this be 
made available free of charge.150 
Finally, according to the ECC-Net survey, language issues are the largest problem encountered 
by consumers using the ESCP. First of all, while the forms are available online and can be 
automatically translated, they need to be filled in in the language of the competent court. This 
may incur high translation costs.151 Furthermore, the Dutch experience shows that courts do 
not know what to do with Dutch forms that are to be sent to a foreign defendant, though one 
would send the answer form in the language of the defendant. Also, the Service Regulation 
requires that a notice be sent that the defendant can refuse the documents, but it was found that 
most courts do not do this.152 
                                                 
 
146 Also observed in submissions to the public consultation, e.g. BEUC (2013) p. 6; Lawyer Ireland (2013) p. 12; 
the Law Society (2013) proposes that claim forms be standardized and automatically translated (p. 3). 
147 Article 15a, Proposal for amendment of the ESCP Regulation, 2013. See for example the Opinion of the 
European Economic and Social Committee, point 4.4 and 4.5, which pointed out that court fees are calculated 
differently across Member States, and that a cap of 10% of the claim may actually have negative consequences in 
Member States where fees do not reach this level. See also Kramer (2014) p. 108. 
148 Deloitte Report, Part I: Evaluation, p. 82. 
149 Kramer and Ontanu (2013) p. 325. 
150 CBBE (2013) p. 5; Bar Council England & Wales (2013) p. 2; BEUC (2013) p. 5; Business Europe (2013) p. 
2. 
151 Deloitte Report, Part I: Evaluation, p. 83. 
152 Kramer and Ontanu (2013) p. 326. 
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Lastly, there was confusion over who is responsible for translating form D, which is the 
certificate that needs to accompany the decision to be enforced in another Member State. Since 
this will often need to be translated into the language of the Member State of enforcement, 
costs will be incurred; but it is currently unclear whether the courts can recover these costs 
from one of the parties.  
8.5.2.2 The creditor’s right to enforcement 
 
A second problem, mostly concerning access to justice, is the enforcement of judgments 
resulting from the ESCP. The ECC-Net Report concluded that while it is difficult to obtain data 
on enforcement,153 
as the enforcement procedures are very different from one Member State to another, it 
is hard to get advice on who to turn to and what it may cost, furthermore, considering 
that an enforcement procedure, to be started in the country of the defendant with 
necessary legal assistance, can cost even more than the value of the claim itself, all the 
Small Claims Procedure benefits can be nullified.154 
The fact that differences in enforcement procedures between Member States are seen as a 
problem has been identified before,155 and it is not directly attributable to the ESCP. However 
it is regrettable that an instrument designed to make cross-border litigation simpler has not 
succeeded in addressing these problems. 
The amended Regulation also aims to make the procedure more transparent and accessible by 
clarifying Member States’ obligations to provide assistance to creditors. Whereas previously 
the Regulation only required Member States to ‘ensure that parties can receive practical 
assistance’, the amended Regulation clarifies on what topics parties should be able to receive 
assistance. These include the matter of jurisdiction and the question whether the ESCP is 
appropriate for resolving their conflict. In principle, this amendment should create an incentive 
for Member States to be more diligent in providing information, but as always the question is 
whether it will be duly implemented.156  
 
8.5.2.3 The right to a fair hearing 
 
Of the identified obstacles, the high costs, both financially and in terms of time and effort, 
associated with oral hearings is especially concerning with a view to protecting fair trial rights, 
as an oral hearing may be essential to protecting the right to a fair trial of both parties. In the 
                                                 
 
153 A problem that was also encountered by the Dutch researchers: Kramer and Ontanu (2013) p. 326. 
154 ECC-Net (2012); see also BEUC (2013) p. 8. 
155 Eurobarometer 351 (2010) p. 38-43. 
156 ESCP Regulation, as amended by Regulation 2015/2421, Article 11. Experiences with the ESCP show that 
even though it contains a provision requiring Member States to provide assistance, many Member States simply 
do not provide the required information. See for example BEUC (2013) p. 3. 
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context of cross-border litigation, however, requiring both parties to attend an oral hearing in 
the court that has jurisdiction, which may well be far away in another Member State, can also 
form an impediment to fair trial. The court seized must therefore carefully consider whether an 
oral hearing is necessary.  
A solution to this problem may be to conduct a hearing with the aid of audiovisual 
communication technology, such as videoconferencing). Article 8 of the ESCP Regulation 
explicitly provides for this possibility. However, the Deloitte Report was very critical of the 
degree to which an oral hearing through distance communication means is made possible in 
the various Member States. It concluded that in 11 of the 21 Member States included in the 
research, videoconferencing was not available, but that even in those jurisdictions where it was 
in theory available, it was often not used in practice. Accordingly, the Deloitte Report 
concluded that “parties may at present face unnecessarily high costs in order to physically turn 
up in court for oral hearings” and that “these costs could at least partly be saved by parties each 
time a videoconference is organized, instead of an actual physical meeting”.157 The ECC-Net 
Report corroborated the findings on the matter of the availability of videoconferencing.158 
Accordingly, the Deloitte Report recommended amending the Regulation to oblige Member 
States to make videoconferencing available in a selected number of courts.159 Additionally, the 
Report recommended limiting the discretion of the court in deciding whether an oral hearing 
would be organized, so that it should be organized if both parties so request; this was seen as a 
necessary complement to its other recommendation that the threshold for claims be extended 
to EUR 10,000. The Report stated that “additional procedural safeguards may be needed for 
cases with a higher value than 2,000 euro”.160 The 2013 Proposal for amendment of the 
Regulation addressed this suggestion by providing a right to request an oral hearing, which 
may not be refused when the value of the claim exceeds EUR 2,000 (though this was not 
adopted, see below). 
It is submitted that the inclination of courts to refuse an oral hearing through distance 
communication means is problematic with a view to protecting both parties’ procedural rights. 
Offering the possibility of conducting an oral hearing in this way would provide an appropriate 
balance between the right to be heard in person on one hand, and on the other hand, the need 
to reduce costs – and to limit the potential for ‘tactical’ requests, which only seek to frustrate 
the procedure and create difficulties for the opponent. The fact that the use of audiovisual 
technology is so often either refused or altogether impossible is therefore undeniably 
                                                 
 
157 Deloitte Report (2013) Part I: Evaluation, p. 80. 
158 ECC-Net (2012) p. 22. See also the submissions to the public consultation, among others BEUC (2013) p. 7, 
Business Europe (2013) p. 2; ECC-Portugal (2013) p. 4 proposes that videoconferencing should be made available 
whenever its costs are lower than the travel costs. 
159 Deloitte Report (2013) Part II: Assessment of the policy options, p. 116. 
160 Deloitte Report (2013) Part II: Assessment of the policy options, p. xxii. Submissions to the Public Consultation 
also suggested that procedural safeguards, in particular the right to an oral hearing or a right to appeal, should be 
more ‘robust’ if the maximum amount was raised: Bar Council England & Wales (2013) p. 3. 
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problematic. National court practices whereby an oral hearing is required as a rule should also 
be discouraged.161 
The Regulation amending the ESCP Regulation, adopted in December 2015, addresses some 
these problems. Concerning oral hearings, it imposes an obligation on courts and tribunals to 
use distance means of communication such as videoconference or teleconference whenever an 
oral hearing is held (Art. 8(1)). In order to safeguard the rights of the parties, an exception will 
be made for the party who expressly requests to be present in court (Art. 8). It has been pointed 
out that the increased reliance on digital means of communication may not be easily 
implemented in all courts.162  
 
To compensate for the increased value of claims to be regarded as ‘small’ under the Regulation, 
the 2013 Proposal aimed to increase procedural protection by clarifying when an oral hearing 
should be held. It proposed that courts may not refuse a request for an oral hearing if (a) the 
value of the claim exceeds EUR 2,000, or (b) both parties indicate their willingness to conclude 
a court settlement and request a court hearing for that purpose.163 This clarification is 
commendable, because it increases legal certainty and strengthens the protection of the right to 
an oral hearing. It was however not included in the 2015 Regulation amending the ESCP 
Regulation. The ESCP Regulation retains an efficiency-based approach to oral hearings, where 
the judge in each case decides whether or not to hold an oral hearing. Article 5(1) of the 2015 
Regulation provides that the court shall hold an oral hearing only if it considers that it is not 
possible to give the judgment on the basis of the written evidence. The parties may request an 
oral hearing, but the court may refuse this request if it considers that, with regard to the 
circumstances of the case, an oral hearing is not necessary for the fair conduct of the 
proceedings. The 2015 Regulation is therefore stricter than the original ESCP Regulation, 
which only provided that “the court or tribunal may hold an oral hearing” (Art. 8). The 2013 
Proposal shows that the ESCP aims to strike a balance between fairness of the procedure on 
one hand and the accessibility on the other hand. It is commendable that the European 
legislature acknowledged that oral hearings in cross-border cases may incur disproportionate 
costs, especially where the presence of the parties in person is required. Such costs can be 
reduced when hearings are held through distance communication means, but while the 2015 
Regulation’s emphasis on the use of such technology is to be welcomed, it seems rather 
premature to expect courts in all Member States to be able to deliver it, as the European 
Economic and Social Committee pointed out. If not all courts can guarantee the availability of 
such technology, it seems unwise to grant parties an absolute right to an oral hearing, as parties 
                                                 
 
161 BEUC (2013) p. 7. 
162 EESC Opinion, no. 5.1. 
163 Article 5(1) European Commission, Proposal for a Regulation amending Regulation (EC) No 861/2007 of the 
European Parliament and the Council of 11 July 2007 establishing a European Small Claims Procedure and 
Regulation (EC) No 1896/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2006 creating a 
European Order for Payment Procedure, COM (2013) 794 final. 
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may abuse this right to increase their opponent’s costs. Keeping in mind that the ECtHR does 
not confer an absolute right to an oral hearing, but allows the judge to decide in each case 
whether an oral hearing is necessary164, the ESCP’s arrangement seems to strike an appropriate 
balance between fairness and accessibility. The only problem is that there seems to be no 
remedy when the court wrongfully denies an oral hearing where one is necessary (see 8.5.2.6, 
below).  
 
8.5.2.4 Service of documents on the defendant/debtor 
 
Another problematic element is identified by the Deloitte Report, as well as Kramer and 
Ontanu: the service of documents to defendants. The Deloitte Report concludes that while 
electronic means of effecting service are available in most Member States, the Regulation 
restricts their use; postal service is the main means of servicing documents.165 Allowing 
documents to be served electronically would save both times and costs. That practices 
concerning service are sometimes unsatisfactory is shown by the research among Dutch courts 
done by Kramer and Ontanu. According to them, most courts remarked during interviews that 
in the majority of cases they did not receive acknowledgement of receipt of the documents by 
the defendant.166 Service then becomes a problem for the courts, and they deal with it in 
different ways: 
Some extend the period for answering if no acknowledgement of receipt is received in 
time, while others make another attempt to send the documents. One court remarked 
that it does hand down judgment, even if an acknowledgment of receipt is not received; 
it assumes that the addressee received the documents. Another court explained that it 
simply sends the documents by ordinary postal mail without acknowledgment of 
receipt. 
It does not need explaining that the latter two solutions are undesirable if the right of the 
defendant to offer his views is taken seriously. At the same time, the courts cannot be blamed 
for lack of procedural means of effecting service, as the Deloitte Report shows that this problem 
is widely experienced. 
The 2015 Regulation widens the possibilities for electronic service (Art. 13). Whether this 
change will make service easier is questionable, because it provides that service may be 
effected through electronic means only if both parties agree. This seems of little use in cases 
where no reaction of the defendant is received at all, as the Dutch courts experienced. 
Concerning language, there are no new measures to address these issues.  
 
                                                 
 
164 See Chapter 4.3.2.6. 
165 Deloitte Report (2013) Part II: Assessment of the policy options, p. xii. 
166 Kramer and Ontanu (2013) p. 326. 
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8.5.2.5 The right to a trial within a reasonable time 
 
The ESCP Regulation contains relatively short time limits for all stages of the procedure. A 
decision in an ESCP should be obtainable within 74 days: 14 days for the court to serve the 
claim form on the defendant (Art. 5(2)); 30 days for the defendant to reply (Art. 5(3)); and 30 
days for the court to give its decision after the defendant’s reply has been received (Art. 7(1)). 
The procedure may be longer when the defendant lodges a counterclaim (Art. 5(6)), where a 
translation is requested (Arts. 6(2) or 6(3)), where the court demands further details (Art. 
7(1)(a)), takes evidence (Art. 7(1)(b)), or decides to hold an oral hearing (Art. 7(2)(c)). 
If the ESCP was indeed always concluded within this time period, it would likely satisfy the 
requirements of the right to a trial within a reasonable time. The problem is however, as 
observed by one submission to the Public Consultation,167 that courts do not always abide by 
the time limits. It may be remembered that the ECtHR requires states to make available 
effective measures for addressing excessively long proceedings. It is evident that Member 
States are responsible for addressing delays in concluding procedures under EU law such as 
the ESCP in the same way as they are responsible for delays in ordinary national civil 
procedures. Any delays should therefore be effectively addressed. In this regard, it is interesting 
to note, as another submission to the Public Consultation did, that the ESCP Regulation 
contains no provision for delivering default judgments in case of an unresponsive defendant; 
this is left to the Member States. The submission recommended that this be harmonised.168 The 
2015 Regulation did not take up this suggestion or otherwise addressed delays.  
8.5.2.6 Effectiveness of procedural safeguards and right to appeal 
 
Even if, in principle, the defendant’s procedural rights are adequately protected by the ESCP 
Regulation, the question is what happens if something goes wrong; for example, if the claim 
form was not served on him in such a way as to enable him to arrange for his defence, or where 
an oral hearing was wrongly refused. Article 18 of the ESCP Regulation provides for a review 
procedure under very narrowly defined circumstances. Under this Article, the defendant may 
apply for a review of the judgment if either a) the claim form has been served on him in one of 
the ways provided for in Article 14 of the EEO Regulation, but not in sufficient time as to 
enable him to arrange for his defence; or b) if the defendant was prevented from objecting to 
the claim by reason of force majeure or due to extraordinary circumstances without any fault 
on his part. It should also be noted that the ESCP Regulation does not provide for a right to 
appeal, but leaves this to the Member States (Art. 17(1)). 
                                                 
 
167 BEUC (2013) p. 5.  
168 ECC-Poland (2013) p. 5. 
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The question is now what a defendant can do if the claim form was not served on him in an 
appropriate manner at all, for example when it was served on a business address where the 
defendant is no longer located, yet a judgment was handed down against him regardless (Art. 
7(3)). This happened in the eco cosmetics/Raiffeisenbank case,169 which dealt with the EOP 
Regulation and is discussed in detail below. In that case, the CJEU ruled that if an EOP is not 
served on the defendant in accordance with one of the methods of service permitted by the 
Regulation, the defendant will not be able to oppose the Order if he so wishes. Since, according 
to the CJEU, this is incompatible with the rights of the defence, such an Order cannot benefit 
from the enforcement regime provided for by the Regulation. Equally importantly, the CJEU 
ruled that the review procedure of Article 20 EOP Regulation (the equivalent of the ESCP’s 
Article 18) cannot then be applied, since a failure to effect service is not one of the grounds for 
review provided for in that Article. The Regulation does not provide for a remedy in such cases, 
which leads to the conclusion that a remedy should be provided by national law. 
It is submitted that the CJEU’s findings in eco cosmetics/Raiffeisenbank also create issues for 
the ESCP. Under the ESCP Regulation, as under the EOP Regulation, service is essential to 
allow the defendant to decide whether to respond to the claim, respectively oppose it. When 
service has not been effected in the appropriate manner, he cannot make effective use of his 
right to be heard, which is incompatible with the scheme and purpose of the Regulation. 
However, unlike under the ESCP, the claim is not automatically awarded if the defendant does 
not oppose it. According to Article 7(3) of the ESCP Regulation, when the defendant does not 
respond the judge ‘shall give a judgment on the claim’. It does not however provide that the 
claim shall be awarded; it is presumed that the extent of the examination of the claim shall be 
governed by the law of the Member State of the court in accordance with Article 19. If a default 
judgment is given, it is presumably then also a matter of national law whether or not the 
defendant is able to oppose that default judgment. A failure to effect service may not be as 
problematic as it is under the EOP, in which it would mean that the claim cannot be regarded 
as uncontested and essentially fall outside the EOP Regulation’s scope. However, it is clearly 
incompatible with the defendant’s rights if a judgment resulting from an ESCP procedure could 
be declared enforceable and be enforced without the defendant having been informed of the 
proceedings. 
It also seems clear that the review procedure of Article 18 would not be applicable in case of a 
failure to effect service, since, like its counterpart in the EOP Regulation, it does not encompass 
such cases. National law (of the Member State of origin) should thus provide for a remedy. 
This lack of a harmonised remedy can be called unsatisfactory. The ESCP, like the EOP, can 
only be an effective method for resolving cross-border disputes if the procedural rights of both 
parties are protected effectively and if any remedies are foreseeable and uniformly applied. Yet 
                                                 
 
169 CJEU Joined Cases C-119/13 and C-120/13, eco cosmetics & Co. KG v Virginie Laetitia Barbara Dupuy and 
Raiffeisenbank St. Georgen reg. Gen. mbH v Tetyana Bonchyk ECLI:EU:C:2014:2144. 
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again, the defendant is expected to find his way among 27 different national procedural laws 
to find redress if a judgment is enforced against him without him having been served, while his 
counterpart who has been served is allowed to make use of the review procedure of Article 18. 
Fortunately, the 2015 Regulation amending the ESCP Regulation widens the scope of the 
review procedure to include all cases where “the defendant was not served with the claim form 
in sufficient time and in such a way as to enable him for a defence”.170 The limitation of the 
availability of review to only certain methods of service will therefore be repaired. Review 
however still takes place in the Member State of origin, and it can be questioned whether this 
does not place a disproportionate burden on the defendant; see Section 8.5.3, below. 
However, the review procedure it still only available in situations where the defendant did not 
appear and where service was not effected properly (essentially the situation covered by Article 
45(1)(b) of Brussels I bis). There are no remedies where, for instance, the right to an oral 
hearing was wrongly refused (unless an appeal is available). It is therefore recommended that 
Member States allow ESCP decisions to be appealed, so that such problems can be addressed 
in the Member State of origin. The ESCP Regulation could also be amended to make such an 
appeal mandatory. 
 
8.5.2.7 Other elements of the right to a fair trial 
 
A number of elements of the right to a fair trial have not yet been discussed. Firstly, the right 
to a fair trial includes a right to adjudication by an independent and impartial tribunal.171 It also 
requires that a trial be held in public.172 It goes without saying that in their conduct of a ESCP, 
Member State courts should comply with these requirements. None of the empirical evidence 
however appears to assert that compliance with these requirements is lacking in relation to the 
ESCP (though of course the risk of them being violated exists in any procedure). The same 
goes for the right to a reasoned judgment.173 
 
8.5.3 The uniform procedures and the need for grounds for refusal 
 
The previous Chapter proposed that refusal of enforcement should be possible under all EU 
Regulations that facilitate cross-border enforcement of civil judgments. It is submitted that all 
arguments put forward in favour of that position in the previous Chapter apply equally to the 
ESCP and EOP procedures. There is no reason to presume that these procedures are immune 
to the problems for which refusal of enforcement has proven to be a solution. A lack of 
                                                 
 
170 ESCP Regulation as amended by Regulation 2015/2421, Article 18. 
171 Chapter 4.3.4. 
172 Chapter 4.3.3. 
173 Chapter 4.3.2.7. 
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impartiality such as corruption, procedural fraud, or any serious mistakes that result in a 
violation of the parties’ right to a fair trial are equally possible under these procedures as they 
are under ordinary national civil procedures. 
It is therefore proposed that the ESCP and EOP procedures also include grounds for refusal. 
The difficulty is however that the Regulations already contain a multitude of possibilities for 
opposition, review, appeal or refusal of recognition (in case of irreconcilability), some of which 
are governed by the Regulations themselves, some by national law. The question is now how 
these will interact with the remedies already available under the Regulations and whether they 
will not overcomplicate the procedures. 
It is important to emphasize that a mechanism for refusing recognition or enforcement should 
be a measure of last resort, as it always has been. The availability of such a mechanism in the 
Member State of enforcement does not diminish the need for remedies at the earlier stages of 
the proceedings, such as appeal or review. In fact, inactive defendants could be discouraged 
from relying on the possibility to oppose recognition or enforcement by making such 
opposition dependent on them having exercised any available possibilities for review or appeal 
in the Member State of origin. 
For the EOP Procedure, it is submitted that a remedy should be made available, in the 
Regulation, for a failure to effect service, in order to address the problem identified by the 
CJEU in the eco cosmetics case. Because increasing the scope of the review procedure would 
be unsuitable as a remedy for such cases,174 this should take the form of a possibility to oppose 
the Order for Payment after it has been issued and once the defendant becomes aware of its 
existence, which may be at the moment enforcement measures are taken. This guarantees that 
the rights of the defense are respected fully. The burden of proof that the order was not served 
on him should lie with the defendant in order to discourage abuse. In order to prevent such 
situations from occurring in the first place, the rules on service, especially those of Article 14, 
should be reformed in order to ascertain that service is effected.175 The period for opposition 
should also be clarified. 
As for the review procedure, it is submitted that the review procedure of the EOP Regulation 
is amended to coincide with Article 18(1) of the ESCP Regulation, as amended.176 This would 
                                                 
 
174 As the CJEU ruled in eco cosmetics/Raiffeisenbank, review would not be suitable for such cases because the 
EOP should not have been issued to begin with. See the discussion under 8.5.1.1 above. 
175 See 8.4.1 for a discussion on how the permitted methods of service could be improved. 
176 The difference with the extended possibility for opposition in case of ineffective service, as proposed, is of 
course that opposition offers the defendant all procedural rights provided for in Article 16 of the EOP Regulation, 
and that he is allowed to contest the claim in its entirety. Recital 25 to the EOP Regulation provides that the review 
mechanism should not entail a second opportunity for the defendant to contest the claim (Kramer (2014) p.101, 
shows that Dutch courts indeed interpret the provision strictly). As A-G Bot concluded in eco 
cosmetics/Raiffeisenbank, the consequence of a failure to effect service of an EOP should be that the EOP is 
considered invalid; opposition where service was not effected should avoid this consequence. See View of A-G 
Bot in eco cosmetics/Raiffeisenbank, paras. 51-52. 
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make review possible in all situations where service was ineffectual. Review would be possible 
where the defendant was not served with a claim form or EOP, in sufficient time and in such a 
way as to enable him to arrange for his defence; or where he was prevented from contesting 
the claim by reason of force majeure or due to extraordinary circumstances without any fault 
on his part.177 
The question remains however who should carry out such a review: the Member State of origin, 
or the Member State of enforcement. The review procedure essentially performs the function 
of Article 45(1)(b) of the Brussels I bis Regulation in remedying ineffective service, but 
through review in the Member State of origin instead of refusal of recognition or enforcement. 
It entails a thorough review of the methods of service applied. In its current form, it also relies 
on a self-examination by the courts of the Member State of origin of the judgment. Chapter 3 
posited that experience with the public policy exception shows that Member States can hardly 
be expected to exercise self-examination.178 Such self-examination may be possible, however, 
when the methods of service are harmonized, as they are under the ESCP and EOP procedures, 
provided that the impartiality of the court that carries out the review is guaranteed (see Section 
8.4.2, above). Yet it remains the case that a review procedure in the Member State of origin 
places a disproportionate burden on the defendant. The EOP and ESCP Regulations already 
greatly benefit creditors by providing them with a simplified procedure that abolishes 
exequatur. The defendant is now not only required to actively invoke the possibility for review, 
but to do so in a Member State that is not his own. It is submitted that this constitutes a 
disproportionate disadvantage. It is however considered that review is in principle preferable 
to refusal of enforcement, being less radical as a remedy, and allowing for a reconsideration of 
the judgment as such. For that reason, it is proposed that the EOP and ESCP Regulations retain 
a review procedure (though with a scope widened to include all possible defects in service), 
but that the mechanism for requesting a review is made more accessible. As a first step, a 
standardized form should be included in the Regulations; the possibilities for making such a 
form available online should be examined. It is submitted that it be clarified what the scope of 
the review in exceptional cases should be, in order to ensure that it does not amount to a second 
opportunity for appeal or opposition. 
As for the ESCP regulation, much could be gained by harmonizing the possibilities for 
opposition (currently presumably governed by national law), review, and appeal. Appeal and 
opposition (to a default judgment) are currently entirely governed by national law. Availability 
of such remedies and clarity on their interrelation could go far towards ensuring that mistakes, 
such as a refusal to hold an oral hearing where one was necessary, are avoided and if necessary 
                                                 
 
177 This would have the additional advantage of harmonising the requirements for review as contained in the 
ESCP and EOP Regulations with Article 19(1) of the Maintenance Regulation. As the European Commission 
states in its 2013 Proposal for amendment of the ESCP and EOP Regulations, There is no reason why these 
provisions on review, which pursue 
exactly the same objective, are formulated differently in the various European regulations” (p. 9). 
178 Chapter 3.4.1. 
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addressed within the procedure itself. Refusal of enforcement or recognition will then remain 
a measure of last resort. 
To conclude, it is proposed that the ESCP and EOP Regulations retain a procedure for review 
in cases where service was ineffective, to be carried out in the Member State of origin. The 
ESCP procedure should guarantee a right to appeal to address procedural irregularities before 
a final judgment is obtained. Finally, the procedures should include a public policy exception 
to be applied by the Member State of enforcement for exceptional cases, for instance in cases 
of corruption. 
It is submitted that adding a mechanism for refusal of enforcement to the Regulations should 
not diminish their effectiveness to such an extent as to nullify their accessibility and efficacy. 
It transpires from the reports referred to above that, to a large extent, the attractiveness of the 
uniform procedures lies in the fact that they are harmonized and reduce the need to familiarize 
oneself with foreign civil procedural law. The availability of refusal grounds does not diminish 
this accessibility, nor does it affect the immediate cross-border enforceability of decisions 
resulting from these procedures. As stated above, effective remedies within the procedures 
themselves will in most cases reduce or abolish the need for refusal grounds. It is important 
that a failure to invoke such remedies is taken into consideration in an application for refusal 
of enforcement, either by the judge on their own motion or by incorporating it into legislation, 
in the model of Article 45(1)(b) of the Brussels I bis Regulation. 
 
8.6 Enforcement of return orders and access rights under Brussels II 
bis 
 
This section discusses the automatic enforcement of judgments under the Brussels II bis 
Regulation.179 The enforcement of judgments in family law matters, specifically those in child 
abduction cases, is of a different character than the enforcement of civil or commercial 
judgments, due to the sensitivity of the issue and the variety of interests involved. Decisions in 
cases involving children have an impact not just on the rights and responsibilities of the parents, 
who are usually the parties to the return proceedings,180 but also on those of the child itself. 
                                                 
 
179 This section does not discuss the (non-)recognition of judgments relating to divorce, legal separation or 
marriage annulment (Article 22) or judgments relating to parental responsibility (Article 23). The reason is that 
the grounds for refusal of recognition of these categories of judgments are identical to those of the Brussels Ibis 
Regulation, which is discussed in detail in 2.3.2. Though this does not mean that the interpretation of those grounds 
will be identical in the context of Brussels IIbis, and that these grounds are sufficient or necessary to protect 
fundamental rights in that context, the lack of reforms and controversy on this point renders an in-depth discussion 
rather superfluous. See for a discussion of the grounds for refusal Borrás (1998) paras. 67-73; Siehr (2012) p. 261-
286. See for a recent view of their application in the Netherlands Curry-Sumner (2014). 
180 Though this section refers to ‘parents’, it is of course possible that other persons or organisations exercise 
custody rights over the child. In such a case, this person of organisation will be the party to the abduction 
proceedings. 1980 Hague Child Abduction Convention, Article 3(a); Brussels IIbis Regulation, Article 11(1).  
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While speed and efficiency are essential, the child’s safety and well-being are of paramount 
importance.  
For these reasons, international and EU instruments in the field of family law have sought to 
achieve a balance between these interests. Effective enforcement, and any possibility to refuse 
enforcement, are only one element of the complex of rules that are intended to achieve this 
balance. It is difficult to argue for or against the free movement of judgments in this field 
without considering what impact this will have on all the factors involved. Even more than in 
civil and commercial cases, it needs to be carefully considered whether refusal of enforcement 
can ever be an appropriate remedy for violations of the rights of the interested parties. Refusal 
of enforcement of a judgment ordering the return of the child may remedy a violation 
committed in the Member State of origin of the judgment, but at the same time be contrary to 
the best interests of the child by further delaying a final decision on where he or she should 
live. 
This section aims to provide insight into the complexities of enforcement in the context of 
family law matters and some viewpoints for future developments in this field. The following 
concentrates on the two types of judgments which require enforcement, and for which Brussels 
IIbis abolished exequatur and the possibility of refusal of enforcement: judgments requiring 
the return of a child (Art. 42(1)), and those providing a parent with a right to access to his child 
(Art. 41(1)). It is shown that the first category of judgments, which are given in child abduction 
cases, is most controversial. Much of the discussion below therefore focuses on this type of 
case. 
8.6.1 Introduction: the 1980 Hague Convention 
 
International child abduction refers to situations in which a child is removed181 from the state 
where he or she is habitually resident to another, in breach of rights of custody. The typical 
abduction situation envisaged by international instruments is one where one parent has custody 
and the non-custodial parent abducts a child across borders to pre-empt an unfavourable 
custody decision or out of frustration over losing custody.182 Removal of a child is also 
considered wrongful if the parents share custody but one of the parents removes a child without 
the other parent’s consent.183 Abduction may consist of wrongful removal, in which a child is 
taken from one state to another, or of wrongful retention, in which the non-custodial parent 
                                                 
 
181 Neither the Brussels IIbis Regulation nor the 1980 Hague Convention distinguish between categories of persons 
who may wrongfully remove a child; the abductor may therefore equally be a grandparent, aunt, uncle, or a person 
unrelated to the child.  
182 Dyer (1978) para. 19-20. 
183 Pérez-Vera (1982) p. 35. 
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fails to return the child to the custodial parent after a visit.184 For clarity’s sake, this section 
uses the term ‘abduction’ to refer to both types of situations. 
Chapter 2 discussed that child abduction cases are covered by several international 
instruments.185 The primary instrument is the 1980 Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of 
International Child Abduction186 (hereinafter: the 1980 Convention), which applies in the EU 
alongside Brussels II bis.187 Article 12 of the 1980 Convention requires the state to which the 
child was abducted to order the return of the child ‘forthwith’, unless one of the grounds for 
refusal applies. The defences, especially the ‘grave risk defence’, should be interpreted 
restrictively,188 in order to discourage abductors from claiming it too freely simply to gain time. 
Empirical research suggests that courts have indeed interpreted Article 13(1)(b) in a restrictive 
fashion.189 
Another important element of international legislation on child abduction is the principle that 
the Member State where the child was habitually resident before the abduction retains 
jurisdiction (perpetuatio fori); this prevents the abductor from profiting from the abduction by 
taking the child to a state that has a more favourable custody regime. The underlying principle 
is that the courts in the state where the child was habitually resident is best placed to decide 
where the child should live and how the dispute between the parents should be resolved.190 
This principle is laid down in Articles 5(2) and 7 of the 1996 Hague Child Protection 
Convention as well as in Article 10 of Brussels II bis. It is important to note that according to 
these instruments jurisdiction lies with the state where the child is ‘habitually resident’. This 
concept is of a factual nature: it refers to the child’s actual residence, not to his legal domicile. 
Due to its factual nature and the lack of an internationally accepted definition, it is one of the 
most litigated issues under the Conventions.191 However, for the purposes of this section it is 
merely important to note that a child’s habitual residence may change: importantly, even if a 
child is wrongfully removed, the state to where he is taken may eventually become his state of 
habitual residence and therefore gain jurisdiction. The 1996 Child Protection Convention 
explicitly allows for this possibility.192 Even though Article 7 of this Convention aims to 
                                                 
 
184 Pérez-Vera (1982) p. 16-17. 
185 See for a discussion of all instruments relevant in Europe Kruger (2011) p. 111-130. 
186 Convention of 25 October 1980 on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction.  
187 Because the 1980 Convention remains in force within the EU, the following discussion on the child abduction 
regime in the EU refers where relevant also to that Convention. See also Article 62(2) of Brussels IIbis that 
provides that “The conventions mentioned in Article 60, in particular the 1980 Hague Convention, continue to 
produce effects between the Member States which are party thereto” unless the Brussels IIbis Regulation takes 
precedence.  
188 Perez-Vera (1982) para. 34. 
189 Schuz (2013) p. 273. 
190 Vlaardingerbroek (2014) p. 13. 
191 Schuz (2013) p. 175. The 2015 European Commission Study on the assessment of the Brussels IIbis Regulation 
shows that habitual residence is a problematic issue under that Regulation as well (p. 42).  
192 Article 7(1).  
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prevent jurisdiction from being transferred onto the state to where the child was abducted 
simply because of the abduction, this transfer may eventually happen because the child’s 
habitual residence has changed. If the parent and/or authorities in the state from where the child 
was abducted acquiesce in the removal, or if no action is taken to have the child returned and 
the child has settled in his or her new environment, this together with the change of habitual 
residence may cause jurisdiction to be transferred. In order to prevent this, the courts of the 
state where the child was habitually resident prior to his abduction must take timely action. The 
Brussels II bis Regulation contains the same rule, with some additional specifications.193 Time 
is therefore of the essence; however, the safety of the child may trump the need for a speedy 
return: a state may refuse to return a child to the state from where he or she was abducted if 
this constitutes a grave risk to his or her safety. To prevent this defence from being abused it 
should be interpreted restrictively. 
8.6.1.1 Interpretation by the ECtHR 
 
The ECtHR has repeatedly been asked to determine whether states adequately performed their 
obligations under the Conventions. The ECtHR has consistently found that Article 8 ECHR 
confers on states positive obligations to effectively cooperate to ensure the speedy return of 
children to their state of habitual residence.194 Ordering the return of an abducted child need 
not be automatic: courts are allowed to refuse to order a child’s return of one of the defences 
of Article 13 of the 1980 Convention applies. In the ECtHR’s case law, there are some 
inconsistencies concerning the extent of the review that courts are obliged to carry out to 
establish whether return of the child would constitute a ‘grave risk’ to his or her safety. In the 
much-discussed case of Neulinger v. Shuruk,195 the ECtHR appeared to require courts to make 
an ‘in-depth’ examination of the entire family situation in the context of the grave risk defence. 
Some commentators were of the opinion that such an in-depth examination would be 
incompatible with the effective functioning of the return mechanism and would almost equate 
them to custody proceedings, which is explicitly not the purpose of the provision.196 In a later 
case, X. v. Latvia, the ECtHR however stated that Neulinger had not been intended to create a 
universal principle. In that case, the ECtHR clarified that what it expects of courts that are to 
decide on the return of an abducted child, is to “genuinely take into account […] the factors 
capable of constituting an exception to the child’s immediate return in application of Articles 
12, 13 and 20” of the 1980 Convention, “particularly where they are raised by one of the parties 
to the proceedings”197. The court must then “take a decision that is sufficiently reasoned on this 
point, in order to enable the [ECtHR] to verify that those questions have been effectively 
                                                 
 
193 Article 10. 
194 For instance ECtHR X. v. Latvia, appl. no. 27853/09, ECHR 2013; see Beaumont and Walker (2013).  
195 ECtHR Neulinger and Shuruk v. Switzerland, appl. no. 41615/07, ECHR 2010. 
196 Keller and Heri (2015) p. 284; Beaumont and Walker (2013) p. 17-30; see Vlaardingerbroek (2014) p. 15. 
197 ECtHR X. v. Latvia, para. 106. 
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examined”198. Secondly, the factors “must be evaluated in the light of Article 8 of the 
Convention”.199 An ‘in-depth examination’ of the ‘entire family situation’ is therefore not 
necessary. X. v. Latvia is seen as having achieved an appropriate balance between the aims of 
the 1980 Convention and the requirements of the ECHR.200 
To conclude, Article 8 ECHR imposes on states positive obligations to effectively cooperate 
in order to ensure the return of abducted children; in this regard the ECtHR has shown itself to 
be sensitive to the requirements of the international framework on child abduction. 
8.6.2 Reforms achieved by the Brussels II bis Regulation and controversy 
 
The preceding section having described the state of international child abduction law outside 
of Brussels II bis, this section now concerns the reforms introduced by that Regulation and 
their reception. It is shown that much of the criticism levelled at the reforms concerned the 
perceived disturbance of the balance that had been achieved by the 1980 Convention.201 
The Brussels II bis Regulation applies alongside the 1980 Convention, with some of the more 
specific rules of the Regulation taking precedence over those of the Convention. With regard 
to child abduction, the Regulation retains the perpetuation fori rule (Art. 10), with some 
specifications.202 Most importantly, Article 11(8) of Brussels II bis provides that a refusal by a 
state on the basis of Article 13 1980 Convention can be trumped by a subsequent judgment 
requiring the return of a child from the Member State with jurisdiction (i.e., the state of habitual 
residence of the child prior to the abduction). Finally, the exequatur was abolished for return 
orders. This system of automatic enforcement was considered a “valuable improvement”, 
according to the 2015 Study on the assessment of the Regulation,203 though enforcement still 
proved difficult and time-consuming in practice, sometimes taking as long as a year.204 
However, the system whereby the Member State of habitual residence retains ultimate control 
and may issue judgments which trump earlier non-return orders of other states has been 
criticised by some commentators. Some believe that it is at odds with the principles of 
international cooperation in child abduction cases to allow one Member State to trump 
another’s findings; this is believed to potentially cause ill-feeling and resentment between 
States in a context in which harmonious cooperation is essential.205 It is also considered that 
                                                 
 
198 Ibid.  
199 ECtHR X. v. Latvia para. 106. See Beaumont, Trimmings et al. (2015) p. 43. 
200 Keller and Heri (2015) p. 287; Beaumont, Trimmings et al. (2015) p. 43. 
201 Beaumont and Walker (2011) argue that there is an increasing discrepancy in the interpretation of the 1980 
Convention between the CJEU and the ECtHR, with the CJEU placing too much confidence mutual trust whereas 
the ECtHR overemphasizes the child’s best interests (p. 231). See for the CJEU’s view Lenaerts (2013).  
202 See Section 8.6.1. 
203 Study on the assessment of the Brussels IIbis Regulation (2015) p. 33. 
204 Study on the assessment of the Brussels IIbis Regulation (2015) p. 31. 
205 McEleavy (2004) p. 510. 
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the absence of refusal grounds removes any possibilities to correct mistakes such as a failure 
to hear a child even though it has a right thereto, and may simply create new problems without 
addressing the problems associated with cross-border enforcement of return orders.206 
On the other hand, it has been acknowledged that it is very costly and time-consuming for the 
left-behind parent to apply to the courts in another state from where he or she is located and 
request a return order there. The absence of exequatur also allows return proceedings to be 
concluded faster and may therefore reduce any harm to the relationship between the child and 
the parents.207 Concentrating the proceedings in the state of habitual residence is commendable 
from that perspective. In Povse, the ECtHR effectively sanctioned this strict division of 
responsibilities.208 
The question is now whether this concentration of powers in the Member State of habitual 
residence, and the absence of refusal grounds, is the best way of balancing the rights of the 
parties concerned. It is important to realise that, from the perspective of fundamental rights 
protection, at least eight factors209 should be considered: 
i. The best interests of the child (Art. 24(2) CFR, Art. 3 1980 Convention);210 
ii. The child’s right to participate in the proceedings, including his or her right to be 
heard (Art. 24 CFR, Recital 19 and Art. 42(2) Brussels II bis); 
iii. The child’s right to a relationship with the abducting parent (Art. 8 ECHR); 
iv. The child’s right to a relationship with the left-behind parent (Art. 8 ECHR); 
v. The right of the abducting parent to a relationship with his or her child (Art. 8 
ECHR); 
vi. The right of the left-behind parent to a relationship with his or her child (Art. 8 
ECHR);211 
vii. The abducting parent’s right to a fair trial in the context of the return proceedings 
(Art. 6(1) ECHR/47 CFR, Art. 42(2) Brussels II bis); 
                                                 
 
206 Scott (2015) p. 28-29. 
207 Scott (2015) p. 28. 
208 See Chapter 4. 
209 Other rights or interests could be identified. For example, although it is not expressly recognised by the Brussels 
IIbis Regulation, the 1980 Convention, or the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) it has 
been argued that the child additionally enjoys a ‘right to identity’. This right is relevant to child abduction since 
the removal of certain (family) ties meaningful to the child affects his or her identity. See Ronen (2004) p. 160. 
210 In literature on international child abduction, there is a discussion on the question whether the best interests 
standard of the child should be seen as an expression of the independent rights of the child. The recognition of 
children’s rights, and the idea of children as independent rights holders, is in a state of development. See Schuz 
(2013) p. 112. 
211 When the party that applies for a child’s return is not a parent, but for instance a child protection agency, this 
factor changes, as these types of organisations’ relationship with the child has not been found to be protected by 
Article 8 ECHR; however, the rights of foster or adoptive parents have been found to come within the scope of 
this Article. ECtHR Jolie and Lebrun v. Belgium appl. no. 11418/85, 14 May 1986; European Commission on 
Human Rights X v. France, appl. no. 9993/82 DR 31, p. 241; Kilkelly (2003) p. 18. 
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viii. The left-behind parent’s right to a fair trial in the context of the return proceedings, 
including their right to enforcement of a decision ordering return (Art. 6(1) 
ECHR/47 CFR, Art. 42(2) Brussels II bis). 
Considering that this research is restricted to the implications of the right to a fair trial for the 
organisation of cross-border enforcement, it is difficult to do justice to the added complexities 
of the right to family life (Art. 8 ECHR). The question whether automatic enforcement of return 
orders is or is not the best way of safeguarding the parties’ rights under these provisions goes 
beyond the remit of this research. However, it is also impossible to treat the enforcement of 
return orders in the same way as other civil or commercial judgments, due to this special 
characteristic. Chapter 7 for this reason concluded that refusal of enforcement of return orders 
may only be justified if it is not contrary to the child’s best interests. It also showed that 
suppression of refusal grounds may be justified on the grounds that the possibility of invoking 
refusal grounds may encourage abductions and remove from the left-behind parent the 
advantage of going to court in their own Member State.212 Given that there may be good 
arguments for automatic enforcement of return orders (i.e., against allowing the Member State 
to where the child was abducted to refuse enforcement), it is worth considering how the 
procedure for enforcement of such orders can protect the parties’ rights as effectively as 
possible in the absence of refusal grounds. 
 
8.6.3 How should enforcement of return orders be organized? 
 
Section 8.2 of this Chapter argued that for judgments within the scope of Brussels I bis, where 
grounds for refusal apply, the procedure for obtaining permission for cross-border enforcement 
(certification) should be as simple and effective as possible. Any comprehensive checks, for 
instance whether service was effected, can be kept to a minimum because grounds for refusal 
in the Member State of enforcement will act as a safety net. It follows that if there are no refusal 
grounds for return judgments, safeguards at the ‘judgment export’ stage should be more 
extensive. 
Brussels II bis contains a certification procedure, which requires the judge who issues the 
certificate to check whether:213 
(a) the child was given an opportunity to be heard, unless a hearing was considered 
inappropriate having regard to his or her age or degree of maturity; 
(b) the parties were given an opportunity to be heard; and, 
                                                 
 
212 Chapter 7.5.  
213 Article 42(2) Brussels IIbis Regulation. 
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(c) the court has taken into account in issuing its judgment the reasons for and evidence 
underlying the order issued pursuant to Article 13 of the 1980 Hague Convention. 
The first two requirements clearly have as their purpose to protect the child’s and the parents’ 
rights to be heard, respectively. The question is whether such a pre-certification check is likely 
to be effective. 
8.6.3.1 Impartiality of the judge who issues the certificate 
 
Firstly, the mechanism as such can be criticized on the same grounds as that of the EEO: the 
risk of a lack of impartiality on the part of the judge who issues the certificate. Section 8.4.2 of 
this Chapter concluded that it is unlikely that a judge who has previously decided on the merits 
of a case is unlikely to critically evaluate his or her own findings at the certification stage. This 
risk applies a fortiori to the mechanism of Article 42 of Brussels II bis, because it expressly 
requires that the certificate is issued by the same judge who delivered the judgment. The EEO 
Regulation only requires that this be done by “the same court”, which allows Member States 
some leeway that, it is suggested, Member States should use to divide tasks among different 
judges to safeguard impartiality.214 
It is to be expected that there is a similar risk of bias with regard to certification under Article 
42 of Brussels II bis. As discussed above, certification may be seen as a stage of the proceedings 
separate from the proceedings leading to a return order, as it is both formally and functionally 
separate from that examination.215 As was also explained, involvement of the same judge in 
two stages of the proceedings may be incompatible with fair trial depending on the ‘scope and 
nature’ of the issues examined. From the ECtHR’s case law it transpires that a lack of 
impartiality may occur where the two stages of the proceedings concern different legal 
questions, but there is nevertheless a ‘close link’ between the issues examined. Such a close 
link may be present where the stages both concern the same set of facts216 and where the second 
stage may to some degree entail reconsideration of the decision taken at the first stage.217 In 
San Leonard Band Club, discussed above, the ECtHR ruled that when there is an overlap in 
the questions judges are required to examine, even if it is limited, at separate stages of the 
proceedings, this may give rise to concerns as to the judge’s impartiality.218 As to the EEO 
Regulation, it was concluded that the overlap between certain requirements of the EEO 
Regulation and the proceedings on the merits may be of such a nature that impartiality concerns 
arise. A judge can hardly be expected to come to a different conclusion on a matter such as 
jurisdiction in the certification phase than he did in the merits phase. 
With the Article 42 procedure, all three requirements cited above may overlap with questions 
that were already examined during the examination on the merits. It was, after all, the judge 
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who decided on the merits who also provided the parties and the child (if appropriate) with ‘an 
opportunity to be heard’. Article 42(2)(c) likely provides the most extensive overlap, since this 
requires the court to check whether it adequately considered the factors which may be used as 
grounds for refusal under the 1980 Convention. It may be recalled that these concern a) whether 
the party who requests the child’s return indeed exercised custody prior to the abduction, and 
b) whether return would expose the child to physical or psychological harm or otherwise place 
the child in an intolerable situation.219 It is submitted that it is unrealistic to expect a judge to 
come to a different conclusion on these matters when he issues a certificate than he did when 
deciding on the return as such. This is especially so for the third requirement (Art. 42(2)(c)), 
considering its overlap with the decision on the merits. 
The problems with the concentration of these two tasks in one and the same judge is illustrated 
by the Zarraga case, discussed previously.220 It may be recalled that in that case the Spanish 
court certified its own judgment as enforceable, considering that the child in question (nine 
years of age) had been given an opportunity to be heard. However, in that case the ‘opportunity 
to be heard’ had consisted of an invitation to the mother and child to return to Spain, with no 
guarantee that they would be allowed to leave together; a request for a hearing through 
videoconferencing was refused. The courts of Germany, to where the child had been abducted, 
considered this insufficient, but were not allowed to refuse enforcement on this basis. It was 
submitted that the opportunity to be heard provided to the child in the Zarraga case was not 
effective and that the Spanish court should have done more. Indeed, it is difficult to see how a 
simple invitation to the child to return to the state of previous habitual residence for a hearing, 
without any guarantees as to being allowed to leave, can ever be effective: if it were so simple 
to get a child to return, return orders would not be necessary. In this case, the court that issued 
the certificate clearly did not consider the opportunity to be heard that it had earlier granted to 
the child to be ineffective. It is submitted that it could hardly have been expected to find 
otherwise, because that would have required the court to come to a different conclusion with 
regard to the same question and on the basis of the same facts. It is proposed that the Brussels 
II bis Regulation be amended to require Member States to divide the decision on the merits and 
the certification among different judges, in order to safeguard impartiality. Without an 
impartial and critical examination of the requirements for certification, these requirements have 
no practical value to the parties to the proceedings or the child. 
8.6.3.2 The right of the child to participate in the proceedings 
 
A related issue is the divergence among states on the question whether children should be heard 
at all; states have different interpretations as to when a hearing is appropriate having regard to 
the child’s age and maturity. Under the Convention on the Rights of the Child and the EU 
Charter of Fundamental Rights children have a right to express their views and have them taken 
into consideration in matters that concern them in accordance with their age and maturity. 
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However, some argue that hearing a child is difficult, as a child may be manipulated, may feel 
put under pressure, or forced to choose between his or her parents. In abduction cases, an 
abducted child often has not seen the left-behind parent for a considerable length of time, and 
cannot therefore be expected to have a realistic impression of that parent. It is also hard to 
explain to children that the return proceedings are not decisive as to where the child will live, 
as that decision remains with the judge in the state of the child’s habitual residence.221  
It was foreseen when the Brussels II bis Regulation was adopted that these divergences would 
create problems at the enforcement stage.222 The 2015 Study on the assessment of the Brussels 
II bis Regulation shows that such divergences have indeed created problems at the enforcement 
stage: distrust between Member States on this matter has led to refusals of enforcement where 
the Regulation allows it.223 It has proven especially difficult to organise a hearing of the child 
if the abducting parent does not cooperate.224 Given that such divergences exist, it can be 
doubted whether the condition that the child be heard prior to issuing the certificate of Article 
42(2)(a) is at all effective. Unfortunately, the 2015 Study does not provide conclusions as to 
whether the requirement of Article 42(2)(a) serves its purpose. 
It has therefore been suggested that the requirement that the child be given an opportunity to 
be heard should be harmonised in order to avoid diverging approaches: Scott proposes 
harmonisation of the age at which children may be heard and the ways in which this could be 
done.225 Explicit and harmonised rules on this matter could certainly increase the effectiveness 
of the certification mechanism: they would both ensure that the rights of the child are respected, 
and reduce the scope for mistrust and uncertainty at the enforcement stage. More research is 
needed to ascertain whether such harmonisation is feasible. 
8.6.3.3 Right to appeal against (non)-certification 
 
Finally, it needs to be considered what consequences should be attached to a failure to correctly 
apply the requirements for certification. Currently, the only potential recourse of parties to 
return proceedings against the wrongful issuing of a certificate is Article 43(1) Brussels II bis, 
which provides that “the law of the Member State of origin shall be applicable to any 
rectification of the certificate”. The wording of this provision makes clear that Member States 
are not obligated to allow for rectification. Moreover, Article 43(2) provides that no appeal 
shall lie against the issuing of a certificate. This leaves open the possibility that a party may 
appeal against a decision not to issue a certificate, but clearly excludes any appeal against its 
issuing on the grounds that the preconditions of Article 42(2) were not observed. It can be 
questioned what the purpose of requirements for certification is, if a failure to observe them 
can remain without consequences. Perhaps a mechanism such as that of Article 10 of the EEO 
Regulation, whereby a debtor can apply for withdrawal of the certificate in the Member State 
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of origin if it was clearly wrongly issued with regard to the requirements of the Regulation, 
should be introduced. In that way, the burden of opposing the certification lies with the 
abducting parent, and the fact that this remedy should be invoked in the Member State of origin 
may act as a deterrent for invoking it too lightly and causing unnecessary delays. Combined 
with a more precise and harmonised set of requirements for certification, such as suggested by 
Scott,226 so that possibilities for abuse are minimised, such a mechanism may provide a more 
equitable balance between the rights of both parties. 
 
8.6.4 Conclusion: cross-border enforcement of return order and access rights 
 
The simple answer given to the question posed above, whether refusal of enforcement is ever 
an appropriate sanction for fair trial violations in cases concerning access rights, is no. It was 
shown that the primary interests that return proceedings should protect are those of the child. 
Since it is only the parents (or other authorities) that can hold a right to a fair trial in the context 
of return proceedings, a violation of those rights cannot outweigh the child’s interests. If refusal 
of enforcement leads to a risk to the child’s safety, health or well-being, this cannot be an 
appropriate remedy. It is possible that the parent’s right to a fair trial and the child’s best 
interests may align; in those cases, refusal of enforcement may be appropriate, but it is still the 
child’s interests that are decisive. Whether it is necessary for the safeguarding of the best 
interests of the child to have a possibility for refusal of enforcement in the Brussels II bis 
Regulation is a question that is outside the remit of this research. 
 
8.7 Conclusion 
 
This Chapter showed that judgment import, or export as the case may be, is by no means 
irrelevant for the protection of the parties’ fair trial rights. An effective mechanism for cross-
border enforcement is essential for guaranteeing the creditor’s right to enforcement. In this 
regard, the Brussels I bis Regulation’s certification mechanism appears to function quite well, 
since it abolishes the need for a declaration for enforceability and is easily obtainable. Though 
the debtor’s rights should be adequately protected by the availability of refusal grounds, some 
improvements to the certification procedure are necessary to ensure that the debtor is aware of 
his rights. 
It may be clear that this research rejects the mechanism of the EEO. Not only does it abolish 
the possibility for refusing enforcement or recognition, it also relies too much on self-control 
by the judge who issues an EEO on the matter of adequate service. The overreliance on non-
hierarchical and possibly ineffective service methods is a problem that plagues the EOP 
Procedure as well. The combination of potentially ineffective minimum standards on service, 
                                                 
 
226 Scott (2015) p. 199.  
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combined with the reliance on self-control by the judge and the lack of effective remedies for 
the debtor, is incapable of replacing the grounds for refusal. Most problematic may be cases in 
which a judgment against a consumer is wrongfully certified as an EEO despite it not having 
been issued in his own Member State, for example because it was not clear that the debtor was 
acting as a consumer. To expect a debtor in such a case to request withdrawal of the certificate 
in a foreign court is impracticable and at odds with the principles of the Regulation itself. 
It should also be pointed out that there exists now a remarkable inequality between debtors 
against whom enforcement is sought under the EEO Regulation, and those who fall within the 
regime of Brussels I bis. It is submitted that since the EEO Regulation was intended as a first 
step towards complete free movement of judgments across the EU, which was clearly rejected 
by the Member States, the European legislature should question whether it should remain in 
force. It should also be emphasized that as of now, there appears to be no evidence that the 
EEO has resulted in a significant improvement for creditors. 
As for the uniform procedures, a number of improvements are possible and necessary. It is 
suggested that the methods of service, in particular, are evaluated carefully. The interplay 
between cross-border service, standards of examination pertaining to default judgments, and 
enforcement is a complicated one, which Member States resolve in different ways. In this 
regard, initiatives such as the ELI-Unidroit project ‘From Transnational Principles to European 
Rules of Civil Procedure’,227 which includes a Working Group on service, are to be welcomed, 
and its conclusions should be taken into consideration. Apart from service, there are many 
elements of the uniform procedures that could be improved. One area where great gains could 
be made is in the digitalization of procedures: improving possibilities for, for example, 
videoconferencing could greatly improve the accessibility and fairness of the ESCP. It is 
commendable that the evaluation project of the ESCP and EOP Regulations that was 
commissioned by the European Commission gives a great deal of attention to this topic;228 
there are many other initiatives in this field.229 Cross-border service and the impact of 
digitalization are just examples of the great potential for improvement in the field of cross-
border civil litigation.  
                                                 
 
227 http://www.europeanlawinstitute.eu/projects/current-projects/ (last accessed 04/12/2015). 
228 See the reports of Kezmah and Bostjan, published as part of the Access to Justice Project at 
http://www.acj.si/en/project-results (last accessed 04/12/2015). 
229 As one of many examples, see the e-Codex project, http://www.e-codex.eu/home.html (last accessed 
04/12/2015). 
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9 Conclusion 
 
9.1 Introduction 
 
The motivation for this research is to achieve the policy objective of complete free movement 
of civil judgments across the European Union (EU), which entails the abolition of grounds for 
refusal of recognition or enforcement. Because this development has profound implications for 
the protection of litigants’ right to a fair trial, this research set itself the goal of identifying the 
requirements imposed by the right to a fair trial on the regulation of free movement of civil 
judgments across borders within the EU. It was shown that the right to a fair trial in particular, 
and the fundamental rights framework more generally, are relevant to the cross-border 
recognition and enforcement of civil judgments in different ways. 
Firstly, the right to a fair trial includes a right to enforcement of the judgment resulting from 
the trial. Facilitating enforcement in cross-border cases is therefore important to safeguarding 
this aspect of fair trial. It also serves the societal interest in the reliability and efficacy of the 
civil justice system. 
Secondly, mechanisms for cross-border recognition and enforcement can also act as a ‘shield’ 
against violations of the right to a fair trial. A refusal to recognize or enforce a foreign judgment 
is a very effective, though radical, way of ensuring the foreign judgment does not take effect, 
thereby avoiding a violation in the Member State of enforcement. A limitation on free 
movement in the shape of a possibility to refuse recognition or enforcement to a judgment that 
is the result of an unfair procedure can thus provide protection to judgment debtors. 
These two observations show how the right to a fair trial informs free movement of judgments 
from an individual perspective. The research question should however also be answered from 
a constitutional perspective. The right to a fair trial is protected, in the EU, by the European 
Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) and the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights (EU CFR). 
These instruments form the fundamental rights framework of the EU as an organization and of 
its Member States when they apply EU legislation. From the constitutional perspective, the 
question is how fundamental rights can be most effectively protected in this constellation, and 
which institution is responsible for checking the compatibility of judicial decisions with the 
right to a fair trial. More to the point, the question is whether EU Member States can 
legitimately be obligated to rely on the presumption that judgments from other Member States 
conform to the right to a fair trial. This research analysed this question from the perspective of 
both the ECHR and the EU CFR. 
This conclusion summarises the findings of this research for each Chapter, providing succinct 
answers to each of the research questions. It delineates the implications of these answers for 
legislation, policy and practice. Finally, a number of avenues for further research are explored. 
9.2 The research 
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9.2.1 The research questions 
 
As was elaborated upon in the Introduction to this thesis, this research set out to answer the 
following research question: 
Which are the requirements imposed by the right to a fair trial (as laid down in Article 
6(1) ECHR and Article 47 CFR) on the free movement of civil judgments in cross-border 
cases within the EU, and how can the right to a fair trial be effectively safeguarded in this 
context? 
This research question was divided into the following sub questions, which were answered in 
each consecutive Chapter, as summarized below. 
1. How does the (previously) existing mechanism for recognition and enforcement 
protect, and what consequences will its abolition or simplification have for the 
protection of, the right to a fair trial in cross-border cases? 
2. Which requirements can be derived from Article 6(1) ECHR and Article 47 CFR that 
are relevant to the civil trial, including the enforcement stage? 
3. To what extent does the ECHR require a mechanism that allows the Member State 
where enforcement is sought to refuse such recognition or enforcement in case of a 
violation of the right to a fair trial, and what preconditions does it impose on its 
abolition? 
4. To what extent does the EU legal order require a mechanism that allows the Member 
State where enforcement is sought to refuse such recognition or enforcement in case of 
a violation of the right to a fair trial, and what preconditions does it impose on its 
abolition? 
5. If a mechanism for the refusal of recognition and enforcement is found to be necessary, 
what criterion should national judges apply? 
6. Which procedural safeguards should EU legislation concerning the recognition and 
enforcement contain in order to guarantee the effective protection of right to a fair trial 
in cross-border cases? 
 
9.2.2 Summary of the findings and answers to the research questions 
 
This research consists of three parts. The first part consists of Chapters 2 and 3. 
Chapter 2 discussed the evolution of free movement of judgments in the EU. It showed that, 
because of their importance to the functioning of the internal market, recognition and 
enforcement of foreign judgments has been on the EU’s legislative agenda since the first 
founding Treaty. For a long time, civil judgments were recognized automatically, while for 
enforcement a declaration of enforceability (exequatur) was required in the Member State 
where enforcement was sought. Both recognition and enforcement could be refused by the 
Member State addressed on the basis of a limited number of narrowly formulated refusal 
grounds. The introduction of mutual recognition as a legislative concept in 1999 however, 
fundamentally changed the basis of cooperation in the field of civil justice. In its most absolute 
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form, mutual recognition requires Member States to recognize or execute judicial decisions 
from other EU Member States without any discretion to review or refuse the decision. Mutual 
recognition is based on mutual trust between the Member States, though whether it in fact 
exists or whether it is merely assumed to exists remains a question. Chapter 2 showed that the 
introduction of mutual recognition in the field of civil justice took the shape of the abolition of 
exequatur and of the refusal grounds, though the various regulations achieved this in different 
ways. 
Chapter 3 showed why and how this development has an impact on the protection of the right 
to a fair trial. The most controversial of the reforms proved to be the abolition of the public 
policy exception. This provision, which was a standard feature of EU (but also domestic and 
international) instruments, allows states to refuse recognition or enforcement to a judgment if 
that recognition or enforcement would be contrary to the public policy of that state. Since public 
policy encompasses fundamental rights, including the right to a fair trial, the exception enables 
states to refuse recognition or enforcement to judgments that result from a procedure that does 
not conform to the requirements of a fair trial. The Chapter discussed a number of cases where 
the public policy exception was used in this way. Apart from public policy, there are other 
refusal grounds capable of addressing fair trial violations, notably the protection afforded to 
the defaulting defendant and the review of jurisdiction under the Brussels I Regulation. Chapter 
3 also showed that the cross-border element of refusal provides protection in and of itself, since 
it provides an ‘outsider view’ that may identify violations that would go unchecked in the 
Member State of origin. The abolition of refusal grounds is therefore problematic from the 
perspective of fundamental rights protection. 
Together, these two Chapters (Part I of this research) answered sub-question 1. They showed 
that serious problems simply sometimes occur, and that application of the refusal grounds has 
proved a very effective remedy in those cases. The abolition of refusal grounds in particular, 
and the reforms in European civil procedure law more generally, therefore raise questions as 
to their conformity with the right to a fair trial. 
Part II of this research (Chapters 4, 5 and 6) explored different ways in which the right to a fair 
trial circumscribes cross-border recognition and enforcement of civil judgments. 
Chapter 4 answered sub-question 2. It showed that the right to a fair trial holds a prominent 
place within the ECHR, because of its importance in a democratic society and as a central 
element of the rule of law. The CJEU has long acknowledged the existence of the right to a fair 
trial within the EU legal order. The Charter explicitly links the interpretation of the right to a 
fair trial in the EU context to that provided in the European Court of Human Rights’ (ECtHR) 
case law. The CJEU’s interpretation of the right to a fair trial is in some respects more specific 
and extensive than that provided by the ECtHR. It was also shown that the right to a fair trial 
applies to the enforcement stage of civil proceedings, and guarantees a right to enforcement to 
the judgment creditor. The Chapter further discussed whether some kind of hierarchy could be 
discerned within the right to a fair trial. While in principle all aspects of the fair trial are equally 
deserving of protection, it was shown that a useful distinction can be made between them 
according to their function in achieving a fair trial and according to how a failure to observe 
them could be remedied. 
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Chapter 5 concluded – in an answer to sub question 3 – that in principle, the ECtHR allows 
discretion to refuse enforcement to be removed from the Member State where enforcement is 
sought under EU legislation. However, this results from the ECtHR’s reduced level of scrutiny 
in situations where Contracting Parties act as agents of the EU and therefore have no discretion. 
Chapter 4 discussed that the ECtHR developed the Bosphorus doctrine for addressing potential 
fundamental rights violations that occurred due to the application of EU law. The Bosphorus 
line of case law is based on the premise that the EU provides fundamental rights protection that 
is equivalent to that provided by the ECHR. In Povse, the ECtHR applied this reasoning to the 
free movement of civil judgments. Chapter 5 argued that Povse suffers from twisted logic due 
to the ECtHR not being well placed to deal with a violation involving several states. The 
marginal scrutiny by the ECtHR of the application of EU law is especially problematic in the 
context of mutual recognition, since the ECtHR essentially sanctioned the concentration of 
decision-making power in the Member State of origin, which, it was submitted, may at times 
produce results that are highly problematic with regard to the protection of fair trial. The 
ECtHR ruled in MSS v. Belgium and Greece, where it ruled that exceptions to mutual 
recognition should be made if the state where the decision originates does not fulfil its 
obligations under the ECHR. 
Chapter 6 analysed the role of fundamental rights in the EU’s constitutional framework, 
answering sub-question 4. It showed that the EU has committed itself to protecting fundamental 
rights, which constitute part of its founding principles. Through the CJEU’s case law, and most 
explicitly through the EU CFR, the EU and its Member States are bound to respect fundamental 
rights in the creation and application of EU legislation. However, Chapter 6 showed that 
fundamental rights standards in EU legislation can also act as maximum standards where a 
high level of harmonisation is intended, reducing or removing Member States’ discretion to 
apply higher national conceptions of certain fundamental rights. It is therefore especially 
important that fundamental rights standards laid down in secondary EU legislation provide 
sufficient protection, also because Member States have few or no possibilities to correct the 
application of EU law without disregarding their obligations. The CJEU itself has accepted that 
the protection of fundamental rights may at times require an exception to absolute mutual 
recognition. Sub question 4 is therefore answered to the effect that the EU fundamental rights 
framework requires a mechanism for refusing recognition or enforcement in order to ensure 
that the EU does not fall foul of its commitment to respect fundamental rights. 
Part II concluded that what the right to a fair trial, as protected by the ECHR and the EU CFR, 
requires, is that violations are prevented or, if not, addressed effectively in the domestic 
procedure. Whatever the division of tasks between the EU’s Member States in the context of 
cross-border recognition and enforcement, there remains an obligation on the EU and its 
Member States to protect fundamental rights effectively. The question is therefore how EU 
legislation on recognition and enforcement can most effectively protect the right to a fair trial.  
Part III (Chapters 7 and 8) presented recommendations as to how effective protection of fair 
trial is best achieved. 
Chapter 7 proposed – answering sub question 5 – that the EU instruments should retain an 
emergency brake in the shape of a public policy exception (and other grounds for refusal) which 
should be applied by the Member State addressed. The Chapter analysed to what extent 
procedural public policy and the right to a fair trial overlap, with the purpose of exploring 
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whether procedural public policy could be replaced with a more narrow reference to fair trial. 
While the Chapter concluded that such a replacement would have several advantages, it 
considered that the disadvantage of having to create an artificial distinction between procedural 
and substantive public policy could not (within the limits of this research) be overcome. The 
Chapter also explored how in certain concrete cases the conflict between creditors’ and debtors’ 
rights to fair trial could be resolved. It concluded that the judge should always ask himself 
whether refusal of recognition or enforcement is an appropriate remedy to the debtor’s violation 
and whether it is proportional to the disadvantage suffered by the creditor. The Chapter made 
a reservation with regard to the enforcement of decisions ordering the return of a child, which 
involves a more complicated balancing act between the rights of the parents and the interests 
of the child. 
Chapter 8 answers sub question 6. It examined how the procedure for cross-border recognition 
and enforcement should be designed to safeguard both creditors’ and debtors’ fair trial rights 
effectively. To that end it analysed the existing instruments, with special attention to the more 
innovative instruments. It concluded that a simple, speedy and effective mechanism to achieve 
cross-border enforcement is essential with respect to realising the creditor’s right to 
enforcement. It also showed that the self-control required by the European Enforcement Order, 
the Brussels II bis Regulation and the uniform European procedures is likely to be ineffective 
and may be incompatible with the right to a fair trial because it does not guarantee an impartial 
examination of the prerequisites (minimum standards) for enforcement. The Chapter also 
highlighted a number of particular deficiencies in the various instruments, such as the lack of 
information provided to the debtor by the certificate of the Brussels I bis Regulation. It also 
pointed out the inequality that exists between debtors depending on which mechanism the 
creditor chooses to enforce the judgment he obtained. A number of recommendations for 
improvement of the existing Regulations were made. 
9.2.3 Limitations of the research 
 
This research has as its explicit aim to discuss the cross-border recognition and enforcement of 
civil judgments from the perspective of fundamental rights. It does not explore whether free 
movement of civil judgments is feasible or desirable politically or economically. This 
limitation is of special significance with regard to the retention of the public policy exception. 
Public policy is still at least in theory a national concept, since all Regulations that contain this 
concept refer to the public policy ‘of the Member State addressed’, although its outer limits are 
defined by the European Court of Justice, and its content partly consists of common European 
norms. The value of public policy has often been found in its capacity to ‘bridge gaps’ between 
different procedural systems, which makes free movement of judgments more feasible 
politically. This function of public policy is not analysed in this research, nor is the question 
whether this function is an argument for the retention of public policy.  
Another limitation is that this research does not consider whether it is legitimately possible to 
weigh the protection of fundamental rights against considerations of efficiency, such as the 
potential costs and benefits of the abolition of certain safeguards, or against other 
considerations of societal interest. This research has as its starting point that the right to a fair 
trial should be protected effectively in all proceedings falling within its scope. Since both the 
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EU and its Member States have committed themselves to protecting fundamental rights, 
limitations on that protection are only allowed in so far as the fundamental rights framework 
allows for those limitations. Whereas, for example, the right to privacy (Art. 8(1) ECHR) can 
be legitimately limited provided certain conditions are fulfilled, the right to a fair trial does not 
contain an explicit limitation clause.1 It is therefore not possible to legitimately discuss in what 
cases interferences with the right to a fair trial should be allowed. Whether such an outcome is 
acceptable as ‘collateral damage’ of the abolition of safeguards that may be seen as obstacles 
to enforcement is a political question; but this research would maintain that even politically, 
such a trade-off could not legitimately be considered, given that within the EU’s political 
framework, fundamental rights are considered to be among its founding principles.  
9.3 Implications of the findings and recommendations 
 
9.3.1 Implications for academic and political debate 
 
The findings of this research have several implications for academic and political discourse. 
This research entails a fundamental consideration of the mode of cooperation between EU 
Member States on the basis of EU legislation. During the discussions on the abolition of 
exequatur in the Brussels I regime, commentators opposed this development for various 
reasons. Some argued that the abolition of exequatur, and in particular the abolition of the 
public policy exception, was unacceptable because it would be incompatible with national 
sovereignty. In this paradigm, which is the basis of classical private international law, 
recognition of a foreign judgment is, in essence, a favour one state bestows on another out of 
comity (literally: courtesy). It is the exception to the rule that judicial decisions have no legal 
force outside of the jurisdiction where they were rendered, and that states at all times retain the 
authority to protect their legal order against dubious foreign influences. This language of 
‘protection’ of the legal order is still influential in classical private international law. In this 
paradigm, the refusal of recognition or enforcement to a foreign judgment can perhaps with 
some legitimacy be seen as expressing a lack of trust. 
This research however proposes that refusing recognition or enforcement need not be seen as 
a denial of mutual trust if it is considered that the protection of fundamental rights is a common 
goal of the EU and its Member States. It is not a denial of mutual trust to review a foreign 
judgment on the basis of a commonly accepted norm such as the right to a fair trial. In fact, a 
possibility to refuse recognition or enforcement can work in synergy with mutual trust. The 
implication of this conclusion for the field of EU civil procedure is therefore that effective 
cross-border recognition and enforcement with appropriate safeguards should be seen as a 
common goal of the EU and its Member States. In this paradigm the retention of a possibility 
for refusal is not a matter of ‘obsolete nationalism’ but rather an acknowledgement of the fact 
that review by a second Member State is sometimes the most effective way of safeguarding 
common fundamental principles. 
                                                 
 
1 See for a general overview of the topic Koch (2008).  
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This research proposes a reconsideration of the function of mutual recognition, in the sense 
that it rejects the notion that mutual recognition can only be an effective mode of cooperation 
if it is absolute. This research has shown that the effective protection of procedural rights is 
very difficult to combine with absolute mutual recognition, i.e., the abolition of grounds for 
refusal to recognise or enforce a foreign decision. If there are clear indications that fundamental 
rights are not adequately protected in the Member State whose decision is to be recognised, it 
should be possible to refuse such recognition. In the context of the recognition or enforcement 
of civil judgments it does however always need to be considered whether refusal would 
constitute a disproportionate interference with the debtor’s right to enforcement. Refusal 
cannot therefore be automatic; it needs to be carefully considered in each case whether refusal 
is an effective and proportional remedy to the violation suffered by the judgment debtor. 
Harmonisation of civil procedure, or the formulation of common minimum standards of civil 
procedure, may help to reduce uncertainty as to the acceptability of foreign judgments (see 
below), but it can never sufficiently replace the protection provided by cross-border checks. 
For this reason, ‘building’ mutual trust by formulating common minimum standards, in so far 
as this is possible, should not be seen as a panacea. 
This also implies a reconsideration of the relationship between the EU and its Member States 
when it comes to fundamental rights protection. It has been shown that effective protection of 
fundamental rights is a common task of the EU and its Member States. Given that EU Member 
States are able to benefit from a presumption of Convention compliance under the ECHR when 
they act in the implementation of EU law, the EU legislature should take its responsibility to 
afford ‘equivalent protection’ to the ECHR seriously. This may involve, as this Chapter argues, 
giving back some discretion to the Member States when they implement EU legislation, rather 
than aiming to curtail their discretion by adopting narrowly formulated common norms in 
secondary legislation. Respect for fundamental rights binds the EU and its Member States, so 
instead of viewing fundamental rights protection as a potential source of conflict and aiming 
to restrict Member States’ discretion, the European legislature should trust Member States’ 
judges to combine fundamental rights protection with a faithful application of EU legislation.  
9.3.2 Implications for legislation 
 
For the purpose of legislation, the implications of this research are the following.  
Firstly, all the instruments that are discussed in this research are Regulations. While 
Regulations have the advantage of needing, in principle, no implementation, practice has 
shown that they should be properly embedded into national procedural law for them to function 
effectively. To achieve this, it is especially important to gather information regarding the 
functioning of the instruments in the Member States and to take seriously the concerns and 
problems that practitioners, national legislatures and litigants experience. This is not only a 
task for the European institutions, but also one for the Member States. 
This connects to a second recommendation. The field of civil justice cooperation has seen a 
great deal of legislative innovation over the past decade. Together, the instruments discussed 
in this research comprise a plethora of enforcement regimes, some of which are even 
alternatives. After this period of innovation, time has come for the critical evaluation of the 
functioning of the various instruments and to draw lessons from the practical experiences with 
 390 
 
them. Consolidation, coherence, and effective implementation are now more important than 
innovation, and it is commendable that the European legislature and policy maker increasingly 
shows evidence of its awareness of this fact.2 
Specifically, this research recommends the following changes to existing legislation. Firstly, 
this research recommends the retention, or where necessary the reintroduction, of a public 
policy exception in instruments the European Order for Payment (EOP), European Small 
Claims Procedure (ESCP) and Maintenance Regulations. For the EOP and ESCP Regulations, 
this implies that the ‘review procedure’ be widened in scope and that its use is closely 
circumscribed. For the EOP Regulation, this refusal ground would have to be reformulated so 
as to remove the requirement that the judgment was delivered by default, since the EOP by its 
nature does not require the defendant to enter an appearance. The EOP Regulation also requires 
a remedy for the defendant who was unable to oppose the Order for reasons outside his control. 
For the Brussels II bis Regulation, specifically return orders, this research reserves a conclusion 
as to whether refusal grounds should be reintroduced, since it has found that the best interests 
of the child, a topic that falls outside the scope of this research, should always be paramount in 
these procedures. 
For the Brussels I bis Regulation, this research concludes that the certification procedure, 
combined with refusal grounds, appears, ‘on paper’, to combine protection of both debtors’ 
and creditors’ rights reasonably well. A number of specific recommendations are made, such 
as the introduction of a harmonised period of time between service of the certificate on the 
debtor and the taking of enforcement measures, as well as on the provision of information to 
the debtor as to the possibility to invoke grounds for refusal. It should also be clarified in what 
circumstances a debtor is allowed to request translation of the judgment. The cost, and 
especially the disparity in costs, of enforcing a judgment across borders remains a bottleneck. 
For the EOP Regulation, it was recommended that it be clarified when an EOP would be 
considered to have been ‘clearly wrongly issued’ for the purposes of a review under its Article 
20(2). It should however be considered whether the review procedure would still be needed if 
grounds for refusal are available in the Member State of enforcement, especially given that the 
authority to apply the grounds for review or refusal of the EOP would be divided across two 
Member States. 
For the ESCP Regulation, the amendment that use of distance communication technology is 
now obligatory for oral hearings is welcomed. Regarding the possibilities for review of Article 
18(1), the recommendations are the same as for the EOP; it should be carefully considered 
whether a review mechanism remains necessary when the recommended grounds for refusal 
have been reintroduced. 
Finally, this research recommends that the added value of the European Enforcement Order 
Regulation be reconsidered. Since this research rejects the idea that the checks necessary for 
judgment inspection can be effectively carried out in the Member State of origin, refusal 
grounds should have to be reintroduced; but this would negate any advantages of using the 
                                                 
 
2 See on the need to develop a coherent approach also Stadler (2005) and Tulibacka (2009). A comprehensive 
overview of the field is provided by Strorskrubb (2008).  
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EEO in comparison to the Brussels I bis Regulation. Given that there does not appear to be a 
great deal of political interest in the instrument, since it has not been evaluated or amended 
since its introduction, it is recommended that the European legislature consider its withdrawal.  
9.4 Avenues for further research 
 
9.4.1 Convergence of civil procedure 
 
One important and potentially fruitful avenue for research is the identification of common 
(minimum) standards of civil procedure. A great deal of research on these matters has already 
been conducted, going back to the work of the Storme Commission3 in the 1990s, but a number 
of recent projects also deserve mentioning.4 
One such project is ‘From Transnational Principles to European Rules of Civil Procedure’, a 
joint initiative of the European Law Institute and Unidroit, the International Institute for the 
Unification of Private Law. This project aims at adapting the Principles of Transnational Civil 
Procedure adopted by the American Law Association and Unidroit. These Principles are an 
optional model for reform and approximation of domestic private law. The European Law 
Institute-Unidroit project aims to adopt more specific principles for European civil procedure. 
In 2014, five working groups of international experts were formed, which respectively address 
(1) Service and Due Notice of Proceedings; (2) Provisional and Protective Measures; (3) 
Access to Information and Evidence; (4) Lis Pendens and Res Judicata; and, (5) Obligations 
of the Parties and Lawyers. At the end of 2015, it was decided to form three more working 
groups, addressing (6) Costs, (7) Judgments, and an overarching working group on (8) 
Structure of Civil Proceedings. While it has been reported that the comparative research carried 
out by these groups is of a high quality, some matters are unclear, including whether the 
principles would apply only to disputes involving a cross-border element and what the precise 
goal of the project is. In any case, the Principles are intended to be used as soft law for the 
European legal community. 
The European Commission has also commissioned a number of comparative studies,5 
including a Study on the service of documents in EU Member States, with the stated aim of 
“understanding the existing disparities between the national regimes on service of documents 
that might constitute an obstacle to the proper functioning of Regulation 1393/2007 on the 
service of documents” 6. This knowledge will then be employed to put forward reasoned and 
circumstantiated suggestions enhancing the existing regime of service of documents, including 
by setting minimum standards or highlighting best practices that could be proposed to all 
                                                 
 
3 Storme (1993).  
4 A comprehensive overview is provided by Kramer (2016).  
5 Among others J Albert, Study on the Transparency of Costs of Civil Proceedings in the EU: Final Report, 
December 2007, available at https://e-justice.europa.eu/content_costs_of_proceedings-37-en.do (last accessed 17 
April 2016).  
6 https://euservicestudy2015.wordpress.com/ (Accessed 29 April 2016). 
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national authorities.7 Secondly, a Study recently started on the functioning of national civil 
procedure law on the context of the enforcement of European consumer rights.8 
Furthermore, the European Parliament is undertaking a project9 on establishing common 
minimum standards of civil procedure. A recent Research Briefing identifies10 three legislative 
options for implementing the common procedural principles: (1) optional instruments, that are 
available as an alternative to national procedures; (2) common (minimum) standards in 
Directives, either sector-specific or addressing a specific element of civil procedure (such as 
the existing Mediation Directive11 and Legal Aid Directive12); or (3) a horizontal approach that, 
due to the limitations of Article 81 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 
(TFEU), would apply only to cases involving a cross-border element. 
All these initiatives have the potential to facilitate convergence of civil procedure law. This 
convergence may take different forms, from optional soft law instruments to binding sectoral 
legislation. The degree of convergence will also differ depending on whether the instrument 
aims to identify common principles or minimum standards (such as the European Parliament 
project) or to develop or amend directly applicable legislation (such as the projected 
amendment of the Service Regulation by the European Commission). 
All these projects are to be commended for their attention to procedural rights and the actual 
functioning in practice of the instruments. The European Parliament project in particular has 
as its goal to “establish a balance between the fundamental rights of litigants in the interest of 
full mutual trust between the Member States”13. As this research recommends a more coherent 
and integrated approach to protecting fundamental rights in the context of civil justice 
cooperation, it welcomes these initiatives. It is to be hoped that they will lead to legislation that 
achieves a better balance between efficiency and fundamental rights protection and that 
addresses the practical problems that are experienced in the implementation of EU legislation. 
                                                 
 
7 https://euservicestudy2015.wordpress.com/description-of-the-project/. 
8 http://conflictoflaws.net/2016/study-on-the-laws-of-national-civil-procedure-of-the-28-member-states-and-the-
enforcement-of-european-union-law/. 
9 European Parliament, Committee on Legal Affairs, Working Document on establishing common minimum 
standards for civil procedure in the European Union. The legal basis, 21 December 2015.  
10 Mankó (2015) p. 4. 
11 Directive 2008/52/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 May 2008 on certain aspects of 
mediation in civil and commercial matters, OJ L 136/3. According to its Recital 7, this Directive aims to ‘promote 
further the use of mediation and ensure that parties having recourse to mediation can rely on a predictable legal 
framework’ by introducing ‘framework legislation addressing, in particular, key aspects of civil procedure’ for 
cross-border disputes. 
12 Council Directive 2002/8/EC of 27 January 2003 to improve access to justice in cross-border disputes by 
establishing minimum common rules relating to legal aid for such disputes, OJ L 026/41. This Directive seeks to 
promote the application of legal aid in cross-border disputes for persons who lack sufficient resources where aid 
is necessary to secure effective access to justice (Recital 5). Another example is the Directive on Consumer ADR: 
Directive 2013/11/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 May 2013 on alternative dispute 
resolution for consumer disputes and amending Regulation (EC) No 2006/2004 and Directive 2009/22/EC 
(Directive on consumer ADR) OJ L 165/ 63. 
13 European Parliament, Committee on Legal Affairs, Working Document on establishing common minimum 
standards for civil procedure in the European Union. The legal basis, 21 December 2015, p. 2. 
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If EU legislation is better adapted to national practice this will increase the efficacy of the 
safeguards contained in that legislation. 
The European Parliament also has as its aim to create a sufficient level of mutual trust between 
the Member States. The presumption is that trust in the functioning of other Member States’ 
legal systems will encourage Member States to accept foreign decisions more readily. It is 
certainly in the interest of litigants if judicial decisions are not met with distrust in Member 
States other than where they were rendered and enforced smoothly and efficiently. Building 
mutual trust is therefore a laudable goal, and if common minimum standards are likely to help 
achieve that goal, it is worth the effort to identify and implement them. Common minimum 
standards may also help Member State courts to interpret and apply EU legislation, increasing 
the chance that this legislation is applied in conformity with fundamental rights. Coherence in 
the drafting, interpretation and application of EU civil procedure legislation is greatly needed.14 
However, it is very important to emphasise that mutual trust should always remain a rebuttable 
presumption. Even if common rules or minimum standards exist this of course never guarantees 
that they will always be observed in practice. Building mutual trust by identifying common 
principles is commendable, but it can only ever lead to a strong working presumption that 
decisions from other Member States conform to those principles. Common principles are not 
an alternative to cross-border checks because, as this research shows, such checks may 
sometimes be the only way to ensure the observance of the principles. 
9.4.2 Best practices in the application of EU civil procedure law 
 
Particularly where it comes to the uniform European procedures, much can be gained by 
making courts, practitioners and litigants more familiar with the intricacies of the procedures. 
It is therefore commendable that the European Commission’s study on service aims at 
highlighting best practices that could be proposed to all national authorities. For the uniform 
procedures to fulfil their potential to improve access to justice effectively, they need to be 
understandable and well integrated into their domestic legal ‘surroundings’. This does not only 
mean that they should be implemented effectively, but also that they should become part of 
domestic procedural culture. 
One field where promising research is already taking place is that of usability of civil 
procedure. User-friendliness may be achieved in various ways. One way is to improve 
accessibility and availability of information, for instance through the European E-justice Portal, 
which is intended to be a “future one-stop-shop in the area of practical information concerning 
judicial cooperation in civil matters”.15 Another recent initiative is the Online Dispute 
Resolution Platform,16 which aims to serve as a single point of entry for consumers and 
                                                 
 
14 A comprehensive exposé of the need for coherence in EU instruments is provided by Von Hein and Rühl (2016). 
15 https://e-justice.europa.eu/content_european_judicial_atlas_in_civil_matters-321-en.do, last accessed 
12/04/2016. 
16 http://ec.europa.eu/odr, last accessed 12/04/2016. 
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professionals seeking to settle a dispute out of court.17 A great deal of research into the 
possibilities of procedural innovation is also taking place, for instance that carried out by 
IRSIG-CNR,18 and by the Hague Institute for Innovation in Law.19 Digitalization of civil 
procedures may take many forms, from the simple possibility to communicate with the court 
via e-mail (which is already possible in some EU Member States20) to divorce dispute 
settlement modules which are conducted entirely online.21 
These initiatives are all very different, but they all aim to increase the accessibility and usability 
of civil procedure, some explicitly for cross-border cases. It is commendable that cross-border 
online dispute resolution or other forms of alternative dispute resolution are being facilitated. 
These initiatives have the potential to increase access to justice and help businesses and 
consumers enforce claims in cross-border situations. It will always have to remain a priority to 
ensure that the rights of claimants and defendants are properly balanced, and that there is no 
information disparity between professional and private litigants. 
 
9.5 Final remarks 
 
How to protect of the right to a fair trial of two parties in the context of recognition and 
enforcement is a perennial topic for discussion,22 not just in the Europe but also around the 
world.23 This research is an attempt to provide guidance on the delicate balance between 
debtor’s and creditor’s rights, and the societal values underlying those rights, this involves. 
This research showed that this balance has been struck in different ways according to time and 
place. Within the EU, mutual trust (even before the term was applied) has spurred on an 
evolution from inter-State cooperation based on comity, to automatic recognition paired with 
exequatur and refusal grounds, to complete free movement of judgments with no possibility of 
refusing recognition and enforcement. The concept of public policy has likewise evolved from 
a purely national concept to one whose limits are defined by the Court of Justice of the 
European Union. Its content evolved to include the right to a fair trial as defined by Article 6(1) 
ECHR. These changes are inevitable and even desirable, as public policy is intended to reflect 
society’s fundamental values at a given moment. The right to a fair trial is likewise constantly 
adapting to changing circumstances: see for instance the ECtHR’s recent judgment that the 
right to adversarial proceedings includes a right to submit documents digitally to the court.24 
This is a long way of saying that the proposals submitted in this research should not be seen as 
definitive. The guidelines for the application of the public policy exception developed in 
                                                 
 
17 European Commission, Press release. Solving disputes online: New platform for consumers and traders, 
Brussels, 15 February 2016.  
18 http://www.irsig.cnr.it/index.php?lang=en, last accessed 12/04/2016. 
19 http://www.hiil.org/, last accessed 12/04/2016. 
20 See for instance the project ‘Quality and Innovation in the administration of justice’ (KEI) of the Dutch 
government, which allows civil procedures to be conducted fully digitally. 
21 The HiiL project ‘Rechtwijzer 2.0’: see http://www.hiil.org/project/rechtwijzer, last accessed 12/04/2016.  
22 See for a historical view Berglund (2009) and Lopez de Tejada (2013).  
23 See for instance on the United States Von Mehren (1981) and on China Zhang (2013).  
24 ECtHR Lawyers Partners A.S. v. Slovakia, appl. no. 54252/07 ECHR 2009; Chapter 4.3.2.4. 
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Chapter 7 should always be adapted to the circumstances of the case. This research proposes 
that absolute mutual trust cannot be justified, since deficiencies in fundamental rights 
protection can ‘never’ be ruled out; but while that conclusion may be definitive, a different 
solution than cross-border refusal of enforcement may be available in future, such as recourse 
to a supranational European enforcement court or authority. Likewise, common minimum 
standards may enable even further reduction of prerequisites for enforcement.  
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Nederlandstalige samenvatting 
 
De aanleiding voor dit onderzoek is het het recente beleidsdoel van de Europese wetgever om 
volledig vrij verkeer van civiele vonnissen tussen Lidstaten in de Europese Unie (EU) mogelijk 
te maken. Dit beleid omvat het versimpelen of afschaffen van de mogelijkheid om erkenning 
of tenuitvoerlegging van een vonnis afkomstig uit een andere Lidstaat te weigeren. Zo heeft de 
herschikte Brussel I of Brussel Ibis-Verordening de uitvoerbaarverklaring (exequatur) 
afgeschaft, waarmee vonnissen die binnen de reikwijdte van deze Verordening vallen 
automatisch in alle EU-Lidstaten uitvoerbaar zijn. Een aantal Verordeningen gaat echter 
verder. Zo heeft de Alimentatieverordening zowel het exequatur als de gronden voor weigering 
van erkenning of tenuitvoerlegging, waaronder de openbare orde-exceptie, afgeschaft. De 
Europese Executoriale Titel maakt automatische tenuitvoerlegging mogelijk van vonnissen 
inzake niet-betwiste geldvorderingen, waarbij geen weigering van tenuitvoerlegging mogelijk 
is. De Brussel IIbis-Verordening heeft de weigeringsgronden afgeschaft voor vonnissen die de 
terugkeer van een kind bevelen en vonnissen die het omgangsrecht betreffen. Tenslotte bestaan 
er sinds enkele jaren twee uniforme Europese procedures, die als alternatief kunnen worden 
gebruikt voor nationale burgerlijke procedures: de Europese Betalingsbevelprocedure en de 
Europese Procedure voor Geringe Vorderingen. Beide procedures resulteren in een beslissing 
die automatisch uitvoerbaar is in alle EU-Lidstaten zonder dat weigering daarvan mogelijk is. 
De implementatie van het beleid om erkenning en tenuitvoerlegging ingrijpend te 
vereenvoudigen is daarmee al ver gevorderd. 
Omdat deze ontwikkeling potentieel ingrijpende gevolgen heeft voor de bescherming van de 
rechten van de verdediging, heeft dit onderzoek als doel om te onderzoeken welke eisen de 
bescherming van het recht op een eerlijk proces stelt aan de verwezenlijking van het vrij 
verkeer van vonnissen binnen de EU. Dit onderzoek toont aan dat het recht op een eerlijk proces 
in het bijzonder, maar ook het Europese grondrechtenkader in het algemeen, op verschillende 
manieren van belang zijn voor de grensoverschrijdende erkenning en tenuitvoerlegging. 
Ten eerste omvat het recht op een eerlijk proces een recht op tenuitvoerlegging van het vonnis 
dat uit dat proces voortkomt. Het faciliteren van tenuitvoerlegging van vonnissen in 
grensoverschrijdende zaken is daarom belangrijk om dit aspect van het eerlijk proces te 
garanderen. Effectieve grensoverschrijdende tenuitvoerlegging dient bovendien het 
maatschappelijk belang door de effectiviteit en betrouwbaarheid van het gerechtelijk systeem 
te bevorderen. 
Ten tweede kan het mechanisme voor grensoverschrijdende erkenning en tenuitvoerlegging 
van vonnissen ook schendingen van het recht op een eerlijk proces opsporen en remediëren. 
Een weigering om een buitenlands vonnis te erkennen of ten uitvoer te leggen is een zeer 
effectieve, doch ingrijpende, manier om te voorkomen dat het vonnis geen werking heeft, 
waarmee een schending van het eerlijk proces in de Lidstaat van tenuitvoerlegging voorkomen 
kan worden. Een beperking van het vrij verkeer van vonnissen in de vorm van een mogelijkheid 
om erkenning of tenuitvoerlegging te weigeren van een vonnis dat resulteert uit een oneerlijk 
proces kan daarmee bescherming bieden aan de schuldenaar. 
Deze twee observaties laten zien hoe, bezien vanuit de individuele procespartij, het recht op 
een eerlijk proces een rol speelt bij het vrij verkeer van vonnissen. Deze vraag kan echter ook 
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worden beschouwd vanuit een constitutioneel perspectief. In de Europese Unie wordt het recht 
op een eerlijk proces beschermd door zowel het Europees Verdrag voor de Rechten van de 
Mens (EVRM) en het Grondrechtenhandvest van de Europese Unie (het Handvest). Deze 
instrumenten vormen het grondrechtenkader van de Europese Unie als organisatie én van haar 
Lidstaten wanneer deze EU-recht toepassen. Vanuit constitutioneel perspectief is de vraag hoe 
grondrechten het meest effectief kunnen worden beschermd in de bevoegdheidsverdeling 
tussen de EU en haar Lidstaten en de Lidstaten onderling, en welke organisatie 
verantwoordelijk is voor het opsporen en remediëren van grondrechtenschendingen.  Meer 
specifiek is de vraag of EU-Lidstaten kunnen worden verplicht om erop te vertrouwen dat 
rechterlijke beslissingen uit andere Lidstaten in overeenstemming zijn met het recht op een 
eerlijk proces, of dat zij de verantwoordelijkheid behouden om deze beslissingen hierop te 
controleren. Dit onderzoek analyseert deze vragen vanuit het perspectief van zowel het EVRM 
en het EU-grondrechtenkader.  
Het onderzoek bestaat uit drie delen. Het eerste deel bestaat uit hoofdstukken 2 en 3. 
Hoofdstuk 2 bespreekt de ontwikkeling van het vrij verkeer van civiele vonnissen in de EU 
vanuit politiek en historisch perspectief. Het laat zien dat, vanwege hun belang voor het 
functioneren van de interne markt, erkenning en tenuitvoerlegging van vonnissen sinds het 
eerste EU-Verdrag binnen de EU is gereguleerd. Lange tijd werden civiele vonnissen 
automatisch erkend, wat betekent dat hun rechtskracht kon worden ingeroepen. Voor 
tenuitvoerlegging, het nemen van (dwang)maatregelen om nakoming van het vonnis te 
verzekeren, was een uitvoerbaarverklaring (exequatur) in de Lidstaat van tenuitvoerlegging 
vereist. Zowel erkenning als tenuitvoerlegging konden worden geweigerd in de Lidstaat waar 
erkenning of tenuitvoerlegging werden verzocht, op basis van een beperkt aantal eng 
geformuleerde en uitgelegde weigeringsgronden. De introductie van wederzijdse erkenning als 
uitgangspunt voor wetgeving in 1999 veranderde de basis voor justitiële samenwerking in 
civiele zaken echter ingrijpend. In zijn meest absolute vorm vereist wederzijdse erkenning dat 
Lidstaten buitenlandse vonnissen erkennen of ten uitvoer leggen zonder enige discretionaire 
ruimte om dit te weigeren. Wederzijdse erkenning is gebaseerd op wederzijds vertrouwen 
tussen de Lidstaten, hoewel het de vraag is in hoeverre wederzijds vertrouwen in de praktijk 
bestaat of moet bestaan. Hoofdstuk 2 toont aan dat de introductie van wederzijdse erkenning 
op het terrein van het civiele procesrecht de vorm aannam van de afschaffing van exequatir en 
de weigeringsgronden, hoewel verschillende Verordeningen dit op verschillende manieren 
hebben vormgegegeven.  
Hoofdstuk 3 laat zien hoe en waarom deze ontwikkeling invloed heeft op de bescherming van 
het recht op een eerlijk proces. De meest controversiële ontwikkeling betrof de afschaffing van 
de openbare-orde exceptie, die traditioneel een onderdeel is van (EU-)wetgeving met 
betrekking tot justitiële samenwerking in civiele zaken. Deze exceptie staat Lidstaten toe om 
erkenning of tenuitvoerlegging van een vonnis te weigeren wanneer deze erkenning of 
tenuitvoerlegging in strijd zou komen met de openbare orde van de aangezochte Lidstaat. 
Omdat openbare orde grondrechten omvat, waaronder ook het recht op een eerlijk proces, 
maakt de exceptie het mogelijk om erkenning of tenuitvoerlegging te weigeren van een vonnis 
dat het resultaat is van een procedure die niet aan de eisen van een eerlijk proces voldoet. Het 
Hoofdstuk bespreekt een aantal zaken waarin de openbare orde-exceptie op deze wijze werd 
gebruikt. Naast openbare orde zijn er andere weigeringsgronden die schendingen van het recht 
op een eerlijk proces kunnen remediëren, waaronder de bescherming van de bij verstek 
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veroordeelde gedaagde en de controle op de naleving van bepaalde bevoegdheidsgronden 
onder de Brussel I-Verordening. Hoofdstuk 3 toont ook aan dat het grensoverschrijdende 
element van de controle van deze weigeringsgronden ook op zichzelf bescherming biedt tegen 
schendingen van het eerlijk proces, omdat de toepassing van weigeringsgronden een 
onafhankelijke controle biedt die schendingen kan idenficeren die anders in de Lidstaat van 
oorsprong onopgemerkt waren gebleven. De afschaffing van weigeringsgronden is daarmee 
problematisch vanuit het perspectief van grondrechtenbescherming. 
Samen laten deze twee hoofdstukken (deel I van dit onderzoek) zien dat ernstige schendingen 
van het eerlijk proces zich simpelweg soms voordoen, en dat weigering van erkenning of 
tenuitvoerlegging een zeer effectief middel kan zijn om deze op te sporen. De afschaffing van 
weigeringsgronden in het bijzonder, maar de hervormingen op het gebied van Europese 
justitiële samenwerking in civiele zaken in het algemeen, roepen daarom vragen op met 
betrekking tot hun verenigbaarheid met het recht op een eerlijk proces. 
Deel II van dit onderzoek, hoofdstukken 4, 5 en 6, onderzoekt verschillende wijzen waarop het 
recht op een eerlijk proces van invloed is op grensoverschrijdende erkenning en 
tenuitvoerlegging van vonnissen in burgerlijke en handelszaken. 
Hoofdstuk 4 laat zien dat het recht op een eerlijk proces een prominente plaats inneemt binnen 
het EVRM, vanwege het belang van een eerlijk proces binnen een democratische samenleving 
en als essentieel element van de rechtsstaat. Het Hof van Justitie van de Europese Unie (HvJ 
EU) erkent al lange tijd het bestaan van een recht op een eerlijk proces binnen de EU rechtsorde. 
Het Handvest legt een expliciet verband tussen de toepassing van het recht op een eerlijk proces 
binnen de EU-context en de toepassing door het EHRM in zijn jurisprudentie. De interpretatie 
van het recht op een eerlijk proces door het HvJ is in sommige opzichten meer specifiek en 
daarmee uitgebreider dan tot nu toe door het EHRM wordt geboden. Hoofdstuk 4 laat ook zien 
dat het recht op een eerlijk proces een recht op tenuitvoerlegging van het vonnis omvat, en 
eisen stelt aan de tenuitvoerleggingsfase van het burgerlijk proces. Hoofdstuk 4 bespreekt ook 
of het mogelijk is om een zekere hiërarchie te ontdekken tussen de elementen van het recht op 
een eerlijk proces. Terwijl in beginsel alle elementen in gelijke mate bijdragen aan een eerlijk 
proces, kan er wel een onderscheid worden gemaakt aan de hand van hun functie die zij 
vervullen en de manier waarop een schending kan worden geremedieerd.  
Hoofdstuk 5 concludeert dat het EVRM in beginsel niet vereist dat EU-Lidstaten de 
mogelijkheid hebben om erkenning of tenuitvoerlegging van een vonnis uit een andere Lidstaat 
te weigeren, mits EU-wetgeving deze bevoegdheid uitsluit. Dit is echter een gevolg van het feit 
dat het EHRM geen rechtsmacht heeft om te oordelen over situaties waarin Lidstaten handelen 
in de uitvoering van EU-wetgeving. Hoofdstuk 4 bespreekt dat het EHRM de zogenoemde 
Bosphorus-doctrine heeft ontwikkeld om eventuele grondrechtenschendingen die voortkomen 
uit de toepassing van EU-recht te beoordelen. De Bosphorus-doctrine is gebaseerd op het 
uitgangspunt dat de EU grondrechten beschermt op een wijze die gelijkwaardig is aan de 
bescherming geboden door het EVRM. In zijn beslissing in Povse paste het EHRM deze 
doctrine toe op de tenuitvoerlegging van vonnissen in burgerlijke zaken op basis van EU-
wetgeving. Hoofdstuk 5 betoogt dat Povse een weinig logische toepassing van de doctrine 
inhoudt, omdat de doctrine slecht toepasbaar is op een situatie waarin twee Lidstaten bij een 
eventuele schending betrokken zijn. De beperkte rechtsmacht van het EHRM in zaken 
 400 
 
betreffende de toepassing van EU recht is problematisch in de context van wederzijdse 
erkenning, omdat het EHRM hiermee toestaat dat discretie om erkenning of tenuitvoerlegging 
te weigeren wordt weggenomen, terwijl dit soms tot onacceptabele resultaten kan leiden. Het 
EHRM liet zien dat dit het geval kan zijn in zijn arrest in M.S.S. t. België en Griekenland, 
waarin het oordeelde dat een uitzondering op wederzijdse erkenning moet worden gemaakt als 
de Lidstaat waar de beslissing vandaan komt niet voldoet aan haar verplichtingen onder het 
EVRM. 
Hoofdstuk 6 analyseert de rol van grondrechten in de constitutionele structuur van de Europese 
Unie. Het laat zien dat de Europese Unie zich heeft verbonden om grondrechten te beschermen, 
en dat grondrechten deel uitmaken van de algemene beginsele van de Unie. Door de 
jurisprudentie van het HvJ EU, en expliciet door het Handvest, zijn de EU en haar Lidstaten 
gehouden om grondrechten te respecteren wanneer zij EU-wetgeving creëren of 
implementeren. Hoofdstuk 6 laat ook zien dat grondrechtenbepalingen in secundaire EU-
wetgeving ook als maximumeisen kunnen gelden, waarbij zij de discretionaire ruimte van 
Lidstaten om hogere nationale eisen aan grondrechtenbescherming te stellen. Het is daarom 
belangrijk dat grondrechtenbepalingen en secundaire wetgeving voldoende bescherming 
bieden, ook omdat Lidstaten geen mogelijkheden hebben om de toepassing van EU-wetgeving 
te corrigeren zonder hun verplichtingen onder het EU-recht te veronachtzamen. Het HvJ EU 
heeft geoordeeld dat in sommige gevallen een uitzondering op absolute wederzijdse erkenning 
mogelijk moet zijn om grondrechtenbescherming te waarborgen.  
Deel II concludeert dat het recht op een eerlijk proces, zoals beschermd door het EVRM en het 
Handvest, vereist dat schendingen van dat recht worden voorkomen of, zo niet, op effectieve 
wijze in de nationale procedure worden geremedieerd. Hoe de verdeling van 
verantwoordelijkheden tussen de EU en haar Lidstaten, en de Lidstaten onderling, ook word 
verdeeld, deze verantwoordelijkheid om effectieve bescherming te bieden geldt onverkort. De 
vraag is dus hoe EU-wetgeving met betrekking tot erkenning en tenuitvoerlegging het recht op 
een eerlijk proces zo effectief mogelijk kan beschermen. 
Deel III, hoofdstukken 7 en 8, doet aanbevelingen over de effectieve bescherming van het 
eerlijk proces in EU-wetgeving op dit terrein.  
Hoofdstuk 7 beveelt aan dat de EU-Verordeningen een ‘noodrem’ zouden moeten behouden in 
de vorm van een openbare orde-exceptie (of andere weigeringsgronden) die in de Lidstaat waar 
erkenning of tenuitvoerlegging wordt gezocht kan worden toegepast. Dit hoofdstuk analyseert 
in hoeverre procedurele openbare orde en het recht op een eerlijk proces overlappen, met als 
doel om te verkennen of het mogelijk is om openbare orde te vervangen door een verwijzing 
naar het eerlijk proces. Hoewel het hoofdstuk concludeerde dat een dergelijke vervanging 
meerdere voordelen zou hebben, overwoog het dat het nadeel dat daarmee een kunstmatige 
scheiding zou ontstaan tussen materiële en procedurele openbare orde een probleem oplevert 
dat niet (binnen de reikwijdte van dit onderzoek) kan worden opgelost. Het hoofdstuk verkent 
ook hoe in concrete gevallen het conflict tussen de rechten van de schuldeiser en schuldenaar 
kan worden opgelost. Het concludeerde dat de rechter zich altijd moet afvragen of erkenning 
of tenuitvoerlegging een geschikte remedie is voor de schending van de rechten van de 
schuldenaar, en of deze remedie geen disproportionele inbreuk maakt op de rechten van de 
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schuldeiser. Het hoofdstuk concludeert ook dat deze redenering niet onverkort kan worden 
toegepast op de tenuitvoerlegging van beslissingen die de terugkeer van een kind bevelen, om 
dat hierbij een meer gecompliceerde afweging moet worden gemaakt tussen de rechten van de 
ouders en het belang van het kind.  
Hoofdstuk 8 onderzoekt hoe de procedure waarmee grensoverschrijdende erkenning of 
tenuitvoerlegging kan worden bereikt moet worden vormgegeven om zowel de procedurele 
rechten van schuldeisers als schuldenaars te beschermen. Daartoe analyseerde het de bestaande 
instrumenten, met bijzondere aandacht voor de meer innovatieve instrumenten. Het 
concludeerde dat een eenvoudige, snelle en effectieve procedure om tenuitvoerlegging in een 
andere Lidstaat te bewerkstelligen essentieel is voor de bescherming van het recht op 
tenuitvoerlegging van de schuldeiser. Het liet ook zien dat de zelfcontrole waarop de Europese 
Executoriale Titel, de Brussel IIbis-Verordening en de uniforme Europese procedures 
vertrouwen waarschijnlijk niet effectief is. Dit mechanisme kan zelfs in strijd komen met het 
recht op een eerlijk proces omdat het geen onafhankelijk onderzoek van de minimumeisen voor 
grensoverschrijdende tenuitvoerlegging garandeert. Het hoofdstuk bespreekt ook een aantal 
tekortkomingen van de bestaande Verordeningen, waaronder de gebrekkige 
informatievoorziening aan de schuldenaar door middel van het door de Brussel Ibis-
Verordening voorgeschreven certificaat. Het wijst ook op de ongelijkheid tussen schuldenaars 
afhankelijk van welk tenuitvoerleggingsregime de schuldeiser kiest. Het hoofdstuk bevat een 
aantal aanbevelingen ter verbetering van de bestaande Verordeningen. 
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